The Osmind study relies on voluntary self-reports, making it “naturalistic” research that captures how these services perform outside the strict protocols of randomized trials (measuring outcomes through self-reported surveys is standard practice in real-world scientific research). The study tracked 88 participants and used standardized tools to measure changes: the PHQ-8 questionnaire for depression (a scale from 0 to 24, where higher scores indicate worse symptoms), the GAD-7 for anxiety, and the WHO-5 for overall well-being. Assessments occurred before the session, one day after, and a month later. No dosages were specified, but sessions followed state guidelines for supervised administration.

Results showed meaningful gains across the board. Depression scores on the PHQ-8 fell by an average of 4.6 points, shifting participants from moderate to mild severity, a change that meets the threshold for clinical significance. Anxiety dropped by 4.8 points (on the GAD-7 scale), and well-being rose by 10.7 points (on the WHO-5 index). No serious adverse events occurred during sessions, though 3 percent reported lingering issues, like heightened anxiety or family strain, a month later. These preliminary improvements suggest that psilocybin could offer rapid relief in a legal therapeutic setting, aligning with the compound’s reputation for fostering emotional resilience.

Direct comparisons to other psilocybin studies or clinical trials are tricky, as many rely on different scales, populations, and measures. Some studies report quantified outcomes (“effect size”) in the proportion of participants who had meaningful changes, while others report changes in a particular scale. As an example, in one randomized study, about two-thirds of participants continued to experience relief from major depressive disorder (MDD) remission five years after receiving treatment. That study only included participants diagnosed with major depression and measured outcomes with a different metric (the GRID-HAMD scale) than the Oregon study.

Nonetheless, Osmind’s review of real-world data reveals significant results on depression and anxiety, consistent with more medicalized clinical trials. Oregon’s approach to psychedelic treatment is a novel experiment, not just because it uses psychedelics, but because it created an entirely new mental health services framework. The state had to design training criteria for schools so that non-medical professionals could learn to administer a drug that is currently undergoing drug trials. By law, these “facilitators” did not need prior mental or medical training.

This new study shows promise for both the impact of psychedelics as a mental health treatment and for lowering the cost of licensed mental health services. Psychedelic therapy can be very expensive (over $15,000) when using a medical model, where two licensed therapists see a single patient for three extended sessions (based on countries where it is federally legal). In Oregon, professionals do not need to attend medical school and can administer group sessions, reducing the total cost per patient.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has requested that Health and Human Services (HHS) review whether psilocybin should continue to be banned as a Schedule I drug (the DEA request was publicly confirmed by Kathryn Tucker, JD, who is involved with the case; it was also confirmed privately by legal counsel to Reason staff). A Schedule I designation reflects the government’s opinion that the substance has no medical value and is highly susceptible to abuse. Businesses that traffic in Schedule I substances, including Oregon psilocybin clinics, are considered federal criminal enterprises, are generally unable to access financial services, and are prohibited from claiming deductions on their federal income taxes using the “ordinary and necessary” standard that applies to other businesses. These federal penalties significantly increase the cost and risk faced by these businesses, and these additional financial burdens must be passed on to customers.

Data collected by Reason Foundation shows that states with legal psychedelic services do not display increased rates of criminal activity or hospitalizations. Taken together with this latest study, data from Oregon makes a strong case that psilocybin holds clear medical value and does not endanger public health, calling into question whether it should be considered a Schedule I drug.

The post New study details how legal psychedelic services can treat depression, anxiety appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Excessive land use restrictions are a primary contributor to the ongoing housing crisis, and minimum lot size (MLS) regulations are among the most pervasive. MLS requirements dictate the smallest amount of land on which a home can be built. These rules are often coupled with minimum setback and square-footage regulations, creating a template for what homes must look like to obtain a permit. This bundle of laws makes smaller homes either unprofitable for developers or illegal. The homes produced by these design standards are out of reach for many Americans, underscoring a need for flexible housing options in the low-density forms most appealing to buyers.

Rolling back these regulations where they are excessive can open the door for smaller, denser, and less expensive units. Empirical evidence from many municipalities finds that allowing more homes per acre can lead to an influx of new units at the lower end of the market. Understanding the motivations behind MLS regulations, their current state, and what positive policy change would look like can pave the way for reform in this area.

History, rationale, and current state

Minimum lot size requirements are among the oldest and most pervasive elements of zoning, shaping land use patterns across nearly every city in the U.S. Throughout the 20^th century, MLS regulation expanded, both in where it is imposed and the size of lots mandated. According to a report from the American Planning Association (APA), in the mid-20th century, it was not uncommon for localities to have lot requirements of over 20,000 square feet, with some areas requiring as much as five acres per unit. Despite growing populations, many of these laws have remained stagnant or become more severe. MLS laws serve three functions: generating tax revenue, providing water and sewer distribution, and maintaining aesthetics.

The inception of many MLS laws can be traced back to local tax policy. The Mercatus Center finds that MLS laws expanded during the baby boom, in part, to exclude smaller homes that could not generate enough property tax revenue relative to the number of children who would live in them. Specifically, “by setting a floor for land costs, [MLS] was intended to slow, if not exclude entirely, the entry of such families…”

Additionally, according to the APA, historical justifications for MLS regulations include the ability for local governments to plan their distribution of utilities, regulate congestion, and maintain air quality and health standards. For example, lots must be large enough to accommodate adequate water and sewage service, especially in areas not connected to a central system that relies on disposal methods such as septic tanks. Typically, zoning codes account for different levels of connection by having lower requirements where connection to central systems is possible, and higher requirements where it is not. Laws to ensure a minimum standard of sanitation are understandable. However, the vast majority of American homes are connected to central water and sewage, so sanitary concerns are a somewhat dubious justification in most areas today. Instead, today, MLS requirements are commonly used to promote spacious residential environments and to exclude denser housing options.

Figure 1 depicts the median lot size in each state. One influence is the environment and nature preservation. Nevada, which has the lowest median lot size, is largely uninhabitable, with development concentrated around cities and necessitating more efficient use of space. However, in less environmentally constrained areas, local land-use regulations play a significant role in determining lot sizes. Vermont combines extensive land conservation with some of the most stringent MLS requirements in the country, designed to preserve its rural character. The Northeastern Vermont Developments Association, for example, mandates an acre lot for every family as the densest option.

Often, MLS requirements vary significantly on a granular level. Let’s consider just one state. Florida has a wide range of minimum lot size requirements, determined either at the county or city level. Figure 2 shows the minimum lot sizes in a single city, Plantation, with just over 100,000 residents.

The patchwork of 18 different districts with 10 different minimum lot sizes in Plantation is not the result of meaningful differences in infrastructure capacity, but rather, a legacy of aesthetic preferences. In fact, Plantation was founded in the 1950s with the vision of large lots, fruit gardens, and a unique feel to every home in mind. Initial advertisements for the “anti-development” bolstered that there would be “a full acre with every home,” to prevent crowding. The zoning code accompanied these preferences to ensure this outcome. While a large home far from neighbors is the dream for many, codifying this preference into law has downstream consequences that cannot be ignored. Today, the median home sale price in Plantation is $515,000, well over Florida’s median of $404,400. Prices in Plantation have climbed so high that the city has signed on to a countywide gap-finance effort, despite a history of being resistant to affordable housing measures. Crystalized policy has not allowed Plantation to adapt to its modern challenges, highlighting a need for reform in this area. While their stories may be less clear, most other localities across the nation look just like this. Each county has its own version of these regulations, leading to varying MLS standards that can change from city to city and even street to street. As these areas look to tackle their affordable housing challenges, it would be helpful to reassess existing rules, such as minimum lot sizes, rather than trying another complicated and expensive approach.

MLS regulations and the cost of development   

The cost of housing can be divided into several categories, and the relative proportions depend on many factors. Location, current market conditions, and home construction processes all determine the division of cost categories. While construction is typically cited as making up the majority of the cost of new housing, evidence from Redfin suggests that, depending on location, the cost of land acquisition can be substantial. Tracking the cost of land as a share of home values across 40 U.S. metros, Redfin finds that the cost of land can be up to 60% of the home’s value. Of the top 20 metros with the highest land-cost-to-home-value ratio, nine were in California, with the rest in other notorious high-cost areas, including Boston, New York City, and Seattle. Requiring developers to purchase more land than they need influences the types of projects they can take on and the cost of housing down the road.

Research finds that MLS regulations raise housing prices in two ways: directly and indirectly. Accounting for 78% of the cost increase, the direct effect refers to mandating larger homes, which are naturally more expensive. The indirect impact captures the amenities that larger lot sizes create, for example, less congestion and higher local tax revenue. A 2011 study of homes in the Boston area corroborates this finding, estimating that areas with restrictive MLS regulations have home prices 20% higher than towns that do not. Further, regions that restrict their MLS are likely to experience rapid home price appreciation after the restriction takes effect. The study finds that towns experienced home price increases of up to 40% 10 years after an increase in MLS listings, controlling for other factors. Importantly, this relationship goes both ways.

Houston, Texas, has among the most liberal land use rules in the country, and this trend extends to minimum lot sizes. In 2013, Houston expanded a previous policy allowing lots as small as 1,400 square feet across most of the city. This reduction is credited as one of the reasons home prices in Houston, even in its urban core, have remained lower than in comparable metros across the country. A flexible policy has made Houston resilient in a time of strain. Minimum lot-size rules raise housing costs across the board, and their impact is burdensome on entry-level homes.

Small single-family homes, often referred to as starter homes, have been hit especially hard by large lot size regulations, contributing to the phenomenon of the “missing middle.” This phrase refers to the decline of middle-density development affordable to middle-income earners. By mandating expensive land purchases, small housing becomes unprofitable. Just by allowing more homes per acre, massive supply additions can be made specifically for middle-income buyers. Estimates by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) find that single family homes were built at an average rate of 5.5 units per acre (~8000 sq ft) from 2000-2024. Even a modest increase in density of eight units per acre (~5400 square feet) could have added 4.8 million additional units in this time frame. These findings are not just theoretical; they are supported by profit incentives that developers respond to. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that between 2009 and 2024, the percentage of single-family homes built on 7,000-square-foot lots or smaller rose from 25% to 39%, indicating a desire among developers to supply these density levels—if they are allowed to do so.

While large homes and neighborhood amenities are desirable for many, they should not be the only option. When land is a primary expense, requiring developers to purchase more of it than they need is a substantial barrier to new supply—especially for lower cost options. In combination with other regulatory reforms, many high-cost areas would benefit from allowing smaller land parcels for housing development.

Policy recommendations

Fully addressing current housing challenges requires not only expanding total housing supply but also enabling the construction of the types of homes that reflect the preferences of buyers, particularly single-family housing in the form of starter homes. Reforming minimum lot sizes will lower prices for many housing types, and it is an especially critical step toward opening the single-family market.

Key points

As policymakers work to liberalize land use in their communities through MLS reform, here are several key points to consider:

#1 Reduce and standardize minimum lot sizes

Where central water and sewer connectivity is possible, states and communities should reduce and standardize their MLS to modest entry-level sizes. While different communities will have varying levels of willingness, any change in regulations could increase the supply of affordable units. By reducing and standardizing, states can create a predictable development atmosphere and enable more efficient use of space where desired. Standardization also aids city planners in accounting for utilities, one of the primary motivations behind MLS regulations from a planning perspective. Importantly, reducing lot size minimums does not mean that every neighborhood will be dense—just that developers can offer more options to prospective residents.

#2 Couple MLS and dimension requirement reform

While clear MLS reform is the top priority in this area, these reductions must be supported by accompanying dimension reforms. For example, setback rules specify how far a structure must be from the edge of the property line. Setbacks are often justified on grounds of fire safety or privacy, but are frequently used in practice to maintain a suburban or rural feel for communities. If safety were the true motivation, it raises the question of why urban areas with far smaller setback requirements are not viewed as comparably at risk. Much like MLS, these laws mandate inefficient use of space and result in higher prices for residents. Reducing minimum lot sizes should be paired with adjustments to setback requirements to ensure land is used efficiently.

Further, square-footage requirements for structures restrict small housing options, like tiny homes (defined as having 400 square feet or less of living space). While some areas have changed their square-footage minimums to accommodate these housing options, many maintain larger minimums. For small lots to make sense, they must be paired with small homes. Together, MLS and dimension reforms enable compact development.

#3 Allow lot-splits by right

Lot splitting is dividing one existing lot into two or more lots. Allowing lot splits is critical for infill development and complements MLS reform by creating options for existing neighborhoods. For example, lot splits are a great way to integrate smaller housing options, like tiny homes and accessory dwelling units. Because adjusting minimum lot sizes only affects future development on raw land, it may fail to capture areas that already have homes but include property owners interested in more density. Allowing this practice by right is a valuable tool to ensure MLS reform reaches its full potential.

Recent lot size policy reform: Case studies

As housing becomes an increasingly relevant policy action item, several states and localities have reformed their MLS regulations. Below are three recent examples of putting the policy recommendations above into practice.

Maine, House Paper 1224 (2025)

In April 2025, Maine passed House Paper 1224, banning any municipality from setting an MLS requirement greater than 5,000 feet per dwelling unit in areas connected to central water and sewer systems. Importantly, this bill includes a provision that setback and other dimension requirements cannot be stricter for multifamily housing than for single-family housing, though no specific maximum is given. In addition to reforming lot size requirements, this bill loosens density rules and allows affordable housing projects an additional story above the existing local height limit. HP 1224 ranks among the most comprehensive, clear, and far-reaching statewide minimum lot size reforms to date.

Texas, Senate Bill 15 (2025)

Texas’ 2025 Senate Bill 15 sets a minimum lot size of 3,000 square feet for single-family lots in new subdivisions larger than five acres. These provisions apply only to municipalities with more than 150,000 residents at least partially in counties with over 300,000 residents. In qualifying municipalities, SB 15 also provides maximum setback limits. As of 2025, municipalities within 19 out of Texas’ 254 counties meet the county population requirement to be subject to SB 15. While this change may seem incremental, the passing of this bill represents a massive win for Texas. The provisions in this bill were contentious and required revision from an initial 1,400-square-foot minimum proposed due to pushback from House members. While not as sweeping as initially desired, SB 15 opens the door for further reform and establishes a significant win for efficient use of land in the populated areas where Texans need it most.

The City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Legislation 1579 (2025)

In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a recent MLS reform reduced requirements across all existing subdistricts, effective May 7, 2025. Table 1 includes the change in minimum lot size per dwelling unit for each subdistrict.

Table 1: Pittsburgh Minimum Lot Size Reform by Subdistrict

Source: The City of Pittsburgh

While Pittsburgh’s current median home price is $235,000, which is well below the national average, prices in the city are rising. Through this legislation, lawmakers are taking active steps to ensure residents and developers are not faced with arbitrary hurdles.

Conclusion

Reducing MLS requirements does not mean mandating density or erasing existing neighborhood character. Instead, it provides flexibility, allowing communities to grow with their needs and respond to housing challenges as they arise. Buyers need these smaller homes, and developers are willing to answer. Reducing these regulations could substantially increase supply in the coming years through medium-density development. Homeowners can still enjoy traditional large single-family options, but others gain access to homes that better meet their needs, desires, and budgets. Given current home prices, mandating inefficiency through outdated lot size regulations is no longer a viable option.

The post Mandating inefficiency: Minimum lot size regulation and housing appeared first on Reason Foundation.

As it stands, California’s state and local governments have the most public pension debt in the country, with total unfunded pension liabilities of more than $265 billion, according to a new report from the Reason Foundation. That’s over $6,000 in pension debt for every state resident. CalPERS has $166 billion in debt, and CalSTRS has $39 billion in unfunded liabilities.

Since pension benefits promised to government workers are constitutionally protected, taxpayers are on the hook for that debt. In the years ahead, paying this pension debt will consume an ever-larger portion of state and local budgets.

So, to pay for retirement promises already made to government workers while also hoping to keep costs down, public pension systems are chasing new investment return strategies and targets. Worryingly, California’s over-reliance on high-risk, high-return strategies could result in overwhelming losses, a burden that taxpayers would ultimately bear.

Historically, pension plans have relied on investments like stocks and bonds, but many plans are moving away from this strategy and dedicating more assets to higher-risk investment strategies, such as real estate, hedge funds, private equity, and commodities, for which it can be challenging to obtain accurate market value information, and reporting periods lag behind those of traditional investments.

The Reason Foundation finds that in 2001, only 11% of California’s pension assets were allocated to alternative investments. However, by 2024, this share had increased to 37%, which is the 18th-highest in the nation.

CalPERS has more than doubled its shares in private equity over the last four years (from 6.3% of its total assets in 2020 to 17% in 2024), and it plans to expand further, so that private assets (private equity and private debt) make up 40% of its portfolio.

As it attempts to make up for the failure to set aside enough money to pay for promised retirement benefits, CalPERS is moving away from safer, predictable investment options in the hopes of better returns from riskier options that charge high fees, come with less transparency, and more risk and volatility that could leave taxpayers holding the bag.

With debt and costs rising, the pressure to take public pensions in this direction is strong because investment outcomes greatly impact overall funding progress and contribution requirements. The pressure is also increasing because California’s pensions have generated investment returns that fall below those of other pension systems nationwide.

Over the past 20 years, CalPERS achieved an average return of 6.8%, and CalSTRS achieved 7.6%, both of which are far below the S&P 500 average of 10.4% for the period.

Even over the last five years, during which CalPERS and CalSTRS have adopted higher-risk strategies in the hope of achieving better investment returns, California still ranked 36th out of 50 states in average investment returns for all public pension plans. California’s average investment return over the past five years was 7.51%, while Nevada ranked first with 9.67% average returns, and Washington state was second with 9.66% average returns for its pension systems during that time.

It is in taxpayers’ best interests for CalPERS, CalSTRS, and other public pension plans to achieve high investment returns, but investment strategies should include a thorough evaluation of the downside risks. Private equity charges high fees that primarily benefit fund managers, not retirees or taxpayers. They have opaque accounting practices and market valuations. They offer the potential for high investment returns, but that comes with high risk that they could fail to deliver.

Underestimating the risks associated with alternative investments could lead to even more costs. Taxpayers at the state and local level would see more money siphoned away from infrastructure, education, and public safety to make up for investment losses and to pay public pension debt. California’s pension systems should be more cautious about taking risks with taxpayers’ money and workers’ retirement benefits.

A version of this column first appeared at The Orange County Register.

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While this specialization can increase efficiency, it also leads to significant institutional blind spots. In reality, people do not live within administrative divisions. The conditions that shape a person’s life—where they live, learn, work, and seek care—are deeply intertwined. As a result, a policy that may achieve desired outcomes in one department can unintentionally create harmful consequences in another, ultimately undermining broader goals of improving health and well-being.

For example, a city might fund a highly structured addiction treatment program that integrates counseling, medication, and case management. Yet without stable housing or employment opportunities, even the most effective interventions can falter once patients leave care. A state might pass legislation to improve public safety by increasing penalties for public drug use or expanding police authority to clear encampments. But without concurrent mental health and housing coordination, enforcement can produce the opposite of its intended outcome. Cities that increase enforcement without increasing services often see more frequent crisis calls, higher incarceration rates, and repeated emergency department visits, because individuals are cycled through short-term punitive responses instead of being stabilized through treatment, housing, or crisis-care coordination. These policy mismatches are a direct result of siloed policymaking, which is built to solve isolated problems rather than address the overlapping complexities of human behavior and institutional systems.

An interdisciplinary harm reduction approach identifies where policies intersect, overlap, or conflict, showing how siloed decisions can generate unintended harms elsewhere. It asks policymakers to view every issue as part of a larger ecosystem—what public health professionals call a “continuum of care.” The goal is to identify where policies may be incongruent, such as through gaps in care, conflicting mandates, or fragmented accountability, and to design coordinated responses that reduce those harms without creating new ones elsewhere. Though harm reduction is often associated with drug policy, its logic is conceptually applicable across disciplines. It is a pragmatic framework for thinking about risk mitigation that recognizes that human beings are not automatons and that each makes discreet decisions based on their own circumstances, background, and perceptions. A harm reduction approach doesn’t attempt to craft policy for a conceptualized version of humanity, but caters to the needs of real human beings by prioritizing practicality, coordination, and evidence over ideology. 

The value of an interdisciplinary approach can be better understood through economist Friedrich Hayek’s work on imperfect knowledge. Hayek argued that no single entity—whether a government agency, a business owner, or an expert committee—possesses all the information needed to make perfect decisions. Knowledge is distributed across countless individuals and institutions and is constantly in flux. This means that sound policymaking cannot rely on centralized control but must instead employ mechanisms that facilitate information sharing, test ideas in real-world conditions, and adapt based on feedback. While harm reduction does not originate from Hayek’s theories, an interdisciplinary harm reduction framework reflects this same insight. It brings together actors from different systems to identify shared goals, map where policies overlap, conflict, or create gaps, and build solutions that are both pragmatic and self-correcting.

In some arenas, these ideas are already being put into practice. For example, when police officers are trained in harm reduction principles, such as recognizing overdose symptoms, using naloxone, and collaborating with health providers, enforcement becomes more effective and safer for both patients and officers. When cities apply behavioral insights to design roads that naturally cue drivers to reduce speed—like using roundabouts instead of traditional intersections, as Golden, Colo., did—speeds and crash severity decline without relying on police presence. In healthcare, supervised consumption sites in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, have managed overdoses on-site, preventing deaths while reducing ambulance calls by 700 each year and saving more than $2.3 million annually in emergency costs. These examples spanning different sectors share the same underlying logic: measure concrete outcomes, coordinate across systems, and reduce avoidable harm.

This same logic can be successfully applied to housing, urban planning, education reform, governance, and beyond. By aligning their goals, data, and evaluation methods, agencies can prevent duplication, save public resources, and craft policy approaches that reinforce, rather than undermine, one another. 

Reason Foundation’s Interdisciplinary Harm Reduction Framework is built on that logic. Drawing on established models—including the National Harm Reduction Coalition’s core principles, continuum-of-care approaches used in public health, and Continuous Quality Improvement methods—it defines harm reduction as a pragmatic and evidence-informed approach to reducing avoidable harms across multiple areas of public policy, including health, housing, education, technology, finance, governance, and public safety. The framework provides policymakers with a guide to identify preventable harms, design proportionate responses, and evaluate their effectiveness in reducing risk for individuals and communities. Ultimately, it moves harm reduction policy design from theory to practice, creating a shared, interdisciplinary language for effective and measurable reform.

How to use this framework

This guide provides a clear explanation of the Interdisciplinary Harm Reduction Framework and its application across different areas of public policy. We begin by outlining the framework’s core principles and defining each one in the context of real-world decision-making. We then walk through the process of operationalizing these principles, offering a step-by-step guide for identifying harm, designing proportionate interventions, aligning incentives, and measuring outcomes. Each section is designed to be accessible for readers, whether or not they have a background in harm reduction or public policy. The ultimate goal is to translate this framework into a practical decision-making tool applicable to any policy area, from health and housing to education, governance, and technology.

Core principles

1. Outcome-Informed Decision-Making: An effective harm reduction approach must be grounded in reliable data, empirical research, and rigorous evaluation. This means prioritizing interventions with a demonstrable record of success in real-world conditions, using measurable indicators of harm reduction to track progress, and maintaining a willingness to adapt as new evidence emerges. Simultaneously, policies must proactively anticipate and minimize unintended consequences, such as fueling illicit markets, displacing harms to other populations or settings, or creating perverse incentives. This requires both pre-implementation analysis and ongoing monitoring to identify and correct harmful trends early. The emphasis should be on facts over ideology, ensuring that policy choices remain tethered to outcomes rather than political whim.

2. Risk Minimization Without Blanket Restrictions: This principle advocates for policies aimed at reducing the severity and likelihood of preventable harm without resorting to one-size-fits-all or authoritarian policy interventions. Overly broad restrictions affect entire populations, often imposing costs on the majority because a relatively small minority engages in higher-risk behaviors or encounters higher-risk conditions. A harm reduction approach focuses instead on identifying higher-risk individuals and areas to tailor interventions to have the greatest positive impact without unnecessarily limiting the freedoms of the general public.

3. Individual Autonomy and Voluntary Action: This principle prioritizes empowering people to make voluntary, informed choices about their own lives, so long as those choices do not cause direct and demonstrable harm to another person. Rather than relying on coercive mandates, the focus is on removing barriers to support and safeguarding personal agency. This allows individuals to voluntarily adopt safer behaviors when they are ready. This approach also recognizes that individual decisions can have ripple effects for families, communities, and broader society, and that these effects must also be addressed to strengthen both personal and collective outcomes. Lasting change is most effective when it is chosen willingly, not compelled. This principle acknowledges that responsibility for outcomes ultimately lies with individuals.

4. Targeted, Context-Specific Solutions: One-size-fits-all approaches are rarely effective and impose high costs, burdens, and harms on the general public. Harm reduction requires a nuanced understanding of specific communities, environments, and markets to tailor strategies that meet their unique needs. Whether applied to health, housing, finance, or technology, interventions should be proportional to the scale of the problem, appropriate for the target population, and feasible for sustained implementation.

5. Cross-Disciplinary Application: Harm reduction needn’t be confined to public health and drug policy. It offers a versatile framework applicable to housing stability, educational access, financial resilience, technology safety, governance reform, and public safety initiatives, among other issues. Viewing harm reduction through multiple policy lenses ensures more comprehensive solutions, prevents siloed thinking, and helps identify overlapping areas where small, well-designed policy changes can yield compounding benefits.

6. Practicality and Real-World Application: Proposed solutions must be operationally feasible, cost-effective, and workable in the real world. This requires an objective assessment of cost-effectiveness to ensure that both public and private resources are directed toward policies that deliver the greatest reduction in harm per dollar spent. Rather than pursuing unattainable ideals, this principle prioritizes tangible, incremental improvements that can be implemented within existing legal, economic, and cultural contexts. The goal is meaningful, sustainable progress over large-scale, disruptive changes that carry a high risk of both failure and unintended consequences.

7. Incentive Alignment: Sustainable harm reduction requires aligning the interests of individuals, communities, and institutions. Policies should be structured so that all stakeholders share a vested interest in achieving positive outcomes. This can be done through market-based incentives, regulatory flexibility, or public–private collaboration. Equally important is ensuring that policies do not create additional harms, allowing harm reduction efforts to gain long-term support based on shared value rather than enforcement or compliance mandates.

Step-by-step operational playbook

A successful operational playbook translates the Interdisciplinary Harm Reduction Framework into a six-step process that moves from problem identification to coordinated solution implementation. It begins with defining the policy problem and desired outcome, clarifying the harm being addressed, what measurable improvement looks like, and who is responsible for leading the effort. The next step involves mapping the systems and actors involved to visualize how different agencies, organizations, and individuals interact across health, justice, and community sectors. This step also includes establishing a steering committee composed of representatives from each partner agency and at least one community member with direct experience with the specific issue being addressed (e.g., substance use, homelessness, or navigating the justice system) to guide coordination and monitor progress.

Once these overlapping dynamics are mapped, the process turns to identifying points of risk, friction, or missed opportunity—areas where harm accumulates, or coordination fails—and recording them in a simple risk register to ensure accountability. After these risks are identified, teams apply the framework’s principles to decision-making, using the seven harm reduction principles as a lens to test whether proposed actions are practical, proportionate, and evidence-based. The fifth step focuses on designing coordinated interventions and evaluation plans that align funding, roles, and outcomes across systems while creating shared metrics to track progress transparently. Finally, the process concludes with implementation, learning, and adaptation, during which the steering committee meets regularly to review data, adjust strategies based on results, and share updates publicly to promote accountability and continuous improvement. 

Step 1. Define the policy problem and the desired outcome

Begin by clearly describing the specific problem and what measurable improvement would look like. Define the harm you are trying to reduce and how success can be measured. Before moving forward, assign a preliminary lead agency and identify all necessary stakeholders that should be involved in defining the problem. Early clarity about ownership of the issue prevents confusion later.

Questions to consider:

• What harm or challenge are you trying to reduce?
  
• Who is most affected, and in what environments or circumstances?
  
• What would improvement look like in both the short- and long-term?
  
• How will you measure success?
  

Step 2. Map the systems and actors involved

List and visualize all systems, organizations, and individuals that influence this issue. Include public agencies, community groups, non-governmental organizations, private entities, and informal supports, such as families or peer networks. Mapping reveals how decisions in one ambit of life can affect outcomes in another. As you map, identify who has authority, who provides data, and who will make final decisions. Assign a sponsor with budgetary or legal authority, an accountable lead for daily coordination, a data steward for evaluation, and at least one community representative to ensure real-world experiences inform every stage of the process.

Questions to consider:

• Which systems or organizations currently influence this issue?
  
• Where do people most often fall through the cracks?
  
• Who are the main decision-makers, funders, or gatekeepers?
  
• Where do responsibilities overlap or duplicate?
  

Step 3. Identify points of risk, friction, or missed opportunity

With the systems mapped, identify where harm accumulates or where efforts are misaligned. These are the points where coordination fails, incentives conflict, or barriers prevent access to support. Political or community pressures can also limit coordination, especially when proposed changes are controversial or misunderstood, and these should be identified as part of the same risk landscape. Recognizing these intersections early allows attention and resources to be focused where they can make the greatest impact.

Once identified, document these friction points in a simple tracking table or “risk register” that summarizes potential risks. For each, include its likelihood, impact, early warning signs, mitigation strategy, and responsible party. Review this document regularly in coordination meetings to ensure potential harms are identified early and addressed proportionately.

Questions to consider:

• Do any current or proposed laws, statutes, or ordinances create barriers to implementing coordinated policies?
  
• Where does harm most often occur within or between systems?
  
• Are there communication gaps or conflicting priorities among agencies?
  
• Do any current policies create or worsen unintended harms?
  
• Which groups or communities are most likely to be overlooked?
  
• What new risks could arise from this intervention?
  
• How will we monitor for unintended effects or privacy issues?
  
• Who is responsible for updating the risk register?

Step 4. Apply the framework’s principles to each decision area

Once the risks are identified, use the seven harm reduction principles to guide decision-making on how to address them. This framework is not meant for exclusive use by government officials. It is better understood as a shared checklist that independent actors can use when they convene to weigh tradeoffs, compare options, and discard approaches that do not work in practice. When public agencies participate, their role is primarily to bring partners together, share existing data, and remove unnecessary regulatory or administrative barriers so that those closest to the problem are free to test and refine solutions.

Apply each principle to the systems and decisions you have mapped to help ensure that responses are realistic, coordinated, and effective. The principles act as a filter to check whether proposed solutions reflect outcome-based, context-specific, and collaborative thinking grounded in local knowledge rather than top-down assumptions.

Every principle should be reviewed through the lens of those directly affected and those implementing support on the ground. Invite both service recipients and frontline practitioners to comment on how each principle applies in practice. When discussing context-specific design, confirm that diverse populations and geographic realities are represented.

Questions to consider:

• Are desired outcomes clear, measurable, and evidence-based?
  
• Is the proposed intervention proportional to the level of harm?
  
• Does it respect individual choice and autonomy?
  
• Is the approach tailored to local needs and contexts?
  
• Are agencies and partners collaborating toward a shared goal?
  
• Can it be implemented with available capacity and resources?
  
• Are incentives aligned to reinforce positive outcomes rather than process?
  
• Have affected communities been asked how proposed changes may impact them?
  
• What accommodations are needed for language, disability, or access?
  
• How will feedback be tracked and reported back?
  

Step 5. Design coordinated interventions and evaluation plans

With the principles applied, move from mapping to planning. Develop coordinated interventions across systems, assign clear roles, and clarify how each participating organization chooses to contribute. In an interdisciplinary harm reduction landscape, partners include public agencies, private providers, philanthropic funders, and community organizations. Each of these actors controls its own mission, budget, and internal accountability structures. Public officials may revise the way public programs are funded, contracted, or evaluated, but they do not direct or supervise the internal operations of independent institutions.

Within that constraint, “aligning funding” means using the tools that each actor legitimately controls to support the shared goals identified in earlier steps. Public agencies can decide how to structure their own grants, contracts, or reimbursement rules so that public dollars reward reductions in avoidable harm rather than simple service volume. Philanthropic organizations can voluntarily support parts of the effort that align with their missions. Service providers and community groups can decide how to allocate their own staff time and resources to participate in the coordinated response. No single institution sets funding levels for the others. Coordination emerges because different actors see value in the shared objectives and choose to orient some of their resources toward them.

Accountability is created similarly. Each partner remains accountable first to its own constituents, boards, donors, or voters. To make collaboration workable, partners can record their voluntary commitments in simple memoranda of understanding, contracts, or grant agreements that specify who is responsible for which activities and what indicators will be used to judge success. Where public funds are involved, outcome measures and reporting expectations should be defined clearly and published in advance, so that participation is both informed and voluntary. For purely private or philanthropic efforts, this framework still offers a template that organizations can adopt internally to clarify expectations and track results.

Once roles and commitments are clear, establish a shared evaluation plan that integrates information from these efforts and tracks progress across relevant sectors, not just within a single agency. The goal is to create a transparent picture of whether the overall approach is reducing harm, while respecting the independence of each participating institution.

Establish a feedback loop where results, risks, and community feedback are reviewed together at defined intervals. This integrated review structure replaces fragmented reporting and ensures that decisions remain transparent and data-driven.

Questions to consider:

• Who will lead and coordinate implementation across systems?
  
• How will roles and responsibilities be shared?
  
• What data or evaluation tools will be used to track progress?
  
• How will feedback and learning be used to improve the program over time?
  
• What process is in place for identifying and correcting unintended harms?

Step 6. Implement, learn, and adapt

Implementation should include a standing review meeting—monthly during pilots—to compare data to benchmarks, discuss new risks, and document lessons learned. Decisions about scaling up, sustaining, modifying, or stopping an initiative should be based on those reviews, not on intuition or politics. Publish concise progress reports regularly so partners and the public can follow the evidence and stay invested.

Questions to consider:

• Are we meeting regularly enough to detect problems early and adjust accordingly?
  
• What evidence or benchmarks will guide decisions about scaling, modifying, or discontinuing the intervention?
  
• How will we document lessons learned so they meaningfully inform future decisions?
  
• Are any political, organizational, or resource pressures influencing implementation decisions?
  
• How will we ensure transparency so partners and the public can track progress?
  
• Do we have a clear process for deciding when and how to adapt the approach if circumstances change?

Hypothetical example: applying the framework to post-release overdose prevention

This section demonstrates how the Interdisciplinary Harm Reduction Framework can be applied to a real-world issue: preventing overdose deaths among people recently released from prison.

Step 1. Define the policy problem and desired outcome

In this example, we begin with a clear definition of the harm to be addressed, which is the sharp rise in overdose deaths that occurs in the first two weeks among those released from prison, a period when overall mortality can be up to 10 times higher than in the general population and overdose deaths up to 15.5 times higher. 

In one Colorado cohort of 905 people released from state prison, nearly 78 percent of people had a chronic medical or psychological condition, yet only about 10 percent had even a single outpatient visit within 30 days of release, and only 31 percent used any health service at the main safety-net system within 180 days. Upon release, individuals frequently face delays in reinstating Medicaid coverage, securing stable housing, or reconnecting with treatment providers secondary to loss of access to medication, housing, or support networks they once had, thereby disrupting the continuity of care. 

These administrative and logistical barriers create dangerous interruptions in care precisely when overdose risk is highest. Using the framework, policymakers first define the problem as avoidable harm linked to gaps in post-release coordination. The desired outcome might be to reduce fatal and non-fatal overdoses within 90 days of release and increase access to and voluntary use of medication for opioid use disorder (MOUD).

Applying the principle of outcome-informed decision-making, the team might identify measurable targets as: (1) a 15 percent reduction in 90-day overdoses; (2) a 20 percent increase in MOUD initiation within 14 days of release; and (3) a decrease in emergency department visits or emergency calls related to overdose. These outcomes are clear, evidence-based, and trackable across systems.

Step 2. Map the systems and actors involved

Mapping this issue involves correctional health, probation, public health, community clinics, pharmacies, emergency medical services, and peer recovery organizations. It demonstrates that, while each system plays a role, none are responsible for the transition from custody to care, revealing a high-risk gap in care upon prisoner release.

To operationalize the principle of cross-disciplinary collaboration, the example establishes a shared governance model for addressing the target problem. The sponsor (county public health) holds decision-making authority and funding. The accountable lead (correctional health) manages daily coordination. The data steward and evaluator ensure data integrity and oversight. The team also establishes a steering committee composed of representatives from each lead agency, the data steward, and a community advisor. The committee oversees progress, reviews data, and ensures that decisions remain transparent and evidence-based throughout the project. This clear structure transforms the mapping exercise into a functional plan for coordination.

This shared governance structure reflects real-world models that have already reduced deaths after release from prison. For example, Rhode Island’s statewide corrections-based MOUD program is sponsored by a cross-agency overdose task force, with the Department of Corrections as the operational lead and community treatment providers and public health officials jointly responsible for data and evaluation. In that program, everyone entering custody is screened for opioid use disorder, offered all forms of medication treatment while incarcerated, and connected to community clinics and Medicaid coverage before release. Evaluations found that this coordinated approach was associated with a roughly 61 percent reduction in overdose deaths among people recently released from incarceration and a 12 percent decline in overdose fatalities statewide, illustrating how clearly defined roles, shared accountability, and continuous data review can translate into measurable reductions in avoidable harm.

Step 3. Identify points of risk, friction, and missed opportunity

Once the systems are mapped, policymakers can then identify key friction points where harm accumulates. In our example, the team identifies significant harm associated with evening releases that occur after treatment clinics and community providers have closed, leaving individuals without immediate access to medication or follow-up care; inconsistent naloxone access; inadequate data exchange between correctional facilities, community health providers, and social service agencies; and stigma encountered during the initial stages of treatment engagement in the community. 

Each of these issues is logged in the risk register with ratings for likelihood and impact, early indicators, and assigned mitigation responsibilities. For example, risks tied to evening releases may be reduced through partnerships with mobile response teams, while data-related risks are mitigated by implementing role-based access to shared records to protect privacy and improve continuity of care. This keeps risk management transparent, targeted, and proportionate to actual harm.

Step 4. Apply the framework’s principles to decision areas

This step illustrates how the framework’s principles inform design choices:

• Outcome-informed decision-making anchors each intervention to a specific measure.
  
• Risk-minimization keeps the focus on key transition moments without adding barriers.
  
• Individual autonomy ensures the program remains voluntary and participant-driven.
  
• Targeted, context-specific solutions allow scheduling and staffing to adapt to local needs.
  
• Cross-disciplinary collaboration connects correctional, clinical, and community systems.
  
• Practicality and real-world application keep interventions feasible with existing resources.
  
• Incentive alignment ties payments to performance measures, including successful post-release care coordination, treatment initiation, and retention in recovery services.

In the worked example, these principles directly shape the policy response: naloxone is offered at release, next-day MOUD appointments are reserved, peer recovery coaches facilitate linkage, and data dashboards track both health and justice outcomes.

Embedding input from people who have personally navigated the reentry process is also built into this step. The framework emphasizes participation from those most affected. In this example, individuals who have recently been released from custody review program materials, test the discharge workflow, and highlight gaps such as transportation and stigma.  Their feedback is formally documented and integrated into revisions, making engagement an accountability tool, rather than a symbolic exercise.

Step 5. Design coordinated interventions and evaluation plans

Here, the framework moves from planning to execution, including a pilot study for the proposed interventions. The mapped systems and agreed principles guide the design of an integrated pilot:

• Screening and identification: At the time of incarceration, individuals are screened for opioid use risk during the correctional health intake process and monitored throughout custody and release.
  
• Harm reduction at transition: Naloxone is provided at release, with a brief training before discharge.
  
• Linkage to treatment: Peer recovery coaches meet people at release or within 24 hours to connect them with clinics.
  
• Continuity of care: To prevent treatment interruption, pharmacies issue short-term bridge prescriptions, which are temporary supplies of medications like buprenorphine, to cover the period between release and a confirmed clinic appointment.
  
• Monitoring and evaluation: Public health and correctional partners share de-identified data through a secure dashboard.
  

Evaluation follows the framework’s rule of evidence before expansion. The pilot uses a stepped-wedge design, which means the program is rolled out in phases—starting with one jail and gradually expanding to the others. This allows researchers to compare outcomes before and after implementation at each site and see whether improvements, such as fewer overdoses and stronger treatment connections, are linked to the program rather than other changes over time.

Step 6. Implement, learn, and adapt

The final stage in the framework emphasizes learning as an ongoing function. In the worked example, the steering committee meets monthly to review performance data, risk indicators, and community feedback. New challenges, such as transportation gaps or clinic delays, trigger minor course corrections. Decisions to expand, sustain, or stop the intervention depend entirely on whether the predefined data-driven outcomes are met, ensuring that changes are based on evidence rather than assumptions. Transparent reporting ensures that progress, setbacks, and adaptations are documented and shared with partners and the public.

Outcome of the example

If the coordinated pilot is implemented effectively, the county might see promising indicators within the first year—more people accessing treatment, fewer overdose-related emergency responses, and improved coordination across systems.

However, if these outcomes do not materialize, the framework still provides a structure for identifying where breakdowns occurred, what barriers—political, operational, or resource-related—interfered, and how the approach should be adapted or scaled back. The purpose of the example is to illustrate how the framework guides both improvement and course correction.

Final note for policymakers and advocates

This framework is both a mindset and a method. It encourages policymakers to move beyond assumptions toward evidence, collaboration, and continuous learning. By clearly defining harms, designing proportionate responses, measuring outcomes, and adjusting based on results, public systems can reduce avoidable suffering and wasted public resources while preserving choice, privacy, and dignity.

The goal is progress that is practical, measurable, and humane. When public responses expressly recognize that knowledge is dispersed across individuals and institutions, approaches can be tested through evidence and refined through feedback, officials are able to not only reduce harm but also strengthen trust and accountability across every system they touch.

The post Interdisciplinary harm reduction: A practical guide appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Peske has a point. The nationwide average teacher salary fell by over 6 percent between 2002 and 2022, going from $75,152 to $70,548 in 2023 dollars, according to new Reason Foundation research. In total, inflation-adjusted teacher salaries fell in 40 of 50 states, as shown in Table 1.

It’s also a fact that teacher salaries are tied to educational attainment and years of experience, meaning that high-performing teachers—and those in shortage areas like math, science, and special education—aren’t paid more for their results or expertise.

To put the right incentives in place, bold teacher pay reforms are needed. But to maximize the long-term impact of these policies, it’s important to address the root causes of stagnant salaries. Examining data both before and after the COVID-19 pandemic reveals structural problems in K–12 finance that keep dollars out of teacher paychecks.

Table 1: Inflation-adjusted average teacher salary growth (2002 to 2022)

Teacher salaries before COVID-19

Nationwide, inflation-adjusted teacher pay was flat in the nearly two decades leading up to the pandemic, with the average salary falling by 0.6 percent between 2002 and 2020. While a handful of states saw big swings—salaries rose by 22 percent in Washington while falling 19 percent in Indiana—most states saw moderate changes, ranging from -5 percent to +5 percent over that period.

Remarkably, teachers’ salaries weren’t increasing at a time of unprecedented growth in public school funding, which rose by 25 percent per student as all but one state boosted K–12 spending from 2002 to 2020. Figure 1 shows the growth in K–12 revenue and teacher salaries during this period.

With education funding at record levels, why wasn’t more money going to teacher paychecks?

Figure 1: U.S. revenue per student growth vs. average teacher salary growth (2002-2020, inflation-adjusted)

A surge in non-teaching staff

One reason teacher pay didn’t grow with K–12 spending is that public schools spent heavily on hiring non-teaching staff. From 2002 to 2020, as student enrollment grew by 6.6 percent, non-teaching staff expanded by 20 percent. For every five new students, public schools added about one non-teacher. In comparison, the number of classroom teachers rose by 6.6 percent—mirroring enrollment growth, but well below growth in all other staff.

Figure 2 shows the growth of public-school staff by position type. The largest growth category was in student support, which includes social workers, psychologists, speech-language pathologists, and other positions. A nearly identical number of instructional aides—paraprofessionals who assist teachers and often work with students with disabilities—were also added to public school payrolls. Taken together, the data suggest that special education and a greater emphasis on wraparound services played large roles in the growth of non-teaching staff.

Figure 2: Public school staffing growth by position type (2002–2020)

Rising teacher pension debt

Another expense that diverted funding from teacher salaries was employee benefits, a Census Bureau category that includes pensions, Social Security, health insurance, and other costs. Between 2002 and 2020, benefit spending per student rose by 79 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars. While salary and wage spending increased by $573 per student, benefit spending increased by $1,745 per student. Research indicates that rising teacher pension costs were the primary factor behind this trend. States have failed to set aside enough money to pay for the pension benefits promised to teachers, resulting in unfunded liabilities that accumulate over time.

Pension debt can add up to big bucks: In 2024, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas had an estimated $62.6 billion in unfunded liabilities, while the California State Teachers’ Retirement System had $85.5 billion in debt. These costs are usually paid for by increasing school districts’ and teachers’ contribution rates to the pension plans. As a result, K–12 funding that might go to salaries has increasingly been directed toward pension costs, even as many states have reduced teachers’ retirement benefits.

Before the pandemic, the story was relatively straightforward: Teacher salaries stagnated despite significant increases in public school funding, primarily because funds increasingly went to hire non-teachers and cover unfunded pension liabilities. After the pandemic began, however, a different story emerged.

Teacher salaries after COVID-19

Teacher pay now plunged, falling 5.6 percent in fiscal year 2023 dollars, from $74,698 in 2020 to $70,548 in 2022. But this wasn’t because more dollars were going to new hires or benefit spending—the number of non-teachers dropped by 2 percent (before again rising sharply in 2023), and real expenditures on employee benefits inched up by $39 per student. While teacher turnover during the pandemic might have played a part, inflation during those years took a big bite out of teacher paychecks.  

After the onset of COVID-19, price growth reached levels not seen since the 1980s. “We currently face macroeconomic challenges, including unacceptable levels of inflation,” said Janet Yellen, who was Treasury secretary at the time.

The price level during the 2022 school year was nearly 10 percent higher than just two years earlier. Large pay bumps were needed to keep pace with inflation, far more than the usual 3 percent or 4 percent that districts typically dole out. Yet this didn’t happen.   

While school districts weren’t exactly strapped for cash—education funding rose by 7.4 percent between 2020 and 2022, reaching a new record of $20,097 per student in 2022—most of this $1,386 per-student increase came from federal Covid-19 relief funds. And because these dollars were temporary, many districts were hesitant to allocate them to long-term commitments such as teacher salary increases. Instead, they opted to spend the federal funding on things like building renovations, tutoring, and one-time bonuses.

Groups such as the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association lobbied hard for the stimulus funding that ultimately squeezed teachers’ purchasing power. The consensus among economists is that Covid-19 fiscal stimulus—including the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act signed by President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, which sent $122 billion to public schools—helped lift inflation to historic levels. Public school lobbyists won the battle for pandemic relief funding, but that money didn’t increase teachers’ take-home pay even as inflation cut their purchasing power. 

Conclusion

Public school staffing decisions and rising pension debt led to teacher salary stagnation in the years leading up to COVID-19. While teacher take-home pay failed to keep up with inflation during the pandemic, the rise in price levels was atypical—and due in part to the stimulus spending that teachers’ unions lobbied for.

For policymakers looking to boost teachers’ salaries today, states like Texas and Arkansas offer bold ideas for targeting dollars on effective teachers and those teaching in shortage areas. But to maximize the long-term impact of such reforms, they’ll also need to pay down pension debt, examine special-education costs, and encourage school districts to prioritize teacher pay over other expenses. That teachers’ wages had stagnated over two decades of unprecedented growth in public school funding highlights deep structural problems in K–12 finance that shouldn’t be ignored.

A version of this column first appeared at The Thomas B. Fordham Institute.

The post Why teacher salaries are stagnant appeared first on Reason Foundation.

San Diego’s $2.5 billion unfunded pension liability accounts for about 40% of the city’s total $6.8 billion debt. In the 2024 fiscal year, the city paid about $500 million in pension contributions, nearly 60% of which goes toward paying down pension debt. With unfunded pension liabilities and the city facing $540 million in forecasted budget deficits in the coming years, it has imposed a wave of unpopular taxes and fees on solid waste, parking, hotel stays, and more. Today, it is more than justifiable for taxpayers to question whether local leaders have given sufficient consideration to spending reductions and service streamlining relative to raising taxes and fees.

San Diegans felt similarly in 2006 when they passed Proposition C, authorizing “managed competitions” in which private companies would compete against city workers to reduce costs and increase innovation in delivering city services.

Managed competition can be transformational, generating cost savings of 5% to 20%. This technique has been successfully implemented in numerous states and cities, including Phoenix, Charlotte, and Indianapolis.

Former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith told Governing that the robust managed competition program implemented during his terms in the 1990s created over $400 million of value for city taxpayers. In Florida, former Gov. Jeb Bush’s administration conducted more than 100 managed competition initiatives that saved taxpayers more than $550 million.

But managed competition requires leadership committed to driving ongoing improvements, results and value. Politics and special interests can make managed competition challenging to sustain over time, as happened in San Diego.

City leaders didn’t fully embrace the managed competition effort, dragging out its implementation for years. Then they tended to give public employees special treatment relative to private firms regarding their cost estimates to deliver services, projections of future service demand, and the ability to penalize underperformance. It wasn’t a level playing field for private firms, and the city wasn’t pushing for efficiencies from government agencies. Rather than build the capabilities to improve these things, San Diego stopped trying.

From a taxpayer perspective, it is time to give competition another chance.

The rising costs of residential solid waste are a prime example. The private sector already picks up 70% of San Diego’s solid waste from businesses and apartments, with the city’s solid waste operation collecting the remaining 30% from single-family neighborhoods and multiplexes. The city’s costs have gotten so high that it is imposing a new solid waste tax on homeowners. San Diego did not see fit to test the market with the private firms that perform the same job in surrounding cities at significantly lower costs.

Phoenix has been applying managed competition in residential solid waste collection since 1979, dividing the city into zones and competing trash service in each zone every six years. In 2011, Phoenix’s Public Works Department told Government Technology that competition had generated $38 million in cumulative savings to that point.

San Diego’s leaders owe it to taxpayers to test the market and ensure that city workers are performing their jobs at maximum efficiency and at the lowest possible cost. Frustrated San Diegans rightfully wonder why the city didn’t implement this approach instead of raising taxpayers’ costs with the trash fee while continuing to do business with the same city employees. Worse, city officials are executing this implicit city job protection program at a time when every worker hired is adding significant costs and financial risks to San Diego’s already underfunded pension system.

Two decades ago, San Diego’s financial mismanagement earned it the moniker “Enron-by-the-Sea” and prompted taxpayers to demand procurement and pension reforms to save money. But as things improved over time, the city abandoned competition. And after state courts blocked a pension overhaul approved in a landslide in 2012, elected leaders ignored residents’ wishes and made no effort to craft a similar reform.

Instead of asking taxpayers to pay more taxes and fees to cover the city’s spending and debt, San Diego should give managed competition a fair chance to see if government agencies can improve efficiency or if the private sector can deliver better services at lower costs.

A version of this column first appeared at The San Diego Union-Tribune.

The post San Diego’s government needs more competition, not more taxes appeared first on Reason Foundation.

One reason the act has gained support is that it avoids preempting local zoning authority outright. Instead of overriding local control, the act focuses on research, guidance, and incentives for localities that choose to reform their zoning and regulatory frameworks. While this approach may seem like a balanced first step, it raises important questions about how far federal agencies should go in shaping local decisions. Incentives and guidance can easily evolve into indirect pressure, administrative burdens, or expectations that narrow the flexibility of states and localities. Even if all the bill’s provisions are implemented, it will not, on its own, significantly reduce price pressures. States and local governments still must reform their restrictive systems.

The ROAD to Housing Act utilizes a range of policy tools, grouped into four general categories: mandated reports, financial incentives for regulatory reform, adjustments to housing finance programs, and updates to existing federal supply-side initiatives. This bill takes the unusual step of focusing on expanding housing supply before turning to subsidy-heavy approaches, which marks a shift from many earlier federal housing proposals. Even with this emphasis on supply, the breadth of the bill makes it difficult to evaluate as a cohesive policy approach, and combining many unrelated programs into a single package increases the risk of mission creep, a problem common across federal housing initiatives.

New reports

A major component of the ROAD to Housing Act is its mandate for a series of reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department for Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Many of the reforms highlighted in these guidelines are supported by evidence, including reducing minimum lot sizes, parking reform, allowing accessory dwelling units (ADUs), and streamlining both zoning and building codes. Collectively, these reports would be mandated by the Housing Supply Frameworks Act. The Housing Supply Frameworks Act is the portion of the broader bill that directs GAO and HUD to develop these reports and model guidelines, essentially serving as the research and planning section within the ROAD to Housing Act. However, federally curated guidance often becomes an informal standard that localities feel pressured to follow, even when local conditions differ. Analysts at institutions focused on federalism have frequently warned that benchmarking and advisory frameworks can grow into de facto expectations that add new bureaucratic oversight without meaningfully accelerating supply.

However, requiring research and monitoring by HUD and GAO into these reforms is not equivalent to enacting them. Local governments must implement these changes to enable supply adjustment, and that is where they are likely to encounter resistance. Knowing these barriers, this act goes one step further to nudge local governments toward enacting these proposed reforms.

Federal financial incentives for reform

Beyond requiring research, the ROAD to Housing Act establishes several incentives to local governments that expand their housing supply. Most notably, it establishes a $200 million “Innovation Fund,” which will be awarded annually by HUD to local governments that demonstrate measurable supply expansion from 2027 to 2031. Grants will range from $250,000 to $10 million and be awarded to no fewer than 25 recipients annually.

This could encourage cities to take on politically difficult zoning reforms. However, federal grants can also cause jurisdictions to prioritize actions that maximize eligibility rather than reforms that address the most significant structural barriers. Jurisdictions may make symbolic or superficial changes to qualify for funding while avoiding deeper reforms that could truly expand housing options. There is also the possibility that some jurisdictions will benefit from market-driven supply increases unrelated to any policy change, while others with genuine constraints receive little or no support.

In addition, the ROAD to Housing Act establishes several other grant programs to expand home supply through rehabilitation. Notably, the Whole-Home Repairs Act and the Revitalizing Empty Structures Into Desirable Environments (RESIDE) Act give grants and forgivable loans to low-income homeowners and small landlords looking to repair old or dilapidated structures, through differing avenues and terms. Further, under the Accelerating Home Building Act grants are provided to local governments to develop pre-approved designs. These grant programs are also to be administered through HUD. 

Rehabilitation programs help preserve aging housing and prevent the loss of existing units. Still, they do not meaningfully expand overall supply in markets where zoning and permitting rules limit the addition of new homes. The act also supports pre-approved building designs through the Accelerating Home Building Act. These efforts may help simplify parts of the construction process, but without broader zoning reform, pre-approved plans will not significantly expand supply. HUD’s growing portfolio of grant programs also raises concerns about administrative complexity.

Mortgage reform

The ROAD to Housing Act includes several demand-side tweaks to the existing housing finance landscape to aid accessibility. Included as part of the act are incentives to increase the role of small-dollar loan originators and the expansion of Title I loans to cover the construction of accessory dwelling units (ADUs) and the purchase or improvement of manufactured homes. Further, this act expands existing financial literacy programs.

While these may help certain borrowers, demand-side tools do not directly address the primary driver of high prices: inadequate supply in many communities. If supply does not increase, new lending programs can unintentionally raise prices by boosting purchasing power without increasing the number of available homes. Because the act also aims to encourage supply-side reform, the risk is smaller than in past demand-driven programs, but it still warrants caution.

Reforming existing housing programs

Finally, this act makes several positive adjustments to existing housing programs. For example, it lifts the cap on the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, which allows local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) to convert public housing into privately-managed Section 8 housing and is largely beneficial for tenants. Further, through the Build Now Act, it ties community block grants, one of the largest federal affordable housing and development grants, to broader housing supply, thereby again incentivizing land-use liberalization. Regarding private investments in affordable housing, it raises the cap on public welfare investments by banks, many of which directly support affordable housing initiatives.

This could encourage better land-use regulation, but it also imposes additional conditions on one of the largest federal development programs. The expansion of caps on public welfare investments for banks will likely increase private capital in affordable housing projects, though it also raises questions about the growing federal influence over private investment decisions.

Conclusion

Taken together, these provisions aim to connect federal programs more directly to local regulatory reform and affordable housing investment. The intent is to support voluntary action rather than mandate it. However, there is a real risk that expanding federal incentives, guidance, and grant programs will overshadow the need for comprehensive local reform. A meaningful improvement in housing affordability still depends on states and cities reducing exclusionary zoning, shortening permitting timelines, and updating outdated building codes. The ROAD to Housing Act identifies many contributors to high housing costs and encourages local governments to take action. The bill includes several positive elements, especially the emphasis on zoning reform and regulatory streamlining. At the same time, it carries risks of administrative expansion, program duplication, and indirect federal involvement in land use decisions. A balanced assessment should highlight both the promise and the pitfalls of the act. Federal guidance and financial incentives can only support affordability if they help remove barriers to housing expansion rather than add new layers of oversight. Genuine progress requires local and state governments to confront and reform the regulatory barriers that continue to limit housing supply

The post The ROAD to Housing Act carries promise but risks bureaucratic expansion appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Promoting a new position paper titled “WHO Position on Tobacco Control and Harm Reduction,” Director General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus claims e-cigarettes aren’t promoting harm reduction, via transitioning smokers to a safer source of nicotine, but are instead encouraging a new wave of addiction among young people.  

Instead of switching to e-cigarettes or nicotine pouches, the WHO recommends smokers make use of quit helplines and nicotine replacement therapies. But both these methods have notoriously low success rates and are not readily available or affordable in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) where the majority of smokers live. LMICs often lack the public health infrastructure of countries like the United Kingdom or New Zealand, which have independently and successfully embraced products like e-cigarettes for tobacco harm reduction. LMICs are often more reliant on bodies such as the WHO for health and regulatory advice, placing a great responsibility on these organizations to provide sound, evidence-based guidance.   

In 2019, the WHO congratulated India, where there are more than 250 million tobacco users and around one million tobacco-related deaths per year, for its ban on e-cigarettes. In 2024, the WHO honored Brazil’s National Health Surveillance Agency with an award for reaffirming a ban on e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes are also banned in Argentina, Thailand, Brazil, Vietnam, and Mexico, where more than 70 million tobacco users live. Cigarettes, which are by far the most dangerous way of consuming nicotine, remain legal in all these countries. 

The WHO paper doesn’t provide any evidence that e-cigarettes or nicotine pouches are, in fact, just as or more harmful than smoking. The safer profile of these products is not just some self-serving claim from the tobacco industry trying to sell these alternatives. That vaping is safer than smoking is acknowledged by some of the WHO’s largest funders, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. These countries have different regulatory regimes for nicotine products, but all of their leading health agencies, the Food and Drug Administration, the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, and Health Canada, agree that e-cigarettes are safer than cigarettes. The gold standard for evidence-based medicine, the Cochrane Review, consistently finds e-cigarettes to be more effective than nicotine replacement therapies for smoking cessation. 

The UK’s National Health Service (NHS) and Cancer Research UK consistently promote e-cigarettes to smokers, regularly debunking the myths that these products are just as or more dangerous than cigarettes. The NHS even offers some smokers free vape kits as part of its “swap to stop” initiative. 

These efforts are bearing fruit. Smoking rates in the UK have declined significantly since the rise of e-cigarettes. In November 2025, the number of vapers in the UK surpassed the number of smokers for the first time. The spread of e-cigarettes, nicotine pouches, and heated tobacco products has given tens of millions of smokers who want to quit— but have failed through other methods—an alternative. Sweden has the lowest smoking and lung cancer rate in Europe because those who wish to use nicotine typically choose snus, an oral nicotine product that doesn’t involve combustion or inhaling smoke. 

There is also a wide-ranging body of evidence demonstrating that the kinds of restrictions Tedros is calling for, whether in the form of higher taxes or bans on e-cigarette flavors consumers prefer, result in more smoking of traditional cigarettes. That’s not a prescription for better public health.

Despite the overwhelming evidence that vaping is dramatically safer than smoking, the WHO persists in its demands that if countries don’t ban e-cigarettes outright, they should be subject to the same taxes and regulations as cigarettes. It should be commonsensical that products presenting vastly different risks should be regulated differently. But the WHO’s advice to put vapes, nicotine pouches, and other nicotine alternatives on a level playing field with cigarettes, if implemented in more countries, will only prolong and sustain death and disease among smokers who want to quit but don’t have the right options that might help them succeed. 

The post Why the World Health Organization’s anti-nicotine policy could keep millions smoking appeared first on Reason Foundation.

For state policymakers, it is crucial to have an accurate understanding of modern homeschoolers when considering new laws or regulations. While misconceptions about homeschooling remain prevalent, a growing body of research and data is helping to set the record straight.

The following analysis compiles key information to address two fundamental questions: Who homeschools, and why do they choose to do so? It begins by examining trends in homeschool participation, then looks at the sector’s demographics and the reasons families choose home education, and ends with a brief discussion of policy considerations.

Homeschool participation and growth

Homeschooling has increased over the past few decades, but it saw an especially steep spike at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participation estimates vary by data source, but it is clear that growth has been anything but linear.

Using figures from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, Alanna Bjorklund-Young and Angela R. Watson estimate that nearly 6 percent of students were homeschooled during the 2022–23 academic year. In comparison, the most recent estimate published by the National Center for Education Statistics’ National Household Education Survey (NHES) puts this figure at 3.4 percent in the same year.

This discrepancy is due to differences in how data are collected. The Pulse survey uses a broader definition of homeschooling than the NHES, whose estimates “can be viewed as a more restrictive definition of homeschooling, providing a more conservative estimate of this population,” write Bjorklund-Young and Watson.

However, the NHES also reports that a total of 5.2 percent of students are schooled at home—comprising homeschoolers and students enrolled full-time in virtual courses—a figure that is more in line with the Pulse survey.

Bjorklund-Young and Watson suggest looking at these data sources as a range of estimates. But to evaluate growth over time, the NHES figures should be used to ensure consistent comparisons. According to the NHES data, the proportion of homeschooling students increased from 1.7 percent of all students in 1999 to 3.4 percent in 2011–12, but dipped to 2.8 percent by 2018–19. Homeschooling then surged during the Covid-19 pandemic, with the latest NHES data showing the aforementioned 3.4 percent homeschooled in the 2022–23 school year. While the total number of homeschoolers in 2022–23—1.76 million—is up from 1.45 million in 2018–19, it is nearly identical to the 2012 figure of 1.77 million students.

Research also indicates that the homeschool population is dynamic, with many students switching school sectors at least once during their K–12 education. A survey conducted by Albert Cheng and Angela Watson found that only 17 percent of adults who were ever homeschooled did so for the entirety of their K–12 education, with 56 percent of respondents doing so for six years or fewer.

Homeschool demographics

The National Center for Education Statistics’ NHES program and the Census Bureau’s Pulse survey also provide insight into homeschooling demographics. According to the NHES, a greater share of white students (5.1 percent) were homeschooled in 2022–23 than Black students (1.7 percent) and Hispanic students (1.8 percent), as shown in Figure 1. However, compared to pre-pandemic levels, the proportion of Black homeschoolers increased by half a percentage point—rising from 1.2 percent to 1.7 percent. White participation rose even more, while Hispanic participation fell slightly.

Bjorklund-Young and Watson’s research provides additional context for these figures. Using the NHES data, they estimate that in 2022–23, about 29 percent of homeschoolers were students of color: 6 percent black, 14 percent Hispanic, 7 percent two or more races, and less than 2 percent Asian (see Figure 2). Their estimate rises to 40 percent using Pulse data, indicating that students of color are underrepresented among homeschoolers, regardless of the data source. (About 51 percent of all school-aged students fall into this category.) While students of color have seen only modest growth as a share of all homeschoolers over time—about four percentage points between 1998–99 and 2022–23—Bjorklund-Young and Watson nonetheless conclude that “the stereotypical narratives around homeschooling as a predominantly white population must be updated to represent the modern group of homeschoolers.”

Additionally, a nationally representative survey by Angela Watson and Matthew Lee included comparisons of homeschooling parents with their non-homeschooling peers on characteristics such as political affiliation, religiosity, and schooling sectors. It found that, while Republicans are overrepresented among homeschoolers—44 percent of homeschool parents identified as Republican compared to 36 percent of the general population—the majority of homeschool parents are either Democrats or independents (see Figure 3). The study also found that fewer than half of homeschoolers attend religious services weekly (including 31 percent who never attend services), and about 35 percent of homeschool households have at least one child enrolled in a public school.

The NHES data also provide valuable insight into other key demographic variables, as shown in Figure 4. (Although the National Center for Education Statistics has not yet published a complete 2022–23 dataset, I use its 2018–19 data to supplement the latest figures.)

Not surprisingly, a greater proportion of students living in areas classified as rural or towns are homeschooled than those living in areas classified as cities or suburbs. But while city and suburban students are homeschooled at lower rates, the NHES’s 2019 data indicate they still comprise about 64 percent of all homeschoolers.

Students living in lower-income households homeschool at lower rates than those living in higher-income households. According to the NHES’s 2019 data, nearly half of homeschoolers—about 49 percent—live in households earning more than $75,000.

Finally, in terms of education level, parents who have attended at least some college choose to homeschool at higher rates than parents with only a high school education. The NHES’s 2019 data show that a slight majority of homeschooler parents (52 percent) hold a bachelor’s, graduate, or professional degree, with less than one-quarter having only completed high school or less.

Reasons for homeschooling

The National Center for Education Statistics’ 2023 NHES report provides insight into why parents choose to homeschool. The survey allowed respondents to select multiple factors that were important in their decision, along with one “most important” factor. These findings, which largely mirror the final NHES survey before the Covid-19 pandemic, are summarized in Figure 5.

Notably, parents’ concerns about school environment stood out above the rest, with 83 percent of respondents identifying it as an important reason to homeschool and 28 percent ranking it as the most important one. Another factor receiving high scores in both categories was dissatisfaction with academic instruction at other schools, which was selected as an important reason by 72 percent of respondents and the most important reason by 17 percent. Taken together, nearly half of the respondents cited school environment or academics as the most important reason to homeschool their kids, underscoring the weight parents put on these factors.

Also notable is that moral instruction was selected by 75 percent of respondents as an important reason to homeschool, while the desire to provide religious instruction was chosen by 53 percent.

Takeaways and policy implications  

Available research and data on homeschooling provide several key takeaways for policymakers.

First, homeschoolers are a sizeable and growing share of U.S. students. Estimates vary, but we can confidently say that homeschoolers comprise between about 3.4 and 6 percent of all U.S. students, with a conservative estimate of 1.76 million total students as of 2022–23. “The U.S. homeschool population is of similar magnitude to the private and charter sectors,” conclude Watson and Lee.

As its popularity grows, homeschooling will face increasing scrutiny and regulatory pressure. It’s important for state policymakers to have an accurate view of who homeschoolers are, how they homeschool, why they choose this model, and what the research says about abuse, neglect, outcomes, and other vital issues. They should also carefully consider whether proposed homeschool regulations—ranging from notification requirements to curricular reviews—will achieve their intended purposes, and what the negative unintended consequences of additional oversight might be.

Next, data show that homeschoolers are a diverse population, putting to rest the stereotype that home education is exclusively the domain of white Christian conservatives. While white families homeschool at higher rates than Black and Hispanic families, between 29 and 40 percent of homeschoolers are students of color.

Furthermore, less than half of homeschool parents say they are Republicans, which should alert policymakers to the fact that homeschooling draws support across the political spectrum. Regardless of partisan affiliation, parents want what is best for their children, and for many, this means a home-based education.

Additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, many homeschooling families are connected to the public education system in some form. It’s rare for children to be homeschooled for their entire K–12 education, and more than one-third of homeschool households have at least one child enrolled in a public school. This underscores that, even within the same family, children have vastly different needs that can only be satisfied by a diverse supply of education providers. If maximizing each child’s unique potential is a primary goal for K–12 education, then it only makes sense to give families robust options through policy mechanisms such as education savings accounts, charter schools, and public school open enrollment. Policymakers should be sector-agnostic when it comes to cultivating K–12 education systems.

Finally, these findings offer valuable insights into where public schools are falling short and provide guidance on how they can improve. The fact that 45 percent of homeschool parents cite either concerns about school environments or dissatisfaction with academic instruction at other schools as the most important reason for homeschooling should raise flags for policymakers, especially at a time when lax discipline, chronic absenteeism, declining enrollment, low academic standards, and curricular controversies are making headlines from public school systems across the country.

The latest data and research clearly demonstrate that homeschoolers are diverse in many ways and that past conceptions about them should be discarded. They also provide lawmakers with an accurate understanding of modern homeschooling, its role in the education system, and insights into what public schools can learn from the reasons parents choose to homeschool. This is a critical time in K–12 education. With public schools falling short for families in a variety of measures, homeschooling is increasingly becoming an attractive alternative. Overregulating the sector in response to that preference won’t solve any of those problems, but it may add to them.

A version of this column first appeared at Education Next.

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States owe $2.7 trillion in debt, cities hold $1.4 trillion, school districts have $1.3 trillion, and counties owe $760 billion, according to a review by Reason Foundation of more than 20,000 financial statements filed by government entities for their 2023 fiscal years, the most recent period with complete data available.

In total, California’s state and local governments hold $1 trillion in debt, the highest in the nation. New York’s state and local debt is the second-most, at $800 billion, followed by Texas at $550 billion, Illinois at $410 billion, New Jersey at $310 billion, and Florida at $240 billion.

Additionally, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Washington, Michigan, Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, North Carolina, and Colorado each have more than $100 billion in state and local government debt.

On a per-capita basis, the state and local debt numbers are even more eye-opening, with states like Hawaii, Delaware, and Wyoming having surprisingly large debt loads per resident.

Nationally, state and local government debt amounts to about $18,400 per person. In New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, and Hawaii, state and local debt exceeds $30,000 a person.

Following them are Massachusetts, California, Alaska, North Dakota, Delaware, Wyoming, and Maryland, all of which have state and local liabilities in excess of $20,000 per resident.

Over 40 percent of state and local government debt consists of unfunded pension and healthcare benefits promised to public workers. State and local pension debt amounts to $1.5 trillion, with an additional $1 trillion in healthcare benefits promised to retirees.

The bonds that governments issue to fund infrastructure projects, such as roads and bridges, to build and upgrade schools, and to pay for other programs, represent an additional 33 percent of all state and local debt.

These debts have three negative consequences for taxpayers. First, the annual interest costs and debt payments are starting to crowd out essential services. Many local governments are already being forced to divert funds from taxpayers’ priorities, such as education, policing, and transportation, to pay for promised public pension benefits that they haven’t set aside the necessary money for.

Second, as governments struggle to cover rising interest and pension payments, some politicians will seek to raise taxes and fees, placing a growing burden on taxpayers. The scale of tax increases needed to pay for these public pension debts could also hinder economic activity within communities, reducing revenues and further increasing debt woes.

Third, current levels of debt weaken long-term balance sheets, harming the future. Some cities and states haven’t borrowed or spent wisely, so they’ll be looking to borrow more money to modernize their infrastructure, schools, and technology in the years ahead. However, today’s debt burden will make borrowing more expensive and potentially raise the interest rates on new bond issuances, costing taxpayers even more.

To address this mountain of debt and restore fiscal stability, state and local governments must sustainably align spending with revenues. In years with a robust economy, governments should use budget surpluses to pay down debt rather than funding new or existing programs.

For mega-infrastructure projects, such as major highway and bridge repair, replacement, and expansion, public-private partnerships can be used, allowing the private sector to bear the initial construction costs and any overruns, rather than taxpayers.

Ultimately, the most significant drivers of state and local debt are pensions and retiree healthcare benefits, which must be reformed to ensure they are fully funded and prevent the accrual of debt.

State and local governments have far less ability to keep piling up debt the way the federal government does. The bill is coming due, and cities and states that pay down debt quickly and right-size government will be best positioned for the future.

A version of this column first appeared at The DC Journal.

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Connecticut’s $60 billion Retirement Plans and Trust Funds exist to fund the retirement benefits promised to public workers, not to serve as a bailout vehicle for a professional sports franchise or to promote Connecticut’s economic development.

Gov. Lamont’s efforts to keep the Connecticut Sun in the state come as a Boston-based private equity group led by Celtics minority owner Steve Pagliuca reached a $325 million deal to buy the team and relocate it to Boston in 2027, pending league approval.

Connecticut’s state and local governments have recently made an impressive fiscal recovery after decades of budget neglect. The adoption of spending guardrails and mechanisms that enabled surplus pension contributions has stabilized finances, reduced bonded debt, improved pension funding, and led to credit rating upgrades. But recent fiscal improvements are no excuse for pursuing pension investments for political symbolism rather than financial merit.

The state’s fiscal job is unfinished: Connecticut still ranks second in the nation in terms of per-capita public employee debt (which includes unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities). Furthermore, the state’s pension trust—which calculates contributions presuming a 7% annual return—has earned an average return of just 5.7% over the past 24 years (2001-2024), while the S&P 500 returned 10.6% over the same period, according to the Reason Foundation’s 2025 Annual Pension Solvency and Performance Report.

If the goal of this proposed investment in the Connecticut Sun were to maximize investment returns, it wouldn’t have been paraded in such a manner. A financially motivated investment is one where Connecticut’s pension funds would be comfortable selling at any time deemed advantageous; it is one where the state feels comfortable advocating for management decisions that benefit the team the most, which could very well mean moving out of Connecticut.

In fact, politically motivated investment harms not only the state’s pension plans but also the Connecticut Sun itself. The team would be better off with investors who are genuinely interested in its success, rather than ones whose primary goal is merely to retain the team in a particular geographical location, even if that is not conducive to the team’s ability to compete and win.

Sports teams can be great investments if managed correctly, but the upside comes with a delicate bundle of risks. Professional sports franchises are relatively illiquid, with valuations that fluctuate depending on revenue trends, media rights, and local market conditions. Future exit prospects are also limited, because—unlike an investment in a publicly traded company—only so many people/institutions are willing and able to buy a professional sports team.

If the Connecticut Sun turned out to be a bad investment for the state’s pension plan, public employees in the plan would likely not bear the harm: they are still guaranteed their retirement benefits regardless of investment outcomes or cost increases. The risk instead falls on taxpayers, who must cover any funding gap in the pension fund through higher property, income, and sales taxes.

Connecticut’s pension funds are fiduciary funds established to fund retirement obligations while avoiding unnecessary risk, not a piggy bank for pet political projects. Any sports investments, like all other pension fund investments, must be evaluated on a single criterion: maximizing risk-adjusted returns for beneficiaries and taxpayers.

A version of this column first appeared at The Connecticut Mirror.

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“It’s no surprise that public schools are underfunded throughout the state,” claimed Anaheim Union High School District trustee Jessica Guerrero.

In reality, new Reason Foundation research shows that taxpayers are getting a poor return on their investment in California’s public schools, and the last thing those schools need is more money. Between 2002 and 2023, the state’s public school funding increased by nearly 79%, rising from $14,526 per student to $25,941 per student after adjusting for inflation.

The most recent data shows Los Angeles Unified spends $27,073 per average daily attendance, or per student, for shorthand. Santa Ana Unified spends $25,099 per student, San Bernardino Unified spends $24,881, Long Beach Unified spends $22,379, and Corona-Norco Unified spends $18,321.

California led the nation in K-12 spending growth over the past two decades, and you would expect commensurate gains in student outcomes. But results on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) from 2003 to 2024 were disappointing, with declines in 8th-grade math and only modest gains in 4th-grade math and 8th-grade reading. The lone bright spot was 4th-grade reading, where the share of students scoring below basic on NAEP improved from 50.4% to 43.7%. That means that just over half of 4th graders are meeting the lowest reading threshold.

Despite record education funding, student outcomes have barely budged. While there is plenty of blame to go around, Reason Foundation’s data reveal structural problems with how K-12 dollars are spent. For starters, California’s public schools are a textbook case of mission creep. From 2002 to 2023, enrollment fell by 317,253 students while the number of non-teachers—including counselors, psychologists, social workers, administrators, and instructional aides—increased by 74,428.

There are fewer kids and more staff because public schools are increasingly focused on things like “whole child” development and content about everything from climate change to ethnic studies, which takes time away from core classes like math, English language arts, and science.

For example, California is spending $4 billion on community schools that provide both students and their families with healthcare, mental health support, legal clinics, and other services. These things aren’t bad, but it doesn’t make sense to turn public schools into social service hubs when nearly 46% of 8th-graders can’t do basic math and districts like Los Angeles Unified can’t cover their bills.

Teacher pension debt is also diverting resources from classrooms. In 2023, California’s public schools spent $4,900 per student on pension benefits, which include pension costs, health insurance, workers’ compensation, and other expenses. These costs have increased by a massive 134.9% since 2002, when schools spent $2,086 per student in real terms.

While benefit spending is up, teachers’ benefits aren’t any better. That’s because the main cause of this increase is unfunded pension liabilities. For years, lawmakers failed to set aside enough cash to cover pension promises made to teachers, and the bill has come due.

In 2024, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System reported $85 billion in debt, which is more than the state spends on K-12 education each year. Allowing this debt to accumulate means even fewer dollars will be spent on instruction in the years ahead, as money is shifted to pay for benefits promised to retirees and workers.

Finally, empty school buildings are eating up resources. Between 2020 and 2023, public enrollment dropped by 5.1%. Yet only seven of the state’s public schools closed in 2023-24—well below pre-COVID-19 school closure levels and fewer than rural states like South Dakota and Utah.

Public school closures are challenging for communities, but the alternative is worse. Underutilized schools are inefficient and costly, siphoning away dollars that could be used to boost student achievement with reading programs, tutoring, and increasing pay for high-performing teachers.

There are no easy fixes to California’s student achievement woes, and even more money won’t help. Policymakers must address structural issues with how education funding is spent, with a focus on academics, reducing pension debt, and closing underutilized schools.

A version of this column first appeared at The Orange County Register.

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For as long as organized sports have existed, officials and players have attempted to profit by exploiting insider information or fixing games to win large sums of money. In 1978, Boston College basketball players participated in a point-shaving scheme orchestrated by the mafia. Even earlier, eight players for the Chicago White Sox were permanently banned from professional baseball after accepting money from a gambling syndicate to intentionally lose the 1919 World Series.

However, these types of gambling-related scandals have taken on greater significance in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, which struck down as unconstitutional the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, thereby allowing states to legalize sports betting. Can fans still have faith in the integrity of the games they love in a world where sports betting is legal and widely available?

The answer is that they should arguably have more faith in game integrity now than they did when such betting took place underground and without the oversight of gambling companies, leagues, and sports integrity monitoring organizations.

Before 2018, sports betting was less public, but it was a vast, illicit market operating in the shadows, estimated to be worth $80 billion to $150 billion per year. There was no regulatory framework, and no ability to detect suspicious play from large bets made on individual players’ performance. There were no real-time monitoring systems, no artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms flagging suspicious betting patterns, and crucially, no cooperation between bookmakers, law enforcement, and leagues.

What has changed is that legal sportsbooks are now required by law to monitor and report unusual betting activity to authorities. Actually, the recent NBA gambling scandals—including the 2024 case involving Toronto Raptors forward-center Jontay Porter—probably would have gone undetected without the help of sports integrity monitors like Sportradar. These services track betting activity to identify irregular patterns that may indicate match-fixing or other forms of misconduct. When betting markets on Porter’s individual plays saw abnormal betting action with unusually large wagers all predicting he would perform below expectations, the system worked as designed. Licensed bookmakers flagged the activity. The NBA and federal authorities investigated.

Sportradar is one of the leading integrity monitors, and its Universal Fraud Detection System, which monitors 30 billion odds changes annually across more than 600 betting operators, detected 1,329 suspicious matches globally in 2023—representing just 0.21% of all monitored events, or roughly one in 467 games. Of these suspicious matches, just 35 were in North America. Sports fans should take comfort in these figures, which indicate that American sports are among the least corrupt in the world.

When scandals surface, it’s tempting to say sports betting legalization is creating more corruption rather than examining the possibility that more cheats are being caught because of legalization.

Suppose legal sports betting is so corrosive to game integrity. Why are there no similar concerns in Europe, where sports betting is legal in 21 countries, with hundreds of licensed operators, or in countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand? These countries have had legal, regulated betting markets for decades. Games are well attended, and sports remain integral to the social fabric. Scandals arise and are dealt with, but there’s no serious push to ban sports betting. On the other end of the spectrum, last year, China, where all sports betting is illegal, banned 38 soccer players and five club officials for life following an investigation that found 120 matches had been fixed.  

Banning sports betting so that it falls exclusively into the hands of criminals and offshore platforms won’t eliminate corruption; it may very well worsen it. The combination of individual and team integrity, law enforcement engagement, and tech-savvy monitoring means fans can and should have confidence that they live in one of the greatest countries to watch sports in the world, and trust that the games they’re watching are played fairly.

A version of this column first appeared at RealClearPolicy.

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But the FTC’s loss this week in its monopolization case against Meta is an unequivocal defeat for Khan and the Neo-Brandeisian antitrust movement she began, signaling instead that antitrust authorities have little basis for finding illegal monopolies among big tech’s digital platforms.

Filed under Khan’s watch under President Joe Biden in 2021 and brought to trial this year under President Donald Trump and current FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson, the FTC alleged that Meta monopolized the market for “personalized social networking” (PSN) services, most notably through its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. In a Nov. 18 decision, Judge James Boasberg of the D.C. district court ruled that the relevant market in the case is not PSN services but a wider social media market that, at the very least, includes two other major players: YouTube and TikTok. Meta never held a monopoly in that market, Boasberg determined, because Facebook and Instagram together fall well below any threshold that courts would consider a monopoly.

An irrelevant market

According to the FTC, Facebook viewed Instagram as a competitive threat to its dominant share of the PSN market, and instead of competing, chose to buy its competitor. WhatsApp, while not an existing competitor in the PSN services market, was, according to the FTC, well-poised to enter it. Once again, Meta bought a potential competitor.

The market that the FTC chose to define as relevant for the case proved to be its undoing. The PSN services market, according to the FTC, includes Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and a smaller platform called MeWe. Even when the case was filed almost five years ago, the boundaries of this market were fragile. Meta argued that the FTC’s case failed to survive a wider market definition that also included YouTube and TikTok. In this larger six-firm market, Meta’s acquisition of Instagram (or potential competitor WhatsApp) would simply not involve enough market share for the monopolization allegations to hold water.

Staking an entire antitrust case on the assertion that YouTube and TikTok are not competitors of Facebook and Instagram was always, at best, a highly risky move by the FTC. In 2021, when the court decided to allow the case to proceed, it warned, “[T]he agency may well face a tall task down the road in proving its allegations.” But if the FTC’s vision of a distinct PSN services market was dubious in 2021, by 2025 it was dead on arrival.

Facebook and Instagram provide users with two broad types of content: “Connected content” refers to personal postings or media shared directly by friends within the app, while “unconnected content” refers to videos that are recommended to users by artificial intelligence (AI). As Boasberg makes clear in his ruling, Facebook and Instagram shifted over the course of a decade from providing almost exclusively connected content to providing mostly unconnected content, with connected content forming an important secondary source of value. According to evidence presented at trial, in January 2025, Facebook users spent only 17 percent of their time on the app viewing connected content, while the figure for Instagram is a mere 7 percent.

Inconveniently for the FTC, TikTok and YouTube are even more focused on the unconnected content model that now also tops the list for Facebook and Instagram. Boasberg writes that, “Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube have thus evolved to have nearly identical main features. On all four, users spend most of their time watching videos. All four use algorithms to recommend those videos to users. And if someone finds content that she likes, all four apps let her tap a button to send it to friends—whether via a direct message on Facebook, Instagram, or TikTok, or using a text message.”

Importantly, the court held throughout the case that the FTC must show that Meta is violating the law now, and that the PSN market is properly defined as of 2025. Ten years ago, the case for Meta’s platforms existing in a distinct personalized social networking services market, excluding YouTube and TikTok, might have been plausible. Now, it causes the case to fall apart. The mere fact that users on all four platforms spend the majority of their time doing the same thing goes most of the way to placing them as competitors in a relevant market. Unfortunately for the FTC, its idea of a distinct PSN market fares just as badly by virtually all other standards accepted by courts.

Among the most compelling evidence for vigorous competition between the four platforms comes from the “natural and field experiments” that were presented at trial and summarized in the judge’s decision.  Unexpected outages of YouTube and Meta in 2018 and 2021, respectively, provide windows into short-term substitutions consumers made with their time, while TikTok bans in the United States and India provide an opportunity to track similar longer-term behavior. These are the types of studies economists outside of court would look to when considering the competitive landscape, and they confirm the existence of vigorous competition among the four platforms. Boasberg writes, “[W]hen consumers cannot use Facebook and Instagram, they turn first to TikTok and YouTube. When they cannot use TikTok or YouTube, they turn to Facebook and Instagram. That evidence leaves the Court with no doubt that TikTok and YouTube compete with Meta’s apps.”

Had the FTC been able to rescue the idea of a distinct social networking market, it would have faced several other obstacles, most notably whether consumers were actually harmed by Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. But in the wider and more accurately defined social media market, Meta’s combined share (including Facebook and Instagram) doesn’t come close to any threshold considered monopoly power in previous court cases.

Expect the unexpected

In the wake of its defeat, the FTC should carefully consider the story of how Facebook and Instagram came to be competitors with YouTube and TikTok. At the heart of that story are two sets of disruptive innovations that expanded the frontier of what social media apps were able to provide consumers. The first big change was smartphones. In 2011, according to trial evidence, just over one-third of American consumers had adopted smartphones. The majority of the time consumers spent on apps like Facebook was in front of a desktop or laptop screen. As the quality of cellular data networks increased, consumers switched to using Facebook and Instagram as smartphone apps, and it became clear that streaming videos were among the most popular uses.

At the time, the best way to recommend new content to consumers remained their network of friends. Then, social media companies discovered AI. The same technology that enables generative AI chatbots, drawing inferences from billions of points of data, proved extraordinarily successful at recommending video content to consumers.

Despite these disruptive events, the FTC clung to a rigid and out-of-date market definition that drew a hard line between social networking and video content. By 2021, when it filed suit, it should have already been clear that these markets were being remade. Much of the switch to smartphones, along with improvements in video streaming, had already taken place. In the five years since, the AI revolution dealt a final blow to the idea of a distinct social networking market. Meta, along with the parent companies of YouTube and TikTok, quickly learned that the computing power unlocked by AI could recommend content more successfully than any other method, including a user’s own friends. Sharing content with friends ultimately became a complementary feature to viewing content recommended by AI.

FTC v. Meta is the second antitrust case against a major digital platform that ended this year, in which AI technology radically altered the competitive landscape while the trial was underway. In DOJ v. Google, Judge Amit Mehta found in 2024 that Google had unlawfully monopolized the market for online search. But a year later, generative AI had emerged as a force altering how people access online information in ways that even insiders at Google and its competitors did not foresee the previous year. Judge Mehta noted the need for “a healthy dose of humility” under such uncertainty, which contributed to the final remedies against Google being lighter than many had expected.

Reflecting on the rapid pace of change in FTC v. Meta, Judge Boasberg opened his decision with wisdom from the ancients:

“Believing that the only constant in the world was change, the Greek philosopher Heraclitus posited that no man can ever step into the same river twice. In the online world of social media, the current runs fast, too. The landscape that existed only five years ago when the Federal Trade Commission brought this antitrust suit has changed markedly. While it once might have made sense to partition apps into separate markets of social networking and social media, that wall has since broken down.”

Before plotting future antitrust action against firms in the digital age, the FTC and its counterparts at the DOJ would be wise to ponder the meaning of the word “constant.” Nobody could have predicted exactly how social media would change during the last decade. But the fact that unforeseen change was significant enough to remake a digital market in a few short years should surprise nobody. In its zeal to punish Big Tech and infuse antitrust with populism and activism, the FTC rigidly stuck to a market definition that became more obsolete with every year.

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One way to evaluate the burden of pension contributions is to measure their size in comparison to payroll. Between 2014 and 2024, average pension contributions by state and local governments rose from 23% to 29% of payroll—a 26% increase, Reason Foundation’s Annual Pension Solvency and Performance Report finds.

Differences among states

The median pension contribution rate as a share of payroll in 2014 was 22%; in 2024, it was 26%.

Among states, New Jersey saw the highest increase during these 10 years, 28.5 percentage points, with the aggregate contribution rate going from 13.5% to 42%. Alaska’s 28-point increase, from 41% to 69%, was the second largest, followed by Wisconsin (+25 percentage points), Kentucky (+18), Connecticut (+15), and California (+15).

In eight states, however, thanks to some combination of fiscal discipline, additional pension contributions, strong financial returns, and successful pension reforms, pension contributions as a share of payroll actually decreased between 2014 and 2024, including West Virginia (-7.7 percentage points), New York (-6.4), and Indiana (-3.1).

Some of the observed increases in contribution rates may actually reflect fiscal prudence, not recklessness. States that have made either one-time or ongoing additional contributions to their pensions—such as Connecticut, West Virginia, and Alaska—will have higher contribution rates in the years those additional payments are made. These payments accelerate the amortization schedule and cut decades of interest costs, generating long-term savings. In subsequent years, as their debts are paid off, their required contribution rates should decline.

Amortization rises while normal cost stays stable

One might assume that the long-term nationwide increase in pension contribution rates is a result of public employee pensions becoming more generous. That is not the case. Instead, larger contributions have been needed to compensate for past underfunding—that is, to make up for decades of underestimating the true cost of providing the pensions promised to state and local employees.

There are two components of contribution rates: normal costs and amortization costs.

Normal Cost: The portion of pension contributions used to cover the cost of benefits earned in a given year. This is a forward-looking estimate of the amount that needs to be contributed to pay the benefits accrued by employees during the fiscal year.

Amortization cost: The portion of pension contributions used to pay down unfunded pension liabilities, which arise because normal costs were either underestimated or not fully funded in the past. This is a backward-looking payment, structured over a set period (e.g., 20–30 years), to gradually pay down pension debt.

From 2014 to 2024, normal costs have remained virtually flat, even declining slightly, from 14% to 13%. Meanwhile, amortization costs have increased from 9% to 16%—an 80% increase.

There are two main drivers of the significant increase in amortization costs: first, a widespread, decades-long underestimation of the true cost of the pension benefits promised to public employees; and second, retroactive benefit increases.

The underestimation of costs has been primarily driven by chronic overestimation of investment returns. Since the 2000s, public pensions have assumed that they would earn higher investment returns than they really have. Plans have been increasingly forced to reckon with this reality, and amortization costs have risen to compensate.

Normal costs have been stable. This is due to public pension reforms across the country—such as the creation of new tiers, fine-tuning of cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and the introduction of defined contribution plans—which have kept actuarial costs stable.

Some increases in pension benefits, however, do not manifest as increases in normal costs, which only capture actuarial and pre-determined benefits. When benefits enhancements are forward-looking and pre-funded—as they are supposed to be—normal costs increase correspondingly. But in some cases, state legislatures and cities give retroactive pension enhancements—such as increased salary multipliers or COLAs—without pre-funding them. The costs of such retroactive benefit increases show up all at once, as a debt to be amortized, and only to a small degree, as an increase in normal costs. Because amortization costs have been rising while normal costs have remained stable, the composition of pension contributions has shifted. In 2014, 60% of pension contributions were directed to fund the pension benefits that current employees accrued that year. By 2024, only 45% of contributions funded current benefits. More than half of the contributions, 55%, go toward covering previous underfunding.

State and local governments have footed the increase

In almost all defined benefit plans, employee contribution rates are fixed. If the costs of pension benefits unexpectedly increase due to the expansion of COLAs, disappointing investment returns, or readjustments to discount rates, employers—that is, the sponsoring state or local government—must cover this difference on their own.

That explains the following chart, which shows that, from 2014 to 2023, employer contribution rates increased by 31%, while employee contribution rates rose by only 14%.

State and local governments have had to absorb nearly all of the increased pension costs, because, ultimately, it is public employers—and, by extension, taxpayers—who bear full risk for any unexpected costs in funding pension benefits. The result is that a growing share of current taxpayers’ money is being used to pay pension benefits for past employees—that is, to cover the costs of services they themselves did not use. 

The nation’s estimated $1.5 trillion in government pension debt will continue to generate significant strains on budgets and taxpayers. Lawmakers should continue to prioritize strategies that accelerate amortization schedules and ensure annual contributions are sufficient to pay down existing liabilities, not just maintain them.

Looking ahead, states should adopt cost-sharing and alternative retirement plan designs for new hires that align costs and risks more evenly between employers and employees, preventing the accumulation of new unfunded liabilities.

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Florida’s housing market is under severe strain. Median home prices now exceed $450,000, with more than half of renter households being cost-burdened, spending over 30% of their income on housing. This growing imbalance between home prices and income has made it difficult for workers and families to live near employment centers, schools, and essential services. Senate Bill 208 presents an opportunity to address these challenges by strengthening property rights, removing restrictive zoning barriers, and streamlining permitting processes so the private sector can respond effectively to housing demand.

We share the same goal as Chair McClain: strengthening property rights and improving housing affordability in Florida. Senate Bill 208 would do both.

Strengthening property rights and preempting restrictive zoning

Senate Bill 208 reinforces the right of property owners to determine the most productive use of their land within reasonable bounds of public safety. In many communities, outdated zoning codes prohibit the construction of multifamily housing or mixed-use development on land already suitable for such purposes. These restrictions prevent willing owners and developers from responding to demand, blocking the natural evolution of neighborhoods.

By preempting local governments from imposing unnecessary barriers to housing, this bill restores the decision-making authority of property owners. Property rights are a cornerstone of economic freedom and prosperity, and zoning should not be used to preserve exclusivity or prevent lawful, market-driven development. When local governments restrict property owners’ ability to adapt to changing needs, the result is higher costs, less competition, and fewer choices for Florida families.

Streamlining development and reducing bureaucratic delays

This bill also strengthens Florida’s commitment to reducing red tape in housing production. Lengthy and uncertain approval processes often increase project costs and discourage investment. By refining permitting timelines and creating greater consistency across jurisdictions, Senate Bill 208  provides predictability for builders and investors while ensuring transparency for residents.

A streamlined permitting process allows private developers to bring new housing online faster, reducing the mismatch between supply and demand. Every additional week or month of delay increases carrying costs, which are ultimately passed on to renters and buyers. Cutting unnecessary bureaucracy is one of the most effective ways to expand housing supply without adding new spending or subsidies.

Encouraging private investment

Senate Bill 208 relies on private-sector leadership rather than government intervention. The bill does not mandate specific outcomes but instead allows developers and property owners to respond to the market. By lowering barriers and creating predictability, the legislation encourages investment in a range of housing types that meet the needs of Floridians.

Developers, small builders, and local investors are best positioned to assess demand and deliver housing where it is needed most. A regulatory framework that aids development leverages the efficiency of markets rather than expanding state programs or long-term subsidies. Allowing the private market to function more freely aligns with Florida’s economic strengths.

Reducing labor market distortions

Restrictive local zoning not only limits housing supply but also distorts Florida’s labor markets. When workers cannot find housing near job centers, they are forced to live farther away, increasing commute times and reducing productivity. Employers, in turn, face higher recruitment and retention costs.

By removing these barriers and allowing more housing to be built near employment hubs, Senate Bill 208 helps align workforce availability with economic growth. The legislation will make it easier for workers to live closer to jobs, improving both household well-being and business competitiveness.

Consideration: Tax preferences

While Senate Bill 208 takes a strong step toward deregulation, it continues to rely in part on property tax exemptions to encourage housing production. Although these incentives can help offset regulatory costs, they can also create uneven advantages among developers and distort market neutrality. Florida should continue to focus on broad-based deregulation as the most effective and equitable way to promote housing supply, ensuring that all property owners benefit equally from a freer market.

Policy adaptation for Florida

Senate Bill 208 represents an important step forward in expanding housing opportunities and protecting private property rights in Florida. By curbing restrictive local zoning, streamlining permitting, and encouraging private investment, the bill empowers property owners and the market to respond to demand for housing.

Reason Foundation supports the passage of this legislation and encourages the Florida Legislature to continue leading the way in housing reform that respects individual freedom, limits government interference, and promotes economic growth.

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A new analysis by Aon Investments USA Inc. (a market consulting company), commissioned by the Florida State Board of Administrators (SBA), predicts that the Florida Retirement System, FRS, is on track to eliminate all unfunded pension liabilities by 2042. Lawmakers reformed the system in 2011 by introducing a defined contribution (DC) option called the Investment Plan, and subsequently made it the default retirement plan for most new hires in 2018. These reforms have helped FRS make progress in closing what was a nearly $40 billion funding shortfall after the Great Recession.  

The latest reporting from FRS now gives the system an 83.7% funded ratio (up from 70% in 2009), indicating that the state has made progress but still needs to stay the course to return to its pre-recession, full funding status. According to Reason Foudnation’s recently released Annual Pension Solvency and Performance Report, one bad year in the market (0% returns in 2026) would essentially undo that progress, bringing the system’s unfunded liabilities back to an estimated $40 billion overnight. 

Florida has a long way to go before catching up with its public pension promises 

If market outcomes over the next two decades resemble those of the last 20 years, FRS won’t achieve full funding anytime soon. The pension system’s 24-year average return since 2001 is 6.4%, falling short of the plan’s 6.7% assumption. According to Reason Foundation’s actuarial modeling of FRS, this seemingly small 0.3% shortfall would push the date for reaching full funding out by another three years. 

Another major recession would also significantly derail the system. Reason Foundation’s modeling indicates that an investment loss in 2026 similar to that of 2009 (a 20% loss) would result in a funding ratio of 62%, and it would take 15 years just to climb back to today’s funding levels. The full funding date would extend well beyond 2055 in that scenario. 

Lower market returns would also drive up the annual costs of FRS, which taxpayers and lawmakers should be wary of. In 2024, employers contributing to the FRS pension paid an amount equal to around 12.7% of payroll (totaling $5.6 billion statewide annually). If everything goes as planned, with returns matching the system’s assumptions, this cost will remain relatively stable and drop significantly once the system is free from pension debt. Under the scenario of a major recession, annual costs will need to rise to as high as 22.9% of payroll to maintain full pension benefit payments. 

A recession would necessitate much larger government contributions 

When it comes to public pensions, policymakers can hope for the best, but they need to prepare for the worst. At a minimum, they should structure pension systems to withstand the same market pressures and funding challenges that created today’s costly pension debt.

Florida lawmakers should consider these risks as they weigh proposals to expand benefits. During the 2025 legislative session, lawmakers saw (and rejected) a proposal to unroll the state’s crucial 2011 reform by again granting cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to all FRS members.

Reason Foundation’s analysis of the proposal warned that even under a best-case scenario, the move would add $36 billion in new costs over the next 30 years. A scenario in which the system sees multiple recessions over the next 30 years would have driven the estimated costs of the proposed COLA to $47 billion.

For a pension fund that is still many years away from having the assets to fulfill existing retirement promises, the last thing it needs is to double down on more costs and liabilities. 

Current proposals to cut taxes in the Sunshine State should also factor into any consideration of granting additional pension benefits to public workers. A new group of bills introduced in the state’s House of Representatives signals that lawmakers intend to offer several property tax-cutting measures to voters on the 2026 ballot. It is safe to say that the idea of increasing pension costs on Florida’s local governments while simultaneously facing the prospect of reduced tax revenue is ill-advised.  

Through prudent reforms, Florida has made some laudable progress in improving the funding of its public pension system. However, the state is still several years away from achieving the end goal of all these efforts, and any level of market turbulence would push the finish line out by decades. Policymakers need to be aware of Florida’s long-term pension funding strategy and avoid any proposals to add to the costs and risks imposed on taxpayers through new pension benefits. 

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In Ohio, lawmakers have taken a tentative step toward addressing this gap with House Bill 542, which would require all jails and prisons to report pregnancy outcomes—a proposal prompted by Linda Acoff’s preventable miscarriage while in the custody of Cuyahoga County Jail in 2024. However, the bill, sponsored by state Representatives Terrence Upchurch (D-District 20) and Josh Williams (R-District 44), does not define what constitutes a “pregnancy outcome,” leaving it unclear whether facilities must report live births, miscarriages, stillbirths, other medical conclusions, or all of the above.

There is a significant gap in the oversight of pregnancy in prisons. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ most recent report found that more than 700 pregnancies were recorded in U.S. prisons in 2023, with 91 percent resulting in live births, 6 percent in miscarriages, and about 2 percent in abortions. The report did not include data like preterm deliveries, cesarean rates, and maternal complications, making it impossible to understand whether those births were healthy or whether complications were preventable. The report also did not determine how often incarcerated women actually received the prenatal care, nutritional support, or postpartum follow-up that state facilities claim to provide.

Data from the Prison Policy Initiative show that almost half of pregnant women who are incarcerated never receive prenatal testing or basic dietary adjustments during pregnancy, and some are forced to give birth without medical assistance. Without a comprehensive way to track this information, policymakers and health officials are left with an incomplete picture of what care looks like in practice in correctional settings, making it impossible to measure progress or hold individuals accountable.

In February 2024, 30-year-old Linda Acoff was 17 weeks pregnant and detained at the Cuyahoga County Jail in Cleveland. According to an investigation by The Marshall Project and News 5 Cleveland, she screamed in pain for hours, pleading for help as her condition worsened. A nurse, later fired, gave her Tylenol and sanitary napkins but did not call for medical care. When her cellmate eventually alerted a guard, Acoff was taken by stretcher to a hospital, where doctors confirmed she had already miscarried. An autopsy of the fetus later revealed that she lost her pregnancy due to a common infection that went untreated. The baby’s death became the catalyst for the introduction of House Bill 542. Acoff’s death exposed what happens when there is no system for tracking what goes wrong or why. And the “why” really matters—each pregnancy carries unique risks that require timely, evidence-based responses.

Poor outcomes like Acoff’s are not isolated. Across the country, reports of women giving birth alone in jail cells reveal a pattern of preventable harm. A ten-year review of jail births found that among the women who gave birth inside cells, nearly two-thirds delivered only after repeated pleas for medical help went unanswered, and one in four infants was stillborn or died within two weeks. Many of these tragedies stem from untreated infections, premature labor, and delayed medical response.

Beyond maternal healthcare, the risks for infectious diseases are magnified in correctional environments where pathogens spread far more easily than in the community. Studies show that people in custody experience infectious diseases at rates four to nine times higher than the general population. Crowded living spaces, inadequate ventilation, limited screening, and delays in care all heighten the risk. For pregnant women, these conditions can turn manageable illnesses into life-threatening emergencies, as in Acoff’s case. Yet infection control is rarely prioritized, and access to preventive care remains inconsistent across facilities.

On top of these failures, incarcerated people are still charged medical copays to access care, with rates up to $13.50, including for prenatal visits. For someone earning an average of just 55 cents an hour in wages, according to a 2024 analysis of state prison labor data, medical copays of up to $13.50 represent several full days of work. Although some skilled production jobs pay modestly higher rates, these positions account for fewer than 5% of all prison jobs. A 2021 study in the Journal of Correctional Health Care, a peer-reviewed healthcare journal, found that women in prison were 50% more likely than men to forgo medical treatment because of these fees, even when they had greater health needs. When medical care requires copays that exceed what people can realistically pay, it discourages responsible health decisions and undermines the stated goal of reducing long-term healthcare costs. For pregnant women whose health needs are urgent and often unpredictable, this creates another layer of disincentive that worsens an already fragile system.

Further policy recommendations

Data collection alone will not prevent harm if it does not inform intervention. House Bill 542 establishes the foundation by requiring correctional facilities to begin reporting pregnancy data. To make that reporting more meaningful, the state should ensure the data collected is consistent and detailed enough to identify where care is breaking down.

Define and Standardize Data Collection: Pregnancy outcomes and milestones must be clearly defined and standardized across all facilities to ensure accuracy and comparability. These measures should include live births, stillbirths, miscarriages, preterm deliveries, cesarean sections, untreated infections, and maternal complications. Recording these outcomes in a consistent and structured way will allow state health agencies to identify weak points in care—whether that involves inadequate prenatal screening, delays in treatment, or gaps in postpartum follow-up.

Create a Data Review and Oversight Process: To maintain trust and ensure objectivity, lawmakers could allow the data collected under HB 542 to be reviewed by an independent third-party organization—such as a public health research institute, auditing firm, or university partner. These external reviewers could assess the completeness and consistency of the reporting and publish statewide summaries that identify trends without compromising privacy. Independent evaluation promotes transparency while avoiding conflicts of interest that arise when agencies assess their own performance.

Mandate an Annual Public Report: HB 542 should require the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to publish an annual public summary of statewide pregnancy data. The report should include total pregnancies, outcomes, and any identified patterns in medical care or response times, while maintaining de-identified and aggregated data to protect privacy. A publicly available brief would allow lawmakers, journalists, researchers, and community organizations to assess progress and hold institutions accountable. 

When implemented together, these policies can turn data into a mechanism for accountability and reform that not only tracks harm but actively prevents it.

Ohio’s House Bill 542 is an important first step toward transparency and accountability in a system where too many pregnancy outcomes still go unrecorded. By simply requiring correctional facilities to document and report this information, the bill fills a long-standing gap in maternal healthcare oversight behind bars. With consistent reporting, independent review, and public access to findings, Ohio can begin to build a framework that not only tracks outcomes but helps reduce the harm already occurring in its correctional facilities.

The post Tracking pregnancy behind bars: Why Ohio’s House Bill 542 could save lives appeared first on Reason Foundation.