The pilot program’s structure, however, limited participation and missed wider benefits. Congress should utilize the expected 2026 Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) reauthorization to renew the Army Corps of Engineers’ public-private partnership program with expanded authority to enable private-sector participation.

The program, created in 2018 by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, selected four projects: the Brazos Island Harbor Channel Improvement in Texas; the Fargo-Moorhead Metro Area Flood Risk Management Project in North Dakota and Minnesota; the South Platte River and Tributaries Ecosystem Restoration in Colorado; and the Louisville Metro Flood Risk Management Project in Kentucky.

These projects underwent a six-to-24-month process to test how public-private partnership delivery compared with the standard model. Each project underwent an evaluation to determine whether alternative delivery could reduce costs, accelerate schedules, or improve outcomes when compared to the Corps’ traditional design-bid-build approach.

The program’s framework had a few structural flaws. The program did not permit direct private-sector involvement in project ideas. This restriction prevented P3s from drawing on the expertise and flexibility that make them useful. By limiting private participation to projects the Corps had already selected with non-federal partners, the program foreclosed opportunities for industry to identify infrastructure needs, propose solutions, or bring forward financing mechanisms that might not have occurred to agency planners working within budget constraints and bureaucratic timelines.

The effective prohibition on unsolicited proposals was another major design flaw. Research shows that accepting unsolicited proposals can help public partners identify new project concepts they might not have identified on their own. Companies bring technical skills, knowledge of new financing tools, and operational methods that can improve outcomes when combined with public planning. The restriction meant that the Corps could not benefit from innovations or efficiencies developed by private firms through work on similar projects in other jurisdictions or industries.

The Army Corps of Engineers also restricted projects further to those already in its system and with construction costs above $50 million. This prevented lower-cost or non-traditional projects from entering the process, even when they aligned with mission goals. The threshold excluded many projects that could benefit from alternative delivery while limiting the program to a handful of megaprojects that take years to develop and execute.

Despite these barriers, the pilot program outcomes make a strong case for making greater use of public-private partnerships (P3s). 

Of the four projects:

• The Fargo-Moorhead Area Diversion Project, built through a shared P3 model, is set to cost $330 million less and finish 10 years sooner than a standard Corps project. 
• The Brazos Island Harbor Channel Improvement Project, built through a P3 model, saved a total of $72 million and proved the viability of P3s for future dredging projects.
• The South Platte River & Tributaries Ecosystem Restoration and Flood Risk Management Project saved anywhere from $121 million to $ 194 million and reduced the project time by two to five years.
• The Louisville Metro Flood Risk Management Project saved up to 30% of project costs and had an expected delivery date eight years ahead of schedule compared to a traditional project.

Gains like this show what can happen when incentives align. The project combined federal participation through the Army Corps of Engineers with state and local contributions and private financing to accelerate construction and transfer long-term operations to entities with experience managing similar facilities.

Congress is expected to reauthorize the Water Resources Development Act in 2026. The bipartisan WRDA of 2024, signed in early 2025, funded $10.7 billion in Corps work but did not extend the P3 program. Lawmakers could use the next bill to fix the first program’s limitations. The next reauthorization presents an opportunity to expand P3 authority before the momentum from the successful pilot dissipates.

A renewed program should drop the ban on unsolicited proposals while maintaining evaluation and transparency standards. The Army Corps of Engineers should also remove cost thresholds that restrict participation to large projects. Many projects with costs below $50 million could still produce value when using alternative delivery models. A renewed program could establish criteria for evaluating unsolicited proposals, including alignment with Corps mission areas, demonstration of public benefit, and financial viability, while preserving the agency’s discretion to accept or reject proposals.

Studies suggest that public-private partnerships can deliver projects faster and at a lower cost than direct government delivery. The 2019 USACE “Revolutionize Civil Works“ report found that P3s can deliver projects 20% faster and more efficiently, with added value from better long-term management. These gains result from aligning contractor incentives with project outcomes, transferring certain risks to parties better positioned to manage them, and utilizing private capital to expedite work that might otherwise wait years for sufficient appropriations from Congress.

The Army Corps of Engineers could establish a process for private firms to propose projects that meet navigation, flood control, or ecosystem needs. That process would help the agency manage its current project backlog of nearly $100 billion. Wider use of public-private partnership models could accelerate projects without relying on annual appropriations. Opening the door to private proposals would give communities and industries with pressing infrastructure needs a pathway to work with the Corps on solutions, even when those projects have not yet entered the agency’s planning pipeline.

Renewing and improving this program would not reduce oversight. It would create more ways to align private capital and skills with public goals. Congress should use the next WRDA to grant the Army Corps of Engineers broader public-private partnership authority, enabling it to utilize every tool to meet national infrastructure needs. The pilot program proved the concept works at a surface level. Now, policymakers should remove the restrictions that prevent it from reaching its full potential.

The post A chance to unlock the full potential of public-private partnerships in water infrastructure appeared first on Reason Foundation.

For years, the nation’s busiest ports have been caught in a funding paradox. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, for instance, contribute roughly half of all Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HTMF) revenue but historically received only about three percent back in federal investment. These naturally deep-water ports needed less maintenance dredging than their shallow-draft counterparts, so under the old formula, they were effectively subsidizing smaller harbors across the country.

Section 102 of the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2020 reduced the cross-subsidization of smaller, shallower ports by naturally deep ports. Section 102 guarantees donor ports at least 12% of annual Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund expenditures for expanded uses like berth improvements, wharf repairs, and slope stability projects. 

The 2020 reform represented a moment of bipartisan consensus on infrastructure policy. Congress recognized that forcing major trade gateways to subsidize less economically significant harbors was both unfair and strategically unwise. The legislation established a more equitable distribution formula that would continue to support smaller ports while ensuring that the nation’s most critical maritime infrastructure received adequate federal investment. In fiscal year 2024, approximately $332 million was allocated to donor and energy transfer ports under Section 102, demonstrating the program’s potential impact.

But through reinterpreting budget allocation rules, the Army Corps of Engineers is failing to disburse funds to ports that have been anticipating them. 

The Corps has exploited the vague statutory phrase “to the extent practicable” in Section 102 as the primary basis for reducing or eliminating allocations in subsequent years. According to the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), this will cost ports around $1 billion for the remainder of the Trump administration, and $417.6 million of what Section 102 would have had the Corps pay out currently. By interpreting this phrase to confer broad administrative discretion over the timing and amount of payments, the Corps frames Section 102 funding as subject to fiscal constraints and internal budget priorities rather than a mandatory appropriation. 

Furthermore, the Corps relies on its interpretation that Section 102 functions as a limitation on reimbursement and credit authority—not as an independent authorization to obligate funds. This means it will only pay out Section 102 funding when directed by clear appropriations language or when specific reimbursement authority exists elsewhere. Combined with restrictive budgeting practices and the absence of explicit mandatory payment directives in annual appropriations laws, this interpretation enables the Corps to treat Section 102 allocations as subject to change or elimination in the Corps’ internal work plans and fiscal execution. 

In letters to congressional leadership, the American Association of Port Authorities and 23 major port authorities have demanded restoration of Section 102 funding, warning that continued cuts will cost the port system over $1 billion in federal investment during the current presidential term. These port executives recognize that consistent, predictable funding is crucial for planning and implementing the infrastructure improvements necessary to maintain America’s position in global trade.

Congress should require the Corps to act in accordance with the legislative intent of Section 102 by appropriating the funds promised in Section 102 for the upcoming 2026 fiscal year Energy and Water Appropriations Bill. The current situation illustrates why vague statutory language, such as “to the extent practicable,” invites bureaucratic misinterpretation.

Future WRDA reauthorizations should include more explicit funding guarantees and stricter reporting requirements to ensure the Army Corps of Engineers cannot simply ignore congressional directives. Appropriators should also include specific language in spending bills that compels Section 102 compliance rather than leaving it to agency discretion.

The broader principle at stake extends beyond port funding to the relationship between Congress and the executive branch. When federal agencies can effectively nullify legislation through administrative interpretation, they undermine the constitutional separation of powers and can evade accountability. Section 102 represented sound policy based on economic logic and the “user pays/user benefits” principle. Its circumvention by the Corps demonstrates how statutory vagueness can be exploited or used to avoid disbursing necessary funds.

American ports are critical infrastructure that facilitate over $2 trillion in annual trade. Ensuring their efficient operation and continued modernization should be a national priority. Congress created Section 102 to address fundamental inequities in federal port funding, and those inequities will only worsen if the Corps continues to ignore its statutory obligations. 

Congress needs to rectify this and has an opportunity to do so in the 2026 fiscal year’s Energy and Water Appropriations Bill. Congress should allocate the funds that ports have planned for and were promised, as outlined in Section 102 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2020, rather than allowing the Army Corps of Engineers to circumvent congressional intent. 

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To prevent problems from worsening, Congress should reassert its constitutional authority over tariffs and rein in the executive branch as the framers intended.

The good news is that the courts may do this for Congress. As CNBC reported:

A federal appeals court ruled that most of President Donald Trump’s global tariffs are illegal, striking a massive blow to the core of his aggressive trade policy.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in a 7-4 ruling that the law Trump invoked when he granted his most expansive tariffs — including his “reciprocal” tariffs — does not actually grant him the power to impose those levies.

“The core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the Constitution,” the court said. “Tariffs are a core Congressional power.”

Thankfully, U.S. markets have shown signs of resilience despite economic instability. But even where pockets of improvement appeared, they felt fragile and reactive. The U.S. Bank Freight Payment Index increased in the second quarter, with shipment volumes climbing 2.4% compared to the first quarter. But that snapped a string of weak quarters rather than signaling a robust recovery. The quarter-to-quarter bounce appears to be a short-term rebalancing, rather than robust demand growth. 

What does this short-term rebalancing look like?

When trade restrictions are threatened or implied, importers accelerate orders to beat potential levies. When those threats recede, ordering often collapses just as quickly. That behavior, known as frontloading, produces a brief surge in bookings and port activity, followed by a sharp slowdown that distorts normal seasonality and makes planning more challenging for carriers and terminal operators.

Recent reporting from Reuters shows that Asia-U.S. sea freight rates swung sharply and booking patterns spiked, only to drop as tariff negotiations and deadlines played out. 

Operationally, frontloading shows up in container bookings and truckload demand. Industry trackers note a big, fast swing: ocean bookings and import flows surge during windows of tariff uncertainty and then fall off as the situation cools, leaving carriers with lumpy schedules and excess capacity on certain lanes.

FreightWaves’ coverage of import bookings highlight that ordering peaks in late June or early July and then declines. This is the pattern one would expect when frontloading replaces steady, demand-led ordering. 

The domestic market is fragmenting. Long-haul truckload demand has cratered in many of the major transcontinental lanes—FreightWaves’ analysis shows long-haul truckload demand down roughly 25% year-over-year as shippers shift more middle-mile volume to intermodal rail or delay moves altogether. This decrease is statistically significant and appears to indicate that shippers are adjusting their behavior in response to policy uncertainty.

That behavior has ripple effects. Carriers and owner-operators respond to lumpy demand by pruning capacity, which in turn makes rates volatile when a temporary surge arrives. With less available capacity, when a surge of demand hits, rates will rise faster than if carriers had not reduced capacity.

At the same time, intermodal rail has gained market share as shippers seek lower transportation costs for long-distance shipments. FreightWaves’ white paper shows exactly this dynamic: Ocean spot rates and bookings can spike, regional truckload markets can tighten or soften rapidly, and intermodal rail often reclaims long-haul work during periods of trucking softness. 

If policymakers want freight to stop reacting to every headline and start reflecting real, demand-driven movement again, clarity and predictability are the obvious place to start. Reasonable steps include committing to clear timelines and narrow scopes for trade measures, communicating tariffs and trade policy intentions well in advance when possible, and coordinating with industry to limit surprise disruptions.

On the industry side, shippers and carriers should accelerate the adoption of adaptive practices already in evidence—dynamic inventory strategies, greater modal agility (allowing volumes to shift to intermodal when appropriate), and investment in near-real-time analytics that reduce reaction lag.

The easiest solution to this problem is for Congress to reassert its authority on trade, though it seems unwilling to do so—so far. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the sole authority to regulate foreign commerce and levy tariffs on imports. The president is not intended to legislate with the stroke of a pen. Trade agreements are meant to be negotiated, with congressional debate, and executed by the executive branch, not written and implemented by the president and the president alone.

To that end, Congress could begin by holding hearings to examine recent executive trade actions, introduce legislation to reaffirm its constitutional role in approving trade agreements, and amend existing statutes—such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Trade Act of 1974, and International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977—to limit unilateral executive changes to tariffs and trade terms.

Tariff threats will always be a lever in geopolitics and trade negotiations (despite their poor track record), but when they are wielded without clear implementation plans or predictable timing, they create a costly, avoidable drag on freight markets. Until President Trump’s tariffs are checked by Congress and the courts, and businesses receive a steadier signal, expect the freight markets’ natural rhythms to be punctuated by sudden surges and equally abrupt retreats for the foreseeable future.

The post Trump’s unchecked tariff power is undermining U.S. economy and freight stability appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Louisiana House Bill 687, co-sponsored by state Rep. Mark Wright (R), Rep. Jason Hughes (D), Rep. Shaun Mena (D), and Rep. Sylvia Taylor (D), and signed by Gov. Jeff Landry, follows last year’s approval of the I-10 Calcasieu River Bridge public-private partnership (P3), which was a significant turning point for improved infrastructure delivery in the state.

The Calcasieu Bridge P3 demonstrates how private capital and expertise can be harnessed to replace an aging, structurally deficient bridge without saddling taxpayers with all the up-front risk and costs.

In January 2024, Louisiana’s Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) and Calcasieu Bridge Partners signed a $2.1 billion design-build-finance-operate-maintain public-private partnership contract. By July 2024, the state bond commission had approved state-level private activity bonds to finance the remaining capital costs of the project. The projected toll revenues from users of the bridge will fund debt service on those bonds as well as ongoing operations and maintenance.

The Calcasieu Bridge P3 arrangement locked in hard delivery milestones, shifted traffic and revenue risk onto investors, and preserved state budget capacity for other transportation priorities. Early indications suggest the new bridge will open more quickly and at a lower life-cycle cost than if it had followed a traditional pay-as-you-go or all-publicly funded model.

HB 687 wisely builds on this P3 momentum. Rather than defaulting to years of million-dollar studies, incremental state appropriations, and repeat bond issuances, the bill empowers the Port of New Orleans authority to seek a competitive P3 concession as its first procurement option for the St. Bernard Transportation Corridor roadway project. 

By making a design-build-finance-operate-maintain concession the default, the authority can attract qualified concessionaires for the project. Commuters will gain a modern multimodal corridor sooner, and taxpayers will have the confidence of private-sector due diligence at the contract table.

The geography and travel patterns of St. Bernard Parish make it a natural P3 candidate. Projected rising freight volumes over the next two decades through southeast Louisiana’s ports make a direct land connection to the Louisiana International Terminal a necessity, one better addressed sooner rather than later.

Additionally, the Louisiana International Terminal’s proximity to I-10’s connectors make it the shortest path to an interstate for the port terminal. The new corridor will also enhance hurricane evacuation capacity. 

During the legislative process, HB 687 received criticism from St. Bernard Parish residents, including the district attorney, who argued the bill lacked many safeguards and oversight mechanisms that typically come with a public-private partnership. However, HB 687’s approval simply allowed the Port of New Orleans to begin pursuing a public-private partnership. It did not approve any final designs, decisions, or otherwise relating to the Louisiana International Terminal (a separate contract and project) or the St. Bernard Transportation Corridor (the proposed roadway connecting the terminal more directly to I-10). It authorized the Port of New Orleans to start the process for the latter. Any P3, once the private partner or consortium is chosen, would still have to be approved by the Louisiana legislature. This mirrors the process undertaken for the Calcasieu River Bridge project.

HB 687 does not guarantee a successful P3 or project delivery. For example, the bill provides for tolling authority. While viable in P3s with high traffic levels, tolling may not be the best approach for a dedicated freight corridor. A well-structured availability-payment model would instead tie payments to maintaining evacuation-ready standards and keeping congestion relief metrics on track–exactly the accountability that traditional authorities too often lack.

A successful public-private partnership, and any P3 in Louisiana, will still have to undergo the full procurement process. This typically starts with a request for information (RFI), which explores private-sector interest and gathers feedback on the scope and approach of a proposed project. Then the project moves to a request for qualification (RFQ), which narrows the field of potential bidders to a short list of experienced, financially capable firms or consortia. Then, a request for proposals (RFP) is issued to those shortlisted firms to solicit proposals from those firms or consortia for a project. It typically outlines the project requirements and what aspects will be left to the private firm (for example, whether it’s a design-build-finance-operate-maintain contract or not). 

A successful public-private partnership has appropriate provisions for oversight, windfalls (if a toll is used), and conditions under which the contract can be broken and the asset retaken by the state of Louisiana if the concessionaire is found in breach of the contract. All of these will have to be revisited when a consortium or private partner is selected for whichever approach the Port of New Orleans and the state transportation department decide is the best pick, and is still contingent on the legislature’s approval.

With last year’s Calcasieu River Bridge P3 setting a high bar, House Bill 687 could be another step forward in making Louisiana a leader in infrastructure public-private partnerships. A well-executed St. Bernard Transportation Corridor, procured through a competitive public-private partnership, would yield faster timelines, stronger budget safeguards, and measurable performance guarantees–all while protecting public interests.

The post Louisiana passes public-private partnership bill for toll road project to Port of New Orleans appeared first on Reason Foundation.

U.S. seaports are vital to global trade, serving as gateways for international commerce. Ensuring their efficient operation and maintenance is crucial for economic stability and growth. However, the challenge of how to fund this essential infrastructure has been a contentious issue, leading to various policy debates and reforms.

This policy brief delves into the history, current challenges, and potential reforms for the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF), offering insights into how sustainable and equitable funding solutions can be achieved.

The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund was established to finance the maintenance and operation of U.S. ports. Over the years, the fund has undergone significant changes, evolving from the Port Infrastructure Development and Improvement Trust Fund in the 1980s to its current form. But the HMTF faces persistent challenges, particularly regarding its funding mechanism, the Harbor Maintenance Fee (HMF)—a fee exacted on eligible shipments that feeds into the HMTF. The funds are used to pay for port improvements, required dredging, and other routine maintenance.

The HMF was initially levied on both imports and exports but was significantly altered by a Supreme Court ruling in 1998 that exempted exports from the fee. This exemption has led to inequities and strained international trade relations.

This brief explores three main policy solutions to reform the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and ensure its sustainability: implementing a user fee, abolishing the Harbor Maintenance Fee in favor of general fund appropriations, and increasing diesel fuel tax rates.

These potential reforms are crucial because seaport efficiency directly affects the economy. By addressing the existing inequities and compliance challenges, the U.S. can move toward a more equitable and effective funding mechanism for seaports. The following sections of this brief analyze these topics, offering a comprehensive view of the past, present, and future of seaport funding policy, focusing on regulatory and legal aspects of different funding and financing approaches.

Read the full Policy Brief:

The post Navigating port funding: Alternatives for reforming the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund appeared first on Reason Foundation.

The White House did not specify the severity of the tariffs until April 2, when Trump announced his “Liberation Day tariffs.” The president announced rates on some countries, but others would still be subject to a 10% global tariff imposed on all imports.

A full list of the tariffs by country (as originally revealed on Liberation Day) is here.

How were these tariff rates determined? The administration didn’t give its formula for the tariffs, but the math was simple:

Tariff (Percent) = (U.S. Trade Deficit with Country ÷ U.S. Imports from Country) ÷ 2

The Center for Strategic and International Studies used the European Union (EU) and Indonesia as examples.

The EU’s reciprocal tariff rate was 20%. This rate was generated by the formula above: $235.6 billion deficit ÷ $605.8 billion imports = 39%, halved to 20%.

Indonesia’s rate was set similarly: $17.9 billion ÷ $28.1 billion = 64%, halved to 32%.

The tariff rates, as given in April, were predicated on two core beliefs of President Trump. The first is bad economics. The Trump administration noted that imports are subtracted when calculating gross domestic product (GDP), giving them a negative connotation. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what GDP measures—domestic production, with the general accounting identity being expressed as GDP = Consumption + Investment + Government Expenditures + (Exports – Imports). 

Goods produced abroad are, by definition, not domestically produced, but are included in the Consumption, Investment, or Government Expenditure variables because the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National Income and Product Accounts do not distinguish between domestic and foreign production. Thus, to accurately measure domestic production, Imports need to be subtracted. The upshot is that imports have a neutral effect, not a negative one, on GDP.

The second wrong core economic belief driving the tariffs is Trump’s belief that a trade deficit is a bad thing. Economist Noah Smith described this thought process well:

[B]ecause Trump misunderstands trade deficits in these two ways, he believes that when America runs a trade deficit with a country, that country is ripping us off. He thinks imports are lowering U.S. GDP by forcing us to produce less stuff — essentially, stealing American production. He thus sees trade deficits as a measure of how much is being stolen from America.

Smith describes a trade deficit as “buying stuff with a credit card.” Can trade deficits be bad? Yes, but they can also be good. Smith uses the example of a productive investment as the case for a good trade deficit. If a U.S. company imports a Japanese CNC machine for $100,000, that contributes to the trade deficit. But if that tool is used to make $500,000 worth of car parts, the U.S. has come out ahead.

As with GDP, the White House is fundamentally misinterpreting an accounting identity, in this case, the balance of payments. The balance of payments measures a country’s international transactions in trade, foreign investment, transfers, and changes in the central bank’s foreign currency reserves. The standard GDP equation (GDP = Consumption + Investment + Government Expenditures + (Exports – Imports)) explains how national income is created, but it can also be expressed to show how national income is spent: GDP = Consumption + Government Expenditures + Savings. By equalizing the two, we can arrive at the fundamental balance of payments accounting identity between the Current Account and Capital Account: Exports – Imports = Savings – Investment. 

The upshot is that a Current Account deficit (a “trade deficit” where imports exceed exports) is accompanied by a Capital Account surplus. In essence, when a country imports more than it exports, those additional imports are “paid” by foreign capital flowing into the country. Much of that international capital surplus is accounted for by foreign investment in domestic companies and other private assets. However, the demand for reserve currency by foreign central banks also plays an important role. The U.S. dollar is prized for its stability, which has cemented its status as the world’s primary reserve currency. Foreign central banks buying U.S. dollar reserves are essentially providing the U.S. a free loan, but this foreign demand for dollars increases the Capital Account surplus, which needs to be offset in the Current Account (i.e., increasing net imports). As a result, most expect the United States to run trade deficits for as long as the U.S. dollar remains the principal global reserve currency.

Maligning any import (and its impact on the trade deficit) as only a negative is a massive oversimplification. The rates (originally) put forward by the Trump administration have been paused, walked back, or increased depending on the country—the only part that has remained is the administration’s insistence that tariffs will right the ship, when they seem more likely to sink it.

All this raises a further question: What are the administration’s goals, and how do they justify them? The administration has five claimed uses and goals for tariffs:

• A negotiating tool
• Reshoring production to the U.S.
• Protecting national security
• Raising federal revenue
• Deterring property theft and unfair subsidies

The following sections will evaluate each of these claims.

Tariffs As a Negotiating Tool

President Trump often portrays tariffs as “the art of the deal,” expecting them to coerce trading partners into concessions. In practice, however, traditional allies and rivals have been left baffled. EU diplomats report Washington told them not to expect talks until the United States imposes even higher tariffs. Countries that tried to engage—Britain, Japan, and Israel—found the White House either unresponsive or vague about its demands. As Politico notes, foreign negotiators keep “waiting for a reply” from the Trump administration while being offered no clear agenda.

China initially rebuffed U.S. pressure—when the White House floated talks, Beijing said it was “evaluating” dialogue but warned against “extortion and coercion”, deriding tit-for-tat tariff spikes as a “joke” and retaliating rather than negotiating on intellectual property or subsidy disputes. Eventually, however, both sides agreed to lower rates—U.S. duties on most Chinese imports fell from 145% to 30%, and China’s from 125% to 10%—yet many sectors, notably steel, face disproportionately high levies. Importers point out that relief remains limited by lingering measures such as a 20% ‘fentanyl-related’ tariff and 10% reciprocal tariffs, to name a few.

Likewise, President Trump said his new trade deal with the United Kingdom was a “maxed out deal” and would be the running standard for trade negotiations with other nations. The problem is that even the lowered 10% tariff on imports is substantially higher than the 3% rate in place prior to Trump’s second term.

Reshoring Production to the U.S.

One of President Trump’s repeated claims is that tariffs will spur manufacturing jobs to return to America. In reality, the unpredictable trade environment has done the opposite. Businesses report that the constant threat of new duties has frozen investment plans worldwide. To build new factories, there needs to be an abundance of capital to invest in those projects. And financial markets have reacted badly: for example, the S&P 500 plunged about 4% in the weeks after the “Liberation Day” tariffs on April 2, and 10-year Treasury yields jumped as investors fled U.S. assets. Corporate leaders have been vocal: dozens of firms have pulled or slashed earnings guidance amid the tariff chaos. One CEO admitted it’s become impossible to predict policy, lamenting that “every single prediction has been proved wrong”.

In this climate of uncertainty, long-term capital expenditure has ground to a halt. Yale economists Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian argue that firms simply will not green-light billion-dollar factory projects when trade policy “[is] being enacted in the most uncertainty-inducing way possible.” They observe that “business investment is entirely paralyzed—and will continue to be frozen for the foreseeable future.” Surveys reflect this paralysis: U.S. small-business confidence has plunged sharply, and capital spending plans have stalled. 

Worse still, roughly half of imports to the United States are used in the production and manufacturing of goods in the country, meaning tariffs hurt U.S.-based manufacturers; they do not help them.

In short, rather than encouraging reshoring, the tariffs’ unpredictability has scared off the investors needed to build factories. As one analysis notes, corporations won’t authorize multi-year plant investments when policy whipsaws threaten their returns.

Protecting National Security

The administration justifies its broad metal and tech tariffs on national security grounds, but experts say the evidence is thin. In many cases, economists and defense analysts warn that the blanket tariffs actually undermine security. For instance, Jonathan Hillman of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that without targeted exemptions, the tariffs “are likely to negatively impact the U.S. defense sector, critical infrastructure, and U.S. allies.” 

In other words, blocking imports of steel, aluminum, or semiconductors can raise costs for military suppliers and domestic manufacturers without strengthening them. Hillman concludes flatly that the regime “can backfire without exemptions, harming rather than helping national security.” Beyond that, even if all imports of steel (for example) were blocked, it would take time for any domestic supply to rise to meet demand. 

Worse, there is no sign of any upside in the semiconductor claim. Trump’s team has invoked chip production as a priority sector, yet analysts point out that global chip supply chains cannot simply be reshored by punitive tariffs. China and allies control much of the semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem, and Washington’s measures have only accelerated China’s self-sufficiency drive. In fact, defense industry observers note that the U.S. depended on friendly suppliers even before the trade war; broadly defined “national security” tariffs will do little to change that. In sum, the tariffs have increased industry costs (raising prices by roughly 7% in one model) but have not demonstrably bolstered any specific U.S. military capacity.

Raising Federal Revenue

The claim that tariffs can generate huge federal revenue has also been overstated. In truth, customs duties make up only a tiny slice of the federal budget. For perspective, the U.S. Treasury collected about $5.1 trillion in tax revenue in fiscal 2024 (mainly from income and payroll taxes). In contrast, even very high tariffs would raise only hundreds of billions per year. One independent analysis finds President Trump’s announced tariffs (10–50% across all imports) would generate approximately $330 billion in government revenue annually, while reducing GDP by about 0.8%. That sum is barely 6% of annual tax revenue.

These numbers are at odds with an idea the Trump administration has floated—replacing the income tax with tariffs.

Figure 1: Income Tax vs. Tariffs

Source: Kailey Leinz and Erik Wasson, “Trump Floats Tariff Hikes to Offset Some Income Tax Cuts,” Bloomberg, 13 June 2024.

As Figure 1 shows, the math doesn’t add up.

The Tax Foundation estimates that a sweeping 15% universal tariff (far larger than any real U.S. tariff schedule—or so we thought) would raise about $2.9 trillion over 10 years, roughly $290 billion per year. 

In short, tariffs cannot meaningfully replace income taxes (not even accounting for payroll or other taxes). Even the administration’s own ambitious scenarios ($6 trillion over a decade) look unrealistic: most models show a multi-trillion-dollar shortfall and serious economic side effects.

Deterring Property Theft and Unfair Subsidies

Finally, there is little evidence that the tariffs have stopped intellectual property (IP) theft or state subsidies. China’s bad actors were the ostensible targets, but Beijing’s behavior has not changed. U.S. officials and analysts note that the World Trade Organization itself has long struggled to discipline China on IP and subsidy issues.

But tariffs were only ever a blunt form of pressure. As one expert puts it, trade negotiators needed a “direct approach” with clear penalties for IP theft, not a scattershot list of tariffs. Unsurprisingly, Chinese firms continue cyber intrusions and patent violations unabated, and Chinese industries still enjoy heavy state support. Instead of doing what the administration wanted, China responded to the Trump tariff onslaught with even higher retaliatory duties (up to 125%) on U.S. exports and promptly signaled it was “done” playing tariff tit-for-tat. 

Meanwhile, its “Made in China 2025” strategy and export controls on rare-earth minerals have only intensified. In practice, the tariff war has left foreign businesses cautious, but China’s tech-transfer policies are largely intact. Indeed, the Office of the United States Trade Representative’s latest reports still list Beijing as a top offender on forced technology transfer and IP theft, underscoring that broad tariffs did not eliminate these issues. 

There is no indication that the new duties have meaningfully deterred Chinese IP piracy or unfair subsidies—they have merely provoked retaliation and further hardened China’s stance.

In the end, the Trump administration’s tariff gambit has proven itself far more reversible than resolute. From abrupt freezes and carve-outs on key industries to retroactive exclusions and industry-specific credits, each promise of “reciprocal” discipline has unraveled under political and economic pressure. That same flexibility, however, leaves the entire edifice of protectionism open to swift repeal—an approach that Congress should consider.

By contrast, decades of free-trade agreements and liberalized markets have delivered enduring benefits: American consumers—particularly middle- and lower-income families—enjoy up to a 29% boost in purchasing power thanks to access to lower-cost imports, while producers and exporters have leveraged global supply chains to expand markets and drive innovation. Moving forward, policymakers would do well to remember that genuine economic security arises not from walls at the port, but from the wealth, resilience, and opportunity that come with free and fair exchange.

The Constitution assigns Congress—rather than the president—the authority to set tariffs and regulate trade, ensuring open debate and accountability. In practice, much of that responsibility has shifted to the executive branch, leading to unpredictable tariff decisions that have unsettled markets and complicated relations with our partners. By restoring its proper role, Congress can repeal the current tariffs and establish clear guidelines for any future measures, bringing greater stability to businesses, confidence to allies, and balance to our system of checks and balances in trade policy.

The post Analyzing the Trump administration’s tariff policies and goals appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Public-private partnerships have been used across the country to advance major infrastructure projects where traditional funding is limited. These agreements allow public agencies to transfer significant risks—such as construction delays, cost overruns, and lifecycle maintenance—to private partners, who are contractually obligated to meet performance standards over decades.

Louisiana House Bill 687 would authorize the Port of New Orleans to enter a public-private partnership (P3) to establish, design, construct, and finance the St. Bernard Transportation Corridor. This project is intended to support the Louisiana International Terminal, offer a reliable local and emergency route, and connect key freight and evacuation pathways.

A widely cited example is the Port of Miami Tunnel, completed under an availability payment (AP) design-build-finance-operate-maintain P3. The Port of Miami Tunnel P3’s goal was to reduce downtown traffic congestion by giving freight a dedicated route to the port. The project opened on time and on budget, transferred significant construction and financing risk, and has since delivered measurable mobility and freight efficiency gains, reducing truck travel times by nearly an hour and removing 80% of 18-wheelers from Miami’s downtown.

These results are made possible by contracts that align design, operation, construction, and long-term maintenance incentives. P3s also allow states and agencies to accelerate project delivery using milestone or availability payments, spreading costs over time while beginning construction much sooner than pay-as-you-go models allow.

For Louisiana, freight efficiency is a pressing concern. The state moves over $580 billion in goods annually, and the value of freight shipped to and from Louisiana is expected to grow by 78% overall and 112% for goods shipped by truck over the next two decades. Roadway improvements that reduce traffic congestion and increase access to port infrastructure can directly impact shipping costs, job growth, and regional competitiveness.

HB 687 includes important safeguards: all agreements affecting state roads must be approved by the Department of Transportation and Development, and contracts must include bonding, oversight, and long-term maintenance responsibilities. These provisions mirror best practices in successful P3 legislation across the country.

While many delivery models can work, public-private partnerships offer a pathway for delivering major infrastructure on time, with less public-sector risk, and with the potential for long-term savings.

Video of this testimony and hearing is available here.

The post Louisiana House Bill 687 could improve shipping and boost regional economy appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Governments have used long-term public-private partnerships for surface transportation projects for the past 60 years.

As documented by José A. Gómez-Ibáñez and John Meyer, the phenomenon began in the 1950s and 1960s, as France and Spain emulated the model pioneered by Italy prior to World War II. Italy’s national motorway systems were developed largely by investor-owned or state-owned companies operating under long-term franchises (called concessions in Europe).

In exchange for the right to build, operate, and maintain the highway for a period ranging from 30 to 70 years, the company could raise the capital needed to build it (typically a mix of debt and equity).

The model spread to Australia and parts of Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, and to Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. Nearly all the projects in those regions from the 1950s to 1980s were financed based on the projected toll revenues to be generated once the highway was in operation.

Some projects went bankrupt as a consequence of reduced traffic and revenues during severe economic downturns (e.g., the oil price shock of 1974), leading to the nationalization of some companies.

However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the governments of France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain all privatized their state-owned toll road companies and formalized the toll concession P3 model.

Australia has allowed several concession company entities to go through liquidation, with the assets (in each case major highway tunnels) being acquired by new operators at a large discount from the initial construction cost.

Other governments in Europe adopted a different form of highway concession. Generally, not favoring the use of tolls, they created the concept of availability payments as a means of financing long-term concession projects.

In this structure, the company or consortium selected via a competitive process negotiates a stream of annual payments from the government sufficient (the company expects) to cover the capital and operating costs of the project and make a reasonable profit. The capital markets generally find such a concession agreement compatible with financing the project via a mix of debt and equity. Since no toll revenues are involved, this model applies to a much broader array of transport and facility projects, including rail transit. In the highway sector, nearly all long-term concession P3 projects in Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and a number of Central and Eastern European countries have been procured and financed as availability payment (AP) concessions.

In a small but growing number of cases—major bridges, as well as highway reconstruction that includes added express toll lanes, for example—governments collect the toll revenues and use the money to help meet their availability payment obligations. These cases are called “hybrid concessions” in this report.

Of the top 10 worldwide surface transportation P3s that reached financial close in 2024, four used availability payments, bucking what had been a growing trend over the last seven years. In 2023, seven of the top 10 P3s used availability payments.

The growing use of AP concessions has enabled P3s for projects that do not generate their own revenues, as well as hybrid concessions in which toll revenues help the government cover the costs of its AP obligations.

For the past seven years, almost three-quarters of the largest P3 projects, by financial value, have used availability payment public-private partnerships.

See the full Report here:

The post Annual Surface Transportation Infrastructure Report 2025 appeared first on Reason Foundation.

The cordon pricing program, which is continuing despite the Trump administration trying to shut it down, allows the city to demonstrate firsthand the benefits of a pricing system that eases gridlock, reduces emissions, and makes urban travel more reliable. (While the New York pricing is often called congestion pricing, congestion pricing is technically for a corridor, while cordon pricing is for a zone.)

At its heart, the cordon pricing system operates on a simple economic principle: When a valuable resource is overused, its price should reflect the scarcity that follows.

Generally, the costs of traffic congestion are largely internalized by the city. Economic activity lost thanks to longer commutes leads to lower economic efficiency and attractiveness for businesses.

Likewise, when responding with road expansions or traffic management systems to manage congestion, the city or municipality is, in effect, eating the costs. A cordon pricing system shifts the cost burden of congestion from the city to lay more squarely on the drivers who contribute to it. 

Some political leaders argue that cordon pricing unfairly burdens drivers and local businesses, but these critics fail to consider the costs of congestion. Excess vehicles on the road cause delays, lead to unnecessary additional fuel consumption, and reduce air quality. By calibrating the charges to lessen these impacts, the program aims to yield more efficient use of the city’s roadway infrastructure. In effect, drivers are asked to internalize the external costs they impose on society—an approach that has been successful in several cities overseas, where cordon charges have led to smoother traffic flow and increased use of public transit.

The impact on the suburbs around New York isn’t clear yet, though it seems likely that, because the goal of cordon pricing is to lower congestion within the central business district, the benefits will be concentrated there. Parts of New Jersey, Queens, and Brooklyn could see increased congestion as a result of the cordon pricing program. 

All that said, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) plan has considered the needs and interests of many different groups, especially those who would pay the toll regularly. For example, MTA is offering a 50% discount for low-income road users who would have to pay into the program more than 10 times a month.

The practical benefits of cordon pricing are already evident. Early data supports the approach—traffic within the central business district has dropped by approximately 13% compared to historical averages, reducing congestion during the city’s busiest periods. According to TomTom’s latest traffic data, the congestion level (measured as the congested vehicle-miles of travel divided by total vehicle-miles of travel) in Manhattan’s cordon zone fell from 24.7% to 16.9% within a few months of implementation. Average travel times improved significantly—from 5 minutes and 27 seconds per mile to 4 minutes and 57 seconds per mile—while average speeds increased from 10.9 miles per hour to 12.1 miles per hour. These figures highlight how pricing can lead to measurable improvements in mobility and reduced emissions from idling vehicles by keeping the flow of traffic moving.

An additional incentive for maintaining the program is the enhanced performance of public transit. Preliminary data from the MTA indicates that subway ridership has increased; daily averages have climbed by roughly 8.6% compared to the same period in 2024 (although return-to-work mandates may also have played a role), suggesting that as more drivers refrain from driving in Manhattan, some of them may be shifting to the subway.

Similarly, bus routes in New York City are seeing an 18% increase in ridership. The Brown University Congestion Pricing Tracker shows lower-than-reported decreases in congestion, but that may be due to the inclusion of data from the bridges leading into New York City.

The problem with including bridge routes is that the goal is to lower congestion within roadways in New York City, not just on bridges in or out. 

Unfortunately, the New York cordon charge is a flat rate, unlike the variable rates charged on the dozens of express toll lane systems in operation on freeway systems across the country. Dynamic tolling systems can manage traffic flows far better than a single flat rate like that used in New York’s cordon charge. A paper submitted to the Tinbergen Institute highlighted the differences between a fixed-price congestion pricing method and a more dynamic one that adapts to real-time traffic conditions. The latter, while more effective at internalizing congestion externalities, does take time to mature and adapt to longstanding traffic patterns.

There are other issues with the program as well. New York’s MTA was required by a state law passed in 2019 to dedicate 80% of the revenue generated to capital improvements for the subway and bus systems, a major diversion of road user–generated income away from roads. Further, the charges are designed specifically to raise transit revenue. In most cordon pricing plans, managing congestion is the goal; variable prices are set to reduce the number of vehicles on the road during congested times, not to raise revenue for transit. 

A federal ban could end this valuable experiment. By pushing for an abrupt shutdown, policymakers risk losing critical empirical evidence on how cordon pricing may transform urban travel.

Looking ahead, exploring parallel cases in cities like London and Stockholm could further inform the evolution of congestion and cordon pricing in America. Questions remain about long-term impacts and potential adjustments in fee structures as traffic patterns evolve. As the debate continues in the courts and the public arena, one thing is clear: Innovation in urban policy is a necessary step toward more efficient cities and freer-flowing traffic and should not be hindered by federal red tape.

The post The federal ban on New York’s cordon pricing experiment is bad policy appeared first on Reason Foundation.

The Jones Act, enacted in 1920, requires that goods transported between U.S. ports use vessels built, owned, flagged, and crewed by Americans. While designed to support the domestic shipbuilding industry, the law’s main impact has been limiting international competition and raising shipping prices within the United States, particularly for islands or noncontiguous states and territories like Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

A recent lawsuit filed by the Hawaii-based Kōloa Rum Company, which is represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation, challenges the Jones Act on constitutional grounds. The plaintiff argues that the law violates the Port Preference Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from giving preferential treatment to one state’s ports over another’s. The lawsuit argues that the Jones Act favors mainland ports over Hawaiian ports, leading to higher shipping costs for Hawaiians, and is thus unconstitutional discrimination.

But what does the law say? The text of the Port Preference Clause states, “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.”

The Port Preference Clause, as written, is extremely narrow—especially compared to widely litigated constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause. As a result, case law interpreting the precise legal meaning and application of the Port Preference Clause is limited.

The first related case under the Commerce Clause dates back to 1855, when a bridge that was being constructed over a section of the Ohio River in Virginia had low enough clearance to cause concern in Pennsylvania that it would keep steamboats from going upriver to Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. went all the way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the bridge company, meaning the bridge provided sufficient clearance to vessels and thus didn’t violate the clause. 

Sam Heavenrich, in a 2022 Yale Law Journal article, observed that Wheeling created two different interpretations of the Port Preference Clause. Heavenrich noted that under the narrow interpretation, the Port Preference Clause is all but nullified because the requirements for a statute to be unconstitutional under the clause would be hard to meet under any circumstances, requiring explicit discrimination against a state’s ports as a whole. For example, a law that says, verbatim, “Virginia’s ports shall be favored over that of Maryland’s” would fail a Ports Preference Clause test under the narrow interpretation.

Subsequent cases have leaned towards the narrow interpretation. However, Heavenrich contended that assuming this is the only interpretation is the wrong approach and that precedent for a broader interpretation that would prohibit legislation adopted with discriminatory intent was established in Wheeling. 

The broader approach would acknowledge the intent of a bill or law and the explicit text of the laws. Heavenrich explains the legislative history of Sen. Wesley Livsey Jones of Washington state and the name behind the Jones Act. Sen. Jones had a history of protectionist bills that did target then-territories Hawaii and Alaska. So Heavenrich makes the case that, under a broad interpretation, the Jones Act would be unconstitutional under the Port Preference Clause.

Both interpretations, however, require a statute to authorize some form of explicit discrimination. In Justice Samuel Nelson’s majority opinion in Wheeling, the Supreme Court observed that many different statutes “may incidentally operate to the prejudice of the ports in a neighboring State [but] have never been supposed to conflict with [the Port Preference Clause].” 

Put simply, the consequences on a port or a state’s port by statute are not a constitutional violation of the Port Preference Clause because it did not qualify as explicit discrimination per Justice Nelson’s interpretation. For example, a law like the Jones Act, while it may have consequences on shipping costs and the economy of Hawaii, that alone does not constitute a violation of the Port Preference Clause when interpreting the clause narrowly.

Heavenrich’s article makes a compelling case that this broader interpretation could lead to a successful challenge under the Port Preference Clause, especially when challenging the Jones Act.

A key component of the Kōloa Rum Company lawsuit is that the Jones Act’s impact on costs in Hawaii constitutes discrimination against the ports in Hawaii, so it’s essential to have a credible estimate for these costs. According to a 2020 Grassroot Institute of Hawaii study, which evaluated five different scenarios, the average citizen in Hawaii pays anywhere from $296 to $645 more on goods per year. The Grassroot Institute’s report estimated the Jones Act adds $0.40 to an average Hawaii family’s food bills, $1 to housing costs, and $0.14 to their electricity bills every day.

These costs are high because the Jones Act insulates U.S. shipping markets. Proponents of the Jones Act argue that the law protects national security and supports domestic employment. However, evidence indicates that the U.S. shipbuilding industry has struggled to remain competitive. 

For example, the cost of building American ships is substantially higher than in other countries. Colin Grabow at the Cato Institute noted a natural case study highlighting these egregious cost differences. In 2022, three Aloha-class (the largest U.S.-built class of container ships) container ships were ordered from a Philadelphia shipyard for $333 million per ship. Two ships of the same class were ordered in 2013 for $209 million each, meaning that costs rose by over $100 million in just nine years. 

For comparison, two container ships powered by liquid natural gas were ordered from a South Korean shipyard in 2022—the same year as the new orders from Philadelphia—and have more than double the cargo capacity of Aloha-class vessels. Each ship from the Korean shipyard costs $200 million less than the Aloha-class ships. 

The Jones Act-compliant oceangoing fleet dropped from 434 ships in 1950 to 93 in 2023. Even with larger ships, the net carrying capacity has decreased and is lower today than in 1950. 

The available data clearly shows that the Jones Act’s restrictions have raised shipping costs in noncontiguous states like Hawaii, validating the lawsuit’s claims of economic harm. Legally, there seems to be a path forward depending on whether the courts adopt the traditional narrow interpretation of the Port Preference Clause, but a challenge could succeed if the courts take a broader interpretation of what constitutes discrimination against a state’s ports.

Ultimately, the case presents an opportunity to update U.S. maritime policy to serve all Americans, especially those in noncontiguous and island states or territories like Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, who bear the brunt of the harm caused by the Jones Act.

The post Hawaiian company challenges the constitutionality of the Jones Act appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Reason Foundation’s 28th Annual Highway Report evaluates state highway systems on cost versus quality using a method developed in the early 1990s by David T. Hartgen, Ph.D., emeritus professor at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. This method has since been refined by Hartgen, M. Gregory Fields, Baruch Feigenbaum, and Truong Bui.

Since states have different budgets, system sizes, and traffic and geographic circumstances, their comparative performance depends on both system performance and the resources available. To determine relative performance across the country, state highway system budgets (per mile of responsibility) are compared with system performance, state by state. States with high rankings typically have better-than-average system conditions (good for road users) along with relatively low per-mile expenditures (also good for taxpayers).

The following table shows the overall highway performance of the state highway systems in the 28th Annual Highway Report, primarily using data that each state directly reported to the Federal Highway Administration.

Similar to last year, the top-performing states are a mix of large and small states as well as states that are more urban and more rural. (Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and Figure 1). Five large-population (more than seven million people) states place in the top 10 of the overall rankings: North Carolina (2nd), Virginia (4th), Tennessee (5th), Georgia (6th), and Ohio (10th).

Numerous factors—terrain, climate, truck volumes, urbanization, system age, budget priorities, unit cost differences, state budget circumstances, and management/maintenance philosophies—all affect overall performance in the Annual Highway Report. The remainder of this report reviews the statistics underlying these overall rankings in more detail.

The overall rankings are not dramatically different from the previous version of the Annual Highway Report. However, three states’ overall ranking improved by double digits this year, while two states’ overall rankings declined by 10 or more spots:

• Idaho improved 19 positions from 34th to 15th in the overall rankings, as rural Interstate condition improved by 34 positions and urban Interstate condition improved by 22 positions. In addition, the rural fatality rate improved by 20 positions.
• Maine improved 11 positions from 32nd to 21st in the overall rankings, as rural Interstate condition improved by 24 positions. Capital disbursements also improved by 12 positions.
• New Jersey improved 10 positions from 44th to 34th in the overall rankings, as administrative and maintenance disbursements improved by 15 and 25 positions respectively. Rural Interstate condition improved by 12 positions.
• Massachusetts declined 20 positions from 20th to 40th in the overall rankings, as rural Interstate condition declined by 23 positions. The state also fared poorly in disbursements. Administrative disbursements worsened by 19 positions and maintenance disbursements declined by 26 positions.
• Arkansas declined 15 positions from 13th to 28th in the overall rankings, as rural fatalities declined by 25 positions and urban fatalities worsened by 39 positions. Capital disbursements also declined by 10 positions.

The post 28th Annual Highway Report appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Each state’s overall rating is determined by rankings in 13 categories, including highway expenditures per mile, Interstate and primary road pavement conditions, urbanized area congestion, bridge conditions, and fatality rates.

The study is based on spending and performance data state highway agencies submitted to the federal government, supplemented by data from the National Bridge Inventory, INRIX, and the American Community Survey. This study also reviews changes in highway performance over the past year. 

Although individual state highway sections (roads, bridges, pavements) deteriorate over time due to age, traffic, and weather, states perform maintenance to keep infrastructure in a state of good repair. They also reconstruct roadways when necessary. As a result, system performance can improve even as individual roads and bridges worsen. Table ES1 summarizes recent system trends for key indicators. The U.S. saw system improvements in some categories from 2020 to 2022, but declines in several other categories.

Between 2020 and 2022, three of the four disbursement measures (Capital and Bridge, Maintenance, and Administrative) for the U.S. state-owned highway system increased (states spent more money on their highway systems in 2022 than in 2020). The other disbursement measure (Other) decreased from the previous report. And when factoring inflation into account, spending has been roughly consistent over all categories during the past five years.

Further, six of the nine performance measures improved, including Rural Interstate Pavement Condition, Urban Interstate Pavement Condition, Rural Other Arterial Pavement Condition, Urban Other Arterial Pavement Condition, Rural Fatality Rate, and Structurally Deficient Bridges (a smaller percentage of bridges is structurally deficient).

Three of the nine performance measures worsened: Urbanized Area Congestion, Urban Fatality Rate, and Other Fatality Rate.

Overall, when adjusting for inflation, states are spending about the same amount of money for a slightly better quality roadway system.

Table ES2 summarizes system trends over the past 10 years.

Over a 10-year period disbursements increased, pavement quality worsened, congestion improved (on a statewide basis), the percentage of structurally deficient bridges decreased, and the fatality rate held steady. The worsening urban Interstate quality and rural arterial pavement quality are a change from the previous 10-year period. Figure ES1 displays this information in a graph.

Figure ES1: Trends in Highway System Performance

Figure ES2 shows each state’s ranking based on 2022 data. The top-performing states tend to be a mix of high-population and low-population states that lean both urban and rural.
Very rural, low-population states may have had a slight advantage before 2019. But since the report changed to using expected disbursements and ratios, that advantage no longer exists. For example, while North Dakota often leads the rankings, this year North Carolina ranked first followed by South Carolina, North Dakota, Virginia and Tennessee.

At the other end of the rankings are Alaska, California, Hawaii, Washington, and Louisiana. Two of the five worst performing states rank in the bottom 11 in population.

A number of states with large populations and/or large metro areas fared well: North Carolina (1st), Virginia (4th), Tennessee (5th), Georgia (6th), and Ohio (10th).

Some states had large increases or decreases in their ratings. The rankings for Idaho, Maine, and New Jersey improved by at least 10 spots.

However, the rankings for Massachusetts and Arkansas worsened by at least 10 spots.

Certain states spend significantly more than the national average. This spending may be justified if these states perform well in other categories. While some states’ disbursements have improved their deficiencies, other states are still performing badly:

• For Capital and Bridge Disbursements, five states have per-mile ratios higher than
  1.5: Washington, Idaho, Alaska, Utah, and Indiana.
• For Maintenance Disbursements, 11 states have per-mile ratios higher than 1.5: Washington, Indiana, Vermont, Oregon, Delaware, Colorado, California, Oklahoma, New York, Massachusetts, and Alaska.
• For Administrative Disbursements, six states have per-mile ratios higher than 2.0: Vermont, Nevada, Delaware, Washington, New Hampshire, and South Dakota.
• For Other Disbursements, three states have per-mile ratios higher than 2.0: Washington, Kansas, and Vermont.

System performance problems in each measured category seem to be concentrated in a handful of states:

• More than 25% of the rural Interstate mileage in poor condition is in just three states: Alaska, Colorado, and California.
• More than 30% of the urban Interstate mileage in poor condition is in just six states: Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, California, Delaware, and Colorado.
• Approximately 13% of the rural arterial mileage in poor condition is in just three states: Alaska, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
• Approximately 40% of the urban arterial primary mileage in poor condition is in just five states: California, Nebraska, Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts.
• Automobile commuters in seven states spend more than 60 hours annually stuck in peak-hour traffic congestion: New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware, New York, Illinois, Maryland, and California.
• Although a majority of states saw the percentage of structurally deficient bridges decline, nine states report more than 10% of their bridges as structurally deficient: West Virginia, Iowa, South Dakota, Rhode Island, Maine, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Michigan, and North Dakota.
• Three states have rural fatality rates of 2.0 per 100 million vehicle-miles traveled or higher: Hawaii, Delaware, and Alaska.
• Urban fatality rates continue to worsen as 27 states have urban fatality rates of 1.0 per 100 million vehicle-miles traveled or higher: New Mexico, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Arkansas, Indiana, Montana, Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, Colorado, Georgia, Arizona, Louisiana, Delaware, Oregon, Texas, California, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Alabama, Maryland, Washington, Connecticut, Nevada, and Michigan.
• Other fatality rates continue to worsen as 25 states have other fatality rates of 1.5 per 100 million vehicle-miles traveled or higher: West Virginia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Kentucky, Louisiana, California, Oregon, Texas, Tennessee, Arizona, South Dakota, North Carolina, Delaware, Nevada, Arkansas, Kansas, New Mexico, Washington, Colorado, Ohio, Mississippi, Georgia, Illinois, Florida, and Alabama.

System performance improved for some states but declined for others this year, with slightly less than half of the states (21 of 50) making progress between 2020 and 2022. However, a 10-year average of state overall performance data indicates that system performance problems are concentrated in a handful of states. These states are finding it difficult to improve. There is also increasing evidence that higher-level highway systems (Interstates, other freeways, and principal arterials) are in better shape than lower-level highway systems, particularly local roads.

The post 28th Annual Highway Report: Executive summary of findings and state rankings appeared first on Reason Foundation.

However, this decision to pursue a limited operation and maintenance agreement with Harbor Industrial rather than a more comprehensive design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) public-private partnership (P3) is a missed opportunity given the port’s goals for the terminal. A full-fledged public-private partnership expansion might have addressed the terminal’s challenges (such as low draft and a need for higher capacity and efficiency) more effectively and positioned it for greater long-term success.

Terminal 6 is Oregon’s only international container terminal and the only publicly operated international container terminal on the West Coast. The terminal’s operations are vital for the state’s agricultural, seafood, and retail industries, providing a direct trade link to Asia and other global markets. The port handles 40% of Oregon’s agricultural exports each year.

One of the primary challenges for the Port of Portland and Terminal 6 is its location. Situated approximately 100 miles from the Pacific Ocean next to the Columbia River, the terminal is at a disadvantage compared to other West Coast ports like Los Angeles and Seattle, which are closer to the ocean and have larger consumer markets. This distance increases transit times and costs, making it less attractive for shipping lines and importers.

Geographically, major complications come from that 100-mile stretch. The Columbia River provides access to Terminal 6, but has limited depth, restricting the size of vessels that can navigate to the terminal. This is a significant barrier, as the global shipping industry increasingly relies on larger ships to achieve economies of scale. Maintenance dredging is required to maintain the channel depth, but this is a costly and ongoing challenge, often requiring federal and state subsidies—especially when it would be necessary to maintain a deep depth for containerships that can require drafts of 50 feet.

Terminal 6 has faced substantial financial difficulties, particularly after the 2017 departure of International Container Terminal Services, Inc (ICTSI), the previous terminal operator. Traffic has declined over the last decade, largely due to labor issues that arose as part of an inter-union rivalry over positions at the port.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, when ship traffic was congested, the port poorly managed what traffic it did receive, thanks to still-ongoing labor disputes. ICTSI’s exit was precipitated by these prolonged labor disputes, which severely disrupted operations and led to a significant loss of business. 

Though the union infighting has been resolved, traffic to the port still hasn’t returned. The Port of Portland incurred $14 million in losses from container operations over the past year.

The port’s newest agreement with Harbor Industrial is looking to change things for the better at the terminal. The agreement includes a $20 million state investment in capital improvements, such as pavement upgrades and stormwater management. While this partnership brings much-needed operational expertise and efficiency, it may not be enough to solve the port’s geographic problems or to revitalize Terminal 6’s traffic—a major goal of the plan outlined for Terminal 6.

A DBFOM P3 could have provided a more holistic solution to the challenges facing Terminal 6, especially given the ambitions laid out in the port’s business plan for the terminal. The Terminal 6 business plan includes:

• Doubling terminal container volumes by 2032 (up to 120,000 containers/year), then 180,000 containers/year after 2032.
• A shift from a tiered fee structure to a flat per-container fee structure.
• A 2% increase in productivity (measured by increasing moves per crane hour and vessel productivity)

While a limited-scope P3 could address and work on multiple improvements across the port, Terminal 6 is a critical asset in need of modernization and efficiency improvements.

A DBFOM P3 would involve a private partner in designing and building new infrastructure, not just maintaining existing facilities. This could include deepening the access channel (not the whole of the Columbia River) to accommodate larger vessels (similar to a berth extension P3 in the Port of Baltimore, Md.), expanding terminal capacity, and upgrading technology and equipment to improve efficiency. 

P3s have been used at ports around the world and in the U.S., ranging from the Seagirt Marine Terminal Berth modernization project in Baltimore, Md., to the construction and operation of a new terminal in Edgemoor, Del. Dana Point Harbor in California’s revitalization P3 is also a good model—the P3 reached financial close in 2018 and involved reconstruction of harbor assets and refurbishment. The winning consortium will operate and maintain the harbor for 66 years.

Additionally, a design-build-finance-operate-maintain P3 would allow for better risk-sharing between the public and private sectors. The private partner would take on more of the financial and operational risks, incentivizing them to ensure the project’s success.

The main concern with a P3 approach in this case would be finding private-sector interest, given the Port of Portland’s troubled history. A guaranteed revenue stream through an availability payment P3 (paid to the private partner through either the port itself or by the state) may be necessary, but given the state’s willingness to invest in the terminal and operate it at a loss for the greater part of a year that doesn’t seem to be politically unfeasible. 

While the operations and maintenance agreement with Harbor Industrial is a positive step towards improving Terminal 6’s operations, it represents a missed opportunity to fully address the terminal’s challenges through a more comprehensive design-build-finance-operate-maintain P3. By not committing to a full-fledged public-private partnership expansion, the Port of Portland and the port authority may have limited the potential for long-term growth. A DBFOM P3 could have provided the necessary investment, infrastructure development, and risk mitigation to ensure the terminal’s success and enhance its already critical role in Oregon’s economy.

The post Port of Portland turning operations at Terminal 6 over to a private company is a positive step appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Virginia’s Department of Transportation is introducing a free app called ParkZen to make parking more efficient and less stressful for people in select areas in Virginia.

ParkZen is a crowdsourced parking app that collects anonymized data from users’ smartphones when they enter parking facilities. The data is then processed to determine the availability of parking spaces in real-time. Users can view this data on the app and receive directions similar to those of other navigation apps to the nearest available parking spot. The app can also lead users back to their parked vehicles. 

Other apps exist, like Modii, that similarly offer customized parking guidance—though the method by which other apps collect data is different. Modii, for example, uses “extensive curbside parking data collection technology.” Potential applications include leveraging sensors or cameras to detect openings. ParkingRhino, another parking app, uses sensors and computer vision to report parking openings in real time. Both sensor and camera approaches require existing or newly installed coverage over the parking facility to function properly.

ParkZen was developed by Manos Chatzopoulos, an assistant professor of physics and astronomy at Louisiana State University (LSU), my alma mater. Though I never studied under Chatzopoulos, I did use his app religiously during my time at LSU to find parking. LSU is a large university in terms of campus size and student population. One of my greatest stressors pre-ParkZen was finding open parking spots in commuter lots. Students at LSU could regularly find themselves driving around parking lots, which would sometimes lead to what could be long walks to get to the specific buildings on campus for class.

ParkZen alleviated those concerns for me. The app not only flagged what spots were open but also what lots would generally have availability at a given time. I had far fewer late arrivals to class following the app download. The only time I remember having any problems with the app was when it flagged a few spots that weren’t open as available—though that was soon after the app was introduced when it likely lacked the data that higher app adoption rates brought. Later, during my time at LSU, I can’t recall the app ever leading me to a filled spot. 2023 data shows the app had 4,000 users at LSU.

Chatzopoulos and his colleagues saw the commercial capability of ParkZen and expanded it, starting with other university campuses. ParkZen launched at the University of Montana in the spring of 2023 and the University of Pittsburgh in October 2023.

The app received a $100,000 investment from the Baton Rouge Entrepreneurship Week High Pitch Stake competition and some federal funding through the Louisiana-run Small Business Credit Initiative, allowing the app to scale up further. 

In November, VDOT began testing ParkZen in six transit lots in Northern Virginia (some for the Fairfax Connector bus routes and others for the Virginia Railway Express station parking lots) across Fairfax, Prince William, and Stafford counties. Similar to the app’s function at LSU, it can now provide real-time parking information in those lots in Virginia. VDOT anticipates the app will positively impact commuting, both in terms of transit ridership and reliability.

Amy McElwain, VDOT’s program manager in the Office of Strategic Innovations, highlighted the challenges that ParkZen can help address. “Commuters have told us that not knowing whether parking is available at commuter lots is a deterrent to using transit, carpools, vanpools, and slugging,” she said in a VDOT press release. “Through this app, commuters can optimize the parking experience for themselves and others, enabling everyone to park quickly and catch buses, trains, and carpool rides.”

One of the significant issues with any crowdsourced app is that it requires a sufficient number of regular users to be accurate. As the program and trials grow in scale, more users will naturally start using the app. VDOT has also offered an incentive for early adopters during this trial period. Top users between Nov. 2024 and Jan. 2025 will have a chance to earn a $50 Amazon gift card.

If ParkZen proves reliable for achieving Virginia’s goals during the trial period, the state aims to expand the use of the app to commuter parking lots in the spring of 2025. Success in Virginia could also lead to other states adopting similar initiatives for transit parking.

Innovative solutions like these are a step in the right direction for municipalities and states looking to improve transit ridership. If policymakers want to increase transit use, rather than adopting policies that make commuting by car or bike more difficult, making transit more convenient and appealing is the right approach.

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As Starship’s Starship continues to improve and technology continues to advance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) decision to use the much costlier Space Launch System, SLS, for the Artemis moon landing program will end up costing the agency (and taxpayers) billions of dollars more than necessary.

SpaceX has been one of the leading firms innovating in space since 2008 with the launch of Falcon 1. Starting with the first reusable booster (SpaceX’s Falcon 9), SpaceX’s Starship has continued to innovate by using cost-saving design principles. Starship is designed to be a fully reusable launch system for both stages, substantially reducing costs. Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, has stated that the cost of a Starship launch could eventually be as low as $10 million, though the latest test launch was closer to $100 million. SpaceX has come a long way since the Falcon 9’s development, as shown in Table 1 below.

Starship’s launch on Oct. 13 marked a significant milestone for the rocket, as the booster stage returned to the launch site and was retrieved by the launch tower—a world first.

By contrast, NASA’s Space Launch System is a traditional expendable launch system, meaning both stages must be replaced for successive launches. Since its inception in 2011, NASA has spent approximately $11.8 billion on developing the SLS under contracts with Boeing, Northrop Grumman, United Launch Alliance, and Aerojet Rocketdyne. Each SLS launch is estimated to cost around $2 billion. Because the SLS is not reusable, the cost per launch dramatically increases.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the time to produce each successive vehicle for subsequent Artemis launch program is increasing, and when a project is delayed, its costs rise even more. A more detailed comparison of the costs and features of the SLS and Starship can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: Space Launch System vs SpaceX Starship Comparison

Between the two options, Starship has higher payload capacity, higher payload volume, a substantially lower cost per launch, and was far less costly to develop than the SLS. The aim for Starship to be reusable would dramatically reduce costs compared to the Space Launch System and reduce mission turnaround time compared to an SLS launch, which necessitates building new launch vehicles from scratch every time. 

If realized, the cost savings associated with Starship could potentially revolutionize space exploration. Lower launch costs would mean more missions could be undertaken within the same budget, allowing for more frequent and diverse exploration activities. This could accelerate the timeline for ambitious projects, such as Mars exploration and establishing lunar bases.

If these reduced costs are fully realized, the barrier to entry for businesses interested in exploration and resources found on the Moon would be lowered. Some companies in the United States and China are looking to access the Moon’s supply of regolith (essentially lunar soil, usable for orbital and lunar construction) and may find Starship’s value a major cost-saver compared to alternative launch options.

Even before it’s scaled to full reusability, SpaceX’s Starship’s current cost per launch is just five percent of the cost of an SLS launch. The successful reusability of Starship could be a key factor in reducing launch costs, making space more accessible and allowing for more frequent missions. 

While the SLS is a powerful rocket, its high cost and expendable nature limit its potential impact on space exploration and maximize its negative effect on NASA’s budget.

As SpaceX continues to develop and refine Starship, the cost savings and increased efficiency could pave the way for a new era of space exploration, making ambitious projects like Mars exploration more feasible and opening up space to a broader range of participants. NASA should look to Starship for future launches, especially if SpaceX delivers on its performance and cost-reduction promises.

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The Harbor Maintenance Fee (HMF), in its current form, is an ad valorem tax on the value of commodities transferred, but because of the Export Clause of the Constitution, it is not rendered on exports at all. Policymakers ought to evaluate different options for reform both to comply with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to better fund port and harbor development in the country.

GATT, initially established in 1947, aimed to promote international trade among U.S. allies during the Cold War by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. It was modernized in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which also created the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the successor to the original GATT regime.

Article III, Section 2 of GATT mandates that imports should not be subject to internal taxes or charges exceeding those applied to domestic products. This principle ensures that imported goods are not unfairly taxed compared to domestic goods. 

The Harbor Maintenance Fee was initially applied to imports and exports, but it was significantly altered following the 1998 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. United States Shoe Corp. The Supreme Court found that the HMF, as it was then structured, violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it was not a true user fee but rather a tax on exports. Consequently, the HMF could no longer be applied to exports, leading to funding inequities and compliance issues with GATT.

More specifically, Article VIII, Section 1(a) of GATT allows for fees and charges related to importation or exportation, provided they are limited to the approximate cost of services rendered and do not serve as indirect protection for domestic products or as a fiscal measure. 

This inequity and disregard for the general agreement did not go unnoticed by U.S. trade partners. In 1998, the European Union (EU) argued that the Harbor Maintenance Fee violated Articles I, II, III, VIII, and X of GATT and sought consultation through the U.S. trade representative and the WTO. Following the change to the HMF to exempt exports from paying the fee, the EU gave the United States a deadline of Jan. 1, 2000, to address GATT compliance issues, but the U.S. never made any changes. Although no formal panel has been established by the WTO to address these concerns yet, the EU’s action remains pending.

Throughout the HMF’s history, several reforms have been proposed and evaluated by policy scholars seeking to address this issue (among others).  In 1999, the Clinton administration proposed replacing the ad valorem HMF with a user fee based on the tonnage of vessels. The proposal was never considered by Congress.

This approach aims to comply with both the U.S. Constitution and GATT by ensuring the fee correlates with the cost of services rendered at ports rather than the value of cargo moved through seaports. A tonnage-based fee would be more equitable and could be applied to both imports and exports, thus addressing the current funding inequities.

Another proposal is to abolish the Harbor Maintenance Fee entirely and fund port maintenance through appropriations from the general fund. This approach would eliminate the compliance issues with GATT and the Constitution’s Export Clause but would decouple revenue from the use of the ports, potentially leading to inconsistent and inappropriate funding levels.

A third proposal suggests increasing the federal diesel fuel tax to fund port maintenance. While this approach would spread the funding burden more broadly and avoid direct charges on imports and exports, it may not be as directly tied to the use of port services and could face political resistance. Additionally, as modes of transportation move to different means of propulsion (be that hydrogen-powered vessels or fully electrified fleets), this revenue stream will become less viable over time.

Reforming the HMF to ensure compliance with GATT and the Constitution’s Export Clause is crucial for equitable funding of U.S. ports. Positive reform could spread the cost burden more equitably among beneficiaries instead of exempting exports from paying into the system. GATT-compliant reform would promote fairer competition among trading partners, and reform would additionally help the U.S. avoid diplomatic disputes and WTO arbitration. 

A user fee based on tonnage appears to be the most promising solution, as it aligns with the principles of GATT by correlating fees with the cost of services rendered and can be applied to both imports and exports, but it comes with other considerations, including political feasibility. A solution, no matter how good in principle, is only effective if it can be implemented. Regardless, any reform will require careful consideration of the legal, economic, and political implications to achieve a balanced and effective funding mechanism.

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In the wake of rising traffic fatalities, municipalities around the United States have been looking for a comprehensive solution to reduce or, more optimistically, eliminate traffic fatalities. Two complementary concepts have emerged in the last few decades as possible solutions designed to improve the accessibility and safety of roads across the world: Vision Zero and Complete Streets.

Both programs offer policy solutions and traffic interventions meant to improve safety, but the more heavy-handed interventions can also negatively affect the flow and speed of traffic. As is often the case in public policy, there are major tradeoffs to be considered when deciding which approach works best for safety’s sake.

What is Vision Zero?

Vision Zero approaches traffic safety with the stated goal of eliminating all traffic fatalities and serious injuries. The movement gets its name from what proponents claim is the “acceptable number” of traffic fatalities: zero. Central to the concept is that human error is inevitable, so the natural policy response from a Vision Zero perspective is to design roads in a way that assumes human error is inevitable, to some degree, and then minimizes users’ exposure to the conditions in which a crash is most lethal. This is typically accomplished through a mixture of traffic calming measures such as speed humps, road diets (which conventionally mean the conversion of an existing four-lane roadway to a three-lane roadway, with two through lanes and one center two-way turn lane), and reduced speed limits to lessen the severity of injuries from automobile impacts.

According to the Vision Zero Network, Vision Zero “is a strategy to eliminate all traffic fatalities and severe injuries, while increasing safe, healthy, equitable mobility for all.” It emphasizes a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to road safety, focusing on eliminating safety risk arising from human error and creating safe road environments.

The core principles of Vision Zero focus on safe system design through a few different means, such as:

• Engineering safer roads (typically in the construction stage—including bicycle lanes as part of a road’s plan rather than retrofitting them)
• Promoting safer speeds (this can be via lowering speed limits or by public campaigns for drivers to drive more slowly)
• Enhancing road user education and awareness (reinforcing the right of way, such as automobiles having to yield to pedestrians at marked crosswalks)
• Targeting high-risk locations on a network and implementing interventions to reduce crashes or the lethality of crashes (tightened shoulders at a high crash rate intersection, for example)

All of these factors are undertaken for the same central goal: reducing or eliminating the fatality risk from human error in road environments. In effect, Vision Zero advocates that roadways ought to be designed in a way that mitigates the impact of human error. Crashes are inevitable, so it follows that roads ought to be designed in a way to not only reduce the likelihood of a crash, but the severity of one.

Vision Zero has faced challenges and criticisms along the way. Some argue that the approach is overly idealistic and unattainable, but more policy-focused criticisms examine costs and tradeoffs. However, proponents of Vision Zero argue that it provides a clear moral framework and a long-term vision for road safety improvement.

What is Complete Streets?

Complete Streets is a design framework adopted by transportation planners and engineers in many U.S. cities to create safer, more convenient street designs and city layouts for all transportation users, focusing on pedestrians, bicyclists, and transit riders. The two strategies work together to encourage more travelers to choose alternatives to traveling by automobile.

Complete Streets offers an easy way to lower speeds, focusing (but not only) on converting existing four-lane roads to two-lane complete streets as opposed to new infrastructure, all without unnecessarily expanding the roadway. The National Complete Streets Coalition describes Complete Streets as:

…(A)n approach to planning, designing and building streets that enables safe access for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists and transit riders of all ages and abilities. This approach also emphasizes the needs of those who have experienced systemic underinvestment, or those whose needs have not been met through a traditional transportation approach.

Smart Growth America describes it as a process, not a “product or single type of street.” It, like Vision Zero, focuses on a multidisciplinary approach to make streets safer for users, with a priority on non-automobile users, by focusing on a few key concepts:

• Lowered speeds to reduce fatality chance when a collision occurs, especially a collision between an automobile and a pedestrian or bicyclist
• Street design with safety and multi-modal use in mind (bicycle lanes, crosswalks, protected sidewalks)
• Marked crosswalks. More crosswalks for pedestrians means more mobility for pedestrians and reduces the distance (and time necessary) to reach a marked, signalized crosswalk at an intersection.
• Transit plans. Typically, a Complete Streets approach is accompanied by a complementary transit plan. The goal of these transit plans is to shift trip-share away from what is, in most cities, an automobile-dominated environment to a more heavily transit-reliant one.

Beyond this, a core principle is Complete Streets’ attention, shared with Vision Zero, to the safety of road users regardless of mode. But Vision Zero’s focus is strictly on safety, whereas Complete Streets is split between safety and accessibility/multi-modality.

A Complete Streets approach to road design can vary. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of one type of a complete street.

Complete Streets integrates features such as wider sidewalks, bicycle lanes, crosswalks, accessible pedestrian signals, transit stops, and traffic calming measures. Likewise, it’s also often used to convert existing four-lane streets into two-lane complete streets—though this isn’t the only type of conversion. By considering the needs of different users, Complete Streets aims to improve safety, promote active transportation, and enhance the overall quality of life in communities.

Figure 1: Complete Streets Diagram

Additionally, Complete Streets often employs quick-build projects (alternatively demonstration projects or tactical urbanism projects), which are low-cost, temporary interventions to test street design as was done in Washington State.5 These low-cost interventions allow policymakers and communities to test the impact of proposed changes cheaply before committing to long-term, often more expensive implementation.

Complete Streets approaches also often include complementary transit plans to boost transit ridership. These plans have done little to mitigate the decline in transit ridership nationwide and may require some rethinking for the modern traveling and commuting environment, depending on the needs of each individual city.

Implementing Complete Streets often involves a range of strategies, including road redesign, retrofitting existing streets, adopting zoning regulations that support mixed-use and walkable neighborhoods, and integrating public transportation infrastructure. These efforts are typically guided by community input and data-driven decision-making.

Synergies of Vision Zero and Complete Streets

Both Complete Streets and Vision Zero emphasize safety for users of all transportation modes and favor traffic calming measures and/or lane reconfiguration (by bicycle lanes or sidewalk extensions) as a means of ensuring safety. Complete Streets focuses on the assumption that fewer automobiles on the road means fewer collisions and fatalities. Many Vision Zero activists set a “complete street” as the ideal standard for an urban street because it accommodates multiple modes of transportation (such as bicycles in bicycle lanes and pedestrians on sidewalks) and does so safely.

Additionally, Vision Zero and Complete Streets advocates also promote walkable neighborhoods and more development. These two goals together aid in the natural demand-growth for active transportation. The more densely developed a city is, the easier it is to justify walking from point A to point B, for example.

This brief provides a history of both movements and examines a handful of case studies of relevant city archetypes to attempt to measure the effectiveness of these policies. Most critically, it examines whether or not Vision Zero and Complete Streets policies have been effective at reducing traffic fatalities and explores some potential alternatives.

Full Policy Brief: Vision Zero and Complete Streets: Do They Make Roads Safer?

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This incident highlighted the need for robust information technology (IT) preparedness and operational resilience for airlines, as well as the vulnerability of automated update systems or updates managed by third parties. 

What happened?

The problem began on July 19 when users of CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor began experiencing a blue screen (colloquially called a blue screen of death, or BSOD) loop. The Falcon Sensor is software that analyzes connections on the internet to determine if a connection is malicious. A BSOD loop like this occurs when the system is booting up but encounters an error when verifying system files, causing the computer to crash instead. This specific BSOD loop was caused by an update to the Falcon Sensor, which altered Windows system files. The changes caused errors in the boot process when a Windows system was starting.

Computers receiving the update installed it automatically. This occurred because CrowdStrike operates, as many competitor IT firms do, at the enterprise level. Contracts explicitly state that warranties are only valid if a client/enterprise is using the most up-to-date version of the software. Users could not have prevented the update. CrowdStrike runs Falcon as a service and software package—not just software. CrowdStrike’s clients are limited in what they can do with Falcon once it is installed by the terms of service.

CrowdStrike also stressed that this outage was unrelated to a cyberattack, and its customers’ data was still secure. Additionally, the affected file was only present on Windows systems. Computers running on Linux or MacOS were unaffected.

How was it fixed?

CrowdStrike responded quickly and released a patch in a little over an hour, but computers stuck in the blue screen of death loop could not receive it. A computer in a blue screen loop is unable to boot and, therefore, unable to download and update software. Essentially, nearly every affected computer had to be physically accessed by IT staff to resume regular operations. Networked computers could be fixed in larger groups at once through a set of standards known as a “preboot execution environment.”

What was the impact on the aviation industry?

During the outage, the FAA ordered a global stop on all flights for the three legacy airlines. Flights that were in the air would reach their intended destination and then stop flying until the order was lifted. During the outage, no American, United, or Delta flights were allowed to take off. Like other sectors, the fix for the Falcon update had to be manually implemented by the airlines’ IT staff. Depending on the network status of the computers affected, the fix had to either be done by hand on every computer in a system or network-wide through a preboot execution environment. 

Although the precise costs have not yet been determined, the extensive labor and productivity losses for airlines using the affected CrowdStrike systems suggest that expenses will be significant. Microsoft estimates that 8.5 million Windows devices, or less than 1% of global Windows devices, were affected by the CrowdStrike outage globally. That number is across all sectors, not just aviation.

Delta Air Lines, which canceled over 5,000 flights, has said it plans to sue CrowdStrike, alleging up to $500 million in damages from the outage. Investopedia reported, “CrowdStrike attorney Michael Carlinsky said Delta largely ignored its offers for assistance and contributed to a ‘misleading narrative’ that CrowdStrike is responsible for the way the airline responded to the outage.”

How well did airlines recover from the outage?

Recovery times from the CrowdStrike outage varied heavily from airline to airline.

Figure 1: Canceled Flights by Legacy Carrier by Day

Source: Matt Ashare, “American Airlines credits IT teams with quick recovery from CrowdStrike disruption,” CIO Dive, 2024. 

American Airlines, on July 19, grounded and canceled more than 400 flights in the first 24 hours. The following day, however, American only had to cancel 50 flights, per flight tracker FlightAware, as shown in Figure 1. American Airlines has praised the quick response of its IT teams but has also accredited much of its success to robust crew-tracking software. Knowing exactly where every working member of American Airlines was at any given time served as a buffer and allowed for a return to operational normalcy faster, according to American Airlines CEO Robert Isom.

United Airlines returned to a semblance of operational normalcy on Monday, July 22. United required the manual recovery of “more than 26,000 computers and devices one at a time” at United centers spread across 365 airports globally. This major disruption came a day after United Airlines leadership “lauded United’s operations and technology teams for their work to reduce the recovery time and cost of previous operational disruptions.”

But, of the three major legacy carriers, Delta Air Lines’ recovery from the CrowdStrike outage was by far the worst. Delta’s crew-tracking software was overwhelmed by the outage and took the most time to recover and manually resynchronize, according to Delta. On Tuesday, when both United and American had largely returned to normal operations, Delta still had to cancel 511 flights, bringing its total canceled flights to over 5,000. Delta recovered to pre-disruption levels on Thursday, July 25, nearly a week after the July 19 outage. 

Delta’s relatively glacial recovery time prompted the U.S. Department of Transportation to open an investigation into Delta over its “uniquely severe flight disruptions.” The investigation will likely uncover the root causes, but those answers are likely an abundance of critical computer systems running the Falcon sensor package, a lack of IT preparedness for an outage, or some mixture of both.

What can be done in the future?

CrowdStrike has released a full analysis detailing what went wrong and what can be done to mitigate an outage like this in the future. CrowdStrike plans to have staged deployments for updates in the future by region, time zone, etc. This means that when a time zone or region reports problems, the rollout can be stopped before it impacts systems worldwide. Additionally, CrowdStrike stated it plans to provide customer control over the deployment of updates. Beyond these changes, more rigorous testing seems necessary to prevent an outage of this scale in the future.

But the airlines are not blameless either. While prevention was near-impossible, recovery and outage resilience were largely in the hands of the airlines—especially after CrowdStrike released a patch fixing the issue. Crew-tracking systems for American handled the outage well and kept the airline relatively functional in the days following. Delta’s software was overwhelmed, which led to the airline’s slow recovery in the aftermath. United, having just invested in operational resilience, saw its investment justified. 

Given the impact of CrowdStrike’s outage, airlines should focus on IT system resilience efforts. Having crew-tracking software that functions on the best of days is fine, but it ideally should still keep crews in communication during outages as well. A week after the outage, Delta CEO Ed Bastian reported that the airline had lost $500 million, which may be an underestimate.

Having thousands of angry customers and substantial financial losses should motivate airline management teams and shareholders to pursue additional investments needed to address IT infrastructure weaknesses and avoid suffering from surprise outages in the future.

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