• Discrepancy in air traffic controller numbers and resignations
• Post-mortem on advanced air mobility
• Update on ATC “privatization”
• Europe’s conundrum on air travel
• Scott Kirby is wrong on slots for Newark
• Is the moon race heating up?
• $20 billion more for ATC?
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Controllers Discrepancy

During the government shutdown, we read article after article about the loss of air traffic controllers. Not only were some controllers calling out sick, but some reportedly were taking part-time jobs to make ends meet, and others took the shutdown as an opportunity to retire.

Yet once the shutdown ended, the media were full of news stories, based on updates from the Federal Aviation Administration, that controllers were returning, as USA Today reported on Nov. 16, “FAA Ends Shutdown-Era Flight Limits as Controller Staffing Rebounds.” Aviation Daily on Nov. 14 headlined that, “FAA Freezes Flight Cuts as Controller Callouts Decline Rapidly.” Within a week or so after the government shutdown ended, airline flights were reported as being essentially back to normal, just in time for Thanksgiving weekend.

There is something wrong with this rosy picture. To begin with, recall that controller staffing pre-shutdown was far below FAA norms, with six-day workweeks and 10- to 12-hour shifts for controllers at some key facilities. If all controllers who were on the roster the week before the shutdown returned to their jobs within the week after it ended, many air traffic control (ATC) facilities would still be seriously understaffed and controllers would still be overworked. Instead of allowing a return to all flight activities as they were pre-shutdown, the FAA could have considered what it would take in terms of targeted flight reductions to reduce the number of six-day controller work weeks and 10-hour shifts.

Adding to my concern are statements by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy during the shutdown. In Politico on Nov. 9, Duffy said the following: “I used to have four controllers a day retire before the shutdown. I’m now up to 15 to 20 a day are retiring, so it’s going to be harder for me to come back after the shutdown and have more controllers controlling the airspace. So this is going to live on in air travel well beyond the time frame that this government opens up.” (italics added)

Let’s do a bit of arithmetic here. The federal government shutdown lasted 43 days. The net increase in retirements, per Duffy, was 11 to 16 controllers per day. At the low end, 11 retirements per day times 43 days equals 473 retirements. On the high end, 16 retirements per day times 43 days equals 688 controllers retired during the shutdown. The average of those two numbers for Duffy’s retirement claims is 580 fewer air traffic controllers today than before the shutdown.

So how could air traffic controller staffing possibly be back to pre-shutdown levels? Secretary Duffy owes us an explanation. Perhaps Congress should ask him. If the system is actually staffed with 580 fewer controllers than it had before the shutdown, it’s hard to see how they could be safely handling pre-shutdown levels of air traffic.

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Post-Mortem on Advanced Air Mobility  

This year has turned out to be the time when reality imposed its judgment on the plethora of advanced air mobility (AAM) start-up companies. In a lengthy article in Aviation Week (Oct. 27-Nov. 9), Ben Goldstein summarized the many losers and the handful of survivors.

This trend was already underway in 2024, which saw the demise of Lilium, Rolls-Royce’s Electrical unit, Universal Hydrogen, and Volocopter. Then came 2025’s deluge of bankruptcies. They include the City Airbus project, Germany’s APUS Zero Emission, Spain’s Crisalion Mobility, Cuberg/Northvolt, Eviation, Guardian Agriculture, Overair, Supernal, and Textron eAviation.

Left standing are the U.S. big three: Archer Aviation, Beta Technology, and Joby Aviation. All three have decent funding, a path toward FAA certification, and some potential as ongoing businesses, whether only as producers of aircraft or also as operators. The same issue of Aviation Week had another article on the growing number of AAM companies in China, none of which appear to be planning to seek FAA certification. Both Joby and Archer aim to launch actual electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) air service in the United Arab Emirates as early as next year, with or without FAA certification.

Why have we seen so many failed start-ups? It’s not because eVTOL (the primary aim of these start-ups) is impossible, because we see the survivors’ aircraft flying. One serious problem is the business model. Because battery-powered vertical flight requires a very large amount of power, and batteries are very heavy, an eVTOL’s payload and range are both very limited. Instead of the mass-market fantasy of “flying cars” and go-anywhere air taxis, this is looking more and more like a high-end luxury service for niche markets. In addition, most of the failed start-up companies probably had no idea of both the long time and high cost of obtaining FAA certification.

This is why we are seeing non-eVTOL AAM concepts being developed and tested. One alternative is hybrid propulsion, which can significantly increase payload and/or range. Another is including actual wings on some of these aircraft for cruise flight. And once wings are taken seriously, we have seen Electra.aero demonstrate its blown-wing innovation that enables its EL2 to take off and land in less than 150 feet—and it’s a hybrid-electric. Its larger EL-9 can handle a 1,000-lb. payload and still land and take off in less than 300 ft. The U.S. Air Force is seriously interested in the EL-9. This kind of aircraft is a hybrid STOL.

Giving up vertical flight and battery-only power are two keys to more viable advanced air mobility. These lessons are being learned the hard way, but that is what competitive technology development requires. Imagine if a central planner like NASA had defined eVTOL as the “one best way” for advanced aerial mobility?

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Update on ATC “Privatization” 

My ongoing effort to shift the terminology for de-politicizing U.S. air traffic control by ceasing to call it “privatization” (as opposed to a self-funded public utility) has thus far not caught on here in the United States. As I noted in this newsletter, I switched my terminology several years ago to “public utility” because that is what these air traffic control entities are in all serious proposals today.

Since last month’s newsletter, I’ve continued to do interviews, most notably with Scott Simon on Nov. 15 for NPR’s Weekend Edition, which mentioned privatization in the online version’s headline. The Washington Post editorial board endorsed the idea of corporatization and cited my work in an editorial on Nov. 23, but the headline used the word privatize. Similarly, my Reason colleague Marc Scribner and Cornell Prof. Rick Geddes were interviewed by Dan Levin for Straight Arrow News in a piece that noted the plan would be “more akin to a public utility” but was headlined “The Quietly Powerful Group Keeping US Air Traffic Control Privatization Grounded.”

I was pleased to see an earlier op-ed in The New York Times by Binyamin Appelbaum, which explained the FAA’s limitations and cited “stand-alone corporations in Australia, Canada, and Germany” without resorting to using privatization. Former U.S. Department of Transportation official Diana Furchtgott-Roth had a good piece in The National Interest headlined “How to Modernize America’s Air Traffic Control,” but the unfortunate subhead was “Privatizing air traffic control could help prevent flight delays over the holiday season.” Oh, well…

As I explained last month, opponents of last decade’s House bill to create a U.S. version of nonprofit air traffic control corporation Nav Canada repeatedly attacked this idea as being “for profit” and “dominated by major airlines,” neither of which was true. And the strongest opponents then (and now)—private aviation groups AOPA and NBAA—continue to attack air traffic control “privatization” as if that were the case. In fact, nearly all 95 countries that receive ATC services today from user-funded, de-politicized air navigation service providers (ANSPs) are neither private nor for-profit. That is why, two years ago, I began using the term air traffic control public utility, since that is what the vast majority of depoliticized ATC systems are.

So, to this newsletter’s readership group, I repeat my request from last month’s issue: If you support depoliticizing the low-tech, underfunded Air Traffic Organization, please don’t refer to this as “privatization.” That helps only the opponents of this much-needed reform miscast what is actually being proposed.

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Europe’s Conundrum on Air Travel

Much of the discussion of air travel in Europe seems to be driven by environmental groups such as Transport & Environment (T&E), which calls for cancelling airport expansion plans, increasing taxes on airline passengers, and other measures. Most airport expansion projects are still going forward, but in parallel with that, the European Commission announced on Nov. 5 a plan to spend $400 billion of taxpayers’ money to greatly expand the current 12,128 km high-speed rail network between now and 2040. The stated goal is to shift travelers from short-haul flights to rail travel.

There is no sign in aircraft sale projections from Airbus and Boeing that air travel will not grow or shrink. T&E warns that if all French airport expansion plans were carried out, 38 million more people would travel through French airports by 2050, compared to a hypothetical no-build scenario. In its Nov. 14 article on this subject, Aviation Daily notes that the current Groupe ADP airport expansion plan would mean an increase by 2050 from 82 million to 105 million annual passengers.

A few European airports are attempting to limit increases in air travel. Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands is still battling airlines over its attempt to reduce the number of annual flights, ostensibly due to noise exposure. In Germany, Vienna Airport recently decided not to proceed with adding a third runway. But those anti-growth efforts are swamped by planned expansions. In non-EU member, the United Kingdom, long-sought runway additions have this year been approved for both Heathrow (LHR) and Gatwick (LGW). The ongoing expansion of Germany’s Frankfurt Airport (Terminal 3) will add capacity for between 19 and 24 million annual passengers. And there’s also the ADP expansion plan noted above.

Groups like T&E and the European Commission (EC) seem to be ignoring what is going on in the rest of planet Earth’s airspace. Air travel in India is growing by leaps and bounds, and many airport expansion projects are underway in that country. In the Middle East—especially Dubai and the United Arab Emirates—air travel is booming. Andrew Charlton, in his December newsletter, reported on the Dubai Airshow in mid-November. He noted that a “small order” for new aircraft in this region is 100, with an option for 50 more.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that Europe accounts for 26.7% of global air travel. So if the EC were to succeed in restricting air travel in its domain, three-fourths of the world would continue expanding air travel: the United States because of its affluence and the developing world (China, India, the Middle East), as their economies continue to grow.

I have written previously that the de facto premise of most climate activists and their followers in government is that every sector of every economy must reduce its share of greenhouse gases (GHGs), regardless of either how costly that is to carry out or the benefits of the activity that generates those gases. If I were an environmental policy central planner, my policy would be to figure out the cost per ton of GHG reduction in every sector of the economy—and focus first on all the low-hanging fruit. My guess is that the cost/ton in aviation would be on the high end, and the economic benefits of air travel would also be high. That would suggest looking for relatively lower-cost air travel measures rather than very costly measures, such as spending $400 billion to expand European high-speed rail.

For background reading on approaching climate change policy rationally, I once again recommend Steven Koonin’s important book, Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters, BenBella Books, 2021. Koonin was Undersecretary for Science at the U.S. Department of Energy during the Obama administration. Earlier in his career, he was a professor of theoretical physics at Cal Tech. He has held numerous governance positions at national laboratories.

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Scott Kirby Is Wrong About Newark Slot Controls
By Gary Leff

United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby recently laid out the major benefits that fixing air traffic control would mean for improving air service in the United States, reducing delays and cancellations. I don’t think the FAA as a service provider can ever actually do it – you need the regulator to be different from the actual air traffic organization. The FAA regulating itself has meant zero accountability for decades.

However, Kirby goes on to argue that there still need to be limits at Newark airport, where United has a hub. His point about “simple math” doesn’t imply the solution that he thinks it does.

“Newark, for what it’s worth, always should have been capped. I mean it was the only airport left in the world that was a large airport that was over-scheduled that doesn’t have slots. It’s the only one and it used to have slots and the reality is at Newark the FAA says in the best of times with full staffing on perfect weather day they can handle 77 operations per hour and they were letting it be scheduled at 86 operations per hour for hours in a row. And that is simple math.”

We should improve throughput at Newark, because there’s a lot of demand for air travel out of Newark. We can’t do that because of air traffic control and because we don’t build things in the United States well anymore.

However, if Newark is overscheduled, the answer isn’t to hand the exclusive right to operate most of the flights to United, blocking competitors and future new entrants, as a free gift (subsidy) from taxpayers. That’s what slots are – the right to take off and land at an airport, generally given for free, despite huge economic value. Slot controls allow incumbents exclusivity and block anyone else from competing with them. That airlines have succeeded in regulatory capture to make this standard practice doesn’t make it any less bad policy.

Here’s the better approach: congestion pricing.

Slots are a blunt rationing instrument (and a subsidy to the incumbent airlines). Since they’re “use it or lose it,” we get unnecessary flying on small planes hardly anyone wants to fly, just to squat on flight times. Prices encourage airlines to allocate flights to the right aircraft and the right routes that match passenger demand.

Think of a runway like a heavily used road approaching its capacity. As use approaches 100% of capacity, planes have to queue. Each additional flight imposes delay costs on everyone else, but the airline only internalizes its own delay cost. So airlines are incentivized to overschedule.

Slots try to deal with this by capping the number of flights in a period. Congestion pricing says: “You can operate whenever you like, but you must pay the actual total cost of the delay you impose on others.”

Slots are a crude cap: “X movements per hour.” They’re allocated via grandfather rights and use it or lose it. They’re adjusted infrequently and administratively. Once you have the slot, the flight becomes “free” regardless of the delay it causes.

Charging per flight that approximates the marginal delay cost to others works better. When the system is uncongested, the price is low or zero. As demand approaches or exceeds capacity, prices rise sharply. Airlines operate a flight in that time slice if they are willing to pay – if the value of the flight to passengers and the airline is greater than the congestion charge.

That way, you get the flights that generate the highest value relative to the delay they cause. You also get natural spreading of flights to shoulders or off-peak times, reducing congestion and lowering their costs. Pricing can encourage the use of larger aircraft (“up-gauging”) to spread the cost out across more passengers.

A slot freezes peak delay – a “50 slots per hour” rule means you get 50 flights per hour, regardless of delay and irrespective of whether those are 50 regional jets or widebodies. There’s no incentive to move any of those flights 20 minutes to spread out peak loads.

Slots are also bad at handling weather events and air traffic control problems. Those might reduce an airport’s capacity from (say) 60 to 35 flights per hour. That’s when we get ground delay programs and ad-hoc rationing. Congestion pricing can do the work for you and prioritize the most valuable flights. Instead of stressing the system, airlines contribute towards paying for a better one.

Ultimately, the same price applies to everyone – incumbent airline or new entrant in the market. “Airlines would hate this!” Yes, of course incumbents would. They’re getting a valuable property right for free, and instead they’d be charged (though it could be done as revenue-neutral).

You’ll likely hear that “congestion charges” will just cement incumbent dominance, which is silly, because that’s what the current slot system does. The claim, though, is that incumbents have deep pockets to pay peak charges, while others get pushed out, worsening competition.

• Under slots, incumbents own peak access for free (or were often cheaply acquired in the past). They can sit on grandfathered rights indefinitely. New entrants are often shut out completely.
• If a new entrant sees high value in a particular peak flight, they can buy in. Under a fixed slot regime, there may literally be no access at any price.
• If policymakers still want to support entry (they will, usually for their own constituents rather than the public good), they can offer rebates for new carriers on specific routes and use competition policy to scrutinize predatory practices rather than locking in those practices with slots.

There will also be a class argument that peak times will become “rich people’s time slots,” with lower-income travelers getting pushed into inconvenient off-peak times or other airports. That’s often what happens now, getting pushed to Spirit and Frontier for lower fares at other airports. And lower-income travelers would face fewer delays! In any case, especially if congestion pricing encourages up-gauging, we’ll likely see more major carriers with excess capacity to discount – at peak times. But if you want redistribution, then do it explicitly, not via hidden cross-subsidies embedded in slot allocation.

A fair concern is that low-value flights that few passengers value – often on smaller regional jets to low-volume airports – will lose peak-time service. That’s because these flights are less valuable! But if we’re really going to design policy around these flights, don’t do it in a way that also inefficiently allocates flights, causing delays for the entire air system. Make the subsidy cost of these flights explicit rather than burying it.

A system that sets prices by day and time seasonally, by 15 or 30 minute increments, and is published in advance is easy for airlines to plan for. Then, major weather or air traffic control outages can have surge pricing with a capped multiplier (e.g., 2x). This is easy for airlines to deal with – they manage variable fuel pricing and demand risk constantly. And this will lower costs from ground delays.

Newark shouldn’t get slot controls. We should abolish them at New York’s JFK and LaGuardia and Washington National as well. They’re a rationing mechanism that locks in incumbents and treats all flights in the same time window as equivalent, regardless of the systematic delays they create. And they provide no real incentive to move a flight time or up-gauge.

And slots turn scarcity value into privately-owned assets of the airline, rather than revenue streams to improve system capacity. Congestion pricing does the opposite! Anyone can access takeoffs and landings if the value of their flight is high enough to warrant paying peak prices.

Editor’s Note: This article is a slightly condensed version of Gary Leff’s “View from the Wing” column published Nov. 21, 2025, and is used with the author’s permission.

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Is the Moon Race Heating Up?

While NASA continues to plan to launch its first SLS/Orion human lunar launch as early as February, some observers (including the editor of this newsletter) are very concerned about risking the lives of four astronauts on a spaceship that has flown only once (in 2022), and whose Orion capsule’s heat shield was partly destroyed during re-entry. Instead of fixing the heat shield, NASA is counting on an untested, gentler re-entry path to bring the astronauts back to Earth.

The only reason I can think of for this risky decision is the multi-billion-dollar cost of each SLS/Orion launch. By contrast, because SpaceX and Blue Origin space launchers cost a small fraction of that, they sensibly carry out repeated uncrewed test launches to be sure that when it’s time to launch people, every system and subsystem has had ongoing improvements to increase its operability and level of safety.

I’m encouraged to see both Blue Origin and SpaceX talking with NASA about alternative ways to get people and cargo to the Moon and back. Eric Berger reported in Ars Technica (Nov. 13) that NASA’s acting administrator, Sean Duffy, asked both companies for more nimble plans for their respective lunar landings.

SpaceX disclosed that it has “shared and are formally assessing a simplified mission architecture and concept of operations that we believe will result in a faster return to the Moon while simultaneously improving crew safety.” Could that mean not using the flawed Orion capsules? Berger did not suggest this, but he thinks it might mean working with others beyond those directly involved with Artemis III. He went on to suggest two ideas that might be put forth by SpaceX: expendable Starships and using the company’s proven Dragon (presumably instead of Orion). For the former, instead of depending on propellant transfer in orbit (from one Starship to another), the idea would be to use expendable tankers, which would reduce their launch weight and might reduce the number of tanker missions by up to 50%.

Using SpaceX Dragons instead of Orion would increase safety and reduce cost, though Dragons would need a new heat shield for re-entry to Earth from lunar missions. Berger lays out a mission relying on a combination of Starships and Dragons, which is too complicated to summarize here, but none of its steps involves an SLS or an Orion. This would be a major change from using NASA’s minimally tested vehicles. It would also appear to eliminate having to use the costly (and behind-schedule) Lunar Gateway.

On Dec. 3, the Wall Street Journal reported on new proposals from Blue Origin. It has already been planned, for next year, to send a Blue Moon Mark 1 cargo mission to the lunar surface. This could be followed by a larger version of the cargo rocket to transport astronauts to the Moon in 2028 for a shorter stay than planned for Artemis III. The modified rocket would use storable propellants, which are intended to eliminate in-space fuel transfers. No details are available on that propulsion system.

NASA, per the WSJ report, “will evaluate proposals for a simpler astronaut landing on the Moon from Blue Origin and SpaceX, as well as any other proposals it might receive.” And assuming that Jared Isaacman gets confirmed promptly as NASA administrator, that assessment will be in good hands.

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What About that “$20 Billion More” for ATC Modernization?

Aviation media reports late last month focused on DOT Secretary Duffy’s call for Congress to provide the “additional” $20 billion for air traffic control modernization that a broad aviation coalition has called for, all of them deeming the $12.5 billion in borrowed money that Congress provided earlier this year as merely a down payment.

Until now, when capital investments in the ATC system were called for, Congress allocated funds from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, whose dollars come from aviation user fees, primarily the airline passenger ticket tax. Aviation (or at least airlines) has long relied on user-funded infrastructure, for both airports and ATC. Highways are likewise supported largely by user fees, both fuel taxes and tolls.

The balance in the Aviation Trust Fund is expected to be around $20 billion by late 2025, but a large fraction of that will be drawn upon for the FAA’s 2026 operating and facilities and equipment budget needs. So what is the responsible answer to the “additional $20 billion” for ATC modernization?

Increase the aviation user fees. At a time when the federal budget is running a $2 trillion annual deficit, there is no justification for aviation to add to that total, which directly increases the national debt to unsustainable levels.

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News Notes

Port Authority Plans P3 for Newark Terminal B
Infralogic’s Eugene Gilligan reported (Nov. 13) that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s $45 billion capital plan includes using a long-term public-private partnership for its new Terminal B. Gilligan’s article noted that infrastructure investment firms have held discussions with Port Authority officials regarding the use of a P3 procurement model for replacing the aging existing terminal. The agency in recent years has used such P3s for new terminals at both Kennedy (JFK) and LaGuardia (LGA) airports. The capital plan also includes a new AirTrain Newark and an “EWR Vision Plan” for revitalizing the airport.

SpaceX Starship Cleared for Cape Canaveral Launches
Politico Space reported (Dec. 5) that the Space Force has cleared SpaceX to launch its huge Starship launch system from its launchpad SLC-37. SpaceX hopes to launch up to 76 Starship flights per year from that site within the next few years. Other launch companies expressed concerns about interference with their own launch plans, but the Space Force accepted SpaceX’s plans to identify any new “blast danger areas” that need to be cleared near SLC-37.

First Digital Tower in the Middle East
Hamad International Airport (HIA) in Qatar has received certification for the first virtual/digital control tower in the Middle East. The Virtual Tower was developed by Searidge Technologies, with partners ADB Safegate and NATS, the UK air navigation service provider (ANSP). The vTWR provides 360-degree views of the entire airport, which was not possible from its conventional tower. The new system has two controller workstations in the existing conventional tower and two in HIA’s Backup and Approach Training Center.

Blue Origin Lands New Glenn Booster
On its second launch, Blue Origin’s New Glenn booster lofted two NASA payloads toward Mars and recovered the reusable booster for the first time. This was the first successful New Glenn booster recovery. Blue Origin plans to use it for many future launches, similar to SpaceX’s growing track record with Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launch vehicles.

Nav Canada Breaks Ground for Its First Digital Tower Center
Kingston, Ontario, is the site where Nav Canada has begun construction of an interim digital tower facility. The Kingston Digital Facility (KDF) is intended to lay the groundwork for a future digital tower center that is intended to serve up to 20 airports. Upon completion in 2026, the KDF will initially provide tower services for Kingston and one other airport, as the first digital tower facility in Canada. It is also the first stage in Nav Canada’s Digital Aerodrome Air Traffic Services (DAATS) initiative. Nav Canada’s technology partner on this endeavor is Kongsberg.

DOT Seeks Information on Dulles Airport Revamp
Responding to a White House request, the US DOT on Dec. 3 issued a Request for Information on plans to “revitalize” Washington Dulles Airport (IAD). The RFI includes the idea of public-private partnerships (P3s), like those that have been used to replace aging terminals at LaGuardia (LGA) and Kennedy (JFK) airports. IAD is an airport I avoid whenever possible, in part because of its slow, dangerous people movers called “mobile lounges,” which have no seats and are generally wall-to-wall with standing passengers and luggage. The airport really could use a serious rethink, and it could be a good fit for design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) P3s.

JSX Plans Passenger Service from Santa Monica
Public charter carrier JSX has announced daily flights between Santa Monica (SMO) and Las Vegas (LAS) to begin before the end of December. This will be JSX’s first route to use turboprop aircraft (ATR 42-600s). JSX holds options to acquire as many as 25 additional ATR turboprops, if its early routes are successful. Even if it is successful, the SMO-LAS route will not be long-term, since SMO is due to shut down entirely at the end of 2028.

Fengate Plans to Sell its ConRAC
One of the pioneer developer/operators of consolidated rental car centers (Con RACs) is planning to sell its pioneer project at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Infralogic reported (Nov. 26) that Fengate is in negotiations with BBGI Global Infrastructure to sell the LAX ConRAC and a public school P3 in Prince George’s County, MD. BBGI, which owns 56 P3s in the United States, Canada, and Europe, was recently taken private by British Columbia Investment Management Corporation.

NASA Bans People from Next Boeing Starliner Flight
Ars Technica reported that NASA has approved renewed missions to the International Space Station for Boeing’s ill-fated Starliner capsule, but this first set of new missions will be for cargo only. Assuming this cargo-only mission is a success, Starliner will be approved to fly three passenger missions to the Space Station before the ISS is de-orbited, as planned. The original 2014 NASA contract called for Starliner to operate six crewed flights to ISS.

U.K. Takes Steps to Bolster GPS Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
In response to increasing levels of GPS/GNSS spoofing and jamming, the U.K. government has committed £155 million for three projects. First, £71 million will be invested in a new enhanced LORAN program, a system with higher power and a far different spectrum than used by GNSS. Second will be £68 million to continue the development of a National Timing Center aimed at providing nationwide timing that does not rely on GNSS. Another £13 million will fund a new UK GNSS interference monitoring program.

Eurocontrol Calls for Increased Use of Text Messaging
The 42-government agency Eurocontrol has called for air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and airlines to make significantly more use of controller-pilot-data-link-communications (CPDLC), Aviation Daily reported (Nov. 14). Greater use of text messaging would relieve congestion on voice radio communications channels. Eurocontrol’s Paul Bosman reported at a recent conference that in European airspace, flights average only two data link messages per flight, adding, “This technology has been available for 20 years; can’t we do better?”

FAA Seeks Input on Replacing ERAM and STARS
On Nov. 20, the FAA released a Request for Information (RFI) about creating a common automation platform that would replace separate systems that manage en-route flights (ERAM) and terminal-area flights (STARS). The Common Automation Platform (CAP) sounds good in principle, and FAA is wise to seek a single, state-of-the-art platform to replace the two older systems, developed during different time frames. FAA noted that it is open to several potential approaches to “re-architecting” existing platforms. Responses are due Dec. 19, which does not provide much time for serious brainstorming.

Lockheed Martin Plans Commercial Orion
Aviation Week (Oct. 13-26) reported that the prime contractor for NASA’s Orion moon capsule is planning a commercial version. Lockheed acknowledged NASA’s contract for the Artemis moon missions, but with that program likely to be cut short after only a few launches, it is looking for possible commercial customers. I am happy to refer them to last month’s article on Orion’s potential shortcomings, beginning with its hardly-proven re-entry heat shield. If even half the problems cited by ex-NASA scientist Casey Handmer (in last month’s issue) are valid, my advice is caveat emptor.

Blue Origin Partners with Luxembourg Space Agency on Lunar Prospecting
Project Oasis was recently announced by the space launch company in conjunction with Luxembourg’s space agency. The plan is to remotely surveil lunar water ice to identify Helium 3, rare earth elements, and other resources that might support lunar production of materials and fuel that would not have to be transported from Earth. To the extent that promising lunar resources are identified, the project’s second phase, called Blue Alchemist, will experiment (here on Earth) with turning such raw material into useful materials that could later be produced on the Moon.

Airport P3 Activity in Brazil
In October, airport operator Motiva announced that its Brazilian airport concessions were for sale, with a value estimated at $1.8-2.2 billion. Twelve airport groups initially expressed interest, including the world’s second-largest (AENA Airports) and fifth-largest (Vinci Airports). In early November, AENA announced that it was working on a $986 million bond issue for its Brazilian airport P3 concessions. It also announced that its partially-owned Mexican airport company GAP would merge with its strategic partner AMP. It looks as if more airport deals will be forthcoming soon in Brazil.

Stockholm Arlanda Airport OKs Curved Landing Approaches
Aircraft equipped and certified for required navigation performance (RNP-Authorization Required) may be allowed to make continuous descent approaches on curved arrival paths at Arlanda. Swedavia expects that this will lead to more landings per hour and lower aircraft emissions. RNP-AR has been approved by Nav Canada for two airports in that country, Calgary and Toronto. I am not aware of any US airports approved by the FAA for this kind of landing

Newark Controllers Have Two More Years in Philadelphia, Per FAA
When the FAA shifted control of arrivals and departures at Newark from the troubled New York TRACON (N90) to the Philadelphia TRACON, 14 controllers moved to the Philly TRACON. The time period was indefinite, but on Nov. 17, the FAA announced that those controllers would remain at Philly TRACON for two more years.

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Quotable Quotes

“The economics of urban air taxis are difficult. An aircraft costing millions must fly many hours per day at high load factors to cover capital and operating costs.  Battery energy density limits range and payload. Downwash, noise, and turbulence make rooftop or street-level operations problematic. Wind and weather limits reduce availability. Certification requires thousands of flight hours and proven safety redundancies. Air traffic management for autonomous or semi-autonomous craft is not ready. Public acceptance of low-flying craft over dense cities remains uncertain. . . .  Supernal’s folding is symbolic. The era of hype is ending. The sector is moving into an attrition phase where many firms will fail, a few will survive, and the market will settle into niches. The original promise of eVTOLs as a mass urban transport solution is receding. The story now is about how a vision of the future met the hard reality of physics, economics, and regulation, and how an industry will be reshaped in the aftermath.”
—Michael Barnard, “From Kitty Hawk to Supernal: The Shrinking Future of eVTOLs,” Clean Technica, Sept. 11, 2025

“I enjoyed your piece in the Wall Street Journal [on ATC reform]. As someone on the front lines, I can tell you that things are certainly not getting better. The most frustrating part of my day is battling all the chatter on the radio. Many times we can’t get a word in edgewise. Meanwhile CPDLC (controller-pilot-data link- communications) just sits unused. It’s very rare for controllers to use it for anything other than frequency changes. Many of its numerous functions are not even activated, including free text messages. One concern I have is that the feds are going to spend billions on a new elaborate ground-based system, when a better and less-expensive aircraft AI system may be just around the corner. While I seriously doubt that the ground-based network will be eliminated any time soon, I could see significant reductions in the need for hardware, particularly on the en-route part of the system.”
—Greg Ross, email to Robert Poole, May 10, 2025, used by permission. Mr. Ross is a 737 captain for a major U.S. airline.

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The post Aviation Policy News: Air traffic controller staffing and resignation claims appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Protecting aviation from the next shutdown
• Time to retire the P word
• NASA’s huge risk in Artemis II mission
• Airport privatization back on Canada’s agenda
• Protecting passengers from defective regulation
• Carry-on bags and emergency evacuation
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Protecting Aviation from the Next Shutdown  

The longest federal government shutdown has finally been ended by Congress. Air travel will likely take weeks to recover, in part due to an even larger shortage of air traffic controllers due to the higher-than-usual number of controller retirements during the past month and a half.

The Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization was already far short of standard air traffic controller staffing, and the next few years will be even worse. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy says that an average of 15 to 20 controllers retired per day during the shutdown. If that’s the case, multiply 15 retirements by 43 days and you get 645 fewer controllers post-shutdown. Therefore, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is likely to retain some flight restrictions indefinitely based on the post-shutdown level of controller staffing at towers, TRACONs, and high-altitude centers.

The shutdown may be over, but now is the time for policymakers to think seriously about protecting air travel from the next government shutdown, because there are sure to be more. The most effective means to that end is to do what nearly 100 other countries have done since 1987: de-politicize air traffic control (ATC). What the vast majority of those countries have done is to remove ATC from the government’s budget by (1) separating the air traffic control provider from direct government funding, and (2) enabling it to charge airlines and business jets International Civil Aviation Organization-compliant weight-distance charges for all flights.

Policymakers and opinion leaders should understand that U.S. airlines and business jets pay those user fees whenever they fly in non-U.S. airspace. The business jet lobby group, the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), pulls out all the stops to prevent its members from facing those fees in the United States because they currently pay only a very small fuel tax that covers about 10% of the cost of the air traffic control services they receive. As an Aug. 10 video editorial from The New York Times explained, whenever an airline passenger pays the ticket tax (which is the FAA’s primary revenue source), part of that tax is used to cross-subsidize business jets.

The other obstacle to modernizing U.S. air traffic control is, alas, Congress. It has twice rejected serious proposals to depoliticize our ATC system: once by rejecting the Clinton administration’s proposal to create a federal ATC utility and again under the first Trump administration, where a Republican proposal for a nonprofit ATC corporation modeled on the very successful Nav Canada didn’t move forward.

Perhaps the air travel chaos of this historically long federal government shutdown will prompt Congress to think more seriously about making air traffic control shutdown-proof, as many other countries have done.

As The Wall Street Journal editorialized on Nov. 5:

“This is a ludicrous way to run the air transportation system of any country, much less the richest and most powerful one in the history of the planet. The answer is to hand off the job of air traffic control to a nonprofit funded by user fees instead of taxes. This model is already present in Canada and elsewhere, so it isn’t some pie-in-the-sky idea. President Trump backed such a plan during his first term, but parochial opposition kept it grounded.”

Former U.S. Department of Transportation Undersecretary for Policy Jeff Shane reminded me several months ago of a 2007 bill introduced in both houses of Congress to accomplish some of what other countries have done. It would have enabled ATC user fees instead of current aviation excise taxes (notably the ticket tax and aviation fuel taxes) and, via a kind of “permanent appropriations” process, enable the user-fee revenues to go directly to the ATC system. It would also have provided borrowing authority for the FAA to use to finance ATC capital investments. The Senate bill was S.1076, 110th Congress.

That approach is not my preference, but it would be a major improvement over today’s “ludicrous” status quo for America’s air traffic control system. We need to take air traffic control out of the federal budget, insulating it from the next government shutdown.

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Time to Retire the P word

Both friends and foes of air traffic control reform frequently refer to proposed changes as “privatization.” In an abstract, academic sense, shifting a function from the public sector to some form of non-government management can be dubbed “privatization.” But that word has acquired a serious negative meaning when it comes to air traffic control. This dates back to the initial efforts by then-Rep. Bill Shuster, who chaired the House Transportation & Infrastructure (T&I) Committee last decade, to craft 2017 legislation to replace the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) with a nonprofit, stakeholder-governed corporation modeled after Nav Canada. This plan originated from a working group (of which I was a part) of the Business Roundtable. I also served as a (non-paid) subject-matter expert on this effort for the House T&I Committee. In parallel, a working group on air traffic control reform at the Eno Center for Transportation came up with a similar recommendation.

By the time the House T&I Committee released the first draft of its nonprofit air traffic corporation bill, the proposed stakeholder board was a disaster. The 13 stakeholders were to include four seats representing the major airlines, three representing general and business aviation, and six others representing air travelers and others. This led to a business-jet/private-pilot media campaign denouncing the bill as a takeover of ATC by the big airlines. NBAA bankrolled a new organization called Alliance for Aviation Across America (AAAA) that denounced the bill as having “a private board dominated by the big airlines” that would short-change rural states and small airports.

Despite a later version of the bill having a far more balanced set of stakeholders (including regional airlines and airports, and provisions ensuring the continuation of the Contract Tower program), the same AAAA talking points continued about a big-airline takeover and making profits at the expense of the rest of aviation. And this likely made it impossible for there to be a companion bill in the Senate.

When I review recent reports from organizations opposed to separating air traffic control from the FAA, they consistently label this change “privatization” and imply that it would be a profit-making private company.

A 2015 report from the Center for American Progress defines what they are against as “a private entity with a profit motive.” Yet the same report assumed that a privatized ATC entity would require “a steady stream of tax revenue to cover operational costs” and procurement of improved infrastructure. It went on to state that this would be “a bold attempt to carve out operations and procurement activities along with all or most of [Aviation Trust Fund] funding while dumping responsibility for remaining FAA functions onto taxpayers.” It also assumed airline control of the privatized entity, assuming that they would seek to ensure funding did not go to a major hub of a competing airline.

A more recent 2025 piece from “In the Public Interest” repeats claims such as, “Privatizing ATC would hand significant control of the airspace to the major airlines, allowing them to consolidate their power and dictate rules that prioritize their bottom lines over the public interest.”

In short, the meme is out there that “privatization” means “profits” and “control by airlines.” This does not reflect the situation in any of the nearly 100 countries that now receive air traffic control services from air navigation service providers (ANSPs) organized as public utilities, the vast majority of which are government corporations funded by ATC user fees.

That is why I switched my terminology several years ago to “public utility,” because that is what these entities are. In a U.S. context, they are analogous to electric utilities (including the Tennessee Valley Authority, which gets its funding from its electricity customers, not from Congress). TVA also issues long-term bonds to finance major capital improvements.

I urge fellow supporters of air traffic control public utilities to dump the ‘P’ word and start referring to public utilities as I wrote in my study, “Air traffic control as a public utility.” That is what the Clinton administration proposed in 1994, as its largest “reinventing government” project, the U.S. Air Traffic Services (USATS) corporation. It was to be funded by air traffic control user fees and regulated at arm’s length by the safety regulator, the FAA. I remember testifying in favor of USATS, but it never got beyond a single House committee presentation.

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The Huge Risk in NASA’s Artemis II Mission

As reported by Eric Berger in Ars Technica, NASA plans to launch its Artemis II mission early next month. Its giant, once-flown Space Launch System (SLS) rocket will launch its only-once-flown Orion capsule with four astronauts on board for a trip around the Moon and return to Earth. On the only previous launch (without crew) Orion’s heat shield partly disintegrated during re-entry. Once NASA engineers analyzed the damage, they decided that the fix would be to perform the next Orion re-entry on a different trajectory on which heat would not build up as much. But this has not been tested.

That bothers Casey Handmer, who has posted a very long critique of Orion, which I read in preparation for writing this article. Who is Casey Handmer, and why do I take him seriously? He received his PhD in theoretical physics from Caltech, worked at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and later founded Terraform Industries to make synthetic natural gas. Several space policy experts that I know and respect think he’s very credible.

His lengthy piece presents a technical case arguing that the Orion capsule is poorly designed, particularly in its heat shield. After many detailed pages, he summarizes Orion as follows:

• Orion does not have a “reference mission,” and Orion is not needed to go to the Moon.
• Orion is hugely expensive; the Orion program spends more in a year than SpaceX spent in total on its first space capsule.
• Orion has been delayed endlessly; in 2013 it was so far behind schedule that it could not be included in any serious space exploration architecture. And 12 years later, it has still not flown humans.
• Orion is irredeemably unsafe; the systems engineering was compromised from the beginning. Most obvious is the flawed heat shield. But nearly every other subsystem is either unstable, untested, or unfit.

Obviously, Handmer thinks it is wrong to risk four human lives on this very flawed vehicle. Remember, both the SLS launch rocket and Orion have flown only once. Contrast this with SpaceX’s approach. It has flown 11 Starship spacecraft thus far, none with humans on board. Each mission (and I’ve watched them all) is intended to test different design changes, flight tracks, and other details. Each one is a learning experience that leads to continuous improvements. A good overview of this approach is Irene Katz’s two-page article on Mission 11 of Starship Version 2. (“Next Up: Starship Take 3,” Irene Katz, Aviation Week, Oct. 27-Nov. 9, 2025) It’s a great illustration of SpaceX’s learning by doing.

NASA’s approach typifies the central planning “one best way”. It comes up with a concept and works extensively to fine-tune it on paper. It ends up being so costly that multiple test flights are unaffordable, so after just one SLS/Orion launch, it’s ready to fly with humans. That is an extremely risky way to proceed, but at $4 billion per launch, NASA has painted itself into a corner.

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Airport Privatization Back on the Agenda in Canada

Canada’s federal government has once again raised the subject of airport privatization, which was discussed briefly last year, but did not go anywhere. The government’s aim is to attract private capital to invest in the country’s airports, both the four major hubs (Calgary, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver) and also the larger regional airports. The government is looking for a way for equity investors, such as pension funds and infrastructure investment funds, to upgrade these airports.

What’s different this time, per a recent brief by Jody Aldcorn and Ken Silverthorn of McCarthy Tetrault that crossed my screen recently, is that today’s federal government has deficit constraints, the Canadian Airports Council is open to reforms, and Canadian pension funds are interested in airport investment at home, as they have been doing globally for many years.

Back in 1992, when the national government owned all the principal airports, it began devolving control to local non-profit airport authorities—but required that they pay annual rent to the federal government. The rent is a percentage of each airport’s annual gross revenue, and can be as high as 12%. The airport authorities hate this because they have to charge large fees to airport passengers, which makes air travel more expensive, on average, than in the United States.

When this subject arose last year, I had several suggestions, which I will repeat here, since I think they still make sense. The airport authorities want to get rid of the annual rent payments, but that would reduce a long-standing revenue source of the federal government. My suggestion was—and is—for the federal government to enact legislation enabling local authorities to opt out of annual rent payments if they enter into a long-term public-private partnership lease with an investor group (potentially including pension funds) and the investor group then agrees to compensate the federal government for the loss of rents from that airport. Thereafter, the airport authority and the P3 group would develop plans for modernization/expansion, etc., financed by equity and debt, as Canadian pension funds are involved worldwide.

This is potentially a win-win for the federal government, the airport authorities, and would-be airport investors, including Canada’s outstanding public pension funds, with their long track record of investing equity in airports worldwide.

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Protecting Consumers from Defective Consumer Protection Regulation
By Marc Scribner

Federal authority to police unfair and deceptive airline practices was first established in 1938 and has been largely unchanged since 1958, when consumer protections were extended to sellers of airline tickets. The commercial aviation industry has changed a great deal, as have consumer protection best practices that apply to most other businesses. In recent years, the outdated aviation consumer protection authority has been wielded to regulate air transportation in a variety of questionable ways, which are threatening the gains consumers realized following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of Transportation recently proposed a rule aimed at modernizing aviation consumer protections for the 21st century and protecting consumers from defective regulation.

The Department of Transportation’s aviation consumer protection authority long predates the DOT itself. Its basic structure was enacted by Congress as part of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which included protections against unfair or deceptive airline practices modeled on those contained in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act passed months earlier in 1938. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which established the FAA, also extended aviation consumer protections to ticket agents. Since then, the statute has largely been unchanged (49 U.S.C. § 41712).

In contrast, the FTC’s authority to police against unfair or deceptive practices outside the air transportation industry has evolved significantly since 1938. These changes were driven by court decisions and internal practice in the decades that followed the enactment of the FTC’s consumer protection statute, an approach that was summarized[?] in the FTC’s 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness.

Congress codified FTC’s modern practices in the 1994 FTC Act amendments, which importantly added three standards of proof to the statutory definition of “unfairness” (15 U.S.C. § 45). For conduct to qualify as unfair under the law, it must be (1) “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers,” (2) not “reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves,” and (3) “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” This updated definition of “unfairness” was also included in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which covers the enforcement duties of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (12 U.S.C. § 5531). Thus, a consensus on what “unfairness” means exists in every  federal consumer protection context other than commercial aviation.

While bipartisan recognition of the problem of ill-defined “unfairness” exists in virtually every other federal consumer protection context, Congress has so far not moved to reform the Department of Transportation’s similar aviation consumer protection authority. This failure to act has enabled regulators in recent years to engage in a variety of re-regulatory activities, including new restrictions on airfare advertising that prohibit government taxes and fees from being “displayed prominently” (14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a)), outlawing true nonrefundable ticketing (14 C.F.R. § 259.5(b)(4)), which puts upward price pressure on airfares due to the forced risk transfer from consumers to air carriers, and an inflexible tarmac-delay rule (14 C.F.R. § 259.4) suspected of increasing flight cancellations—particularly at smaller and more-rural airports.

Each of these aviation consumer protection regulations has been criticized as harming consumers, some with stronger evidence than others. But without the FTC-style standards of proof and evidentiary hearing procedures, the scales were tipped in favor of regulators.

Despite congressional inaction, DOT moved to bring the aviation consumer protection in line with FTC-style definitions and procedures in Dec. 2020. While this rule certainly improved airline and ticket agents’ defensive positions against allegations of unfair or deceptive practices, it would have required regulators to explain themselves along the way and give consumers better insight into how decisions that affect them are made. In this way, it should be understood as promoting regulatory quality and consistency in enforcement.

But the Biden administration moved quickly to reverse these reforms. Pursuant to an executive order, it published a rule in Feb. 2022 modifying procedures for discretionary aviation consumer protection regulatory proceedings in several ways that watered down process rigors. This change in policy opened the door for future discretionary rulemaking guided more by political whims than careful empirical analysis. DOT’s recent history of aviation consumer protection rulemakings suggests that past regulatory analysis was not sufficiently robust to avoid perverse harm to consumers.

The good news is that the new Trump administration is seeking to reinstate its previous reforms. Earlier this year, Reason Foundation urged DOT to restore the aviation consumer protection hearing procedures established in the Dec. 2020 rule. On Oct. 30, DOT published a proposed rule to do just that. While this latest shift in policy is welcome, it underscores the need for congressional action. A future administration can reverse these reforms just like the Biden administration did. Amending the aviation consumer protection statute, as Reason Foundation has recommended, would promote aviation consumer protection regulation and enforcement that actually protects consumers, regardless of who sits in the White House.

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Overhead Bags and Cabin Evacuation

Air travelers’ dependence on bringing travel luggage on board and stashing it in overhead bins is a serious problem. Not only does it increase boarding time; it also hinders emergency evacuations. As Sean Broderick reported in Aviation Week (Oct. 27-Nov. 9), a detailed study of evacuations revealed that retrieving bags from overhead makes it impossible to evacuate the cabin in the standard 90 seconds.

The study was carried out at the University of Greenwich. The researchers built a model so they could run thousands of scenarios, modeling a 180-seat narrowbody airliner with FAA-standard exits. In the base-case scenarios in which no passengers retrieved luggage, the median evacuation time was 121 seconds—well above the 90-second requirement. In the worst-case scenarios with many passengers retrieving luggage, total evacuation time averaged 199 seconds, with an average of 63 passengers left behind after 90 seconds. I note that in most scenarios, not all exits were modeled as usable, which is also realistic.

These are dismaying findings. The 90-second standard should not be increased, given the danger of fire and toxic fumes entering the cabin in many cases. So what kind of measures would improve evacuation times? Banning carry-on luggage (or locking the overheads until safe arrival at the gate) is not likely to be considered feasible. But what about providing economic incentives?

One reason so much luggage is brought on board is that airlines charge a lot for checked bags but charge nothing for carry-ons. What if checked luggage fees were cut in half? (I’d say eliminated, but airlines depend on that revenue.) But suppose they also started charging for most or all luggage carried on? We’ve seen the reverse of that when Southwest recently began charging for checked bags, leading to a large increase in carry-ons. So if airlines started charging for any carry-on larger than an under-seat briefcase, requiring a paid carry-on tag affixed to each such carry-on, some fraction of roll-aboard suitcases would end up in the hold, rather than in overhead bins.

This change should reduce boarding delays due to fewer suitcases being stored overhead and also improve evacuation times. Sounds like a winner to me.

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News Notes

Trump Renominates Isaacman for NASA Administrator
President Trump has formally re-nominated former astronaut Jared Isaacman to be the new NASA administrator. The nomination took place a few days after Politico unveiled Isaacman’s 62-page non-public concept paper for re-inventing the agency, which appears to reflect the ideas he discussed with Aviation Week reporter Irene Klotz’s two-page interview with Isaacman, summarized in the July 2025 issue of this newsletter. Politico quotes him as saying the document’s vision is “fully consistent with what I discussed in my Senate Hearing and in my responses to the Commerce Committee’s questions for the record. And I stand by it.”

Iridium Plans GPS Alternative on a Chip
Iridium Communications has announced an 8mm x 8mm chip that can provide position/navigation/timing information based on PNT data from its 66 low-earth-orbit communications satellites, reported Graham Warwick in Aviation Daily (Nov. 4). Iridium is seeking partners to conduct beta trials of the chip. CEO Matt Desch pointed out that the Iridium signal is 1,000 times stronger than GPS signals. The company plans to license the chip and PNT service to value-added resellers such as Collins Aerospace, Honeywell, and Skytrac Systems.

Archer Leases Hawthorne Airport for LA Air Taxi Market
Electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) startup Archer Aviation has paid $126 million to lease, for 45 years, Hawthorne Airport for its planned Los Angeles air taxi service and to test various new aviation technologies. The airport is owned by the City of Hawthorne. It was built in the 1920s and was once known as Jack Northrop Field. It is three miles from LAX and close to major attractions, including SoFi Stadium, The Forum, and Intuit Dome.

SpaceX Details Progress on Starship as Lunar Lander
In response to criticism from acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy, SpaceX released (Oct. 30th) a detailed progress report on its Starship-based Human Landing System for the agency’s Artemis III mission. It reported upcoming in-space trials of in-flight refueling and the development of a Starship HLS crew cabin. In addition, SpaceX issued the following statement: “In response to the latest calls [from NASA], we’ve shared and are formally assessing a simplified mission architecture and concept of operations that we believe will result in a faster return to the Moon while simultaneously improving crew safety.” This information comes from a Garrett Reim article in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report.

Beta Raises $1 Billion on the New York Stock Exchange
In an initial public offering, Beta Technologies sold 29.9 million shares at $34 per share. That puts Beta in the same funding category as Archer Aviation and Joby Aviation, all three now having each raised close to $3 billion. Beta is developing two versions of its Alia aircraft—conventional takeoff and vertical takeoff. It expects FAA Part 23 Type certification for Alia CTOL by late 2026 or early 2027, followed by Alia VTOL certification in late 2027 or early 2028. Beta says it has firm orders for 131 CTOL and 158 VTOL aircraft.

Macquarie Seeks Control of London City Airport
Infralogic reported (Oct. 15) that Macquarie Asset Management has reached an agreement to acquire a 50% stake in London City Airport from two Canadian pension funds: Alberta Investment Management Corporation and OMERS. That is in addition to its previous purchase of a 25% stake from Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, giving Macquarie 75% control of London’s third-largest airport. Earlier this year Macquarie acquired a 55% stake in Bristol Airport and a 26.5% stake in Birmingham Airport.

Quiet Supersonic Jet Makes First Flight
NASA’s X-59 Quest supersonic test aircraft made its first flight on Oct. 28 from Palmdale to Edwards Air Force Base in the California desert. The one-hour and 7-minute flight was at subsonic speeds between 170 and 250 knots. The X-59 is designed to reach Mach 1.4 and an altitude of 55,000 ft. During the next year, the flight envelope will be expanded in altitude and speed, after which acoustic measurements will be made to find out how quiet the aircraft is at various altitudes and (especially) supersonic speeds. A third phase will focus on community response to X-59 flights.

Blue Origin Opens New Glenn Factory at the Cape
The Orlando Sentinel’s Richard Tribou reported on the opening of a $3 billion manufacturing plant for the company’s New Glenn launch rocket. It provided a media tour of the factory, which will produce workhorse reusable New Glenn launch vehicles and also the version selected by NASA for its Human Landing System, to be called Blue Moon Mark 2. It is scheduled for the Artemis V mission, following SpaceX’s moon-lander version of Starship for Artemis III and IV. Blue Origin already had another plant nearby producing the uncrewed Mark 1 version.

New York Times Highlights Collegiate Controller Schools
Reporter Karoun Demirjian interviewed administrators at some 20 colleges that offer an FAA-vetted air traffic controller training curriculum. This program has not been widely known, despite its longevity and the addition of nine more colleges in the past year or two. I was pleased to learn that DOT Secretary Sean Duffy freed up enough FAA funds to keep these college courses in operation during the federal shutdown. That is a wise investment, given the increase in controller retirements during the shutdown. On the other hand, Demirjian reports that hardly any students in these programs have been trained to work in FAA’s high-altitude centers, which are considered the toughest assignments for new controllers.

Microwave Imaging Will Speed Travelers Through TSA Screening
MIT Lincoln Laboratory spent years developing a new kind of walk-through screening device for TSA checkpoints, to replace current walk-through metal detectors. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funded the project. The prototype uses antennas on flat panels that send out low-energy radio waves to reflect any hidden objects. This creates an instant image that the TSA agent scrutinizes. The technology has been licensed to Liberty Defense, and under the name “Hexwave” it was approved by DHS in 2024 to replace conventional walk-through metal detectors in TSA PreCheck lanes.

SpaceX Getting Close to Launching Starship Version 3
Starship Version 3 will be the successor to the Starships that have continued to provide huge amounts of data on operational performance this year. The first V3 launch is planned to, among other things, be the first to test orbital propellant transfer—a key factor in planned longer-term Starship flights, including its Human Landing System for NASA Moon landings.

Venice Airport Operator SAVE Is Being Bought by Infrastructure Funds
A consortium led by infrastructure investor Ardian has reached an agreement to acquire Italian airport operator SAVE, whose portfolio includes the Brescia, Venice, Verona, and Treviso airports, plus a stake in Belgian airport Charleroi. Being bought out under this transaction are infrastructure funds DWS Infrastructure and InfraVia Capital Partners. Infralogic estimates the deal is worth €1.1 billion.

JSX Introducing Turboprops
Public charter operator JSX is planning to introduce turboprop aircraft to its fleet; all other U.S. carriers have phased them out. JSX plans to add ATR 42-600s and possibly ATR 72-600s. JSX aims to provide the same kind of service offered by its small-jet flights. Its current all-jet business is up 30% over last year, with yields continuing to rise, reports Chris Sloan in Aviation Week (Sept. 29-Oct. 12). A number of legacy airlines are sponsoring legislation to treat public charters the same as scheduled (Part 121) carriers. Two airlines—United and JetBlue—are investors in JSX and are not supporting that bill.

Philippines Plans to Privatize Nine Regional Airports
Infralogic reports (Oct. 8) that its government plans to privatize nine regional airports, via two separate bundles. Both the Asian Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation are advisers for the planned auctions.

Iraq Selects Winner for Baghdad Airport
With bids from both Dublin Airport Authority and Corporacion America as finalists, the government in October selected the latter. The International Finance Corporation will negotiate with the Corporacion America consortium. The plan calls for the winner to construct a new passenger terminal (estimated at $400-$600 million) as part of the 25-year concession.

Error in Last Month’s Issue
Not one but two aviation professionals (whom I know) pointed out an error in last month’s lead article. The 17-country ATC utility in Africa is ASECNA, which I know. I plead guilty to sloppy proofreading.

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Quotable Quotes

“The reliance on overworked controllers is particularly dangerous because the FAA relies on outdated technologies that it has struggled to upgrade or replace. As in so many other areas, the United States has fallen behind other nations that use more-modern technologies to guide more airplane safely through crowded parts of the sky. . . . One possible corrective is to remove the government from its role. Other nations—including Australia, Canade, and Germany—have created stand-alone corporations, funded by industry, to operate their air traffic control systems. The FAA already collects a large portion of its funding directly from the industry. It could be fully funded in the same way. . . . Shutdowns cause unpredictable and lasting damage. If our elected representatives once again fail to perform their basic responsibilities, and the government again shuts down, other things will break—and the consequences will be with us for a long time.”
—Binyamin Appelbaum, “Why Is Your Flight Always Delayed? Blame Government Shutdowns“, The New York Times, Sept. 29, 2025

“Lack of competition in the airline industry stems from antitrust law enforcement. That’s what former Delta and Northwest CEO Richard Anderson suggested on the Airlines Confidential podcast this week, when he joined ex Wall Street Journal airline reporter Scott McCartney and ex-American CEO Doug Parker. Spirit Airlines is in bankruptcy. They’ve already said they’re giving up half their fleet. The whole thing was going to be flying if they’d been acquired by JetBlue, but the government stopped that. The Biden administration said they wanted those planes all flying under an ultra-low-cost model, and that’s why they blocked the JetBlue merger that would have saved Spirit.”
—Gary Leff, View from the Wing, Oct. 12, 2025

“The Artemis III mission, a key priority for NASA acting Administrator Sean Duffy, is set to launch in 2027. But given the high-stakes engineering feats planned for the mission, both people inside and outside NASA say that’s impossible—making it more likely by the day that China beats the U.S. back to the Moon. The program’s tight schedules—compounded by a massive wave of resignations at the agency—will make it ‘awfully difficult, if  not impossible’ to make 2027, another congressional staffer said.”
—The Spotlight, Politico Pro Space, Oct. 3, 2025

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The post Aviation Policy News: Protecting air traffic control and travelers from the next government shutdown appeared first on Reason Foundation.

The FAA’s new order that airlines limit flights at 40 major airports is meant to stabilize traffic flow and ensure safe operations, at the cost of tens of thousands of Americans experiencing flight cancellations each day. This unfortunate situation was entirely avoidable and is impossible in most of the rest of the world. That’s because most countries have converted their air navigation service providers into public utilities that operate independently of national government budgets.

What the FAA’s emergency order requires airlines to do

The FAA’s Emergency Order Establishing Operating Limitations on the Use of Navigable Airspace came into force on Nov. 7. Airlines at 40 “High Impact Airports,” which account for the vast majority of air traffic in the United States, are required to reduce their daily scheduled flights between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Required flight cuts begin at 4% today, increase to 6% on Nov. 11, then 8% on Nov. 13, and finally peak at 10% on Nov. 14 and beyond. 

Airlines’ initial planned flight cancellations through Nov. 14 were to be filed with the FAA on today, and are to be submitted seven days in advance on a rolling schedule going forward. Even at the initial 4% reduction, this translates to tens of thousands of Americans receiving cancellation notices for their previously booked flights. 

The impact will be even more severe than if airlines could freely select the lowest-volume flights to cancel because the FAA’s order imposes a requirement that carriers must reduce by marketing code, rather than operating certificate. Large mainline carriers have outsourced their short-haul routes to regional airlines, such as American Airlines, which operates its American Eagle-branded subsidiaries, including Envoy Air, PSA Airlines, and Piedmont Airlines, as well as contract carriers Republic Airways and SkyWest Airlines. Each of these airlines flies under a separate operating certificate, but all are marketed as American.

In its order, the FAA recognizes that major airlines would have an incentive to reduce smaller-capacity regional flights operated under separate certificates from the mainline carrier. As such, the FAA requires that flight reductions be calculated by marketing code and that reductions for any single operating certificate shall not exceed 15%. This will undoubtedly ensure more geographic equity in flight cuts, but will also result in more travelers being impacted.

In addition, the order puts airlines on notice that failure to comply can result in fines of up to $75,000 per flight operated over a carrier’s limit.

To further ease airspace congestion, all commercial space launches and reentries are prohibited between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.

How to make air traffic control shutdown-proof

This unfortunate situation was completely avoidable. It’s also impossible in most of the rest of the world. This is because most countries have converted their air navigation service providers into public utilities since 1987.

According to Reason Foundation’s 2025 Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report, 98 countries are served by air traffic control utilities, which collect user fees from their aviation customers to fund day-to-day operations and finance improvements. Just 24 countries provide air traffic control through legacy FAA-style civil aeronautics authorities, mostly in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The two main reasons why most of the world has moved on from the World War II-era FAA model are:

1. Regulatory independence: There is an inherent conflict of interest when a regulator provides the service that is tasked with regulating. Since 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has urged member states, including the United States, to separate the provision of air navigation services from its regulation. The non-compliant FAA model is increasingly uncommon as countries around the world have moved to adopt consensus regulatory best practices.
2. Financial independence: Air traffic utilities charge cost-based user fees based on ICAO consensus charging principles. This makes them independent from government budgets and allows them to issue revenue bonds to finance major improvements quickly. Free from the strings attached to government funding, air traffic utilities tend to focus on efficiency-enhancing modernization projects. Because utilities are able to finance improvements based on expected future revenue, these projects and their benefits to customers are delivered much more rapidly and cost-effectively.

Reason Foundation’s Robert Poole has been researching and advocating for air traffic control governance reform for more than 40 years. He has long argued in favor of converting the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization into an independent public utility. This approach has enjoyed bipartisan support in the past, although certain special interests have been successful in derailing reform. As he wrote days ago, “Depoliticizing the U.S. ATC system would be the most effective way to insulate it from inevitable future government shutdowns. Building the coalition to get this done should begin now.”

The post FAA emergency order grounds flights for tens of thousands of travelers appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Air traffic chaos: Only in America
• DOT Inspector General post-mortem on NextGen
• Airports and “use it or lose it”
• Airlines vs. spaceships: Florida’s looming problem
• Time to reform TSA airport screening
• Don’t move the ATO to DOT
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Air Traffic Chaos: Only in America  

As this article is being written, the federal government shutdown is dragging on, and reports of overstressed controllers taking sick leave are reflected in late arrivals and departures at more and more airports (following the ‘air traffic control zero” event at Hollywood Burbank Airport on Oct. 6, when there were zero controllers in the tower on the evening shift).

The tragic aspect of this fiasco is that it could not have happened in 98 countries that, since 1987, have depoliticized their air traffic control systems by taking them out of the government budget and converting them into user-funded public utilities (analogous to toll roads and electric and water utilities). New Zealand was the first, spinning off its air traffic control (ATC) system as Airways New Zealand, and transferring the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-compliant weight-distance ATC fees so that instead of being paid to the New Zealand government, they were paid directly to Airways. And since aviation is a growing industry, that revenue stream became bondable, making it possible to long-term finance ATC modernization, of both technology and facilities.

Of the 98 countries that have made this transition thus far, three can be considered to have “privatized” their air traffic control systems: Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom. In 61 cases, the self-supporting air navigation service provider (ANSP) is a government corporation (analogous to our federal Tennessee Valley Authority and various state and local government electric, gas, and water utilities). All of these have bondable revenue streams, enabling long-term financing of new facilities and modernizing their technologies. Six countries in Central America are served by a multi-state ATC utility called COCESNA, and 17 in Africa are served by a multi-state ACESNA. You can find a complete listing of how countries provide for ATC services in Table 5 in the 2025 edition of Reason Foundation’s Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report.

Since these ANSPs are self-funded via ICAO-compliant ATC user fees, they are outside their governments’ budget and hence not affected by their governments’ fiscal problems. Our airlines, passengers, and air traffic controllers would be spared the present miseries if Congress were to depoliticize our Air Traffic Organization (ATO) by separating it from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and enabling it to charge ICAO-compliant user fees and issue revenue bonds based on that revenue stream.

Notice what word I have avoided: ‘the dreaded P word.’ As noted above, only three can be described as to some degree “privatized.” Separating the air traffic control provider from the government budget is not privatization. Nor is allowing it to emulate 98 other countries in charging airlines and business jets the same ICAO weight-distance fees that those aircraft pay nearly everywhere else on the globe.

Support for converting U.S. air traffic control into a public utility has historically had bipartisan support. Vice President Al Gore was impressed by the formation of Airways New Zealand, and doing likewise in this country was a key objective of the Clinton administration’s U.S. Air Services Corporation proposal. When the plan got to a House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing, I testified in favor. But neither the airlines nor the air traffic controllers supported it at that time.

But in the aftermath of a 2013 government shutdown, in which controllers (like today) went without pay until the shutdown ended, controllers’ union, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, supported the 2016-2018 air traffic control corporation bills, along with nearly all the major airlines and the editorial support of nearly all major newspapers’ editorial boards (except The New York Times). That effort began with a blue-ribbon task force convened by the Business Roundtable, and was championed in Congress by Rep. Bill Shuster, then-chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

The next FAA reauthorization is due to be debated in the 2028 fiscal year, Between the FAA’s serious safety gaps concerning the risks of helicopter routes at Reagan Washington National Airport (highlighted by the National Transportation Safety Board) and the current air traffic debacle, perhaps public opinion would support one of more of the following: (1) separate the ATO from safety regulator FAA, per ICAO policy since 2001, (2) allow the independent ATO to implement ICAO-compliant weight-distance fees, and (3) give it bonding authority, to allow long-term financing of facility consolidation and large-scale technology replacements. Calling that “privatization” would be a lie. It would follow the global trend of air traffic control modernization. This change is long overdue in the United States.

P.S.: Not everyone remembers that President Donald Trump’s 2018 infrastructure plan included a call for air traffic reform, and Trump supported Shuster’s House bill via a White House event at the time. Politically, if Trump were to renew that part of the plan, he might encourage MAGA Republicans to take this idea seriously, and it could also be appealing to some Democrats.

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DOT Inspector General Post-Mortem on FAA’s NextGen

On Sept. 29, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) released what it calls a “capstone memorandum” on the FAA’s more than 20-year NextGen lifespan. It draws on 50 audit reports OIG produced, beginning in 2005. While there is nothing “new” here, pulling this all together amounts to a devastating critique of the much-touted NextGen program that was supposed to reinvent U.S. air traffic control.

The planned $36 billion effort (by the FAA and U.S. airlines) was intended to transform the system via advanced technology by 2025. Overall, this summary report estimates that by the end of last year, NextGen had achieved only 16% of its intended benefits. It also notes that despite the 2024 FAA reauthorization legislation calling for the FAA to “operationalize all key NextGen programs and terminate the Office of NextGen by the end of 2025,” the FAA will continue to deploy several NextGen systems over the next three years.

Here are a few conclusions set forth in OIG’s post-mortem. The first of these is that “FAA is delivering a less-transformational NextGen than originally envisioned, resulting in reduced benefits.” Early on, the Joint Planning & Development Office estimated $213 billion in benefits by 2025. FAA has on multiple occasions presented (ever-downward) benefits estimates, with the most recent (2024) being somewhere between $36 and $63 billion. That compares with an actual number, by the end of 2024, of just $9.9 billion. OIG also notes that the benefit estimates depend in part on airlines equipping their fleets with new technology, such as DataComm, which is far from complete.

Another key finding is that “FAA is currently implementing a version of NextGen that will be less-transformative than the original vision.” Instead of fundamentally transforming how air traffic is managed, as the National Research Council pointed out in 2015, the FAA had switched to a NextGen outcome based on “replacing and modernizing aging systems.” In most cases, “programs would remain nearly identical to existing capabilities.” The FAA also removed the NextGen Future Facilities program, which was intended to consolidate and modernize ATC facilities.

Another key finding is that “Many key programs and capabilities are over budget and delayed until 2030 or beyond. The report cites many examples, such as the delays and downsizing of the Terminal Flight Data Management program, which is not only late but has been scaled back from the planned 89 airports to only 49 (meaning only those 49 will get electronic flight strips for tower controllers; the others will still be stuck with paper flight strips).

Summing up, the report says, “Overall, FAA has delivered a delayed, over-budget, and less-transformational NextGen than originally planned. Many challenges continue to persist, even as FAA transitions to its new modernization plans in 2025.”

The OIG report also provides a set of lessons learned from the NextGen fiasco. The first is that FAA has a problem developing and implementing realistic long-term plans and assessing risk—and that this is due to a lack of meaningful requirements for projects (a subject that has been discussed in this newsletter—and this issue’s Quotable Quotes). Vulnerabilities in FAA acquisitions include not establishing fair and reasonable pricing, not promoting competitive procurements whenever possible, not mitigating against conflicts of interest among award-selecting officials, and not establishing effective contract management.

Another ongoing problem is sustaining “legacy systems” that were supposed to be replaced by NextGen systems. As the FAA’s independent 2023 National Airspace Safety Review Team report explained, the cost of maintaining obsolete systems (often with no spare parts available) eats up a significant proportion of facility and equipment budgets that were intended to pay for new technology. The report does not point out that if the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) had the kind of revenue bonding authority that airports have, it could finance new technology and implement it across the system within a year or two, rather than having to dole out the new tech in dribs and drabs over 15 or more years.

There is more, but I will stop here, simply to note that the much-hyped “Brand New ATC System” does not address any of these shortcomings, so don’t expect it to be more successful than NextGen.

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Airports and “Use-It or Lose-It”

A Chicago Tribune story crossed my screen on Oct. 2, “United Airlines Gets Additional Gares at O’Hare, while American Loses a Few: Competition Keeps Fares Lower.” As you may know, Chicago O’Hare (ORD) is a rare case where two major airlines each maintain a hub. Each would prefer to offer more flights than the other, to offer passengers more choices of destinations and/or frequencies. In the old days of long-term lease-and-use agreements, airlines sought to lock in control of as many gates as possible for many decades. Critics rightly referred to it as gate-hogging.

In the last several decades, we’ve seen an evolution in how U.S. airports handle gates. I’m not aware of any U.S. airports that assign gates dynamically, as I’ve experienced at some European airports (where you don’t know your departure gate until about 30 minutes before boarding time). But a growing number of U.S. airports have shifted to more-flexible gate assignments. According to the Tribune article, ORD changed to a “use-it-or-lose-it” provision in its airline use agreement in 2018. Each year, gates are allocated to airlines based on their use the previous year. Under that “use-it-or-lose-it” policy, starting this month, United will gain five more gates while American will lose four.

For a relatively recent example of gate-hogging, I recall an Atlanta trip where I ended my business early and got to Hartsfield (ATL) about three hours before departure time. When I checked the board after getting through TSA, I saw my gate already listed with my Delta flight number. I did not see any earlier flight to my destination, but I decided to spend my time waiting in the DL concourse where my gate was. To my surprise, when I got to the gate, it was empty—and it remained that way for about two hours more while other flights arrived and departed. That seems like gate-hogging to me.

In a landmark study from the National Bureau of Economic Analysis (NBEA) that I wrote about in the April 2024 issue of this newsletter, I learned that in a study of 2,444 airports worldwide, the ones that were being managed under long-term private concessions that included an infrastructure investment fund had more airlines, more airline competition, lower average fares, and higher productivity by several measures than other airports. Clearly, U.S. airports on average could achieve some of these gains by operating them more like businesses (which is what the infrastructure funds bring to the table, in addition to more robust long-term financing).

Another aspect of productivity (or lack of same) is how nearly all airports deal with more flights than their runways can handle. The landing slot system widely used in Europe (and some other countries) generally begins by grandfathering in the airlines and their slots, which represent the status quo at the time the system is implemented. What a way to intervene on the side of “in’s” at the expense of “out’s.” And many slot-controlled airports have a loosely enforced “use-it-or-lose-it” provision; a slot-holder is considered to be fully using its slot if it flies 80% of what full use would be.      

I have long argued that a far more economically productive variable runway pricing system would increase an airport’s productivity and foster competition (see my co-authored 2007 paper, “Congestion Pricing for the New York Airports“). The only airports that have even tiptoed into variable pricing are London’s Heathrow and Gatwick, which have peak and off-peak rates, plus noise charges.

The reformist government in Argentina has recently altered its conventional slot system at Buenos Aires’ Jorge Newbery Airport. The new rules allow airlines to trade slots under the supervision of a regulator and a “silence-positive” provision, which ensures that if the facilitator fails to take action on a slot request within a required period, the change is approved. These are small changes. But if the current libertarian-oriented government wins re-election, I would not be surprised to see more serious reform—perhaps even variable runway pricing.

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Airlines vs. Space Ships: Florida’s Looming Problem

As a life-long “space cadet,” growing up with science fiction and closely following the Apollo Moon landings, I watch SpaceX Starship launches and am a big fan of how SpaceX’s innovation continues to slash the cost of getting payloads into space. But as a Florida resident and still a frequent flyer, I stand to be personally affected by the coming growth of space launches and recoveries from Florida’s spaceports at the Cape.

Next year alone, SpaceX plans 120 Starship launches from Florida—76 from Air Force Space Launch Complex 37 and another 44 from the Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39-A. Assuming most or all 120 succeed, in addition to 120 launches, there will be up to 240 returns—of both the Starship itself and its Super Heavy booster. In addition, in the near term, the company expects to launch (and mostly recover) 50 or more Falcon 9s (though the company plans to phase down Falcon 9s as Starship matures).

The Air Force and FAA have conducted environmental impact studies of these launch and recovery operations, as well as the gradually increasing volumes of Blue Origin’s New Glenn launches and recoveries. One major impact is on (mostly) north-south air travel between the Northeast/Midwest and Florida. This greatly increased space flight activity will ramp up the operations of the Space Data Integrator at the FAA Command Center in Warrenton, VA.

How many flights will be affected on, say, a Starship launch day? Orlando Sentinel reporter Richard Tribou cited a federal report estimating that as many as 12,000 commercial flights per year could be delayed due to increased launch activity at Cape Canaveral.

Based on launch/recovery plans, plus expected telemetry data, FAA staffers must define and refine the “aircraft hazard areas” for each launch and each recovery. The volume of these will increase dramatically next year. In a series of articles in the Orlando Sentinel, reporter Tribou reported that SpaceX says these aircraft hazard areas “are extremely conservative by nature and are intended to capture a composite of the full range of worst-case outcomes, but not any single real-world operation.” The company anticipates that the “actual, implemented areas will be far smaller in geographical scope and far shorter in duration, validated by the robust flight data we are building.”

Needless to say, safety is the FAA’s number one priority as the federal aviation safety regulator. So it is likely to err on being conservative, rather than taking chances on some kind of air/space disaster that could have been prevented.

I don’t have an answer to this dilemma, but I want to bring up a subject that’s not being mentioned thus far in this debate: paying for the airspace used. Worldwide, airlines and business jets pay ATC user fees for the services they receive. They paid nothing in the early days of aviation, but once a complex, costly ATC system was brought into existence, it made sense for those who benefitted from it (rather than all taxpayers) to pay for its capital and operating costs.

When it comes to in-atmosphere launch/recovery traffic, there are currently no user fees—but there should be. If 400 airline and business jet flights are delayed due to space launch/recovery operations, what is the cost to those airlines and their passengers? This is what economists call an externality, and one way to deal with externalities is to price them. I have no idea what the cost to aircraft operators will be from launch/recovery delays, but it’s time for economists to start figuring this out. Space launch companies would certainly be motivated to invest more in precision launch and recovery operations if the use of this valuable airspace were no longer “free.” And in response to such prices, launch companies might figure out ways to provide the FAA with real-time data on flights, so that the FAA might be able to reduce the size and duration of hazard warning areas.

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It’s Time to Reform TSA Airport Screening
By Marc Scribner

The impact of the October government shutdown on the air traffic controller workforce has received wide attention owing to the travel delays caused by shuttered FAA facilities. If the shutdown continues and federal employees go unpaid, we can expect additional travel chaos from the TSA’s frontline security screeners calling out sick or quitting. As with the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, airport security screening is too important to be left to the political strife of Congress. Instead, security screening operations should be devolved to individual airports, with the TSA reorganized as a dedicated regulatory agency to oversee this reformed system. To that end, Reason Foundation has produced draft legislation to implement these reforms.

Forbes reported on Oct. 7 that one-fifth of the mid-Atlantic screening workforce had called out sick, according to the regional union representative. As of the second week of the shutdown, TSA checkpoint problems had yet to materialize. However, this may change soon if the government shutdown continues and TSA employees do not receive their full paychecks, as the agency has warned. During the 35-day shutdown in Dec. 2018 and Jan. 2019, airports in Miami and Houston were forced to close terminals because TSA could not staff security checkpoints.

Despite a major pay increase in 2023 that was credited with reducing annual attrition rates from 20% to 11%, TSA screener turnover is still roughly double the average federal employee attrition rate. Their comparatively low wages and monotonous workplaces make TSA screeners more likely to depart for better jobs even when the government is meeting payroll. A single missed paycheck is likely to lead many screeners to call out sick and seek employment elsewhere to address their sudden financial hardships.

This is no way to run airport security screening. Peer countries do not rely on a single national agency to self-regulate and provide screening services that are then funded by the federal legislature. The current TSA dual provider-regulator model presents an inherent conflict of interest, while its monopoly and dependence on general government funding creates a high-cost single point of failure. To mitigate these inherent risks of the status quo TSA airport security model, three reforms are necessary.

First, the provision of airport security screening services should be separated from the TSA, which would be converted into a dedicated security regulator. Screening operations would be devolved to individual airports. This reform is in keeping with global best practices established by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Annex 17 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly known as the Chicago Convention, states that parties to the agreement—which includes the United States as a founding signatory and the treaty’s depositary—should ensure the “independence of those conducting oversight from those applying measures implemented under the national civil aviation security programme.”

Second, airports newly responsible for security screening should be allowed to contract directly with private security providers. Two months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 nationalized airport security screening operations previously provided by airlines. The law includes a provision that allows for contract screening—the Screening Partnership Program (SPP)—but this program is fundamentally flawed.

Today, airports seeking SPP screening are given merely an advisory role in a TSA-dominated process that selects, approves, and then funds eligible private screeners. Airports are not party to SPP screening contracts and have no control in the process beyond their initial decision to apply to the TSA. As a result, SPP has been an unattractive option for most airports, with just 20 airports currently enrolled in the program. Instead, airports should be allowed to contract directly with private security providers, who would be selected from an approved vendor list maintained by TSA. Airports should also be allowed to self-provide screening, subject to TSA certification, just as is required of private screening companies.

Third, airports should be authorized to directly collect passenger security fees to pay for screening services. Airports would understandably oppose an unfunded mandate to provide security screening. This dynamic is what led to the creation of the TSA in the first place, with airlines lobbying for a federal takeover of the screening services they had previously been required to provide at their own expense.

To address this legitimate concern, Congress should reform the existing security service fee assessed on airline tickets, commonly called the 9/11 Security Fee. Currently, airlines are required to collect security fees and remit the revenue to the TSA. However, since 2013, Congress has raided one-third of fee revenues for deficit-reduction purposes. Instead, these fees should be directly remitted to individual airports to cover the costs of the screening services provided, much like the passenger facility charge is collected today for airport capital project financing.

Reforming the TSA to a model widely used in affluent European and Asian countries would permanently insulate airport security screening from the risks posed by government shutdowns. It could also help advance improvements to practices and technologies, leading to a better passenger experience. And it could do all of this while saving federal taxpayers money.

Reason Foundation’s draft TSA Reform Act is available here.

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Don’t Move the Air Traffic Organization to the DOT Headquarters

As noted in last month’s issue, the FAA has announced plans to move a portion of its Washington, D.C. staff from the two aging FAA office buildings to DOT headquarters, often referred to as “Navy Yard.” Because there is not enough office space at the Navy Yard, the FAA administrator needs to decide who moves there and who relocates to an unspecified “elsewhere.”

Politico Pro reported on Oct. 3 that a Sept. 30 document they reviewed calls for moving the Air Traffic Organization staff to Navy Yard’s East building, by around Dec. 10.

This is the worst choice. For several decades, dating back to the Clinton administration’s reinventing government efforts, it has become clear that the ATO is a high-tech service business that does not belong embedded in the national aviation safety regulator. There is ample evidence that FAA safety regulation of the ATO is not as rigorous as its safety regulation of airlines, airports, flight schools, repair stations, etc.

Consequently, the ATO should be functionally and physically separated from the aviation safety regulator, eliminating the current built-in conflict of interest. Given the FAA’s failure to take seriously a host of pilot reports of the safety hazard presented by Helicopter Route 4 crossing under the final approach to DCA runway 33, I’m hoping the NTSB will recommend organizational separation between the ATO and FAA.

The responsible decision would be to move the ATO outside DOT, to a location adjacent to the Command Center in Warrenton, VA. That is already a key ATO facility, and if it does not have the space to house the D.C.-based ATO staff, nearby office space could be leased. The rest of the FAA’s D.C.-based staff would be appropriate to move to the Navy Yard.

One other benefit of moving the ATO out of FAA would be to comply with ICAO policy that, since 2001, has called for organizational separation between a country’s aviation safety regulator and entities such as airports and air traffic control providers. The United States is one of the last major countries that has failed to adhere to this principle.

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News Notes

Isaacman Again in Line for NASA Administrator
Bloomberg and Politico have reported that President Trump has met with Jared Isaacman to discuss re-nominating him as NASA Administrator. This would be a very positive step, as I explained in the July 2025 issue of this newsletter, based on a two-page interview with Isaacman in the June 30-July 12 issue of Aviation Week. Read one or both to see why this would be such a meaningful change for NASA.

Saudi Arabia’s First Digital Control Tower
On Oct. 1, Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation approved the country’s first remote digital tower, to be located in Jeddah at King Abdulaziz International Airport, to control traffic at A1Ula International Airport. Saudi Air Navigation Services (SANS) is working with Spanish company Indra to implement the project. If SANS can do this, why can’t the FAA?

Arora Group Submits $33 Billion London Heathrow Plan
Arora’s specially created company, Heathrow West, formally submitted its proposal to the U.K. government on Sept/ 2. The plan would include U.S. company Bechtel, whose global airport track record includes the new second airport for Sydney, Australia, and many others. The Arora proposal competes with Heathrow Airport’s own $66 billion plan (which would build the new runway over the M25 motorway) by proposing a shorter new runway instead. Both plans aim to complete the expansion by 2035.

New NOTAM System Getting Trial Run
Politico Pro reported (Sept. 30) that the FAA has begun a trial period of its new Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) system with “early adopter stakeholders” for testing and validation. The new system has been developed, under FAA contract, by Virginia-based CGI Federal. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the replacement system is “resilient, user-friendly, and scalable. The current schedule calls for the new system to replace the antiquated NOTAM system in Feb. 2026.

Islip Shortlists Three Teams for Airport Terminal Project
Long Island’s MacArthur Airport (ISP) is in the market for a new terminal. The three pre-qualified firms submitted their proposals during the first week of October, reports Eugene Gilligan in Infralogic (Oct. 3). The airport owner (Town of Islip) hopes to select the winner by February and execute a pre-development agreement with the winner. ISP is located adjacent to the Ronkonkoma railroad station, which provides service to both Penn Station and Grand Central Station in Manhattan.

Gatwick Second Runway Approved
U.K. Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander has formally approved London Gatwick Airport (LGW) converting the taxiway that parallels its runway into a second runway. That would allow for 80 million annual passengers compared with 43.2 million in 2024. U.K. Chancellor Rachel Reeves said, “A second runway at Gatwick means thousands more jobs and billions more in investment for the economy.” Green Party leader Zack Polanski opposes this decision, saying that “Aviation expansion is a disaster for the climate crisis.” LGW is 50.01% owned by Vinci Airports, the world’s fifth-largest airport firm, according to the Reason Foundation’s “Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report: 2025.”

American to Remove Gate Bag Sizers
Starting this month, American Airlines plans to start removing the bag sizers at its boarding gates, billing the change as “simplifying the boarding process.” My impression (as a two-million-mile AAdvantage member) is that this change will more likely lead to longer delays in getting the boarding door closed, because more passengers will bring aboard too-large bags that will have to be removed at the last minute.

NASA Plans February Launch of Artemis II Mission
On Sept. 23, NASA announced that it plans to launch its huge SLS rocket for only the second time, carrying four astronauts on a 10-day trip around the Moon. SLS’s Orion capsule had a troubled re-entry on its first (uncrewed) launch (in 2022) and has not been modified. The Artemis 2 orbit will take it 5,000 miles past the Moon before swinging back toward Earth for its return. As noted here last month, each Artemis flight costs $4 billion.

First SpaceX Starship Version 3 Will Launch near Year-End
The new version of Starship will make its debut launch in either December or January, reported Aviation Week Network on Sept. 16. The new version has an improved upper-stage heat shield as well as other improvements. It will also be the first Starship equipped for propellant transfer in space, a key capability for its role in the Artemis program.

Blue Origin Planning Second New Glenn Launch
Jeff Foust reported in SpaceNews that Blue Origin is preparing its second New Glenn rocket for launch this month. Its payload will be a NASA Mars mission. The company will try again to recover the reusable first stage by landing it on a barge. New Glenn is a potential provider of a Moon lander for NASA, as is the SpaceX Starship. The Orlando Sentinel separately reported the opening of Blue Origin’s $3 billion New Glenn assembly plant and launch site on Merritt Island, Florida.

Adani Plans Additional $3.4 Billion to Expand Mumbai Airport
Infralogic reported (Oct. 7) that Adani Group is planning to invest $3.38 billion to expand the capacity of Navi Mumbai International Airport in India, primarily for the new airport’s second terminal, which is planned to open in 2029. The new investment is a combination of equity and debt. The project is a long-term public-private partnership (P3), in which the Maharashtra government holds 26%.

FAA to Require 25-Hour Cockpit Voice Recorders
A new air safety regulation, now in final review by OMB/OIRA, will require all newly manufactured commercial aircraft to be built with 25-hour cockpit voice recorders. The National Transportation Safety Board has long recommended this change, since in a number of accidents and other mishaps, the current two-hour recorders get written over by new material and are then useless in NTSB investigations. Unfortunately, there is no requirement for airlines to retrofit 25-hour recorders in their existing fleets.

Beta Planning a Larger Electric Hybrid
Electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) developer Beta Technologies has unveiled plans for a 19-seat hybrid eVTOL, as a follow-up to its six-seat Alia eVTOL. Like the existing Alia, the new aircraft will have wings. Thanks to its hybrid propulsion system, the new 19-seat aircraft is expected to have a much longer range than electric-only VTOLs. Its existing six-seat Alia is designed to make conventional takeoffs as well as vertical ones. To raise funds to develop the new 19-seat hybrid, Beta has filed with the SEC for an initial public offering of shares. Aviation Daily notes that Alia’s MV250, aimed at military missions, has a range of 250 nm. Aviation Week (August 11-21) notes that Archer, Joby, and Vertical are also developing hybrid-electric aircraft with longer range and higher payloads.

China Leads the Pack in Advanced Air Mobility
SMG Consulting, relied on by Aviation Week for assessing the viability of eVTOL and related aircraft, now ranks Chinese developers EHang and Volocopter in first and second place in its 2025 rankings. In the next four places are U.S. companies Beta, Joby, and Archer, followed by two more Chinese and two more U.S. developers (Robinson and Wisk).

Archer and Joby Bid for Bankrupt Lilium’s Assets
According to Aviation Daily’s Jens Flottau, the two U.S. eVTOL developers have joined Advanced Air Mobility Group to bid for the intellectual property of now-defunct German eVTOL startup Lilium. A decision by Lilium’s creditor committee is expected by the end of October. 

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Quotable Quotes

“The bottom line is that there will be no cancellation of SLS, Orion, or Lunar Gateway in the near future. Congress wants all three and is willing to throw money at them for years to come to keep them alive. Though [SpaceX’s] Starship might delay things a bit, as Bridenstein claimed. The reason China will get its lunar base built first will be because of SLS, Orion, and Gateway, not Starship. SLS and Orion are inefficient, cumbersome, and too expensive, and Gateway puts our assets not on the Moon but in space. You can’t build a manned lunar base with a rocket and capsule that launches at best once a year, carrying four people. Nor can you do it building a lunar space station in an orbit that makes landing on the moon more expensive and difficult.”
—Robert Zimmerman, “Yesterday’s Senate Hearing on Artemis: It’s All a Game,” Behind the Black, Sept. 4, 2025

“The FAA has 14 business units, heavily siloed, intensely fortified. I do think the [DCA] incident was a wake-up call for the agency that we have to think differently, act differently, and move quicker with modernization . . . . We’re innovating at about the same pace as aircraft manufacturers are redesigning. But the world is changing. Demand for the [National Air Space] is growing exponentially, and our innovators are innovating at about the pace of an iPad, not the pace of the new mid-market aircraft. The FAA also has to increase its agility, which is going to create some challenges for us.”
—FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, in Sean Broderick, “FAA’s Bedford: NAS Modernization Not Just About Technology,” Aviation Daily, Sept. 10, 2025

“Over the years, FAA’s acquisition and airways facilities organizations have experienced a significant cultural shift, moving away from a mission-driven, engineering-centric approach. Once supported by a robust systems engineering capability via the Martin Marietta Systems Engineering and Integration (SEI) contract, the organization now faces significant challenges due to diminished engineering leadership and oversight structures that lack technical depth and NAS experience. Issac Asimov once said, “Science can fascinate, but if you want something built, call an engineer.” This shift has led to delays, cost overruns, and a loss of mission focus, putting efficiency ahead of safety and security. To restore effectiveness, FAA must appoint a deeply and broadly NAS-experienced Chief Systems Engineer, who will lead the re-establishment of a world-class systems engineering organization informed by current and continuous operations research. . . . Reinvesting in experienced systems engineering and engineering program acquisition management will be essential to modernizing the NAS’s aging systems and will create a cultural shift that will once again attract the very best leaders back to FAA.”
—Mitch Narins, Strategic Synergies LLC, retired from FAA after more than 26 years as program manager and eventually Chief Systems Engineer for Navigation

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The post Aviation Policy News: Government shutdown causes air traffic control problems appeared first on Reason Foundation.

This is simply no way to run airport security screening and underscores the need for reforming the TSA. Reason Foundation has long supported reforms to TSA’s governance model to improve the provision of airport security screening in the United States. To insulate airport security screening from congressional bickering and government shutdown risk, as well as improve its efficiency and effectiveness, we propose the following three reforms: separate the provision of airport security screening from its regulation; allow airports to contract directly with private security providers; and convert the 9/11 Security Fee into a dedicated local user fee.

To that end, we have developed draft legislation, which we are calling the TSA Reform Act, to detail and help implement these reforms. This proposed legislation is contained in Appendix A of this memorandum.

Separate the provision of airport security screening from its regulation

Following the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, U.S. airport security screening was centralized under TSA. Importantly, the law tasked TSA with both providing screening services and regulating those services. This dual mandate combines the regulator with the regulated entity and represents an inherent conflict of interest. 

As with airlines, railroads, and automobiles, arm’s-length regulation by a government regulator and regulated entities is necessary to reduce the risks of regulatory capture. In the case of European Union member states, airport screening is the legal responsibility of airport operators. These airports either provide screening services themselves or contract with private providers.

Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (commonly known as the Chicago Convention) contains the International Civil Aviation Organization’s standards and recommended practices for aviation security. Paragraph 3.5.1(a) states that parties—including the United States, which is a founding signatory and the treaty’s depositary—should ensure the “independence of those conducting oversight from those applying measures implemented under the national civil aviation security programme.”

As a combined regulator and provider, TSA’s current institutional design fails to align with international consensus standards.

To address TSA’s core self-regulator design flaw and to align U.S. screening with global best practices, TSA should be reformed to focus strictly on the regulation of security services. Section 110(b) of ATSA replaced an earlier requirement that airport security screening be conducted “by an employee or agent of an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier” with a mandate that screening “shall be carried out by a Federal Government employee” (presently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)).

We propose that this be amended to require instead that airport security screening be conducted by “an employee or agent of an airport” who would be certified and regulated by TSA.

Allow airports to contract directly with security providers

The major exception to TSA’s general security screening monopoly under ATSA Section 110(b) is the Screening Partnership Program, which allows airports to apply to seek the services of private screening companies (49 U.S.C. § 44920). TSA’s website lists 20 airports that are currently enrolled in the Screening Partnership Program, mostly small airports, but also includes Kansas City International, Orlando Sanford International, and San Francisco International.

Growth in the number of airports opting for private screening has stalled. Observers have identified a complicated, time-consuming, opaque, and biased process as the principal cause for the lack of interest in airport security contracting. A normal government contracting process typically involves a government agency issuing a request for proposals from qualified firms and then initiating a competitive bidding process. In the case of airport security, this would perhaps involve a sponsor airport beginning procurement from a list of security companies certified by the security regulator and then selecting the firm that best fits the airport’s particular needs.

This is not how the Screening Partnership Program is designed. Instead, under current law, an airport seeking to opt in to private screening must submit a detailed request to TSA. If TSA decides to grant the airport entry into the Screening Partnership Program, it will then determine which security company it believes best fits the needs of the airport applicant. As part of this selection process, the airport has only a minor advisory role. The security company is then assigned to the airport, and the private screening company is contracted to TSA; rather than a contract between the company and the airport it would serve.

We propose that the basic statutory framework of the Screening Partnership Program be amended to allow airports to contract directly with security screening providers or to self-provide screening services. The screening companies should be certified by TSA to be eligible for selection by individual airports, and airports should be able to choose the screening companies that best fit their needs and terminate contracts with those that fail to provide adequate service. Airports that choose to self-provide screening services should be subject to the same TSA certification and oversight as private screening companies.

Convert the 9/11 security fee into a dedicated local user fee

The principal barrier to direct airport contracting with security screening providers is payment responsibility. Under the Screening Partnership Program, rates are determined by TSA, which then pays the contracted providers and assigns them to willing airports. An unfunded mandate on airports to provide certain security services without compensation would surely be opposed by the airport industry.

To address these legitimate concerns, we recommend that Congress reform the existing security service fee, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Security Fee, which is assessed on airline tickets. Currently, airlines are required to impose security fees of $5.60 per one-way trip and a maximum of $11.20 for round-trip tickets (49 U.S.C. § 44940(c)(1)). Airlines then remit the fee revenue to TSA. However, since the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Congress has diverted one-third of 9/11 Security Fee revenue for deficit-reduction purposes (49 U.S.C. § 44940(i)).

To fund airports’ security screening operations, Congress should convert the 9/11 Security Fee into a dedicated local airport user fee akin to the passenger facility charge (PFC). Congress authorizes enplaning airports to impose PFCs of up to $4.50 per flight segment, with a maximum of two PFCs per one-way trip ($9) and four PFCs per round trip ($18) (49 U.S.C. § 40117(b)(1)). Airlines collect the fees on passenger tickets and remit the revenue directly to the airports at which the passengers enplaned. The Federal Aviation Administration regulates the use of airport PFC revenue by project eligibility criteria (14 C.F.R. Part 158). Despite these restrictions, PFC revenue now accounts for a large share of commercial service airport capital investment, particularly on terminal projects.

A PFC-style 9/11 Security Fee would restore the 9/11 Security Fee to its original purpose of advancing aviation security. Like the Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight of the passenger facility charge, TSA should regulate the use of these funds to ensure they are spent on security-related projects and operations. Revenue from a reformed 9/11 Security Fee would be sufficient to cover security screening services at most airports, although Congress should require, as part of these reforms, that TSA conduct a detailed financial analysis. Low-volume airports that might be unable to raise sufficient revenue to provide effective security screening should be supported by a separate account established by Congress and funded through annual appropriations, along with TSA administrative costs and other activities lawmakers deem appropriate.

Conclusion

These reforms to the Transportation Security Administration would significantly improve airport security governance and effectiveness in the United States. They are long overdue and are justified on their own terms. But the latest government shutdown, with the looming threat of commercial air travel chaos, underscores the need for these reforms. Airport security screening is simply too important to be left to the whims of Congress. 

Reason Foundation’s proposed TSA Reform Act is available here.

The post Reforming the TSA so airport security isn’t impacted by government shutdowns appeared first on Reason Foundation.

The controllers had called in sick due to the federal government shutdown. During the shutdown, air traffic controllers are not being paid for their often six-day, 10-hour-per-day work weeks. While President Donald Trump has floated the idea of not paying all federal workers back pay this time, controllers have typically received back pay for time worked during shutdowns.

All evening long, flight arrivals and departures at Burbank Airport were delayed, as the FAA’s regional TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) facility took over for the local tower and handled the reduced traffic into Burbank. Outgoing flights from Burbank were delayed an average of two and a half hours.

Air traffic controller staffing shortages were also slowing flights at airports in Las Vegas, Denver, and Newark, among many others.

That’s the bad news. The good news is that this did not have to happen and can be prevented from happening again.

In fact, this kind of situation cannot occur in nearly 100 other countries around the world, because those countries fund air traffic control, much like airports, from customer user fees and long-term revenue bond financing.

By contrast, the FAA, which includes the country’s Air Traffic Organization, is mostly funded by federal aviation user taxes. Because they are taxes, the money goes to the federal government, and Congress must appropriate the funds for FAA and the Air Traffic Organization. When Congress fails to pass budgets and shuts down the federal government, even though airline passengers continue to pay their ticket taxes, the money does not reach controllers or the air traffic system.

This system is also a significant reason why American air traffic control technology is outdated and lags behind that of large air traffic control systems in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and others.

In 1987, New Zealand separated its air traffic control provider from the government, which enabled its new Airways Corporation to retain the revenue from the user fees paid by the airlines, just like electric and water utilities charge their customers. The success of Airways New Zealand led to dozens of countries doing likewise within a decade. Today, nearly 100 countries receive their air traffic control services from air navigation service providers, which are funded directly by user fees paid by airlines and business jets.

With their own revenue source, these air navigation service providers are unaffected by government shutdowns. They are also better able to fund long-term projects and technological improvements because they aren’t beholden to the dysfunctional political battles in Congress that determine aviation funding every few years.

The New Zealand success inspired Bill Clinton’s presidential administration to study and then recommend creating a U.S. counterpart, which was detailed in a large-scale study by the office of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. Unfortunately, opposition by private pilot groups killed it.

Those ideas were revisited after the 16-day shutdown in 2013 caused air traffic control problems and closed the academy that trains new controllers. That shutdown prompted the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to support efforts to transfer the nation’s air traffic control system from the FAA to a self-supporting nonprofit corporation.

This effort was championed by then-Rep. Bill Shuster, who chaired a House transportation committee that twice passed the reforms. President Donald Trump endorsed that plan during his first term, but the administration didn’t push it, and the bill never even made it to the House floor.

Today, the primary opponents are members of Congress who don’t want to lose control over the system and the business jet community, which doesn’t want to pay user fees. But it is still possible to take air traffic control out of the federal budget, insulating it from recurrent government shutdowns.

It’s time for the U.S. to join the rest of the world in recognizing that governments should regulate safety but not run air traffic control, which is a high-tech business that should be directly funded by fee-paying airlines and operated like a public utility or nonprofit corporation.

A version of this column first appeared at The Orange County Register

The post Only in America: Government shutdown causes air traffic control problems appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Airports Council International maintains a database indicating that in Europe, 75% of passengers use privatized airports. In Latin America, the figure is 66%, and in the Asia-Pacific region, it’s 47%.

Here in the United States, only 1% of passengers use privatized airports. The public-private partnership lease of the San Juan, Puerto Rico, airport is responsible for that 1%.

This significant disparity has puzzled many people in both industry and government. So, I was pleased to receive an invitation last fall from Ed Glaeser of Harvard University to submit a proposal for a research paper on a current problem and a potential policy-change solution for it. The problem I suggested was the dearth of U.S. airport privatizations. My proposal was one of a half-dozen that were accepted. The project was managed by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, and the paper went through rigorous peer review. It was released in August, and I hope it has a significant impact on improving airports. 

In the years following the privatization of the British Airports Authority by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1987, there was significant interest in enabling similar transactions to take place in the United States. In 1996, Congress enacted an Airport Privatization Pilot Program under which five airports could be P3-leased. (Outright sale of U.S. airports was and remains against federal law.) 

A handful of small airports were P3-leased, but none were successful. In 2012, Congress made modest changes to the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP). Under this program, Chicago attempted to lease Midway International Airport twice, and Puerto Rico successfully leased Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan. 

Eventually, in 2018, Congress substantially revised the program, renaming it the Airport Investment Partnership Program (AIPP). The most important change was that the (generally up-front) lease payment can now be used by the airport owner’s jurisdiction (city, county, or state) for any governmental purpose, rather than being limited to being spent on airport improvements. 

Many of us thought this would finally lead to airport public-private partnership leases, but the only serious effort to lease one was St. Louis Lambert International Airport. In 2018, the Lambert effort was terminated by the city due to opposition from other governments in that metro area. This was despite very significant private-sector interest in a lease and support from the airport’s airlines.

My research topic was to review the literature on U.S. airport privatization and come up with policy changes that could open the door for long-term public-private partnership (P3) leases. I reviewed a major Transportation Research Board study from 2012 and several reports on the topic by the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service, and others. One theme stood out to me: the non-level tax playing field between the United States and the rest of the world. U.S. airports are financed via tax-exempt bonds, which do not exist in Europe, Latin America, or the Asia-Pacific countries. This problem had not been addressed in the succession of changes made by Congress relating to airport public-private partnerships.

Fortunately, I had also saved the text of the major 2018 White House infrastructure report researched and written by D.J. Gribbin during the first Trump administration. I’d had occasional discussions with Gribbin while he was serving as the leading strategist of President Donald Trump’s $1.5 trillion infrastructure plan, and I remembered that it addressed the tax-exempt bond situation. The transportation portion of Gribbin’s report was also released as a report by then-Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao, and it included the same discussion of tax-exempt airport bonds as a barrier to U.S. airport public-private partnerships.

In the new report, I propose two federal tax policy changes that were discussed in the White House report: (1) allow an airport’s existing tax-exempt bonds to remain in force, but with subsequent debt service becoming the responsibility of the private-sector partner, and (2) expand the availability of surface transportation tax-exempt private activity bonds (PABs) to airports and seaports, as proposed in 2014 by a bipartisan House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure working group on P3s.

Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the U.S. Treasury Department generally oppose any expansion of tax-exempt debt. Their stated reason is their assumption that anything financed via expanded tax-exempt debt would have otherwise been financed via taxable debt—hence, the government would miss out on tax revenue if tax-exempts were expanded.

For U.S. airports, this is simply incorrect, as I explain in the report. Treasury receives no taxable revenue from airport finance today, since nearly all airport bonds are tax-exempt. No new U.S. airport public-private partnership leases are taking place, so Treasury is not getting any tax revenue from non-existent leases. 

Under the changes I propose, if airport P3 leases start to occur, there would be no immediate increase in federal tax revenue. However, as for-profit public-private partnership firms enter the U.S. airport market, assuming they are successful businesses, they will be subject to federal corporate income taxes. This could develop into a new U.S. industry, similar to what has occurred in surface transportation, thanks to long-term public-private partnerships for highways and transit. Today, the United States has a whole new tax-paying corporate sector of highway/transit public-private partnership companies, like what could develop as a new airport P3 industry in the years ahead.

The most important question is whether these tax changes would actually lead to more than the current single long-term airport public-private partnership lease. 

In my new report, I draw on my 2021 Reason Foundation study on airport P3 leases to estimate the impact those tax changes would make. Under current law, in an airport P3 lease, the airport owner (city, county, or state) must pay off its outstanding bonds before the deal can be finalized. 

In Europe, the airport owner receives the estimated gross value of the airport, generally based on a multiple of its EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). But for a U.S. airport, under current law, the owner would receive the net value (gross value minus the bond payoff). That can make a significant difference in what can be considered as a major one-time financial windfall that the city, county, or state can use for any governmental purpose, under the current AIPP law.

For example, based on my 2021 analysis, which estimates the market value of 31 large and medium U.S. airports, for Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International Airport, the gross up-front payment would be $9.2 billion, compared with a net payment of $6.1 billion.

For the Los Angeles International Airport, the gross value of $17.9 billion contrasts with a net value of $10.6 billion. Similarly, for San Jose Mineta International Airport, the gross value is $2.5 billion versus $1.3 billion in net value. 

To make this even more tangible, the report compares the one-time windfall for each of 31 airports with the unfunded liability of that jurisdiction’s public employee pension funds. Atlanta, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are some of the cases with the gross value being more than sufficient to fully eliminate their pension system’s unfunded liabilities. In many of the 31 large and medium airports examined, the payment would make a significant dent in the jurisdiction’s public pension debt. 

Still, the question remains: would any U.S. airport owner consider such an airport lease to be worthwhile? 

I quote a former director of Miami International Airport explaining to Sadek Wahba of I Squared Capital how much elected officials enjoy micromanaging airports. That’s a real phenomenon, but this leads me to a question: What do elected officials think an airport P3 is? 

My hypothesis is that most think a P3 is a de facto sale. Even if their city or state already has one or more long-term DBFOM (Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain) public-private partnership highway projects, they might not see that a long-term airport P3 lease is an ongoing partnership between the airport’s government owner and the selected private sector company or project entity. They may not be clear about the respective roles of the public and private partners in the long-term agreement. To be sure, elected officials will not retain their micro-managing ability of an airport if it is P3 leased, but they will have a significant role in major future decisions, such as expanded terminals or runway extensions, made by the airport. 

So, the airport P3 industry has an important educational role to play with policymakers and stakeholders. And despite my AEI/Brookings paper having the word “privatization” in the title, my first recommendation is to avoid using this term with regard to U.S. airport long-term public-private partnership leases. In the examples and cases described here, they are not sales; they are long-term partnerships that research has shown lead to significantly improved airport performance.

One encouraging word comes from Kevin Burke, chief executive officer of Airports Council International- North America. In an interview with Aviation Week reporter Aaron Karp last fall, Burke lamented Congress’s repeated failures to increase the amount of the federally authorized passenger facility charge (PFC), which has not been increased for 20 years and has lost half of its purchasing power. Without a near-term PFC increase, Burke said, U.S. airports would likely turn to “public-private partnerships to fund the multiple billions of dollars it takes” to improve airports. He noted that airport lease transactions would likely follow the financing model used in Europe and other regions where companies oversee airport management and development in decades-spanning leases with governments.

In looking for another reason for potential optimism, I’d also remind readers that the key tax changes proposed in my paper were first spelled out in the 2018 Trump White House Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America. It would be wise for the current Trump administration to return to some of the proposed changes that Gribbin and the 2018 document outlined to help spur the modernization of airports through public-private partnerships. 

As I conclude in the study, Congress should make these changes to enable U.S. airports to improve their performance and compete on a level playing field with airport P3s in Europe, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific.

A version of this column first appeared in Public Works Financing.

The post How Congress can spur the modernization of U.S. airports appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Cautions on a “brand new ATC system”
• Why has the U.S. avoided airport privatization?
• Perspectives on the air traffic controller shortage
• Commercial launches for the Moon program
• Drone BVLOS regulations finally issued
• FAA moving time
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Cautions on “Brand-New ATC System”

With proposals due Sept. 21 from would-be “integrators” of the proposed “brand new air traffic control system,” my in-box has been filled with questions and concerns about the viability of this very ambitious effort. Aviation experts with long memories are pointing to a similar project from 1983 to 1994 called the Advanced Automation System, AAS. It was intended to be a sweeping overhaul of the system, including large-scale facility consolidation and numerous technology modernizations. The prime contractor/integrator was IBM. From an initial budget of $2.5 billion in 1984 to its cancellation in 1994, the cost had grown to $5.9 billion ($12.8 billion in today’s dollars), and the net modernization result was next to nothing.

One of the longest emails I received was from a former high-level Department of Transportation (DOT) aviation expert, now retired. Referring to the current program, he wrote “We’ve seen this movie before (AAS) and it didn’t end well…I’ve scanned the Request for Solutions (RFS), and it’s breathtaking in both the breadth of requirements and the 3.5-year deadline, meaning that the next administration will have to answer to Congress for the likely failure to deliver on time and the inevitable increases in cost…The integrator is made accountable not only for its own performance, but also for the performance of its subcontractors…And of course, FAA has to approve a great many decisions along the way, one of the reasons AAS was such a disaster.”

A high-level Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) official, recently retired, wrote to say, “I read through the RFS this morning. It’s an impossible task. Despite all the intimidating clauses about ‘no excuses,’ I think there is still substantial risk that they accomplish nothing at all by the end of 3.5 years.”

Aviation reporter David Hughes interviewed several air traffic control experts who were willing to include their names. His article is in the current issue of Air Traffic Technology International, dated Sept. 9, 2025. Here are some of their concerns:

• Charlie Keegan, the first head of FAA’s NextGen program, expressed concerns about the single contractor, whose every move will need to get FAA approval. He also noted that to have any hope of changing things within 3.5 years, the project will need to buy commercial off-the-shelf systems from European companies that are used worldwide—but are not currently FAA-certified.
• Dave Ford, former manager of implementing the STARS program, said the new program “needs a new concept of operation for ATC; otherwise, it’s all speed and no vector.” He also called for outcome-based service contracts with enforceable performance goals.
• Steve Fulton, retired expert on RNP and performance-based navigation, said any new ATC system should aim to implement trajectory-based operations (TBO), networking all trajectories and providing strategic de-confliction.  
• John Walker, former FAA airspace director, told Hughes that FAA has not embraced lessons learned from the failure of AAS, which was cancelled in 1994 (as noted above).
• Gene Hayman, Keegan’s consulting partner, said that any serious ATC reform should separate FAA safety oversight from the air traffic control system—as nearly a hundred other countries have done over the past 30 years.

As noted philosopher George Santayana wrote in his 1905 book, The Life of Reason, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

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Why Has the United States Avoided Airport Privatization?

According to the Airports Council International, 75 percent of airline passengers in Europe use privatized airports that have either been sold to investors or long-term leased via public-private partnerships (P3s). In Latin America, the corresponding figure is 66 percent, and in the Asia-Pacific region, it’s 47 percent. By contrast, the U.S. figure is one percent, represented only by the airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which was long-term leased as a P3 in 2013.

Congressional and other studies have most often cited unequal tax treatment between the United States and other countries—specifically the use by U.S. airports of tax-exempt bonds. That creates a non-level financial playing field for investors. I believed that argument for many years, but after researching and writing a new research paper, released last month, I’ve changed my mind. Here is the reasoning.

Despite this disparity in tax treatment, in the few cases when a U.S. airport has been made available for a long-term P3 lease (airport sales are not legal here), there have been eager bidders. That is true not only for the successful San Juan lease, but also for two attempts to P3 lease Chicago’s Midway Airport and a 2019 effort to lease St. Louis’s Lambert Field. In this most recent case, 18 teams submitted qualifications, and a dozen of the best-qualified ones made presentations in St. Louis. There was no lack of investor interest; it was regional politics that led the St. Louis mayor to abruptly terminate the planned P3 lease.

In my new paper, commissioned by a special project managed by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, I conclude that the problem is not lack of buyer interest; it’s lack of seller interest. But it turns out that a significant factor is the non-level financial playing field. The paper, titled “Incentivizing US Airport Privatization,” was released in August by the sponsoring think tanks and is now also available on the Reason Foundation website.

Before explaining my new assessment of the problem, I want to first remind you of an outstanding National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper by Sabrina Howell and others that assembled data on over 400 airports worldwide and compared performance on a large number of metrics. Their findings are summarized in an article in the April 2024 issue of this newsletter. Very briefly, airports that were acquired or long-term leased by entities that included a global infrastructure investment fund performed notably better than government-run airports, but also better than airport privatizations/P3s that lacked an infrastructure fund. The advantages included more airlines serving the airport, lower average air fares due to more competition, increased airport productivity, and greater passenger satisfaction.

Then why aren’t city, county, and (occasionally) state government airport owners eager to gain these benefits via a long-term P3 lease? The main conclusion I reached in the new paper is that U.S. airport owners have no idea what a gold mine they own. It is also widely observed that elected officials with a major airport in their jurisdiction enjoy micromanaging that airport. But would that be true if the airport were credibly worth billions, and they could retain some critical roles in charting the airport’s future?

On the first of these points, the unequal tax treatment makes a very large difference—not so much to the “buyer” but to the “seller” (actually the lessor and the lessee, in a U.S. context). Under current U.S. tax law and policy, when an airport (or other infrastructure that has been financed via federally tax-exempt bonds) changes hands, the existing tax-exempt bonds must be paid off by the airport owner. Drawing on my 2021 Reason Foundation study, I estimated the gross value of 31 large and medium U.S. airports, and subtracted the amount of tax-exempt airport bonds the owner would have to pay off in case of a P3 lease. Most of the 31 airports had very large amounts of tax-exempt bonds to pay off, reducing considerably the amount they would net (up-front 50-year lease payment minus bond payoff). In some cases, if the airport owner could receive the gross value (as is the case in Europe and other regions), the proceeds would be enough to pay off the jurisdiction’s entire unfunded public employee pension liability. This new policy paper provides some examples from my 2019 study.

Would billion-dollar windfalls do the trick? They would only be available if Congress and/or the U.S. Treasury revised current policy regarding tax-exempt bonds and the change of control. In the new paper, I argue that a long-term public-private partnership is not the same loss of control as would result from a sale of the airport. As we know from dozens of long-term P3s in highways and transit, the public-private partnership is shared governance of the asset. To be sure, no serious infrastructure investor would agree to elected officials micromanaging small-scale airport business matters, but the long-term agreement would spell out how shared governance would work in cases such as adding or expanding terminals, lengthening or adding runways, etc. And the FAA would retain oversight of airport safety and other public interest aspects, as it does today for the P3 airport lease in San Juan.

One additional point noted in the new paper. Back in 2018, the Trump White House released its detailed infrastructure plan, drafted by D.J. Gribbin. It included the tax law changes proposed in my new paper, and the same set of policies was endorsed by then-Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao. So there is some potential that if these changes were put forth again, as first-term proposals not yet implemented, they might gain acceptance.

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Some Perspective on the Air Traffic Controller Shortage

In what amounts to a follow-up to the recent Transportation Research Board study on air traffic controller staffing (see the July issue of this newsletter), the FAA has released a new Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan, 2025-2028. It offers perspectives on how the agency plans to cope with the projected controller shortage.

You may be surprised to learn that the FAA expects increased attrition in this four-year period, partly due to a larger number of controller training failures (at both the Academy and in subsequent on-the-job training). On the other hand, the FAA projects an increase of more than 2,000 controllers by 2028.

One problem that the FAA faces, which most other air navigation service providers (ANSPs) don’t have, is government shutdowns, another of which might occur at the end of this month. The report notes the FY 2013 “discretionary sequester” that led to a hiring freeze and the 35-day government shutdown in FY 2019. The reason that nearly 100 ANSPs do not face this risk is that their budgets are self-generated, via ATC user fees paid directly to each ANSP by airspace users. By contrast, the FAA depends on Congress to provide its budget, and Congress is not 100% reliable.

On page 12, the new report breaks down an expected loss of 6,872 controllers during 2025-2028. The breakdown is as follows:

This is why adding N thousand new hires does not necessarily increase the total controller workforce. Those numbers are further broken down on pages 18-20.

One of the most interesting parts of the report (to a data geek like me) is the Appendix, which provides a breakdown of 2024 staffing at every high-altitude center (ARTCC), every TRACON, and every airport control tower. For each of these facilities, the 10-page Appendix lists its target staffing, the actual staffing breakdown into certified controllers (CPC), CPCs in training, and developmental controllers. It’s then easy to compare the total with the target for each facility, showing which ones are understaffed and which ones (surprisingly) are overstaffed. The overall total at facilities is 13,774 controllers versus a 2024 target of 14,633—an overall shortage of 859). By now, you should realize that this is a moving target, since every year going forward will have changes such as retirements, deaths, promotions of controllers to supervisors, etc.

One topic the report does not address is potential transfers of controllers from over-staffed to under-staffed facilities. Based on the report’s Appendix, I did those calculations for ARTCCs and TRACONs, with the following results. For ARTCCs, 11 of these facilities have more controllers than the FAA’s target: the total surplus for ARTCC controllers is 234, compared with a shortfall of 148 controllers at the 11 ARTCCs with shortfalls. Thus, in principle, there is no controller shortage at ARTCCs overall. FAA’s report makes no mention of any program aimed at making it worthwhile for controllers to relocate from a surplus facility to an understaffed one. Since these are the most complex facilities, they are difficult for Academy graduates to master (compared to an experienced ARTCC transferee). Large (nationwide) companies make such transfers all the time. Why doesn’t the FAA at least look into this?

The Appendix lists towers and TRACONs together, so I had to select only the TRACONs for a similar comparison of shortages and surpluses. The surpluses are fewer and smaller than the shortages. Only eight TRACONs have modest surpluses, with Chicago’s C90 having six more controllers than the target. The largest shortfall is Northern California TRACON, short 40 controllers. Overall, 16 TRACONs are short 224 controllers, while eight have a small surplus totaling only 29.

The potential windfall is with ARTCC staffing, if the FAA could figure out a workable incentive package to motivate some controllers to relocate from a surplus-staff ARTCC to one with a shortage. Alas, the report makes no mention of this possibility.

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Commercial Launch Gets a Boost for Artemis Moon Program

As Ars Technica’s Eric Berger wrote on Sept. 8, “From the beginning, the second Trump administration has sought to cancel the costly, expendable [Space Launch System] rocket. Some officials wanted to end the rocket immediately, but eventually the White House decided to push for cancellation after Artemis III.” But as reported in this newsletter’s August issue, Sen. Ted Cruz added to the One Big Beautiful Bill extra funding to continue SLS through Artemis IV, V, and VI. But on an early September podcast, Acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy questioned SLS’s $4 billion cost for each SLS launch.

A second positive factor for commercial launch playing a larger role was what Aviation Week headlined as “Starship Goes the Distance,” (Sept. 1-14 issue), referring to its flawless Starship Flight 10 that “puts SpaceX’s program back on track.” That includes not only its planned role as a lunar landing craft but also its potential role as part of the replacement for the hugely costly SLS launch program.

Ars Technica reported big news on Sept. 10, under the headline, “Congress and Trump May Compromise on the SLS Rocket by Axing Its Costly Upper Stage.” Actually, the change would eliminate not only the upper stage but also the new launch tower that would be required if the overall SLS vehicle used a taller second stage. Both the Extended Upper Stage (EUS) and the larger launch tower are way over budget. Although part of the cost overrun has already been spent, cancelling both now would save about $1 billion every year going forward.

In related news, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk on Sept. 10 said he is confident that Starship can start delivering 100 tons of payload to orbit next year, while re-using both stages. That would be critically important in an SLS replacement program in which multiple Starship and Blue Origin New Glenn rockets launched all the components for Moon landings into Earth orbit for assembly. This scenario was explained in the recent Reason Foundation study, “Why Commercial Space Should Lead the U.S. Return to the Moon,” released last month.

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Drone BVLOS Regulations Finally Released
By Marc Scribner

On Aug. 7, the FAA released its long-awaited proposed rule on beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This rulemaking project had first been announced in Fall 2022, with a target release of the proposed rule set for Feb. 2024. While it came 18 months late, the proposed rule is a milestone moment for the UAS industry, which has faced steep deployment barriers for more sophisticated operations necessary to unlock the commercial potential of drones.

Over the last decade, Congress and the FAA have established UAS operational limitations, remote pilot certification and operating responsibilities, and remote identification and marking requirements for aircraft. FAA has been gradually relaxing operational limitations and integrating drones into the airspace, most notably in a 2021 rule that allowed qualified UAS operators to fly at night, over people, and over moving vehicles without a waiver.

But from the inception of commercial UAS and continuing today, drone operators have generally been permitted to fly only within visual contact of a remote pilot stationed on the ground unless they obtained a Part 107 waiver to operate beyond visual line of sight. These waivers also applied to the pilot as an individual, creating substantial paperwork and liability complexities for coordinated corporate activities. The nature of seeking mission-specific prior permission, as well as the FAA’s waiver procedures, together created a major barrier to advanced commercial drone operations.

The BVLOS proposed rule would create a new operating framework under Part 108, which is principally aimed at enabling the growth of commercial UAS. It is also an attempt at a performance-based approach to regulation, with requirements and permissions depending on particular UAS operating characteristics.

To start, there are two primary pathways to receive permission to operate BVLOS under Part 108: permits and certifications. Permits may be issued to operators of less-complex missions in areas with lower population density and with fewer and smaller aircraft. The FAA anticipates permits could be issued quickly. The other tier is certification for more complex operations involving larger fleets of heavier aircraft operating over areas with denser populations. Certification will entail a thorough review, and operators seeking certification will be required to develop a safety management system and personnel training program.

Depending on whether a permit or certificate is sought, and for what type of operation, operators will face more stringent limitations. For instance, a permit for package delivery will authorize up to 100 aircraft weighing no more than 55 pounds each and operating over an area of moderate population density (with the density limit defined as within 0.5 statute miles of a cell of 99 people, calculated by Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s LandScan USA tool, which would include some larger-lot suburban subdivisions). Hazardous materials are strictly prohibited from being delivered under a permit, which would include the lithium batteries present in many consumer electronics. The upshot is that parcel delivery operators seeking to build out a nationwide network serving dense urban areas with a diverse array of common consumer goods will need to seek Part 108 certification rather than permitting.

FAA’s proposed BVLOS rule would also create a new class of regulated entities called automated data service providers (ADSPs), with ADSP requirements established at Part 146. ADSPs would be certificated to provide UAS traffic management and real-time data to operators in both the permitted and certificated tiers. An ADSP is tasked with strategic deconfliction with other planned flights and “conformance monitoring” to make other airspace users aware of any UAS that are deviating from expected operations. Part 108 drone operators would be free to choose their own ADSP or provide those services themselves if they are properly certificated under Part 146.

While the proposed BVLOS rule maintains the current 1:1 operator-aircraft ratio, the FAA indicates that it plans to normalize multi-aircraft operations as industry standards are developed. This is in keeping with the proposed rule’s general preference for automated operations overseen by flight coordinators, rather than direct remote pilot control. Automated operations would, in fact, be mandated in certain circumstances, such as the proposed requirement that drones approved to operate in Class B or C airspace must be able to detect and avoid conventional manned aircraft, including those not broadcasting their positions by ADS-B.

FAA’s proposed rule on normalizing drone BVLOS operations represents a major step forward for both the UAS industry and the agency. It also suggests the FAA is getting more serious about aircraft autonomy, which has much broader implications. The FAA is accepting public comments on its BVLOS proposal until Oct. 6.

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FAA Moving Time

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy last month announced that at least some of the FAA’s DC-based staff will “gradually” be relocated to DOT headquarters in Southeast Washington, often referred to as “Navy Yard.” The FAA currently occupies two buildings on the Mall, the Orville and Wilbur Wright buildings. They are on a list of federal buildings that will be considered in a future round of disposals by the Public Buildings Review Board.

Since it’s pretty clear that there will not be enough space at Navy Yard to accommodate all of the FAA’s DC-based staff, the question before us is who should be relocated elsewhere. FAA has three primary functions. It is the U.S. aviation safety regulator, the dispenser of grants to and oversight of airports, and the operator and manager of the air traffic control system. The ATC function is the obvious candidate for being housed separately.

To begin with, in its regulatory function, FAA is at arm’s length from all the key players in aviation (airlines, airports, pilots, mechanics, repair stations, etc.)—all except air traffic control. Self-regulation is a conflict of interest. In 2001, ICAO recommended that aviation safety regulations should be organizationally separate from the provision of airports and ATC. Since then, nearly 100 countries have separated ATC from government transport ministries that house their air-safety regulator. The United States is one of the very few outliers. It’s also worth noting that the Heritage Foundation’s 2025 report calls for the separation of the Air Traffic Organization from the FAA.

The ATO should be physically separated from the FAA, and now is the time to make this change. While it would take legislation to make the ATO a separate modal agency of DOT, moving it to a different location is an administrative decision that does not require legislation. The ATO already has a facility in Warrenton, VA, which is one possible location.

When the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issues its final report on the fatal collision near Reagan National Airport (DCA) in January, I would not be surprised if it recommends separation of the ATO from the FAA, given the FAA’s failure to act on the numerous pilot reports of collision hazards at that airport, reflecting the failure of FAA’s self-regulation. Physical separation now would be a good first step.

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News Notes

Nav Canada Launches Remote/Digital Tower Program
Canada’s air traffic control provider has broken ground on the first of many remote digital tower facilities. Located in Kingston, Ontario, it is described as both an operational digital tower and a transitional facility for a system of Air Traffic Services hubs. This initial facility is planned to be operational by summer 2026. It will serve as the foundation for the ATC utility’s first permanent digital hub, hosting remote services for up to 20 airports. Nav Canada sees the project as the beginning of a broader Digital Aerodrome Air Traffic Services initiative, like similar programs underway in 16 other countries, mostly in Europe.

“FAA Runs Tests While Winter Haven Preps for Remote Tower”
That was the headline on an Aug. 28 article in the AIN monthly magazine. It contrasted the state-funded remote tower project under way in Winter Haven, Florida with the 30-odd such facilities already in operation overseas—and FAA’s slow start on this cutting-edge improvement. FAA is currently testing a system developed by RTX and Frequentis to serve an airport in Colorado, from which a previous provider withdrew due to FAA foot-dragging. The article notes that aviation groups such as the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association (AOPA) support remote towers because they can enable more general aviation airports to have the safety benefits of a control tower at a lower cost than a sticks-and-bricks tower.

Rocket Lab to Begin Testing a Reusable Rocket
Launch vehicle company Rocket Lab has developed a reusable rocket called Neutron to tap into the market for launching medium-sized satellites. It plans the first Neutron launch from the Wallops Island, Virginia space port, where it has built its Launch Complex 3, completed last month. The company’s original launch pad is nearby and is used for launching its smaller Electron rockets. The new Neutron rocket stands 141 feet tall and can launch payloads up to 38,660 lbs. to low Earth orbit. Its first stage is fully reusable and will return to land either at Wallops Island or on a recovery barge. Earlier this year, the U.S. Air Force announced a planned Neutron mission to test point-to-point cargo delivery.

The New York Times Targets Business Jets
In a video editorial last month, the NYT documented the pittance that business jets pay for ATC services compared with airliners. Since bizjet organization NBAA is the most powerful opponent of ATC public utilities, getting people to understand how subsidized bizjets are may help advance a needed shift to bizjets in this country paying the same kind of weight-distance charges that bizjets pay everywhere else.
 
U.S Applications for Aireon’s Space-Based Aircraft Tracking
Runway Girl Network last month included an article calling for the U.S. air traffic control system to start making use of space-based ADS-B surveillance that is available worldwide for airspace that lacks radar surveillance (oceanic, mountainous, etc.). The article quotes Aireon headquarters as suggesting space-based ADS-B in the Caribbean, rather than the FAA’s current intention to install only ground-based ADS-B. While the FAA is also responsible for a huge fraction of Pacific Ocean airspace, the benefits of space-based ADS-B would not be as large as those in the crowded North Atlantic airspace, where Aireon’s service has dramatically improved traffic flow as well as air safety.

Southwest Airlines Deploys Secondary Cockpit Barriers
Aviation Daily reported that Southwest, on Aug. 29, took delivery of a Boeing 737-8 equipped with an Installed Physical Secondary Barrier. Although Congress granted a one-year extension of the date to begin such equipage, Southwest expects to take delivery of 26 IPSB-equipped aircraft by year-end. Boeing is delivering barrier-equipped aircraft to all its U.S. customers. Southwest also plans to equip its existing planes with IPSBs once re-equipage has been certified by the FAA.

French Hybrid eVTOL Under Development
Although nearly all European electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) start-ups have failed, French company Ascendance is moving forward with what it hopes will be a viable aircraft. Potential success factors include hybrid rather than all-electric propulsion, seating four passengers in addition to a pilot, and range of 215 nm. In other words, it is targeting regional service for low-demand flights, a potentially plausible market niche, if the cost is low enough. Flight testing will begin in 2026. The aircraft will be equipped with wings, reports Aviation Daily reporter Thierry Dubois (Aug. 28).

Study Calls for Freeing Canadian Airports from Federal Rents
A new study by the Montreal Economic Institute argues that “exorbitant” rental fees are raising passenger ticket prices to uncompetitive levels. Several decades ago, Canada’s passenger airports were divested from the national government and restructured as local nonprofit airport authorities. But the feds continue to own the airports’ land and charge annual rent, based on each airport’s gross revenue (up to 12%). Airport authorities recover this via a tax on airline tickets. The average charge is $38 (far more than a U.S. passenger facility charge), and on some domestic routes, the charge can be as much as 43% of the ticket price. The study supports the airport authorities’ long-standing call for abolishing the rental fees. One approach to doing this (not in the study) would be for the national government to enact an airport privatization policy, under which airports would have the option of long-term leasing their airport, and sharing the up-front lease proceeds with the national government. That way, the national government would be compensated for the loss of airport rental income.

Ninth Collegiate Training Institute Approved
The FAA announced on Sept. 15 that Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s Prescott, AZ campus has met the requirements to become the ninth educational institution to qualify as a member of the Enhanced Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (E-CTI). This program certifies college programs that replicate the curriculum of the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, thereby expanding the number of controller candidates who can graduate each year. Assuming the CTI graduates pass the required aptitude and medical tests, they can be assigned to an ATC facility for on-the-job training without attending the Academy.

Freakonomics Podcast on ATC Reform
On Sept. 5, the economics-based podcast company released a 70-minute podcast on the topic of “Is the U.S. ATC System Broken?” I was interviewed for this some months ago, but my comments did not make the final cut. Long-time ATC reform expert Dorothy Robyn effectively made the case for the United States to join the rest of the world in separating its ATC provider from the government aviation safety regulator and converting it into a utility in which users pay fees for ATC service, which provides a bondable revenue stream for facility and equipment modernization. Some of the presenters did not agree with this approach.

Blue Origin Developing Lunar Mining and Production
On Sept. 10, Blue Origin unveiled an ongoing project aimed at using lunar regolith to extract metals and oxygen in order to manufacture facilities and equipment on the lunar surface. The project is called Blue Alchemist. If these techniques turn out to be feasible, it could make permanent settlement on the moon more feasible. What must be kept in mind, for each potential material (oxygen, glass, solar panels, etc.) is the cost of transporting a pound of that to the lunar surface, versus the cost of producing it there. Blue Alchemist says its goal is to make lunar production 60% less costly than bringing materials from Earth.

JetZero Looking Into Hydrogen Fuel for its BWB Airliner
While JetZero continues development work on its blended wing body (BWB) Z4 airliner, it is now looking into the potential of hydrogen fuel, under a NASA-funded study with SHZ Advanced Technologies. The technical feasibility of hydrogen is aided by the considerably larger interior of a BWB aircraft, compared with a conventional tube and wing structure. Guy Norris summarized the project in the Aug. 29 issue of Aviation Daily.
 
Joby Studying Hybrid eVTOL
Joby Aviation has contracted with L3Harris to evaluate a hybrid version of its S4 tilt-prop eVTOL. The potential application is a military version (optionally piloted) with a much longer range. A brief article by Graham Warwick in Aviation Week (Aug. 11-31) notes that other eVTOL developers Archer, Beta, and Vertical are carrying out similar studies.

Nav Canada Profiled in Boston Globe
Columnist Jeff Jacoby published a good overview of Canada’s nonprofit air traffic control provider. He draws a contrast between the troubled FAA air traffic system and the self-funded, de-politicized system that is far ahead in 21st-century technology, such as electronic flight strips and space-based ADS-B surveillance. With its bondable revenue stream, Nav Canada is able to issue long-term revenue bonds to finance major projects and to equip all its facilities with new technology in a year or two, instead of up to 15 years for FAA upgrades, due to annual funding from Congress.

How Can JSX Operate at Airports That Ban Scheduled Airlines?
In his Aug. 1 blog “A View from the Wing,” Gary Leff explains how JSX can serve customers at Teterboro Airport, where scheduled airline service is not permitted by the Port Authority, which owns the airport. JSX’s operations at the airport are not offered to the public as scheduled flights. They are offered only to members of Club JSX, a membership program for frequent JSX customers. Pretty clever!

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Quotable Quotes

“I was handed [on my second day as Administrator] the 670-page binder for how we were gonna procure the new [ATC] system. Like, ‘just sign right here, Mr. Administrator.’ I’m not gonna sign that . . . I haven’t read it, I don’t know what’s in it. It doesn’t look good. We ended up tossing that into a trash can and starting over.”
—FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, in “Bedford Speaking at NATCA’s Annual Aviation Safety Conference,” Politico, Sept. 16, 2025

“While both Archer and Joby stocks are making substantial pullbacks from their record highs, investors may soon have an ideal entry point to build a long-term position at a smart price-point. But they should plan to hold the stocks for years to come. Investments in eVTOL companies should be viewed as long-term speculative bets on an industry that could reshape the future of mobility in the coming years—or go bust.”
—Ben Goldstein, “EVTOL Stocks to the Moon? Not So Fast,” Aviation Daily, Aug. 25, 2025

“Here is my one concern. If Artemis I, Artemis II, and Artemis III are all $4 billion a launch . . .At $4 billion a launch, you don’t have a Moon program. I don’t think that exists. We have to bring the price down. And so I have to think about and work with Congress. What does Artemis IV, V, and VI look like? . . . What is the answer? I don’t know, but those are things I think about. You look at what the private sector has done for access to space. For the private sector, you can have a satellite and get it into space for a little over a million dollars. That was unheard of 20 years ago. What’s happened to drive the price down of these vehicles? That’s what we have to think about, because the $4 billion figure is too massive to think we could be sustainable at that number.”
—Acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy, in Eric Berger’s article, “Congress and Trump May Compromise on SLS Rocket,” Ars Technica, Sept. 8, 2025

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The post Aviation Policy News: Cautions on a ‘brand new air traffic control system’ appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• NTSB hearing details FAA institutional failure
• Using commercial space for a return to the Moon
• Problems with U.S. remote air traffic towers
• Will a helicopter company be a winner for Joby?
• Will secondary cockpit barriers be delayed again?
• News notes
• Quotable quotes

NTSB Hearing Details FAA Institutional Failure

The three-day hearings of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on the Ronald Reagan National Airport collision (July 30-Aug. 1) revealed more than most people knew about how U.S. air traffic control works—and doesn’t work. Former NTSB official Jeff Guzzetti called the hearing “the FAA’s day of reckoning,” focusing on both more flights than Reagan National Airport (DCA) can safely handle and the airport’s inadequate air traffic controller staffing. But much of the witness testimony revealed deeper Federal Aviation Administration institutional problems.

The FAA makes use of a database, developed by MITRE, called the Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment (ARIA) tool. During a three-year time period prior to the fatal collision in January, ARIA flagged 874 incidents at Reagan National for review via Preliminary Action Reports (PARs). Out of all those PARs, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) chief operating officer (Nick Fuller) said, none were identified as near-mid-air collision risks (NMACs).

But that was not the only source of information about the hazard of helicopter Route 4 crossing under the approach to Runway 33, where the collision occurred. NTSB also pointed out a second source of data: the NASA-managed Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), under which aviation participants can report hazards anonymously—including pilots, controllers, and others. Between Feb. 2020 and Oct. 2024, there were 85 ASAP reports from pilots about close calls between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy expressed amazement that none of those reports had led to any known concerns or action by the FAA.

Other testimony reported that an ad-hoc group of air traffic controllers in the D.C. metro area had surveyed the airspace around Reagan National and proposed removing Route 4, but an FAA manager, they said, declared that such a change was “too political” to take any action on. Controllers working at DCA had also asked management to reduce the level of arrivals and departures at the airport, but that recommendation likewise went nowhere. After the first day’s hearing, Chair Homendy commented as follows:

“FAA is so bureaucratic that nobody can take what is clearly a safety issue and get it up through the offices that should be making the decisions to ensure safety in the airspace. Or, somebody is ignoring them, maybe. I also have concerns that there’s a safety culture problem within the Air Traffic Organization of FAA.”

As I wrote in the first paragraph, the problem is institutional, as Homendy suggested. We all know that “FAA’s number one job is aviation safety.” But is that how it actually operates?

FAA regulates airlines, general aviation, pilots, mechanics, aircraft producers, engine producers, repair stations, airports, etc. It does this at arm’s length, as any regulator should. Yet the Air Traffic Organization is unlike all the other regulated aviation entities: it is housed within the FAA. That means the ATO has never been regulated at arm’s length, like Delta Airlines, Boeing, LAX, and all the other players. Self-regulation has dramatized its failure in the horrible tragedy that took 67 lives in the crash near Reagan National.

This dangerous conflict of interest has been illustrated by the failures NTSB is documenting. But this is hardly a new subject. FAA self-regulation has been criticized for many years by former FAA administrators, ATO chief operating officers, and numerous aviation safety experts. In their excellent book Managing the Skies (2007), Clinton Oster and John Strong explained the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise in self-regulation at the FAA. They also noted that, “Throughout the world, when air traffic organizations have been reorganized along commercial principles, countries have consistently taken the step of separating regulation of the air traffic control system from its operation.”

They also provided examples of ways in which “FAA has allowed itself to short-change safety in ways it would not tolerate in air carrier, commuter, and corporate flight operations.” Moreover, organizational separation of air traffic control and aviation safety regulation has been ICAO policy since 2001. The United States is one of the last holdouts.

If Congress were serious about reforms to the FAA in the wake of the Reagan National tragedy, it would enact legislation to separate the Air Traffic Organization from the FAA, making it a separate modal agency within the transportation department. The much-smaller FAA (as safety regulator) would be analogous to the Department of Transportation’s other safety regulators, and should be physically located at the DOT headquarters, not in the “FAA building.”

Yet during the same week these NTSB hearings were going on, the Senate Appropriations Committee included in its FY2026 spending bill for DOT a prohibition on using any DOT funding to “plan, design, or implement the privatization or separation of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization functions.” Needless to say, there is no pending legislation on “privatizing” the ATO. But separating it from the FAA is precisely what NTSB’s findings indicate to resolve long-standing problems that led to the DCA tragedy.

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Using Commercial Space for Returning to the Moon  

According to a just-released Reason Foundation study by aerospace engineer Rand Simberg, NASA’s return-humans-to-the-Moon program is failing in its goal of returning Americans to the Moon this decade.

Conceived as a modernized version of the Apollo program of 50 years ago, NASA’s program is based on a massive launch vehicle (SLS), an adaptation of the Apollo capsule, and uses “proven” components from the fatally flawed Space Shuttle program—refurbished engines and modified solid rocket boosters. All are being delivered under sole-source, cost-plus contracts, and all are years behind schedule and hugely over budget. And all but one of the key components are not reusable, a major innovation that this program largely ignores. The SLS program has already consumed $90 billion and has thus far carried out only one SLS test launch. If NASA proceeds with all six planned SLS launches through 2031, the average total cost of each mission would be around $30 billion.

Instead of continuing this failed program, the study calls for cancelling it and replacing it with competitive, fixed-price public-private partnerships like those NASA is using to transport cargo and crew to the International Space Station, procure lunar landers and lunar rovers, and even obtain new space suits. Terminating the SLS program, including the Orion capsule, the Upper Stage (EUS), the new launch tower (ML-2), and the Gateway lunar-orbit station, would free up $5.25 billion a year for mostly reusable launch vehicles and other components.

The Reason Foundation report by Simberg identifies five potential launch vehicles for the revised program: Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy, New Glenn, Vulcan, and (soon) Starship. Multiple launches would deliver components and fuel into Earth orbit for assembly into Moon mission systems. Orbital assembly was used to build the International Space Station over many years. Moon mission systems, aided by rapid launches of reusable vehicles, would change that from many years to many months.

Reflecting increasing concerns by space technology experts on the huge cost and delays of the SLS program, the White House mini-budget for NASA called for terminating SLS after only two more launches. But study author Simberg argues that this approach is still too costly and too risky, given the overall SLS program track record. The study calls for “stopping the bleeding” by terminating the program now and quickly refocusing on the commercial space alternative.

Unfortunately, at the last minute in crafting its version of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the Senate added a little-noticed provision to give NASA billions of dollars more for SLS Missions 4, 5, and 6, plus billions more for over-budget components, including the lunar-orbit Gateway station. The expedited House vote to approve the bill on President Donald Trump’s timeline before July 4 likely meant that most Republican House members may not have read it or known that this provision was in the bill they voted for. Vice President J.D. Vance cast the tie-breaking vote for the bill, which only received Republican votes in the Senate. It is unclear if Vance and President Trump, when he signed the bill, were aware of this provision that countermanded the declared White House policy on the SLS program.

Fortunately, those new outlays would be years in the future, and a new NASA administrator who appreciates the potential of commercial space could make a solid case for not spending those additional billions on what is increasingly viewed as a colossal boondoggle.

The full study, “Why commercial space should lead the U.S. return to the moon,” is here. And Simberg and I answer some frequently asked questions about this study here.

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Problems Continue to Plague U.S. Remote Towers
By Marc Scribner

Remote/digital air traffic control towers are increasingly mainstream around the world. As documented in a recent Reason Foundation report, covered in the May issue of this newsletter, dozens of remote/digital towers are currently in operation around the world, providing superior air traffic services at a fraction of the cost of conventional brick-and-mortar towers. What’s more, countries as varied as Italy, Norway, and Thailand are planning to deploy remote/digital towers at dozens of additional airports over the next five years.

Despite having developed the initial “virtual tower” concept two decades ago, the FAA has not approved any to be deployed in the United States. This growing air traffic technology gap has gained increasing attention on Capitol Hill, although the political scrutiny has to date not spurred meaningful action at the FAA.

On July 4, President Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act budget reconciliation bill into law that contained $50 million (at Sec. 40003(a)(13)) to fund the Sec. 621 Remote Tower Program that was established by the May 2024 FAA reauthorization. In the following weeks, congressional appropriations committees in the House and Senate each approved their annual Transportation and Housing and Urban Development (THUD) spending bills for FY 2026.

The House THUD appropriations bill was passed by that chamber’s Appropriations Committee on July 17. It recommended $2 million in additional funding for the FAA’s remote tower program, as discussed on page 37 of the accompanying bill report. This was the same amount provided in the current FY 2025 appropriations law and $1 million short of what FAA had requested for FY 2026 (see FY 2026 FAA Budget Estimates – Facilities & Equipment page 56). The House THUD appropriations bill report also orders the FAA to brief the House and Senate Appropriations Committees within 180 days of enactment on the status of remote tower system design approval and deployment.

A week later, on July 24, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its FY 2026 THUD appropriations bill. The accompanying bill report’s language on remote towers (page 44) recommended fully funding the FAA’s budget request at $3 million. In addition, the Senate’s oversight provision was significantly more aggressive than the House’s—ordering the FAA to report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the agency’s remote tower program progress within 30 days of enactment rather than 180 days.

While it is too early to tell exactly what will happen as both chambers of Congress eventually negotiate FY 2026 THUD appropriations, the Senate appears to have an advantage. The House’s bill was highly partisan, passing the committee in a 35-28 vote with no Democratic support, due to a number of controversial provisions unrelated to air traffic control. In contrast, the Senate THUD appropriations bill was approved by the committee in a bipartisan 27-1 vote, which makes it a likely candidate to be fast-tracked to a floor vote by the Senate Majority Leader. The 60-vote threshold in the Senate requires the support of at least seven Democrats, so the odds do not favor the House’s partisan bill.

While Senate appropriators were more enthusiastic about remote towers than their House counterparts, it is good to see broad interest in Congress for this technology. The challenge will be sustaining that interest over time and ensuring the FAA follows through on what Congress has ordered it to do, especially from congressional authorizers on the House Transportation and Infrastructure and Senate Commerce Committees.

This is because, despite growing attention from Congress on the FAA’s remote tower program activities in recent years, the FAA is still moving forward at a glacial pace. Currently, a single vendor—a partnership between RTX (formerly Raytheon) and Frequentis—is undergoing system design approval testing at the FAA’s Technical Center in Atlantic City. RTX/Frequentis became the technology vendor for the Northern Colorado Regional Airport remote tower project after the original vendor, Searidge, quit in 2023 after five years of work due to the FAA’s Kafkaesque regulatory process.

According to internal FAA documents obtained by Reason Foundation earlier this year, the FAA’s sudden decision to publish new remote tower technical requirements on its website in June 2024 delayed the system design approval timeline for the RTX/Frequentis project by four months. While the RTX/Frequentis system is now installed and being tested at Atlantic City International Airport, testing is taking far longer than it should be due to a costly deviation from international best practices in a Sept. 2022 FAA decision.

FAA’s remote tower system design approval process requires vendors to install their technology in Atlantic City for initial evaluation and approval, rather than the standard global approach of testing candidate technology at the first airport where it would be deployed, if approved. A close observer of the FAA’s remote tower program tells me that one problem with the 2022 decision that all vendors must install their technology at Atlantic City International for system design approval testing is that the airport has a low volume of general aviation operations. This means that the FAA must hire aircraft to fly required test procedures—at substantial cost to the agency—rather than seeking volunteers at an airport with robust general aviation activity at no cost.

It is unclear by how much FAA’s centralized Atlantic City system design approval process is delaying remote tower progress, but best estimates for approval dates of the RTX/Frequentis system have slipped over the last year from Spring 2026, to Summer 2026, to sometime in 2027.

In Sec. 621 of the May 2024 FAA reauthorization, Congress ordered the FAA to expand the system design approval testing process to no fewer than three airports outside the Tech Center (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 47124(h)(3)). Unfortunately, the FAA has not begun implementing this directive. A Feb. 2025 video on the remote tower program produced by the FAA makes no mention of it. But even if the FAA had complied with this provision, restarting system design approval from intake likely would not save any time for RTX/Frequentis. And due to the FAA’s poor reputation among remote/digital tower technology vendors, no others are likely to enter the system design approval process unless RTX/Frequentis can prove that it is possible to complete it.

It is critical for Congress to maintain robust oversight of the FAA’s remote tower program, but it can only be expected to do so much. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy and FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford are in an excellent position to help and should closely examine the ongoing problems with the FAA’s remote tower program. Secretary Duffy, with President Trump’s support, has made modernization of air traffic control technology a top priority of the Department of Transportation. But if the FAA cannot certify a relatively basic new air traffic management technology that Romania successfully deployed in 2023, it bodes poorly for the administration’s much more ambitious “Brand New Air Traffic Control System.”

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Will Buying a Helicopter Company Be a Winner for Joby?

Joby is respected as one of a handful of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) startups that are likely to achieve FAA certification within a few years and begin commercial operations. In a surprise move early this month, Joby announced the acquisition of long-time commercial helicopter operator Blade Air Mobility. Aviation Daily’s Ben Goldstein greeted this news as a way to de-risk Joby’s market-entry plans—and at first glance, that seems on-target.

First of all, Blade has operating certificates not only in the United States but also in Canada and southern Europe. Blade carried 50,000 passengers last year and has access to landing sites and terminals in key cities, saving Joby a bundle of money and time as it begins eVTOL operations in several years. And since it will own Blade from now on, it will have an additional source of revenue during its early years of eVTOL operations. Blade has also agreed that Joby will be its eVTOL partner for its profitable organ transport business (which Blade is retaining). Goldstein also cites the positive impressions of the deal from eVTOL analyst Sergio Cecutta, whom I have quoted several times in this newsletter.

But here are a few cautions from an aviation observer whose knowledge I appreciate, expressed Aug. 5 on an invitation-only online aviation discussion group. Without elaborating on his statement, here are his initial impressions.

“Blade loses money on pax [passenger] trips and makes good money on medical, I am told. They [Joby] are only buying the pax biz. They have sheds on wheels for lounges in NY so they can be trucked away, if needed. They own virtually no hard assets. Joby prides itself on its new app, but Blade already has one that works. So, $125M ($95M if certain terms are met) for a company with no assets [and] is loss-making seems like the deal of the century!”

I am in no position to vouch for either assessment, but am simply presenting these two views for you to ponder.

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Will Secondary Cockpit Barriers Be Delayed Yet Again?

While the threat of armed takeover of commercial aircraft seems to have decreased considerably over the past two decades, Congress (and pilots’ unions) have continued to push the FAA to mandate secondary barriers. The idea is to provide stronger protection for the cockpit when a crew member must exit to use the forward lavatory. Today’s practice of positioning a flight attendant with a service cart just aft of the lav is not much of a barrier.

Under pressure from Congress to enforce a 2018 statute mandating such barriers, the FAA cited the need for it to follow procedural rules before setting a deadline for retrofitting airliners. In 2022, the FAA issued a draft rule, but Airlines for America argued that it should apply only to newly certified aircraft, not including aircraft already in production but not yet completed or delivered. Airline unions insisted that the barriers be required for all airliners, including cargo planes.

In 2023, the FAA finalized its secondary barrier rule, which would apply to all newly delivered aircraft, per previous legislation. This final rule called for installations to begin within two years. But here we are in 2025, and major airlines are calling for another two-year delay. They argue that the FAA has not yet approved a design, and there are no manuals, procedures, or training programs.

At this point, it’s worth pausing to consider whether this additional protection against terrorist takeover of an airliner cockpit is still a sufficient enough threat to warrant the cost of secondary barriers. This subject has been addressed by aviation security researchers, and two of the best are Mark Stewart and John Mueller, authors of technical papers and their excellent 2018 book, Are We Safe Enough? Measuring and Assessing Aviation Security. They also produced a 2019 report on this specific topic, “Security Risk and Cost-Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,” Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia.

The results depend on the assumptions made about both costs and benefits. In the book, they found the benefit/cost ratio to be 75. But their updated analysis in 2019, based on feedback about the book chapter, led to a more conservative benefit/cost ratio of 41. Both sets of calculations were made without cost data from the FAA. In a 2022 email to me, Stewart used new cost information from the FAA to yield a revised benefit/cost ratio of 10, meaning the benefits of reduced/eliminated attacks were found to be worth 10 times the cost of the program.

One of the questions worth asking about such analyses is “compared to what?” Stewart and Mueller carried out a similar benefit/cost assessment for the Federal Air Marshals (FAM) program. Unlike the secondary barrier, which has only a one-time cost, the FAMs program has an ongoing annual cost of around $1 billion. Their resulting benefit/cost ratio for FAMs is a pathetic 0.03. So if Congress wants to get more bang for its aviation security bucks, it should abolish FAMs and require companies to retrofit secondary barriers to all current and future airliners. Airlines should welcome the freeing up of two front-cabin seats on all flights currently carrying FAMs.

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News Notes

FAA Supports ADS-B/In Mandate for All ADS-B/Out Aircraft
In a move long recommended by the NTSB, the FAA has announced that it will mandate the installation of ADS-B/In for not only new aircraft but also for all in-service aircraft that are required to be equipped with ADS-B/Out. Two bills to this effect were already pending in Congress by the time the Air Traffic Organization’s acting COO made the announcement on Aug. 1. With ADS-B/In, the cockpit crew will be able to see nearby traffic, both in the air and on the airfield. Had the regional jet that collided with the Army Black Hawk helicopter at DCA been so equipped, its crew would likely have seen the helicopter and aborted its landing (if the latter’s ADS-B/Out system had been operational).

FAA Funding Bill May Stimulate Performance-Based Navigation
The $12.5 billion in general fund money that Congress recently included in the One Big Beautiful Bill, signed into law on July 4, included $300 million to “fully implement” Performance-Based Navigation (PBN). The language says PBN should be implemented “for all terminal and en-route routes, including approaches and departures at about 40 large and medium hub airports.” The aim is for PBN to become a “primary means of navigation.” Aviation Week’s Sean Broderick points out that this plan was already included in the 2024 FAA reauthorization bill.

London Heathrow’s $65 Billion Modernization Plan
On July 31, privately owned London Heathrow Airport (LHR) submitted its plan for a third runway and new terminals, aimed at increasing its annual passenger capacity from 84 million annual passengers to 150 million, and flights from 480,000/year to 760,000. LHR announced that the project will be entirely privately financed. The same day Arora Group submitted a rival proposal including a shorter new runway that would not extend over the nearby M25 motorway, which might reduce some of the local opposition to the expansion. The Arora Group proposal’s cost of £25 billion is about half the £49 billion LHR proposal, but the terminal projects may be smaller than LHR’s. Arora also says its plan will be privately financed.

Mexico Airports Undergoing Changes
July brought news via Infralogic about two airport companies in Mexico. First, the government abandoned a plan to purchase investment fund Aleatica’s 49% stake in Toluca International Airport, because the price Aleatica wanted was too high. The State of Mexico already owns a 26% stake in Toluca. And on July 25, airport operator GAP (Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico) announced its interest in buying the airport assets of CCR, a Brazilian company that has ownership in or operating relationships with 20 airports across Latin America.

Boeing’s Wisk Aero Plans Autonomous Air Taxi Service by 2030
The only U.S. eVTOL startup that is planning for autonomous commercial passenger flights has announced plans to begin commercial passenger flights in Houston, Los Angeles, and Miami by 2030, according to an interview in SmartCities Dive. Reporter Dan Zukowski noted that the four-passenger eVTOLs will be both produced and operated by Wisk, which is partly owned by Boeing. Zukowski reported nothing about where Wisk Aero is in the FAA certification process. As of Aug. 2025, no piloted eVTOL has received FAA certification. It seems likely that this multi-year process will take longer for automated eVTOLs than for their piloted counterparts from Archer and Joby.

Skykraft Launches Five Air Traffic Satellites
Via a SpaceX Falcon 9 launch from the Vandenberg launch site in California, Australian company Skykraft in late July lofted five satellites into orbit for its planned space-based ADS-B and voice communication system. The company plans to compete with Aireon and several European startup companies in providing satellite-based air traffic management services.

DOT Inspector General to Review Newark Control in Philadelphia
The DOT Office of Inspector General on July 29 announced an investigation into the FAA’s shift of air traffic operations at Newark Airport (EWR) from the New York TRACON on Long Island (N90) to the Philadelphia TRACON. The reason for the move was a severe shortage of controllers (and other problems) at N90. Besides, the transferred controllers had to learn a new facility, and the EWR data had to be transmitted to Philadelphia by ancient copper wire cable rather than modern fiber optic cable. These cables are now being replaced.

Ardian Becomes Heathrow’s Largest Shareholder
Infrastructure fund Ardian last month bought out Ferrovial’s remaining stake in London Heathrow Airport, and now owns 32.6%, as the airport’s largest owner. Ardian’s initial stake was 22.6%, acquired in Dec. 2024. Paris-based Ardian is the 13th largest infrastructure investment fund according to a tally of the top 100 funds by Infrastructure Investor, based on each fund’s most recent five-year total capital raised.

Helsinki Airport Introduces Double-Boarding Bridges
At Helsinki Airport’s west pier, dual passenger boarding bridges have recently been introduced. For a large aircraft, one bridge can be used for the front cabin and the other for the coach cabin. For smaller planes, the plan is to accommodate two planes at the same boarding gate. New or recently upgraded boarding areas in both the south pier and the west pier are equipped for dual gates to be installed.

Air Force Testing F-35 Collision Avoidance
The Air Force Research Laboratory is testing a “collision avoidance manual deconfliction” system on an F-35 fighter plane. The aim of the project is to protect against collisions between military and civilian aircraft. Commercial aircraft are equipped with TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System), but “many” military fighters, bombers, and helicopters are not.

Breeze Replaces Avelo in Southern California
Within a week of Avelo announcing that it was leaving the Burbank, California airport, Breeze Airways announced that it will offer service from Burbank to five former Avelo routes: Bend, Eugene, Eureka, Pasco, and Provo. Breeze already serves LAX and John Wayne Airport in Orange County.

New Video Interviews Air Traffic Control Reform Expert
ReasonTV’s Eric Boehm interviews Dorothy Robyn, who has supported air traffic control reform since her days as a domestic policy advisor in the Bill Clinton White House. The new video is “Why Does the Government Run Air Traffic Control?“
 
Aviation Week Editorial on Digital Tower Centers
A guest Viewpoint editorial in Aviation Week makes the case for bringing to the United States the technology and productivity gains being realized in Europe by providing control tower services to multiple airports from a digital tower center. Bill Payne and David Hughes spotlight two proposed Colorado projects that would create such digital tower centers. For context, they discuss some of the cutting-edge examples in Europe. The Colorado projects would be models for what could be done on a much larger scale to replace aging control towers and to provide tower services to smaller airports that lack them. The piece is the full-page Viewpoint piece in the July 14-27, 2025 issue of Aviation Week.

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Quotable Quotes

“We’re not in the aviation system of the 1960s or 1970s. And the proposed [EU] legislation does not reflect a real analysis of what the traveling public wants. Over the past two decades, as LCCs have grown, we have seen a drop in ticket prices and a democratization of air travel, to the benefit of customers, tourism, and economies. But airlines have only been able to set the headline fare at a low price because they can break out other elements, such as faster boarding, inflight food or drink or a cabin bag. [Airlines] are commercial entities, and they have to make money, otherwise fares will go up, and that will exclude some people from travel.”
—John Strickland, in Helen Massy-Beresford, “Europe’s Airlines Say Cabin Baggage Changes Threaten Consumer Choice,” Aviation Week, July 14-27, 2025

“One big picture piece that I left out is really the role of Congress. Refusing year after year to grant budgets of long enough duration to implement large-scale projects absolutely eliminates the possibility of even remotely effective planning. Instead, every project decision FAA makes is reactive. Especially when funding levels are inadequate to meet safety needs, let alone pursue long-range innovation and development. All managers can do is respond to immediate developments—most often, sifting budget allocations that occur as managers attempt to balance competing project needs. I’ve seen these kinds of budget-driven developments occur over and over. I do have sympathy for those caught in this dilemma, [but] I lose patience when some of the short-term workarounds prove less efficient in the long term. But there is no shortage of contractors to provide FAA managers with seemingly attractive solutions.”
—A retired FAA systems engineer, email to Robert Poole, June 24, 2025

“As we all know, an airline seat that takes off empty can never be sold again. And carrying a marginal passenger comes at extremely low cost to an airline. Most of the expense of the trip is baked in—the plane, crew, fuel. Airlines have gotten much better at filling seats. And they try to maximize revenue—yet the real cost of a ticket has fallen over time, inclusive of fees. That’s no accident. Airlines will sell that marginal seat for almost any amount they can get for it. Except they don’t want to offer a lower fare to someone that would buy a seat anyway, at a higher fare. And so airlines go to great length to price discriminate, i.e., to segment customers. AI is a tool to get more granular with price discrimination. And so it seems reasonably likely that it will be used to figure out whom to offer those lower fares to, filling more seats at even lower fares but only offering those prices to people who wouldn’t buy at all at a higher price. This way, airlines can fill seats and generate incremental revenue without cannibalizing existing higher-yield traffic. Our best defense against AI pricing of the imagined parade of the horribles sort is competition.”   
—Gary Leff, post on online aviation discussion group, July 23, 2025 (Used with his permission)

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The post Aviation Policy News: NTSB hearing details FAA institutional failure appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Who should pay for air traffic control modernization?
• The need for leadership at NASA
• Disturbing findings on the controller workforce
• Surprising Senate additions to the One Big Beautiful Bill
• TSA shoe removal finally abolished
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Who Should Pay for Air Traffic Control Modernization?

In the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” Congress provided $12.5 billion for much-needed upgrades to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facilities and equipment. The Modern Skies Coalition of airlines and other aviation interest groups is calling for another $18.5 billion to cover all the items in Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s plan for a “Brand New Air Traffic Control System.” Such spending would be a dramatic departure from more than 50 years of air traffic control being paid for by aviation users, rather than American taxpayers.

In 1970, the Airport and Airway Revenue Act established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, based on an array of aviation user taxes (airline ticket tax, some aviation fuel taxes, and several others). For the last 55 years, receipts from users have paid for air traffic control (ATC) operations, facilities, and equipment. Compared with having all taxpayers cover those costs, the users-pay principle is far more sustainable than relying on general federal revenues. To be sure, our air traffic control system is seriously underfunded. This is partly because the FAA has been unwilling to ask Congress for significant increases in the user tax rates (in part because the Office of Management & Budget limits what FAA can even ask for).

Given how far behind the FAA is in modernizing its technology and replacing and consolidating its aging facilities, it’s understandable that aviation organizations would turn to general support to supplement what the FAA gets from current user taxes, but this is an unwise move for at least two reasons.

First, once a function becomes dependent on federal “general revenue,” it competes with every other priority of Congress, including education, the environment, social welfare, national defense, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and other programs. The U.S. highway sector has done far better than (non-tolled) highways in most of Europe, because the latter highways are paid for out of general revenues; gas taxes in Europe are general revenue, not dedicated to highways as in this country. So transport ministers have to compete with all other agencies for their funding.

Second, and of far greater concern, the federal government is on a fast track to insolvency. The largest items in the federal budget are Social Security and Medicare. Their actuaries project that both programs will exhaust their trust funds in less than a decade. When this happens, Congress will be under severe pressure to make up for its huge annual shortfalls and will have only a few alternatives. Either significantly increase taxes and already out-of-control federal borrowing or slash that very large annual amount from the rest of the federal budget (meaning cuts for most other spending categories).

This looming fiscal debacle has led all three major credit rating issuers to downgrade their ratings on federal bonds in recent years. A growing number of books by knowledgeable finance professionals discuss the potential for our federal government to essentially go bankrupt (e.g., financier Ray Dalio’s new book, How Countries Go Broke). The national debt, which exceeds $36 trillion, is at an all-time high as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, a level typically seen only during a major war or a severe economic depression.

Yet this is peacetime with a productive economy. Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers told ABC News earlier this month, “I can’t tell you whether the financial crisis is going to come this year or whether it will come five years from now. But we’ve never had deficits remotely like this at a moment when the economy was strong and we were at peace.” 

The Economist cites Goldman Sachs’ finding that if Congress postpones fiscal tightening for another decade, it may need to cut spending or raise taxes by another 5.5% of GDP to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.  

In other words, shifting air traffic control from user-tax funding to general funding would be very unwise, especially at this juncture. A far wiser course would be to significantly increase user taxes (or better yet, convert them into bondable user charges, like those used by ATC utilities all over the world).

The $12.5 billion already provided by the Big Beautiful Bill is a done deal and will pay for some much-needed technology upgrades. But proceeding with further chunks of “general funds” that add even more to annual budget deficits and hence the unsustainable national debt would be unwise and unsustainable. Aviation interest groups should propose and support significant increases in aviation user taxes instead.

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The Need for Leadership at NASA

Jared Isaacman is among the best-qualified people ever nominated to be NASA administrator. He’s a long-time private pilot, an experienced astronaut, and a technology entrepreneur. He was nominated by President Donald Trump last December and, in April, was easily approved for the position by the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. Isaacman was considered a shoo-in for approval by the full Senate. However, on May 30, Trump abruptly withdrew his nomination, around the time the president and Elon Musk had their stormy parting.

Everyone concerned about the future of NASA should read Irene Klotz’s two-page interview with Isaacman in the June 30-July 12 issue of Aviation Week. Isaacman told Klotz that while he’s had business relationships with Musk, they have not been personal friends. While obviously disappointed at having been dropped, he told Klotz that it’s important for a NASA administrator to have strong support from the president, so that the administrator can push back against unjustified political demands.

What is especially dismaying is that Isaacman spent nearly six months giving serious thought to what NASA needs going forward. He expressed comfort with the White House decision to terminate, after two more launches, the hugely over-budget SLS/Orion return-to-the-Moon program in favor of competitive contracts with commercial space companies. Isaacman also addressed concerns that the various NASA centers deeply involved in that program were unwilling to shift gears. He told Klotz of conversations he had with legislators from Alabama, home of the Marshall Space Flight Center, which manages the SLS program, saying that they are not, per se, opposed to change but “need something to pivot to.”

Isaacman also expressed concern about NASA bureaucracy. “Departments with four people have a chief and a deputy chief. A lot of people show up to work every day at NASA because they want to change the world, but there are lots of people that enjoy the system of moving from deputy chief to chief to associate deputy principal and up,” Isaacman told Aviation Week. “To me, we need to rebalance to a lot more doers and a lot fewer of those who are feeding the bureaucracy.”

He also discussed bureaucratic limitations that limit research carried out on the International Space Station (while it remains in orbit). “There are still way too many steps in the process to clear science and research experiments to fly on the ISS. A lot of pharmaceutical companies—and industry in general—will tell you NASA is too difficult to work with, and they move on.”

Klotz recounts that during Isaacman’s confirmation hearing, he floated the idea of NASA possibly becoming more financially self-sufficient via user-generated revenue programs similar to the FAA’s Airport & Airway Trust Fund, with customers paying to fly their experiments, as customers of NASA.

Isaacman also expressed concerns about the proposed NASA budget for science, technology, and aeronautics being cut in half. He agreed that in a tight budgetary environment, “we’ve got to look at all spending.” But that is “a good forcing function to figure out what’s broken so you can concentrate resources where it really matters.” He singled out the Nancy Grace Space Telescope (almost finished) as foolish to terminate, and also voiced support for rebuilding the aeronautics program to focus on truly important breakthroughs, rather than funding 5% engine improvements or minor changes such as Boeing’s truss-braced wing. “Unless something flies really fast or it’s a radical design, NASA shouldn’t be doing it.”

Finally, Isaacman summed up as follows: “What are the two or three most important things we must get done, for the good of the American people who are funding $20-25 billion a year? There’s not a lot of talk like that. There’s talk of 100 things to do, and we don’t have enough money to do them all.”

His priorities would be returning to the Moon before China with technology that can be parlayed for Mars exploration; using the ISS to expand the orbital economy, and revamping how the agency manages and funds science missions.”

I cannot imagine any other potential candidate for this administrator position who possesses both the technology background and the knowledge of how to transform NASA into something significantly better. It’s extremely disappointing that the administration withdrew Isaacman’s nomination, and it is unlikely that President Trump would change his mind on this nomination, but it would be a very smart thing to do. I have no idea if there is anyone in the White House who could successfully make this case to Trump, but I sure hope someone does.

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Disturbing Findings on the Air Traffic Controller Workforce

Last year, the National Academies took on a major study of the FAA’s air traffic controller workforce. This article is based on a summary of its report, which is available here. The main tasks assigned to the 13-member study committee (two of whose members I know) were to:

• Look into the factors affecting controller staffing at FAA’s  313 air traffic control facilities;
• Compare FAA’s staffing model with an alternative developed by controllers’ union NATCA; and,
• Assess FAA’s adoption of recommendations from a 2014 National Academies study.

Rather than covering everything in this brief review, my focus is on some rather startling findings that everyone in aviation should be aware of.

One of these findings is that despite continued growth in air travel, the full-time equivalent (FTE) air traffic controller workforce has declined by 13% from 2010 to 2024. How or why did this happen?

The report notes sequestration and government shutdown in 2013, another shutdown in 2018-19, the COVID-19 pandemic (which interrupted controller training), and the “constrained hiring plan of 2023.” This is obviously no way to manage a safety-critical function. Please note that in the now more than 90 countries worldwide served by user-funded ATC utilities, no “government shutdown” would affect controller hiring and training, because their funding comes directly from ATC user fees, rather than from a legislative body.

Also disturbing is that since 2019, 30% of FAA air traffic control facilities have at least 10% fewer controllers than they need, and another 30% have at least 10% more than they need. This is not the simplistic “controller shortage” often discussed in aviation (and other) media. This imbalance suggests that FAA does not have the tools to shift controllers from over-staffed to under-staffed facilities.

Another revelation is that the numbers we read about the length of time it takes an academy graduate to achieve certification (CPC) status are misleading. This averages 0.5 to 1.6 years at low-level facilities (about what people expect), but 2 to 2.8 years at intermediate (levels 7-9) facilities, and 3.9 to 4.3 years at level 10-12 facilities. The report also finds that training success rates are falling for both academy graduates and CPC on-the-job training; this latter category declined from 81% success in Fiscal Year 2010 to just 61% in FY 2019.

Overtime use has grown from an average of 2% in 2013 to 9% today. Perhaps related is that time on position has declined significantly between 2010 and 2024. Another way of stating this is that regular hours worked per FTE have decreased 4% over this period, while overtime per FTE has quadrupled.

The report also documents that 19 large facilities serving the “core 30 airports” are staffed at less than 85% of modeled staffing targets as of 2024. These understaffed facilities account for 27% of commercial flight activity, 40% of all delays, and 45% of non-weather delays.

One solid recommendation is that the FAA should devise incentives to shift controllers from over-staffed to under-staffed facilities, especially the above 19 understaffed large ones. FAA should also determine the causes of the “perplexing trends in overtime, regular hours worked, and time on position” and rectify them.

Perhaps the most troubling finding is that the FAA should request enough funding in its annual budget request to acquire the number of additional controllers its model says are needed. What the researchers appear to be saying is that FAA does not do that, which strikes me as dereliction of duty. The study group put this first in the report, apparently to give it a prominent position. I hope the new FAA administrator takes all these findings and recommendations seriously, especially this one.

The air traffic controller workforce problem is not simply attracting enough applicants. There are also serious problems in how the FAA manages the controllers it has.  

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Surprising Senate Additions to the One Big Beautiful Bill

The Senate Commerce Committee added a number of aviation and space provisions to the House version of the One Big Beautiful Bill. Due to pressure from the White House to finalize the bill for the president’s signature by July 4, the House did not debate any of these additions and simply voted to approve the Senate version. This leads to mostly good news for aviation policy and bad news for space policy.

The biggest news for air traffic control is a push for facility consolidation, which has historically been very difficult to get support from Congress, even though with today’s technology, there is no need for 22 high-altitude centers (ARTCCs), there are opportunities for more TRACON/tower consolidation, and there is tremendous potential for remote/digital tower centers (as discussed in last month’s issue).

So here is what the bill provides for air traffic control. First, it allocates $1.9 billion to consolidate at least three existing ARTCCs into a single new one (leaving it up to FAA and Congress to decide on the specifics).

Second, it allocates $100 million to plan closure/modernization of at least 10 ARTCCs. As I have pointed out in previous issues, de-politicized ATC utilities in Australia, Germany, South Africa, and the United Kingdom have all done this successfully, but they did not have to deal with a legislative body fiercely opposed to “closing a vital facility in my state/district.” Back in 2013, Reason Foundation commissioned a detailed study on potential U.S. ATC facility consolidation.

Third, the bill provides $1 billion for TRACON modernization and consolidation. Finally, it also pushes FAA to actually implement the digital/remote tower provisions in Section 621 of the 2024 FAA reauthorization.

Unfortunately, the Senate provisions for NASA are major steps in the wrong direction. NASA’s current return-to-the-Moon program (Artemis) relies on ancient technology from the troubled Space Shuttle program and attempts to repeat the 1960s Apollo program with a massive new (non-reusable) booster rocket dubbed SLS and an astronaut capsule dubbed Orion. This program has already consumed $90 billion and has carried out only one unmanned SLS launch. Nearly every major component in this program is being developed under sole-source, cost-plus contracts, and they are all years late and far over budget. The White House mini-budget for NASA, released several months ago, called for NASA to do only two more SLS launches, after which the focus would shift to using commercial launch vehicles under competitively contracted public-private partnerships, like NASA is using successfully for transporting people and cargo to the space station and planning to use for lunar landers, lunar rovers, and even space suits.

Alas, Senate Commerce rejected the White House plan and authorized continuing the SLS program for Missions 4 and 5 ($4.1 billion), and spending more on late, over-budget components ($2.6 billion for the Lunar Gateway station, $20 million more for Orion crew vehicles). I wonder if the White House even knew the bill included this departure from the White House’s wiser approach to the Moon landing project. And of course, U.S. presidents do not have a line-item veto.

This bill is now law, but perhaps Congress will look more critically at these changes when it comes time to actually appropriate funds for these NASA boondoggles.

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TSA Shoe Removal Regulation Finally Abolished

Passengers nationwide (except those already exempted as PreCheck fliers) rejoiced earlier this month after the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced, effective immediately, that passengers would no longer have to remove their shoes in airport screening lanes.

TSA mandated shoe removals in response to the Dec. 2001 capture of passenger Richard Reid, who had concealed explosives in his shoes. He paid the price with a prison term, but air travelers have been inconvenienced ever since.

The policy never made sense. First, it was not enacted until six years after Reid’s arrest. If there were a real threat, why did TSA wait that long?

Second, just about every other country with significant air travel never implemented shoe removal; not even Israel, which is generally recognized as having the world’s most stringent airline security policies.

Third, even in getting rid of the mandate, TSA failed to speak the truth. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem greeted the policy change by stating, “Thanks to our cutting-edge technological advancements and multi-layered security approach, we are confident that we can implement this change while maintaining the highest security standards.” But of various new checkpoint security technology touted in recent years, none have actually been introduced. In 2021, Axios reported that electronic shoe scanners developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory had been licensed to Liberty Defense Holdings, which was planning demonstrations in the third quarter of FY 2026 and to start testing them at some airports in FY 2027. In other words, no such technology is in use at any U.S. airport.

In a July 8 op-ed piece titled “America’s Most Successful Terrorist?”, George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan estimated the time-cost to U.S. air travelers during the years this inane policy was in place. He made estimates of the time required for each person to take off and put back on their shoes, delays that forgetful people impose on everyone waiting in line, and delays TSA itself adds when it has to stop the line to instruct a non-compliant person to remove shoes at the last minute. While I think his numbers are exaggerated (e.g., he ignores that PreCheck members are exempt when estimating the total minutes lost), his total of wasted minutes since the policy was implemented is 15 billion minutes. I think it’s more like eight billion, but still a staggering number.

Coincidentally, during our 2025 spring cleaning, my wife and I discovered a DVD from 2010, titled “Please Remove Your Shoes.” It’s a critique of the token security provided when the FAA was in charge (prior to the creation of the TSA) and the new agency’s first decade, when the TSA was beset by performance failures and increasing bureaucracy. It includes critiques from informed people who were involved in airport security both before and after TSA’s creation. Based on my research and writing on airport security during that period, I found it to be credible and well-done.

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News Notes

Macquarie Buys Pension Fund Stakes in Three UK Airports
Infrastructure fund Macquarie Asset Management paid $1.84 billion to acquire stakes in three British airports from Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTTP). It acquired a 25% stake in London City Airport, a 55% stake in Bristol Airport, and a 26.5% stake in Birmingham Airport. The London City Airport investment valued that airport at 20 times its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The average multiple for Birmingham and Bristol was 16X EBITDA. These multiples suggest that UK airports are returning to pre-pandemic business levels.

American Adopting ADS-B/In for A-321 Fleet
After several years of operational trials, using ADS-B/In to provide in-cockpit data on other aircraft positions in real time, the airline is adding this system to its entire A-321 fleet. Developed by ACSS (a joint venture of Acron and Thales), the Saferoute+ system adds a cockpit display of traffic information; it is also paired with an ADS-B/In collision-avoidance (TCAS) computer. American’s flight trials have shown improvements in runway arrival rates at DFW of up to five aircraft per hour. Because of its safety benefits, the NTSB has long argued for the addition of ADS-B/In to all commercial aircraft.

More Airports Getting Runway Safety System Similar to ASDE-X
The last of 35 U.S. airports to get runway-surveillance systems known as ASDE-X was Memphis, 14 years ago, and the system has long been out of production. But Saab, its developer, has produced a successor called Aerobahn Runway and Surface Safety service. Under FAA’s new Surface Awareness Initiative, Saab has won a contract to equip 26 more airports with this technology. Alas, instead of buying them all at once, FAA will pay for them to be installed in dribs and drabs over the next decade (FAA business as usual).

Hard Facts About Rail vs Air Travel in Europe
Green groups in Europe keep insisting that governments ban short-haul airline service in favor of people taking trains between European cities. But one of the advocates of this policy—Climatboostse Action Network-France—has released a report comparing the cost of air and rail trips within Europe. It finds that only a limited subset of trips cost passengers less by rail than by plane. A report on this subject by Greenpeace compared ticket prices for 21 routes between France and cities elsewhere in Europe. Weighted by number of passengers, the train averages 2.5 times as costly as the plane. These results lead these groups to call for large-scale taxation and/or subsidies.

NATS Boosts London Gatwick Runway Productivity
London Gatwick Airport (LGW) is the world’s busiest single-runway airport—at least until it completes converting a parallel taxiway to its second runway. Meanwhile, however, it now has the benefit of a Departure Manager system from Frequentis. Paired with the same company’s Arrival Manager system, it aims to increase the single runway’s daily throughput. These systems are operated by NATS, the UK’s ANSP. The system is also linked with Eurocontrol’s Network Manager so that arrivals and departures are coordinated with other air traffic.

New Mumbai Airport to Get $6.6 Billion Investment
Mumbai’s second airport is set to open this August, having been developed from scratch by infrastructure developer/operator Adani Group. Infralogic (June 24) reported that by 2030, Adani Group will have invested $6.6 billion in this new airport. That total covers the first three of five planned phases for this airport, in one of India’s largest cities.

Forbes Details the Case for a U.S. ATC Corporation
If the United States is ever to join the global move toward air traffic control utilities, the case must be made to opinion leaders far beyond the aviation community. An important example of such efforts is a long article in Forbes by reporter Jeremy Bogaisky. Its headline conveys its basic message: “Why the U.S. Should Copy Canada to Fix Its Broken Air Traffic Control System.” It offers a good overview of how Canada’s ATC system has improved considerably since the former government entity was converted into a nonprofit user-funded utility.

FAA Testing New NOTAM System This Month
Aviation Daily reported that FAA plans to test a new aeronautical notification system in July, aimed at eventually replacing the current antiquated NOTAM system, which is reverting to its original name, Notice to Airmen Management System (NMS). The new system will be cloud-hosted. It is being developed by CGI Federal, along with Google Public Sector, NG Aviation, and Mosaic ATM. FAA’s Thomas Draffen said NMS is intended to be turned on for real in Feb. 2026, with the old system turned off at that point.

Sweden’s “Flight Shaming” Backfires
Swedish activist Greta Thunberg popularized the idea of “flight shaming,” which led to that country’s government imposing a $45 tax on all departing flights (which was later emulated by a number of other countries). But UK newspaper The Telegraph reported that this tax has been abolished, as of July 1, because international departures from Sweden had declined by one third since the tax was imposed. Ryanair has already returned to Sweden, re-introducing 10 routes.

EHang Licensed to Carry Passengers via eVTOL
China has licensed eVTOL startup EHang to carry passengers (in what is apparently the first such license anywhere in the world). An article in The Economist reported that EHang plans to start commercial flights soon in Guangzhou and Hefei, and it also reports that drone deliveries are becoming widespread in China.

Honda Launched Its First Reusable Rocket
It may be small, but Honda’s new reusable rocket had its first launch and landing in mid-June, as Andrew Liszewski reported June 18 in The Verge. The 21-foot-tall rocket ascended to 890 feet and then landed within 37 cm (about 1.2 ft.) of its target. Honda has released few development plans, but The Verge reported that Honda has a development goal of having the capability for suborbital launches by 2029.

Another University Adopts FAA Controller Training Curriculum
DOT Secretary Sean Duffy announced on July 2 that Middle Georgia State University has become the seventh university or college to qualify for teaching the same curriculum as FAA provides at its Controller Academy in Oklahoma City. The program is called the Controller Training Initiative CTI). Besides completing the CTI coursework, would-be controllers must pass the Air Traffic Skills Assessment and physical exams. They can then be assigned to an ATC facility to begin on-the-job training.

Horizon Aero to Buy UK’s Gloucestershire Airport
The city and borough governments have selected Horizon Aero as their preferred bidder to buy Gloucestershire Airport. The company is a joint venture of Vayu Aviation Services (UK) and Vensa Infrastructure Ltd (India). The reason for the sale is to bring about investment in the airport and its two business parks. The Infralogic article (July 9) made no mention of a proposed price, which is presumably to be negotiated.

Maldives Developing Billion-Dollar Airport
The Maldives consist of 1,190 islands in the Indian Ocean. With tourism as a major industry, the government is now carrying out a $1 billion expansion of Velana International Airport, its largest by far. As ENR reports, a Saudi company is the design-build contractor for a new 78,000 square meter terminal designed for up to 7 million annual passengers. Beijing Urban Construction Group built a new 11,000 ft. runway recently.

Article Explains What the Brand New ATC System Is—and Isn’t
Long-time aviation reporter David Hughes has an article in the July issue of Avionics News titled, “What the ATC Overhaul Is and Isn’t.” It quotes several aviation researchers (including the editor of this newsletter) on what the plan may actually be able to accomplish and what is well beyond its scope. This is a good overview in five very readable pages.

Montenegro Evaluating Two Bids for Airport P3
The government is seeking a well-qualified firm or team to manage and improve its Podgorica and Tivat Airports. In May, the government opened bids from two qualified bidders: Incheon International Airport Corporation (South Korea) and Corporacion America Airports.  The Montenegro Tender Commission will review the bids and submit its assessment for the planned 30-year public-private partnership concession. Meanwhile, Infralogic reported (July 7) that the government of Jamaica is considering an early extension of the 30-year concession for Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay, which is held by MBJ Airports.

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Quotable Quotes

“We elect people to Congress to represent not the people they directly benefit. We ask them to use their best judgement and common sense to do the things that benefit the country. And for more than 30 years they have resisted creating an air traffic control system that they know perfectly well must be redone. But they refuse to do it, because there are control towers in virtually every district, and they’re just horrified that one of their constituents might have to move or lose their job. . . . And the second thing is they cannot resist the private pilots in this country who enjoy enormous political pressure because there are so many of them. I’m ashamed of those private pilots. They know perfectly well that they don’t pay their fair share of the cost of a system that needs to pay for itself by allocating the resources that we have among the users that demand service. . . . We need to create a private enterprise or something organized and operated like a private enterprise, but run with shared governance, including the government and commercial airlines and private aviation. We need a better system and we need it very quickly.”
—Robert Crandall, former president and chairman, American Airlines, “Bob Crandall Slams Private Pilots and Congress for Blocking Vital Air Traffic Control Reform,” View from the Wing, June 14, 2025

“FAA is coping with the same issues in 2025 as it was when I worked at Newark tower in the 1960s and ’70s. . . . Troubles abounded, with shortages of qualified controllers, demanding work rules, and traffic volumes that caused stress on individuals and the safety of flight. The current FAA air traffic control system was designed in the mid-1950s and remains the foundation of today’s operational environment. The unrecognized, fundamental failure is the management system supporting and operating the ATC system, which still reflects the 1950s era paradigm. . . . In 1995 Rep. Norm Mineta (D, CA) introduced HR 1441 [USATS Corporation], a bill intended to address the continued FAA structural problems, create a new and efficient management structure, and meet the demands of a growing aviation community. The legislation aimed to transfer the air traffic service from the FAA to a [government] corporation that would charge fees for its service and provide for efficient research and planning. Congress, industry, and public agencies should consider this fundamental change without delay.”
—Maurice F. Connor, Letter to the Editors, Aviation Week, June 16-29, 2025

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The post Aviation Policy News: Who should pay for air traffic control? appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Bold new idea: control tower consolidation
• Why the “Brand New ATC System” will not work
• Reason’s annual report on aviation infrastructure
• Informing pilots of possible runway incursions
• Could airport screening be privatized?
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

A Bold New Idea: Control Tower Consolidation

Consolidating U.S. air traffic control facilities has a fairly long history of being proposed, but with very little to show for it, except for a few consolidated terminal radar approach control facilities (TRACONs). Yet since today’s technology permits air traffic to be managed anywhere from anywhere, the concept continues to make sense.

I’m pleased to report that a bold new consolidation proposal is being worked on by leading companies that have pioneered remote/digital air traffic control towers. Going beyond the already-implemented remote tower centers in Europe, which are mostly focused on managing a dozen or more small-airports from one remote tower center, this idea suggests a much more expansive approach called a control tower complex.

A control tower complex (CTC) would focus on a geographical region and manage up to a dozen towers of various sizes and complexity. For example, a hypothetical consolidated tower complex might include managing five small airports, four medium airports, and one larger airport, all managed from a single CTC. As with all existing remote tower centers, there would be real productivity gains (due to economies of scale), some alleviation of current shortfalls in air traffic controller numbers, and significant cost savings due to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) not having to replace numerous obsolete physical air traffic control towers. Instead, it would only incur the costs of demolishing them and replacing them with cameras and other sensors at each airport site. For example, the recent cost of replacing the tower at Teterboro, NJ, a general aviation airport, was $74 million.

The FAA has succeeded over the years in consolidating a handful of TRACONs, but no other types of air traffic control (ATC) facilities. One major obstacle has been political: Members of Congress generally oppose losing any FAA facility in their state or district.

Another concern is likely opposition from air traffic controllers to proposed relocations. But this new concept calls for locating each CTC in the region where the to-be-replaced towers are and vetting potential CTC locations for cost of living and related quality of life factors that would be attractive for controller and manager relocation.

With a range of tower sizes in the CTC, there would be opportunities for controllers to train and qualify for moving to a higher-level remote tower, without having to relocate. Also appealing to controllers would be state-of-the-art technology, as well as a training lab with a control tower simulator at each CTC. As for congressional opposition, while the usual resistance can be expected, if the benefits and cost savings are in the ballpark CTC advocates suggest, the good-government case should be overwhelming.

One way to find out is to try this approach via a pilot program to implement one or two such control tower complexes. The FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) could offer this as a public-private partnership, open to companies with a track record of developing and operating remote tower centers overseas. Qualified companies would likely include Frequentis, Indra/Kongsburg, and Saab, which have each implemented remote tower centers in Europe.

The procurement process would reveal the likely cost of a new CTC, which could be compared with the cost of replacing each of the conventional towers based on recent replacements, such as Teterboro’s tower. The cost savings would be just one of the benefits. If the CTC idea lives up to its potential, adopting it as the way forward would accelerate the pace of replacing potentially several hundred smaller, aging brick & mortar towers. And it would likewise help to alleviate the ongoing controller shortage, not just initially but also by encouraging controllers at a CTC to make use of on-site simulator training to qualify for shifting to a more complex airport, without having to relocate.

This strikes me as an unprecedented innovation that would address a number of air traffic control problems.

I note that in the 2024 FAA reauthorization legislation, the FAA is directed to expand the scope of its remote tower efforts to include a remote tower center serving at least two airports. There is no sign of the FAA taking any action on this provision of the law.

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Why DOT’s “Brand New Air Traffic Control System” Will Not Work
By Rick Castaldo

This month, with fanfare and publicity, Department of Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced an ambitious goal to overhaul the U.S. air traffic control system infrastructure with a large congressional appropriation of tens of billions of dollars. Within three to three and a half years, he promised, this plan would produce “a brand new air traffic control system.”

This is a laudable goal, but it ignores two basic underlying realities. The first is the Federal Aviation Administration’s deteriorating infrastructure, which is truly on its last legs. This must be addressed with far more urgency than “buying new stuff.” Many believe Secretary Duffy is not being provided accurate data on the condition of the 70,000 pieces of equipment he discusses that make up the National Airspace System, NAS. To put it bluntly, he is being misled.

The second reality is that the FAA’s process for procuring new systems and technology is seriously flawed, as illustrated by lengthy delays and limited benefits from the 20-year NextGen modernization project, which is widely recognized as producing very little bang for the tens of billions of bucks spent.

Secretary Duffy’s call to action was apparently driven by the deadly mid-air collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and the numerous outages at the Newark TRACON, causing major air traffic disruptions. In addition, last year’s nationwide NOTAM system outage caused havoc as well, with additional failures after an influx of capital and promised changes of that 50-year-old-system.

Secretary Duffy’s “brand new air traffic control” plan is to award an integration contract to a single commercial company, committing many billions of dollars in advance of any detailed plan—and all to be accomplished in less than four years. More disturbing is that an attitude of “Let them tell us how to do it” is a recipe for cost growth and failure. Whoever is advising Secretary Duffy on this path is 100% wrong. The integration contractor would need direction from someone highly knowledgeable. And whatever contractor is chosen, they would need more than a cursory understanding of the complexity of the existing National Airspace System, NAS, infrastructure, archaic electrical interfaces, and the vast number of existing contractors that provide key services, like telecommunications. They would also need the authority to execute anything needed in very short time frames, unheard of at the FAA.

One seasoned executive (recently retired) with years of FAA experience as well as at air navigation service providers (ANSPs) worldwide, tells me this approach is akin to a feeding frenzy of a school of sharks, all fighting for a piece of the $15 billion carcass. Another retired executive, instrumental in many successful FAA programs, writes, “If you want it bad, you get it bad.” He gives credit to the secretary for understanding that this effort cannot be undertaken within the seriously flawed FAA procurement system with traditional FAA contracting involvement. 

Another writes, “The approach proposed ignores the reality that the current infrastructure must be maintained. This is not an option.”

The entire US economy depends on the predictable movement of aircraft throughout the world, into and out of the country, and between major US hubs.

In 2000, a single ASR-9 radar system fell over at Boston Logan Airport. The FAA had no spares for the (at that point) eight-year-old ASR-9 antenna, so it took the training academy system from Oklahoma to replace the Logan system. The failure was traced to a poor structural design, and the FAA paid tens of millions of dollars to the contractor for a repair kit affecting more than a hundred of those radars. That family of radars is still in use 25 years later and is the basis of surveillance service and weather information at all our major airports. The FAA has been attempting to modernize this equipment for years and has failed. That radar outage in Boston, lasting only three days, caused air traffic control disruptions throughout the country for a week, and that was a single radar at a single hub.

My point is that the current infrastructure must absolutely be kept operating at almost any cost while, at the same time, new equipment is infused into a system that basically never shuts down. 

The integrator must be tasked specifically with the mission to maintain 24/7 operations. In my opinion, there is no single integrator in the world capable of this. It will take many of the same manufacturers and contractors utilized today, just to keep the NAS basically functional. One writer suggests that a program similar to the World War II Manhattan Project be chartered. Some believe it requires a single person, with the authority over every single element of a project of this scope, right down to guaranteeing zoning permits and electrical connections, with the ability to waive any regulation, specification, or rule, local or federal. That will never happen.

Many people inside the Beltway, as well as the FAA staff, continue to blame a lack of funding for the FAA. That is a minor part of the overall problem. Much of the billions spent on NextGen did not prove beneficial. The entrenched FAA staff running the failed procurement system deserves much of the blame.

One retired FAA senior contracting officer tells me that when FAA got its own acquisition system in April 1996, it didn’t change the fact that FAA has a risk-adverse, “cover your ass” culture that continued with lengthy legal reviews and processes that drive costs up, cause program delays, and do nothing for the quality of products procured.

A former FAA chief systems engineer writes that the discipline of systems engineering is a lost art at the FAA. Many of the current heads of these functions have near-zero qualifications in engineering, lack a core understanding of requirements development, and have an over-reliance on archaic military specifications for equipment. Over-specifying equipment has resulted in tremendous cost growth and delays in numerous procurements.

A recent attempt at replacing a 40-year-old surface radar with a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) system resulted in hundreds of additional requirements and environmental specifications that made a true COTS product a fictional pursuit. For example, the FAA demanded that a COTS radar continue to operate in 100-mile-per-hour winds at an airport with no reduction in performance. Who lands in 100-mile-per-hour winds? More importantly, the chief operating officer and senior staff should have been asking about this during the many reviews on the way to the issuance of a request for proposals.

Unfortunately, Secretary Duffy is being advised by many of the same FAA staff who have been instrumental in running the FAA and aviation trade associations for many years. These inside-the-Beltway professionals have near-zero domain expertise on the operation, maintenance, and logistical support for the technology used by the National Airspace System. Moreover, the vast array of companies and associations supporting this effort are currently involved in some of the failed programs, now behind schedule and over budget.

Given the above realities, what should be done instead?

Duffy’s plan calls for new, innovative investments. This should be suspended until the current NAS is stabilized. Spending billions on new elements is not today’s priority if the current NAS equipment cannot be kept working. But:

• Speeding up TDM-IP under a nationwide effort is essential.
• Also, modernizing the voice switches at hub airports immediately.
• Continuing to replace radios as they fail is prudent under existing contracts.

Duffy should direct the FAA Administrator and the ATO Chief Operating Officer to choose a single individual with responsibility for ensuring that the 31 major hub airports (which handle the majority of all passengers) receive priority for spare parts, available trained technicians, and requisite controller workforce for safe movement of air traffic at each of those airports.

The COO should install a second individual to ensure that nationwide systems such as the wide area augmentation system, the national airspace data interchange network (NADIN), NOTAMs, and flow control at the command center are given priority for spare parts and staff to maintain those operations.

The COO should cease all installations of new program equipment and redirect funding to maintain the NAS systems that are essential for the 31 major airports. This will cause complaints from the current vendors. Many of these programs are far over budget and behind schedule. They eat up precious resources and are not focused on maintaining air traffic flow or air safety. Terminal flight data manager (TFDM) is one such program, with hundreds of millions spent and near-zero current benefit, and far behind schedule.

A third individual should be assigned absolute authority over the procurement of spare parts, without regard to various “stovepipe” organizations. This should be the top priority for funding and dedicated staff. This individual should have direct access to the Logistics Center inventory of available spares and the ability to direct the manufacturing of spares essential to keeping existing systems running.

A fourth individual should be put in charge of repairing aging physical infrastructure, including all TRACONs, centers, and towers. Repair-only should be a priority for existing funds by an individual with a construction background (e.g., Army Corps or Navy Seabees).

Finally, all four key individuals should be given every latitude to execute their mission. The transportation secretary, FAA administrator, and COO should hold weekly reviews of every major task undertaken by this group.

Rick Castaldo recently retired from a long career in air traffic control technology. With a degree in electrical engineering from Oklahoma University, he served in multiple positions within the FAA, including the Logistics Center, the Tech Center, and FAA headquarters. After 10 years as an international ATC consultant, he returned to U.S. DOT as a subject matter expert on radar systems and ADS-B. He has been an advisor to this newsletter for a number of years.

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Reason’s Annual Report on Aviation Infrastructure P3s
By Marc Scribner

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic will be long-felt, but 2024 marked the first year that global air traffic exceeded 2019 levels. Also proving resilient was the long-term global trend of private investment in airports—via outright purchase, long-term lease, or public-private partnerships (P3s) for select airport projects—and the continued modernization of air traffic control. These activities are documented in Reason Foundation’s recently released Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report 2025.

The airport section includes an updated table of 2023 revenue of the world’s 38 largest investor-owned airport companies, with the five largest being Aeroports de Paris, Aena Aeropuertos, Heathrow Airport Holdings, Fraport, and Vinci Airports. Combined revenue from these 38 airport companies totaled $52.1 billion, representing 35.7% of the 2023 world airport revenue of $146 billion. For pre-pandemic comparison, these investor-owned airport companies collected $48.3 billion in 2019, or 26.6% of the 2019 total global revenue of $181.7 billion.

The robust recovery of the private airport sector is especially interesting because the United States led the global air traffic recovery while possessing only one privately operated commercial service airport (San Juan, Puerto Rico). The relative financial resilience of private airports can be partially explained by the involvement of private infrastructure funds. Recent empirical research from New York University’s Stern School of Business found that airports with majority infrastructure fund ownership enjoy faster passenger growth and attract more new airline entrants, especially low-cost carriers. In addition, research by Airports Council International on the rise of the airport group model, in which private companies manage multiple airports, has found that airport groups improve airport financial resilience.

The rebound in airport privatization and P3 activity led Infrastructure Investor to run an article in July 2024 headlined, “Airports are once again a favourite.” It highlighted airport investors’ global portfolio rebalancing as passenger traffic began exceeding pre-pandemic levels, as well as interest in new markets. Analysis by Reason Foundation of transactions contained in Acuris’s Infralogic database found that the total deal value of projects reaching financial close in 2024 was nearly double the value of 2023 transactions, increasing from $17.7 billion to $32.9 billion.

Last year saw a number of major private airport developments worldwide. In April, Spanish airport company Aena agreed to invest $401 million to expand the capacity of Congonhas Airport, the second-largest airport in São Paulo, Brazil. The four-year project will replace the existing terminal with one more than twice its size, increasing the airport’s capacity from 17 million annual passengers to 29.5 million. The project will also upgrade the airport’s runways.

A new airport development, financing, and management company was founded in Canada. In July, Vancouver-based Centerline Airport Partners signed a contract to manage Parma Airport in Italy and is seeking to raise $100 million from investors. Centerline has partnered with Atlantico Capital to help it raise funds in the United States, Europe, and Latin America.

In November, Germany’s AviAlliance agreed to acquire AGS (Aberdeen, Glasgow, Southampton) Airports from Ferrovial and Macquarie for $1.95 billion, or approximately 23 times EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization). AviAlliance owns stakes in the airports of Athens, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The United States is an outlier in the worldwide trend of private airport investment and management. While P3s for major projects such as passenger terminals, cargo facilities, and consolidated rental car centers are growing in popularity, whole-airport P3 leases remain rare.

The notable exception has been the P3 lease of San Juan, Puerto Rico’s Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport in 2013, which for years was the only airport to successfully enter the FAA’s Airport Privatization Pilot Program, now mainstreamed as the Airport Investment Partnership Program (AIPP). In Dec. 2023, the FAA issued its record of decision and finding of no significant impact for the planned airport expansion accompanying the P3 lease of Tweed New Haven Airport (CT). This became the first whole-airport P3 lease approved on the mainland United States. Interestingly, Tweed New Haven’s private partner Avports, which had previously been the airport’s long-time contract manager, structured the agreement so that the airport did not seek relief from existing FAA mandates that would have required AIPP approval.

In Nov. 2024, south-central Florida’s Avon Park Executive Airport was approved by the FAA to enter AIPP. The general aviation airport is under a 30-year P3 lease with Florida Airport Management (FAM), which had previously managed the airport under contract with the city of Avon Park. The terms of the long-term lease require FAM to complete 13 improvement projects in the airport master plan that were estimated to cost $14.3 million in 2015. If FAM performs well according to agreed-upon metrics, it will have the option to extend the concession by up to 19 additional years.

There is continued speculation about why the United States is such an outlier compared with most of the rest of the world on airport privatization and long-term P3s. The Congressional Research Service released a report on the subject in early 2021. After comparing the global trend with the very limited use of the recent and current federal program, CRS analysts suggested that unequal tax treatment of revenue bonds (tax-exempt municipal bonds for existing airports versus taxable revenue bonds for private partners) could be a causal factor.

Turning to air traffic control, Reason’s Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report finds that 98 countries are now served by air navigation service providers (ANSPs) operated as corporations funded by user fees. FAA, which operates as both a regulator and an ANSP, is increasingly an outlier. Just 24 countries—mostly developing ones—continue to cling to this legacy civil aviation authority model, which has been out of step with International Civil Aviation Organization best practices since 2001.

FAA’s outdated institutional model is the root cause of the agency’s delayed air traffic control modernization efforts. The agency has yet to adopt space-based ADS-B for surveillance of its oceanic airspace, something even much poorer countries such as Azerbaijan and Papua New Guinea have been able to do in the last few years. FAA has also yet to commission a single remote/digital tower, which are rapidly proliferating in Europe and Asia, as is discussed in more detail in a recent Reason Foundation report, Advancing Remote Tower Deployment in the United States.

U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced a planned overhaul of the FAA’s aging air traffic control facilities and equipment in May. Alas, as was discussed in detail in a previous issue of this newsletter, Secretary Duffy’s focus is on increasing taxpayer funding for the same broken system, rather than needed governance reforms to address the root cause of these problems. This suggests that management of the U.S. National Airspace System will remain mired in the status quo for the time being, and innovations in air traffic control will continue to take place outside the United States.

In addition to the Annual Aviation Infrastructure Report 2025, readers of this newsletter may also be interested in Reason’s Annual Transportation Finance Report, 2025. Robert Poole examines developments in the infrastructure investment fund world, provides updates on the largest companies and major P3 projects underway, and reviews pension funds’ increasing investment in revenue-generating infrastructure.

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Informing Pilots of Potential Runway Incursions

When ADS-B became required on U.S. aircraft operating in controlled airspace more than 20 years ago, some engineers at Honeywell and Sensis came up with a brilliant safety idea. When that system detects a potential conflict between an aircraft and some other vehicle (aircraft or ground vehicle), don’t just inform controllers in the tower: notify the cockpit crew(s) automatically. Seconds count when moving vehicles are heading for a collision. But the FAA relied only on notifying controllers in the tower (who were then supposed to notify cockpit crews).

As my aviation friend and colleague Mike Gahen reminded me this week, he was present at Syracuse’s Hancock Airport 20 years ago when Honeywell and Sensis demonstrated a cockpit alert system to do exactly that. Pilots witnessing the demonstration were eager to have such cockpit notifications.

Honeywell understood the benefits and began developing and then selling to airlines systems called SmartRunway and SmartLanding, with Southwest being a major customer. The systems are add-ons to Honeywell’s enhanced ground proximity warning system, EGPWS, which all Southwest’s 737s already had. Aviation Daily reported that installation is complete on 94% of that fleet and should be at 100% by October. Reporter Sean Broderick says Honeywell estimates that about 25% of the active commercial fleet has those two systems activated, mentioning as examples Alaska Airlines and Emirates Airlines.

But Honeywell is not stopping there. It has a successor system called Surf-A, now in the FAA certification process. Aviation Week‘s Thierry Dubois reports that the company expects certification by the end of this year. Surf-A relies on ADS-B signals and also links to the aircraft’s Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System, and it can provide both aural and visual warnings to cockpit crews. Honeywell’s Bob Buddecke said the retrofit involves a software update and a minor hardware change. They expect FAA certification for the first aircraft type (757) by year-end, with others following in 2026. He points out that “Thousands of aircraft could be equipped for a fraction of the cost of installing equivalent infrastructure at airports.”

Why the FAA did not see the merits of this 20 years ago is puzzling, but at least this significant improvement is finally being implemented.

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Could Airport Screening Be Privatized?

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Acting Administrator Ha Nguyen McNeill startled some members of Congress last month in response to a question about privatized airport screening from a member of the House Appropriations Committee’s homeland security panel. “Nothing is off the table,” she said. “If new privatization schemes make sense, then we’re happy to have that discussion to see what we can come up with—it’s not an all-or-nothing game.” She also said that “airport choice” on how to proceed is important, baffling Politico’s reporter.

As one who was present at TSA’s creation, let me explain. As one of the few aviation policy analysts who knew something about airport security screening prior to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, I was invited to Washington in Nov. 2001 to advise the House aviation subcommittee on to-be-drafted legislation to beef up the rather pathetic pre-9/11 screening at U.S. airports. In three days in D.C., I had meetings with the White House and committee staff and took part in a news conference with committee members on the Capitol steps.

In these meetings, I explained that the problem with U.S. airport screening was not that it was being provided by private security companies. Rather, those companies were being hired and paid by the airlines in the relevant terminals, who wanted fast, inexpensive screening—something of a conflict of interest. I explained that in most of Europe, screening was done by private security firms (or in some cases, trained airport staff). In both cases, the screening had to meet government-prescribed security performance measures. The resulting House bill favored this approach to beefed-up screening.

The Senate was a different story. In the post-9/11 panic, private screening was mistakenly seen as the basic flaw, and a 100% federal takeover was prescribed as the answer—not only federal standards and regulations but a new federal workforce imposed on nearly every U.S. airport. The House rejected the Senate bill by a four-vote margin and passed its own bill instead. When it came time to work out a compromise, a White House official said that if a bill based mostly on the Senate approach was negotiated, President George W. Bush would sign it. That undercut House negotiators, and the compromise allowed airports to request private screening, but only under TSA control. That’s how we got today’s TSA Screening Partnership Program (SPP), under which about 20 airports (including SFO) have TSA-selected screening companies rather than TSA screeners.

Hence, what Acting Administrator McNeil was apparently suggesting is that TSA would be open to revisions to the current SPP. As Marc Scribner explained in the March 2025 issue of this newsletter, the way TSA operates SPP is bizarre. Instead of the airport being able to select a TSA-certified screening company that best meets its needs and contract with it, TSA itself selects a company and enters into a contract with it. This is not how other public services are outsourced. A meaningful reform would be for TSA to allow airports to solicit proposals from TSA-approved security companies and allow the airport to contract with the one that best meets its needs. TSA would still regulate its performance.

A more-fundamental reform would be for Congress to remove TSA’s dual roles. As currently structured, TSA is both the federal aviation security regulator and the primary provider of airport screening—so it basically regulates itself, a clear conflict of interest. TSA should be the aviation security regulator, period.

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News Notes

Progress on Newark ATC Problems
There is some good news from the FAA on the ongoing problems at Newark. First, the runway that had been out of service, supposedly until mid-June, has reopened thanks to the work having been completed ahead of schedule. Second, DOT Secretary Duffy announced on May 28 that the new fiber line that transmits flight data from the New York TRACON to the Philadelphia TRACON (which handles EWR airspace) has been installed, but that operational testing will not be completed until sometime in July. And once that line is in use, a second fiber line will replace the remaining copper line.

Inspectors General to Review DCA Safety Regulation
DOT Secretary Sean Duffy has asked the agency’s Inspector General to review current air safety protocols in the airspace of Reagan National Airport (DCA). The New York Times reported that the Senate Commerce Committee has asked both the DOT and the Department of Defense Inspector General to do likewise. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation into the fatal Jan. 29 collision continues and is scheduled to run through next January.

Florida Airports Planning Remote/Digital Towers
Several sources reported last month that Bartow and Winter Haven, in central Florida, are pursuing a remote tower (RT) center to be developed by Frequentis. The RT center will be located at Bartow Executive Airport and will manage traffic at Winter Haven. City commissioners of the latter city have approved requesting a $500,000 grant from Florida DOT for the project, which is part of a $1.5 million appropriation in the state’s draft (not yet approved) budget. The project will require approval from the FAA and spectrum approval from the FCC.

House Bill Would Permit Over-Land Supersonic Flight
On May 14, Sen.Ted Budd (R-NC) and Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX) introduced legislation to repeal the 1973 ban on supersonic flight over land within the United States. The change would permit supersonic flights whose sonic booms do not reach the ground. Test flights of the Boom Supersonic demonstrator aircraft early this year appear to have achieved “boomless cruise.” On June 6, President Donald Trump issued an executive order on the subject, directing the FAA administrator to remove the current prohibition on overland supersonic flight and establish an interim noise-based certification standard. Separately, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is working on new aircraft noise standards (including for supersonic flight), as Aviation Daily reported (May 15).

Increased Space Launch Activity Prompts Senate User Fee Proposal
Pending environmental impact statements (EISs) for new and refurbished launch sites at Cape Canaveral, FL, are based on projections of 120 annual launches of SpaceX’s giant Starship within the next few years. That is in addition to 100 or more Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launches. In response, the Senate Commerce Committee has proposed a commercial launch user fee to account for the increasingly large amounts of airspace that must be closed during launches and recoveries of spent boosters. The fee would be charged by the FAA, and the proceeds would be used for replacing aging radars and other equipment, and potentially other facilities and equipment improvements.

Frequentis Announces Digital Tower Runway Capacity Gains
Austrian avionics company Frequentis says improved image processing could enable large airports to gain 10-20% more runway throughput. The key technology is a new image processing capability in 4K cameras that can now match the human eye, seeing up to 8 nm. Controllers could then use the panoramic screen as their main information source, without having to manually operate cameras. According to an Aviation Daily article, this could make digital towers feasible for large airports. During Munich Airport’s refurbishment, controllers are using this kind of high-capacity digital tower system. The German ANSP (DFS) plans to keep Munich’s digital tower in place as a contingency tower, with the capacity to manage 100% of airport flights.

Aireon Starts Next Phase of Space-Based VHF Communications
Last month, space-based ADS-B pioneer Aireon announced plans for a new 20-satellite constellation in equatorial orbit, aimed at being operational by 2028. Last year Aireon launched its Space-Based VHF Consortium with ANSPs AirNav Ireland, NATS, and Nav Canada, along with satellite operator Iridium. This year’s focus includes identifying vendors to develop ths satellites and support systems. Space-based ADS-B has thus far lacked space-based voice communications, so this will be a significant step forward.

Jet Zero to Produce Blended Wing Body Airliner in North Carolina
Aviation Daily reported that JetZero, developer of the most advanced blended wing body (BWB) airliner, has selected a location at Piedmont Triangle Airport in Greensboro, NC, as the site where it will produce its Z4 commercial aircraft. The prototype is under construction by Scaled Composites in Mojave, CA. The Piedmont Triad airport is also the location selected by Boom Supersonic for its production facility, and Honda Aircraft’s HondaJet assembly plant is also located there. JetZero plans to begin building production prototypes at its new plant in 2029.

Philippines Plans Regional Airports Privatization
The Philippines Department of Transportation plans to offer “bundles” of regional airports for long-term public-private partnerships (P3s), according to Infralogic (May 12). Transportation Secretary Vince Dizon said the agency is working with the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank to plan the P3 procurements. Bidding is expected to take place in the fourth quarter of this year, with long-term contracts awarded in 2026. The aim of the program is to have 20 regional airports being managed via P3s by the time the current administration ends in Jan. 2029.

Ultra-Short-Take-Off Company Raised $115 Million
Electra.aero announced in mid-April that it had raised $115 million to begin production of its EL9, the first-ever ultra-short-take-off/landing aircraft (which can take off and land in 150 feet). Electra has more than 2,200 pre-orders valued at over $10 billion for the EL9. It has also won military contracts and is underway on a U.S. Air Force contract to develop military use cases for the EL9. The battery-powered aircraft has a cargo payload of up to 3,000 lbs. and a range of up to 1,100 miles with in-flight battery recharging.

Venice Airport New P3 Nears Completion
A bid by new investors to buy out the current SAVE consortium that runs the airport of Venice, Italy was nearing a financial close last month, reported Infralogic (May 13). The new team is backed by Ardian Infrastructure; the majority members of SAVE are DWS and Infravia, which hold 88% of SAVE. Ardian and Finint would each hold 50% of the new entity if the deal goes through as planned.

Curacao Developing Remote Tower Center
A groundbreaking ceremony took place on May 27 for a new ATC operations center in Seru Mahuma, Curacao. The new center is located next to the headquarters of DC-ANSP, the Dutch Caribbean Air Navigation Service Provider. By including remote/digital tower facilities, the new center will manage traffic for both Curacao and Bonaire. DC-ANSP sees the new capability as positioning Curacao as a “technological leader in Caribbean airspace management”. Too bad our FAA cannot make a similar claim.

Washington State’s Paine Field Plans P3 Expansion
Snohomish County, WA, has begun “formal discussions” with airport terminal developer/operator Propellor Airports to consider a further P3 to expand the terminal that Propellor financed, built, and operates at the formerly general-aviation-only airport. Thanks to the passenger terminal, Paine Field is now served by Alaska and Frontier Airlines, but the small size of the terminal limits air travel growth. The region’s major airport, Sea-Tac, will reach its maximum passenger capacity in 2034, and no expansion is planned. Since 2019, investment fund Global Infrastructure Partners has been an investor in the Paine Field terminal.

NAV Portugal Implements Point Merge at Lisbon Airport
The ANSP for Portugal has reconfigured airspace in the vicinity of Lisbon’s international airport, using a system called Point Merge, developed in 2006 by Eurocontrol but not widely implemented thus far in Europe. The new Lisbon airspace was launched in May 2024, and in its first year, delays in that airspace have decreased more than 30% overall. Point Merge replaced traditional holding patterns. And the delay reductions are even larger when considering delays directly attributable to ATC. NAV Portugal puts that those reductions at 40 to 92%, according to a June 6 Aviation Daily article.

Article Explains ARINC Role in Beginning ATC
A recent article in Aviation Intelligence Reporter said that both ARINC and SITA were created after World War II. When I explained to its editor, Andrew Charlton, that ARINC was founded in 1929 and introduced this country’s first air traffic control, he invited me to submit an article on the subject. ARINC also pioneered the nonprofit, stakeholder-governed ATC corporation model, eventually re-appearing as Nav Canada in 1995. My article appears in that newsletter’s June 2025 issue. Andrew has offered a three-month trial AIR subscription to readers of this newsletter. Go to: https://aviationintelligencereporter.aero/free-trial. If you would like a copy of my article, send a request to me at bob.poole@reason.org.

Reaching Non-Aviation Audiences on ATC Reform
If Congress is ever going to take up fundamental air traffic control reform, the reason for such changes needs to reach opinion leaders beyond aviation. An excellent example is “The Real Problem with the FAA,” in The Atlantic, May 19. The author is Dorothy Robyn, who has held a number of high-level positions in the federal government. I first met her when she was on the staff of the White House National Economic Council during the Clinton administration, where she worked on that administration’s USATS air traffic control corporation proposal.

View from the Wing on Remote Towers
In an excellent article, Gary Leff of View from the Wing takes on the FAA’s bizarre opposition to remote/digital towers. The piece appeared online on May 24.

History of ATC Corporation Proposals From CRS
If you are curious how many times serious analysts and institutions have proposed shifting U.S. air traffic control from the FAA to a self-supporting ATC corporation, the Congressional Research Service has done your homework for you. It dates all the way back to a 1974 study by Glen Gilbert, whom the FAA and the Air Traffic Control Association consider the “father of US air traffic control.” Others include my 1982 Heritage Foundation policy study, the National Performance Review, and USATS proposals from the Clinton administration, the 2014 FAA Management Advisory Council report, and the 2016 House bill championed by Rep. Bill Shuster. It is Air Traffic Inc.: Considerations Regarding the Corporatization of Air Traffic Control. The updated version is dated May 16, 2017

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Quotable Quotes

“Unfortunately, our Airspace System is no longer considered the gold standard worldwide. Several critical issues, including aging infrastructure, outdated technology, staffing shortages, and a broken hiring and training process, have been persistent concerns for decades. The consequences could be severe, impacting efficiency safety, and national security. . . . FAA leadership acknowledges the dire state of infrastructure. The condition of our ATC facilities and radars continues to worsen. FAA towers now average 40 years old, TRACONs 27 years, and ARTCCs 62 years, and the majority of radars are approaching 40 years. . . . The FAA Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2018 provided a viable framework for separating the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) from federal appropriations, ensuring stable, predictable funding. However, any effort must not operate as a for-profit model that prioritizes revenue over safety.”
—Paul M. Rinaldi, former president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, written testimony before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, March 4, 2025

“[Mr. Duffy], you’ve often mentioned the need to hire more air traffic controllers. That’s a great idea. But what’s your strategy for that? For decades, the plan has been simple. If the system needs 2000 new controllers, hire 2000 new controllers. Except that idea has never worked, because the failure rate of trainees still hovers around 30-35 percent. If you want 2000 new controllers, you probably need to begin training 2500-3000 people to end up with 2000. . . .  . . . The core of the staffing issue dates back to August 3, 1981 when President Reagan fired nearly 13,000 controllers . . . [and] the agency never took the action it should have to fix staffing back then.”
—Robert Mark, “Secretary Duffy’s ATC Modernization Plan Has a Couple of Problems,” Jetwhine, May 12, 2025

“It is baffling that this Administration, which wants to reduce the size of the federal government, isn’t proposing to take over 35,000 people off the federal payroll (the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization) and allow them to operate a nonprofit public corporation that is freed from stifling government regulations…This is an old idea, recommended by virtually every group that has ever studied the situation. And as the Journal points out, this structure has been proven in Canada and numerous other countries throughout the world to work safely and effectively. It also has the great benefit of separating the safety regulator from the operating organization. Finally, and equally important, any entity given this massive responsibility should be given the tools and resources to make long-term capital investments just like successful US companies do every day. That can only be done by freeing the agency from the vice-grip of federal budgeting.”
—Will Ris, letter to the Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2025

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The last decade, however, has seen a departure from this practice. In highways and bridges, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) legislation, known as the bipartisan infrastructure law, provided $674 billion in federal money that is being provided to state departments of transportation for projects that would otherwise have been paid for via long-term bonds supported by highway user tax revenues or by tolls.

Congress didn’t find the funding for this bill. The borrowed federal money has rewarded holdouts against using tolling to fund projects. The more federal funding is available, the less highway users will realize what infrastructure projects actually cost to build and maintain. This disconnect will reinforce political opposition to the increases in federal highway user fees needed to reconstruct and modernize things like our aging Interstate system.

Unfortunately, major transportation organizations have become big fans of the federal funding from the bipartisan infrastructure law. We now see the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC), the American Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA), and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) all calling for Congress to make the infrastructure bill the new baseline for federal highway and transit funding levels in the forthcoming 2026 surface transportation reauthorization legislation.

Whatever happened to the users-pay/users-benefit principle?

A similar turnabout has taken place regarding funding much-needed improvements to this country’s antiquated air traffic control system. Last decade, Airlines for America (A4A) went all out in support of House Transportation and Infrastructure Chair Bill Shuster’s landmark bill to convert the Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) into an air traffic control (ATC) utility to be paid for via aviation user fees paid directly to a new nonprofit ATO corporation (modeled after the highly successful Nav Canada air traffic control utility). 

Today, when the air traffic control organization’s significant deficiencies are making daily news headlines, the airlines have joined other aviation groups in lobbying for a $30 billion to $50 billion federal bailout of the nation’s air traffic control system. Yet this costly bailout would still fail to address the ATO’s seriously flawed organizational and funding problems. Today, A4A is silent on any kind of increase in aviation user taxes, unlike their willingness a decade ago to pay the kind of air traffic control user fees that airlines pay worldwide.

The retreat from users-pay/users-benefit is troubling for two reasons. The first is simple political defense. When air travel and highway infrastructure are paid for by users, they have a strong defense against claims that taxpayers should subsidize their competitors.

A much-noted study by the Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics in 2004 found that federal subsidies for highway and airline infrastructure were essentially rounding errors compared with other modes such as transit and Amtrak. Thus, when advocates of massive taxpayer funding for potential competitors such as high-speed rail argued for their share of federal subsidies, aviation and highway groups had strong arguments that, since they were not being subsidized, neither should their competitors be. That argument is much less credible since Congress began bailing out the Highway Trust Fund with borrowed money.

The second reason is a much larger concern. The federal government’s current and long-term fiscal solvency should concern everyone involved in U.S. infrastructure. All the billions in the bipartisan infrastructure bill were borrowed. Those dollars add to each fiscal year’s budget deficit and directly increase the national debt, which is now over $36 trillion.

In mid-May, Moody’s Rating Service downgraded the federal government’s credit rating, as Fitch and S&P had done several years before. In its statement, Moody’s projected annual federal budget deficits to reach nine percent of Gross Domestic Product by 2035, up from 6.4 percent in 2024—already an indefensible level in a peacetime, growing economy.

The rating agencies are providing a warning to policymakers. A May headline in The Wall Street Journal declared, “Bond Market Wakes Up to Fiscal Mess in D.C.,” as a weak auction of Treasury bonds led to a stock market selloff, for the first time since late 2023. Thus far, Congress remains mostly oblivious to the realities of the debt and deficits. For example, the “One Big Beautiful Bill,” passed by the House on May 22 and sent to the Senate, ignores these concerns and would increase the national debt by $3 trillion to $5 trillion over the next 10 years.

Obviously, if highway and aviation groups took seriously the federal government’s approaching insolvency, they would forego asking for massive federal spending bailouts and instead work hard for increased user fees and a larger role for public-private partnerships. But of course, giving up their place at the federal trough would hardly move the needle on the projected ruinous increase in the national debt. 

But here’s a more pragmatic reason for them to think again. Trillions in so-called free federal money for infrastructure cannot continue much longer. The impending bankruptcies of Social Security and Medicare, expected by 2033, should be a wake-up call to start planning now for the end of federal money for transportation infrastructure.

State transportation departments and metropolitan planning organizations must start planning to become financially self-sufficient within this 10-year (at best) window. Among the tools in their toolbox are a shift from diminishing fuel taxes to per-mile charges, toll-based financing of major projects, and regional (not federal) funding of metro area transit systems.

Prior to the 1950s, state highway departments were fully responsible for their highway systems, and tolling proliferated as one of the best ways to finance major highway projects. Today, we also have 30 years of experience with long-term public-private partnerships as additional tools for funding major infrastructure projects.

So-called ‘free’ federal funding for infrastructure is politically golden—until it isn’t, because it is no longer possible. Congress, industry organizations, and provider agencies like the FAA, state transportation departments and metropolitan planning organizations all need to face this financial reality. Policymakers need to start planning for self-sufficiency and return to the core principle of the user pays, the user benefits.

A version of this column first appeared in Public Works Financing.

The post The troubling decline of the users-pay, users-benefit principle in infrastructure funding appeared first on Reason Foundation.

America’s air traffic control system needs repairing. Most of the technology listed in Mr. Duffy’s plan should be replaced. But shoveling billions into a failed procurement system won’t fix the problem. America’s air traffic control system lags behind those of other countries in many respects, including technological advancement and productivity.

The Federal Aviation Administration’s budget for facilities and equipment—a substantial portion of which goes to air traffic control—has stayed roughly flat in nominal terms over the past decade, while the operations budget has soared. The 21 high-altitude air route traffic control centers, more than 100 approach control centers, and many hundreds of airport air traffic control towers are antiquated, and most need to be replaced.

But with today’s digital surveillance technology, air traffic in our skies can be managed from almost anywhere. We need perhaps three rather than 21 high-altitude centers. One would do the trick, in fact, but three would ensure backup options in case of failure. This large-scale consolidation should be financed by long-term revenue bonds based on ATC user fees, which are paid by airlines and other airspace users to the ATC service provider. That may sound like a pipe dream, but Australia, Germany, South Africa, and the United Kingdom have all done such consolidations in recent decades.

A single digital remote tower can manage many smaller control towers at a lower cost and higher productivity. While these systems are expanding throughout Europe, the FAA has resisted this breakthrough innovation.

America’s air traffic control system employs a significant amount of outdated technology for which no replacement parts exist, partly because the FAA often waits until a unit fails before trying to repair or replace it. Well-managed, well-funded ATC systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.K. are able to plan large-scale technology replacements before systems begin breaking down. Many ATC providers buy replacement systems in bulk and roll them out to all facilities over a year or two. By contrast, the FAA sometimes takes 10 to 15 years to install replacement systems, by which time the systems may already be obsolete.

These are only a few examples of how badly funded and poorly managed America’s air traffic control system is. A one-time multibillion-dollar infusion won’t fix a broken procurement process. It could also undermine the modernization effort by botching the procurement of new systems. A much wiser policy would be to replace the business model.

Many other countries’ air traffic control systems work far better than ours because their business models have changed, from a tax-funded bureaucracy embedded in a transportation ministry to a public utility funded by customer user fees. Such a model enables the utility’s board and top management to do long-range planning and to finance both technology upgrades and facility consolidations based on a predictable revenue stream. This also changes airlines and airspace users from supplicants before Congress to stakeholder customers demanding high-caliber performance.

Several ATC public-utility models operate around the world. The most common model is a government-owned public utility, as in Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and much of the rest of Europe. America’s Tennessee Valley Authority is an analogous example, funded by customers’ electric bills and financed via long-term revenue bonds. Italy and the U.K. provide air-traffic control via public-private partnerships—partly state-owned and partly investor-owned companies. The highly successful Nav Canada, the world’s second-largest air traffic control provider in terms of annual transactions, uses a nonprofit user cooperative model.

How out of step is the U.S.?

The latest figures from the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization show that four nongovernment providers, 63 government-owned utilities, and four intergovernmental air traffic control utilities serve multiple countries in Africa, Central America, and Northern Europe. Combined, 98 countries today have air traffic control services via user-funded public utilities.

Nearly all countries served by ATC companies have also separated the provision of air traffic control services from aviation safety regulation. The National Transportation Safety Board, as well as many former FAA and Transportation Department officials, have called for such separation in the United States. This has been the policy of the International Civil Aviation Organization since 2001, and the U.S. is one of the few outliers. An initial reform step would be to separate our Air Traffic Organization from the FAA, at last putting the two at arm’s length.

On June 5, 2017, President Donald Trump held an event supporting then-House Transportation Committee Chairman Bill Shuster’s ATC corporation bill, which proposed a nonprofit public utility similar to Nav Canada. He later focused on other infrastructure reforms, and that bill failed. Today, the best congressional champion of air traffic control reform may be Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, chairman of the Commerce Committee.

During the first Trump term, many airline executives supported this kind of reform; today, they seem to favor a one-time infusion of tax money. However, the nation’s air traffic control system’s dire shape is far more visible today than in 2017. It took a tragic midair collision between two airliners over the Grand Canyon in 1956 to bring about nationwide radar surveillance of air traffic. Let’s hope that only one 2025 midair collision suffices to bring about meaningful air traffic control reform.

A version of this commentary first appeared in The Wall Street Journal.

The post Time is running out for America’s air traffic control system appeared first on Reason Foundation.

On multiple occasions since April 28, air traffic controllers have temporarily lost radar or communications with planes around Newark Airport—once for up to 90 seconds—spurring Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigations, making national news, and prompting a recent Saturday Night Live sketch that illustrated how mainstream concerns about air traffic control safety have suddenly become.

Three problems are occurring simultaneously here, each making the other problems worse. First, one of the airport’s three runways is out of service for refurbishment until later this summer. Being down a runway reduces the number of flights that can depart and arrive, and by itself would lead to fewer than normal choices for passengers.

Second is a severe shortage of air traffic controllers in the facilities that manage the airspace for Newark and other New Jersey airports. Across the country, the FAA is woefully short of air traffic controllers, partly because it still has not developed a staffing model that accurately projects both additions and deletions to the controller workforce. The agency touts the number of new hires each year, neglecting both the washout rate from training and the expected number of controller resignations and retirements. Most years don’t see a net increase in the number of air traffic controllers.

As detailed in a 2023 Department of Transportation inspector general report, the Philadelphia control tower and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility, which services Newark’s airspace, were among the least understaffed of major FAA facilities. But The New York Times recently reported on the critical air traffic control understaffing issues now impacting Newark Airport. The Philadelphia TRACON that is responsible for managing Newark’s airspace has “only 22 controllers certified to guide planes in and out of the airport,” the Times reports—significantly lower than the FAA’s target of 38 controllers.

The Times noted:

The overall staffing level of the Philadelphia facility, which is also responsible for several other airports in the region, is about 70 percent.

At times, even fewer controllers are available to work. As little as three air traffic controllers were scheduled during a period on Monday evening at the facility that guides planes in and out of Newark — far short of the target of 14 for that shift.

And even fewer controllers are often available to work. The Times notes that as few as “three air traffic controllers were scheduled during a period on Monday evening at the [Philadelphia] facility that guides planes in and out of Newark—far short of the target of 14 for that shift.”

That brings us to the third problem: the air traffic control system’s obsolete communications technology. All the flight data from New Jersey airports (Newark, Teterboro, and Morristown) get transmitted to Philadelphia via a 25-year-old telecommunications system and routed to a controller display system called STARS, the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System. STARS processes radar data for Newark and, according to the FAA, “telecommunications lines feed this data from New York to the Philadelphia TRACON, where controllers handle Newark arrivals and departures.”

STARS was designed to read obsolete “time-division multiplexing” data from the transmission system, whose copper wires are wearing out and don’t have enough capacity. For years, the vendor working with the FAA to upgrade the system has been patching up that system with “pseudowire” that gets overloaded and loses packets of information, causing blank control screens and no voice communications with aircraft cockpit crews. This was flagged as a serious problem at the Los Angeles TRACON in 2022 and 2023, when there were five incidents of display screens going blank at various air traffic control towers in the region. Investigation of those failures identified “a vulnerability caused by two specific characteristics in the STARS software architecture” that displays flight data to controllers, according to a leaked November 2023 internal FAA report called “STARS Remote Tower Failures Background.”

To the best of my knowledge, the FAA never disclosed this 2023-identified failure built into STARS to the outside world. But it did hold internal meetings to discuss the problem.

The situation in Newark is far worse because the radar and communications data there have no backup systems. Losing both at Newark is far more serious than the failures at Los Angeles TRACON.

With Newark Airport’s outages increasing the scrutiny on the FAA’s failed technology and long-delayed modernization efforts, Forbes recently described the agency’s latest plan to update its communications infrastructure. It involves “adding three new, high-bandwidth telecommunications connections” between the New York TRACON and the Philadelphia TRACON “to provide more speed, reliability and redundancy,” and to establish a STARS hub that doesn’t depend on a telecommunications feed from the New York hub.

An FAA spokesperson told Forbes that improvements will be implemented “in the coming weeks and others in the coming months, and all by the end of the year.”

The problems at Newark Airport are yet another example of our nation’s inadequate air traffic control system. The United States needs to separate aviation safety regulation from air traffic control operations. When the FAA both manages and regulates air traffic control, there is an inherent conflict of interest.

Today, more than 80 countries have air traffic control systems that are public utilities funded by user fees, allowing them to generate money quickly, issue revenue bonds, replace aging facilities, update their technology, and hire skilled staff while being directly accountable to customers. The U.S. is one of the few countries that hasn’t adopted this approach to air traffic control. The results are understaffing, outdated technology, and a lack of meaningful oversight—all now combining to put travelers at risk.

The post The main causes of air traffic control problems at Newark Airport appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Duffy’s plan will not produce a “a new ATC system”
• Advancing remote towers in the United States
• How small-airport subsidies harm other airports
• Could privatization fix Honolulu’s broken airport?
• Will the FAA administrator nominee be defeated by misinformation?
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Duffy Plan Will Not Produce a “New Air Traffic Control System”

I have a number of concerns about the ambitious air traffic proposal unveiled on May 8 by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy. It’s a worthwhile attempt to fix some of the system’s very real problems, but it will not produce “a brand new air traffic control system,” as the eight-page description is titled.

Nearly everything in the air traffic control plan is additions of existing technology, much of which is already in the procurement process but would now be expanded in quantity (e.g., electronic flight strips in 89 air traffic control towers rather than only 49 towers). And the idea of implementing everything in the eight-page plan within three (or maybe four) years is not realistic.

To begin with, all these systems would have to be procured via the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) dysfunctional procurement system, which has trouble defining the “requirements” for a new system in three or four years, as Gary Leff pointed out in his View from the Wing column on May 10, quoting FAA expert Gary Church.

FAA and its contractors have no experience with fully funding a new system all at once, as opposed to using its limited annual facilities and equipment budget to purchase a handful each year for 15 years (referred to as a “waterfall”). There’s a risk of the FAA being taken to the cleaners by opportunistic contractors dealing with a suddenly rich bureaucracy.

Unless, of course, the Department of Transportation and FAA elected to follow President Donald Trump’s proposal, during Duffy’s announcement. “We’d like to give out one big, beautiful contract,” having that one aerospace company do everything from “digging ditches” to “the most sophisticated stuff,” Trump said.

If the past is any guide, such a contract would likely be cost-plus, like those contracts given by NASA to Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman, and others for the $90 billion (so far) Space Launch System program, which is years late and hugely over budget. And who would be capable of overseeing such a program for air traffic control?

Aviation experts have begun to raise caution flags. Jeff Guzzetti, formerly with both the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), told Politico that the proposal is “thin on specifics” and that he doubted it could be done within the very short time frame in Duffy’s plan.

Former FAA Deputy Administrator Katie Thomson questioned the unspecified budget and the aggressive time frame for “realistically doing this.” As more specifics are unveiled, I expect more such questions and concerns.

Then there’s the question of who would pay for a $30 billion or larger crash program. U.S. commercial aviation has long been essentially self-supporting via federal aviation user taxes. That’s an important defense when, for example, advocates of high-speed rail argue for huge federal subsidies. But now, a coalition of 55 aviation organizations wants to undermine user-pay for an unprecedented amount of borrowed money, increasing the already out-of-control national debt.

As it turns out, the Aviation Trust Fund has an uncommitted balance (from user-tax revenue) of $4.8 billion, which is projected to increase to $12.4 billion by 2035. The most urgent needs in Duffy’s plan could be paid for out of that, thereby keeping intact aviation’s self-supporting status.

Most of the incremental improvements in the plan—adding more control towers to the 49 now scheduled for electronic flight strips, adding new surface surveillance tools to 200 airports, finishing the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)—are of this nature.

Perhaps the most dubious proposal in the plan is to replace some of the ancient high-altitude control centers (ARTCCs) with six consolidated new ones (as proposed many times but always dead-on-arrival in Congress, because members don’t want to lose “their” ARTCC). Consolidation makes sense, in principle. But even devising an initial consolidation plan and getting it approved is unlikely to happen in three or four years, and congressional approval is a pipe dream as long as Congress controls the air traffic control (ATC) budget.

Also in the plan is language (but no details) about replacing “many” aging control towers, apparently one-for-one. There is no mention in the plan of remote/digital tower technology and the proven ability of one remote tower center to manage a dozen or more smaller towers. Nor is there any mention of space-based ADS-B surveillance in airspace where radar coverage cannot exist (e.g. oceanic.) This has revolutionized speed, safety, and fuel burn on the North Atlantic routes managed by NATS (UK) and Nav Canada. But the FAA has rejected its use in the Caribbean and has never even considered it for the vast amount of Pacific oceanic airspace for which it is responsible. (The plan makes mention of new ADS-B ground systems in the Caribbean, which is better than nothing.)

In short, the Trump administration is not proposing “a brand new air traffic control system.” It’s an effort to patch up the existing system using mostly components already in the air traffic control system. The most urgent items could be funded out of the current and projected balance in the Trust Fund, thereby keeping commercial aviation in the traditional users-pay/users-benefit system.

For additional context on Duffy’s plan and fixing the nation’s air traffic system, please see my recent Wall Street Journal column, which details the need to modernize our entire model: “The reason many other countries’ ATC systems work far better than ours is that their business models have changed, from a tax-funded bureaucracy embedded in a transportation ministry into a public utility funded by customer user fees.”

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Advancing Remote Towers in the United States
By Ginger Evans and Marc Scribner

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s calls for an air traffic control overhaul earlier this month highlighted many areas where the FAA is increasingly falling behind the rest of the world on technology. Duffy’s attention is very welcome, but one surprising omission from his initial plan was any mention of remote/digital control towers.

This technology is increasingly mainstream outside the United States and offers substantial visibility, productivity, and cost benefits over conventional brick-and-mortar towers. Reason Foundation has just released our new report, Advancing Remote Tower Deployment in the United States, which makes the case for bringing this technology to this country.

Remote/digital towers are being deployed in increasing numbers around the world. Instead of a tall concrete building with a control cab on top to provide controllers with out-the-window views of aircraft movements, a steel mast is erected and mounted with an array of cameras and other communications equipment. Those digital sensors feed information to a ground-level building housing the control room, often remote from the airfield. Instead of looking out a window, controllers have panoramic video displays of the airfield and its environs, including identifying individual aircraft with on-screen tags.

The concept for remote/digital towers was originally developed two decades ago by the FAA. In 2007, FAA conducted simulations of its “staffed virtual tower” at its Atlantic City Tech Center. The results published in 2008 found that the technology could provide better surveillance at all hours, but especially at night and in low-visibility weather conditions when instrument flight rules are required.

Compared to traditional out-the-window practices, controllers who worked the simulated staffed virtual tower required fewer radio communications with aircraft to maintain situational awareness. The participating controllers preferred the virtual tower video displays, with the FAA concluding the concept offered “clear advantages” in night conditions. A 2013 study from the FAA’s Human Factors Branch on “Staffed NextGen Towers” reached similar conclusions.

Despite the success of these tests, the FAA has done little to advance remote/digital towers, and no project has been commissioned in the United States. In contrast, numerous countries around the world are adopting this superior technology. The world’s first remote tower entered service in Sweden in 2015, which today has eight airports controlled remotely. Norway now has 14 such airports, with plans to add seven more by 2027. Germany, Estonia, Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom also have operational remote towers, and Thailand recently announced planned installations at multiple airports.

The capital costs of individual remote towers are a fraction of the costs of a conventional concrete tower—a few million dollars compared to tens of millions of dollars experienced by recent FAA tower projects. While the situational awareness benefits and construction cost savings of remote/digital towers accrue immediately at installation airports, the benefits of the technology are fully realized when multiple airports’ remote towers are centrally managed from a combined remote tower center. When operations are centralized within remote tower centers, staffing efficiency can be improved by 30%.

These operating efficiency improvements are realized through several pathways. First, remote tower centers only need one manager per shift, instead of one per airport. Second, controller coverage can be optimized to avoid disruptions caused by relief time, sick leave, and other factors that influence controller availability. Third, training is conducted on simulators collocated at remote tower centers, avoiding the need for training-related travel. And finally, minimum controller redundancy requirements—such as two controllers for night operations—are more easily achieved.

Sweden is currently managing its eight remote towers from two remote tower centers, which control four airports each. Norway manages all 14 of its remote towered airports from a single remote tower center, with that number expected to increase to 21 airports in two years. Italy is in the process of converting two of its existing control facilities to remote tower centers, which will collectively manage 26 airports by 2033.

Despite growing international interest in remote/digital towers, the FAA has been unenthusiastic. In 2023, a Virginia remote tower project was canceled after nine years, with the vendor withdrawing after it “determined there was no reasonable path for approval” under the FAA’s constantly shifting certification requirements. Another vendor at a project in Colorado pulled out that same year for similar reasons, although the Colorado Department of Transportation and airport sponsor continued work with a new vendor team, albeit without the support of the FAA.

Congress has noticed the FAA’s inability to advance remote/digital towers in the United States. The 2024 FAA reauthorization law included provisions aimed at spurring needed FAA action. Unfortunately, the FAA has not yet made meaningful progress toward meeting these statutory mandates.

To advance remote/digital towers in the United States, we recommend that policymakers should direct the FAA to focus on:

• Developing a new remote tower center to manage multiple small airports;
• Testing and certification of multiple technology vendors;
• Conducting field pilots, including system design approval, at sponsor airports as contemplated in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024; and
• Reviewing European Union standards for (partial) applicability in the United States.

Secretary Duffy should be commended for boldly addressing the problems with the core infrastructure that supports the National Airspace System. However, even with robust funding, this plan is unlikely to address the dozens of towers at which the FAA is unable to provide expected air traffic services. Besides the urgent need to enter the digital age, remote/digital tower technology should be used to fully leverage any new capital funding on air traffic control. A logical starting point is with small airports in reasonable proximity to each other, which could combine their understaffed workforces in remote tower centers to improve service provision and working conditions.

Going forward, Secretary Duffy and Congress should continue their encouragement and oversight of FAA. Their ongoing attention on FAA’s air traffic control modernization efforts should be sustained, with a particular focus on the near-term benefits that could be realized from proven remote tower technology.

—Ginger Evans is president of Tower Consulting LLC and supports airport needs in development, digitalization, and decarbonization. Ms. Evans is a former member of the FAA NextGen Advisory Committee and the Transportation Research Board’s Executive Committee and was awarded the ACC Aviation Award in Excellence in 2023. Marc Scribner is a senior transportation policy analyst at Reason Foundation.

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How Small-Airport Subsidies Harm Other Airports

I was surprised to learn last month that the White House budget outline (referred to as the “skinny budget”) called for cutbacks to federal funding for the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. Surprised but not dismayed, as you will see.

Congress enacted EAS 50 years ago in the wake of the Airline Deregulation Act. It was to be a 10-year program to help small airports transition to the end of government-enforced airline cartels with no price competition. As expected, airline deregulation shook up a pampered airline industry, leading to the demise of Braniff, Eastern, National, Pan American, and several others that could not cope with open entry and market pricing. What emerged was robust competition and significantly lower air fares, with airline deregulation aptly characterized as the democratization of air travel.

Congress had other ideas. Once EAS was established, it had a constituency of small cities and counties in Alaska and many other rural and low-population states, along with the Regional Airline Association (RAA). Now, at EAS’s 50th anniversary, a rethinking is overdue.

To the rescue is a January 2025 report by William Swelbar of Swelbar-Zhong Consultancy: “The Economics that Have Shaped the Evolution of Connecting Smaller Markets to the U.S. Air Transportation System.” Swelbar’s data show that subsidies for some (smaller) airports damage the economics of slightly larger, unsubsidized airports that in many cases are within driving distance of the EAS airports. Given this unintended consequence, Swelbar suggests rethinking which airports get EAS subsidies.

Part of the analysis points out that airline deregulation and EAS legislation were enacted prior to the completion of the Interstate Highway System, which has reduced travel times for many trips in EAS states. The report zeroes in on EAS subsidies to airports located less than 120 miles from a large, medium, or small hub airport. There are 64 EAS airports in this group; 53 of them have air service destined for a network carrier connecting hub. The average driving miles to the closest hub airport is 81 miles at an average drive time of one hour and 42 minutes. The average subsidy for the EAS service at these airports is $136.49 per passenger.

A graphic in the report contrasts 107 EAS airports in the lower 48 states with 160 nonhub airports in the lower 48. The caption explains that, “The government has created a zero-sum air service game where the stronger markets are not able to maximize their economic generation facilitated by air service.” In other words, those nonhub (nonsubsidized) airports could likely attract more service,” if not for subsidies to the EAS airports.

One telling example of a non-EAS airport that could attract more service is Duluth, MN (DLH). There are six other airports within a 180-mile radius of DLH, including large hub Minneapolis/St Paul. The five EAS airports are between 48 and 137 miles from DLH, but DLH loses some business due to the subsidies to the other five.

Will this analysis change minds? Perhaps it has already influenced the Trump administration’s skinny budget call for scaling back EAS subsidies. Swelbar’s analysis has introduced a new economic factor into the debate, supporting the idea of reducing the scope of EAS in the interest of letting the market (and our Interstate highways) improve rural travel. 

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Could Privatization Fix Honolulu’s Broken Airport?

It’s been about a decade since I was last in Honolulu, and I recall its airport as laid-back and old-fashioned. But I was shocked to read a lengthy article in Beat of Hawaii (April 24) headlined, “Hawaii Promised a World-Class Airport. Visitors Got This Instead.” The article complains about full parking garages, limited food and amenities, airlines spread over multiple terminals with slow access between them, and poor disabled access. A major complaint is that many future improvements have been announced, but they have been very slow to materialize.

The article also explains that the airport is not run as a business. Rather, it is part of the Hawaii Department of Transportation. The article contends that “direct state control…means more bureaucracy, less flexibility, and slower response to infrastructure problems or traveler needs.”

It also quotes an unnamed reader as saying, “Until the corruption stops, Hawaii will never have a quality airport. The airport needs to be privatized and have someone responsible for making it the best for flyers and employees.”

This situation reminded me of a U.S. airport stuck in a similar dysfunctional situation: the airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. As journalist John Tierney wrote in the Winter 2017 issue of City Journal, this airport “was run by an unwieldy bureaucracy, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, which neglected the airport while running up bills on its other unprofitable projects …The terminal was a confusing jumble of dim corridors, the stores were tacky and the restaurants greasy spoons, often rented at bargain prices to politicians’ friends or relatives.”

That and much more changed when the Port Authority was required by the legislature to lease the airport for 40 years to Aerostar, a partnership of investors and a company operating airports in Cancun and other Mexican cities. Tierney goes on to report that, “Three years later, the result is an airport that nobody can call Third World. The redesigned concourses are sleek and airy and easy to navigate…The duty-free shop now looks like an upscale department store, and revenue from the new shops and restaurants has more than doubled.”

There’s a lot more in Tierney’s article, which should be required reading for Hawaii legislators.

A large fraction of Hawaii visitors come from Asia/Pacific countries. They are used to world-class airports, many of which have been privatized, either in part or whole via long-term public-private partnership (P3) leases. Those with full P3s include the major airports in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan’s New Kansai Airport. Partial P3 airports include Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Delhi, Guangzhou, and Beijing Capital. Visitors from Asia/Pacific must be shocked by Honolulu Airport’s numerous shortcomings.

But San Juan is not a mainland U.S. airport. Could Hawaii do something like the San Juan P3 lease?

Thanks to a recent revision of U.S. aviation policy in 2018, all U.S. commercial airports can be long-term leased under a new Airport Investment Partnership Program. A P3-leased airport remains eligible for federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants. In most such leases, the entire 50-year (or whatever term) lease amount is paid up-front, and under AIP, the proceeds can be used for any public purpose, including other needed infrastructure or debt reduction.

A 2021 Reason Foundation policy study analyzed 31 large and medium U.S. hub airports, including Hawaii-owned Honolulu (HNL). The study’s high-value estimate if the airport was leased was $2.7 billion. Of course, the amount paid for the lease would be significantly less than that if the lease required large-scale investment by the new airport company in terminals, parking, etc.

Global infrastructure investors and large global airport companies see the United States as the last great untapped airport market. Hawaiian legislators should look into this option for the Honolulu Airport.

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Will the FAA Administrator Nominee Be Defeated by Misinformation?

Bryan Bedford, CEO of Republic Airways, is President Donald Trump’s nominee for FAA administrator. He’s a pilot himself and a respected airline executive, with strong backing in the industry. However, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) aims to defeat him over a spurious air safety claim.

Schumer is an advocate for the “Flight 3407 Families,” relatives of those who died in the 2009 crash of a Colgan Airlines regional airliner. Eighteen months later, Congress enacted a new aviation safety law that did a number of things, including a mandate that all airline cockpit crew members must have at least 1,500 hours of training flight time before being licensed to fly commercial airliners. The Flight 3407 families and their friends in Congress (along with the Air Line Pilots Association, International) strongly defend that 1,500-hour rule.

Bedford, like many aviation safety experts, takes issue with that rule. Here are some key points in that case.

• Both crew members on Flight 3407 had far more hours than that—3.500 hours for the captain and 2,500 for the first officer. The apparent cause of the crash was pilot fatigue, not lack of flight hours.
• Most people who accumulate enough flight hours to get licensed spend their 1,500 hours in repeated flights in a single-engine plane from one or a few small airports. They learn very little from those meaningless flights that would equip them to fly in controlled airspace and into major commercial airports.
• European airlines face no such arbitrary flight-hours requirement, and some first officers on their airlines fly to and from U.S. airports without any problems or FAA concerns.

Bedford, of course, as a long-time airline executive and pilot, knows all this. At Republic he implemented a Leadership in Flight Training (LIFT) academy, teaching real-world commercial flying skills. He has proposed that LIFT graduates with 750 hours of flight time be licensed as first officers, as are military-trained pilots with at least that number of flight hours. That request was denied by FAA during the Biden administration.

I speculate that the Biden administration’s fondness for unions led them to align with the Air Line Pilots Association on preserving the meaningless 1500-hour rule. For those who may wonder why ALPA would take such a position, remember that there is still a national pilot shortage. In times of shortage, airlines have to increase pilot compensation in order to have enough licensed pilots to meet passenger demand. The 1,500-hour rule reduces the supply of new pilots: end of story.

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News Notes

New DOT Incentives for Air Traffic Controllers
On May 1, the Department of Transportation announced a set of incentives for air traffic controllers, aiming to reach “full staffing” within three to four years. The changes include incentives for military controllers, financial bonuses for graduates of Controller Training Initiative schools and the FAA Academy, and adding capacity at the academy itself. FAA provided no projections of how many controllers would retire or quit within the same time period, raising doubts about how much of a net increase would result.

Tokyo Narita Plans 67% Capacity Increase
To meet air travel demand projections, Tokyo Narita Airport plans to add a new runway and expand its terminals, reported Aviation Daily. Tokyo’s other airport, Haneda, has little room for expansion. The additions at Narita will increase runway slot capacity from 300,000 to 500,000. The new runway will be 11,480 ft. long, and the existing runway will be increased to that same length as part of the plan.

SpaceX Wins Top Spot in Defense Launch Services
The U.S. Space Force announced last month that, thanks to its lower launch costs, SpaceX will handle the largest share of its National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3, encompassing an estimated 54 launches beginning in 2027. SpaceX won 60% of the launches, while former first-place company United Launch Alliance finished in second place and Blue Origin finished third.

FAA Focuses on Helicopter Traffic at Other Airports
On April 24, FAA announced that it was taking steps to deconflict helicopter and fixed-wing traffic at several airports in addition to Reagan National (DCA). Named in the announcement were  Las Vegas (LAS), Hollywood-Burbank (BUR), and Van Nuys (VNY). But JDA Journal pointed out that FAA’s Safety Management Systems (SMSs) at those airports “did not serve as catalysts for those potential preventive actions.” It took the tragedy at Reagan National to yield belated action not only there but at these other three airports. As a result, FAA says tower controllers are now exercising positive control over helicopter operations at these airports  

AviAlliance Investing More in AGS Airports
In January, AviAlliance purchased the three-airport company AGS Airports from Ferrovial and Macquarie for £1.53 billion. This month, AviAlliance announced that it plans to invest £350 million to upgrade terminals and runways at all three airports: Aberdeen, Glasgow, and Southampton. In March, infrastructure fund Blackstone agreed to acquire 22% of AGS Airports for £235 million. Pension fund PSP Investments retains a 78% majority stake in AGS.

Joby eVTOL Makes First Piloted Transition from Hover to Cruise
Despite planning to launch flight testing and non-commercial market testing flights in Dubai this summer, Joby’s not-yet-certified S4 made its first piloted transition from vertical to forward flight in late April, reported Aviation Daily (May 5). Joby is also doing flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California, as part of the USAF Agility Prime program.

Would Hydrogen Propulsion Yield Less Contrail Formation?
That question is being addressed in a project launched by Airbus, the Perlan atmospheric glider team, and German researcher DLR. Their test was carried out last December in Nevada, and the data are now being analyzed. The test aircraft was powered by a hydrogen-fueled turbojet engine, while the comparison aircraft used a kerosene-fueled turbojet. Hydrogen exhaust is expected to be free of particulates, which help to form contrails.

Egis Wins Airport Concession in French Guinea
A consortium led by French company Egis has been selected as the preferred bidder for a project to operate and upgrade the Felix-Eboue Airport. The 30-year public-private partnership will commence on Oct. 1. It will include an estimated €100 million worth of improvements to the airport terminal, according to a report in Infralogic (April 22). Last year the same Egis-led team won another 30-year P3 concession, that one for Paris-Beauvais Airport, about 80 km north of Paris.

Archer Outlines Its Planned New York City Air Taxi Network
Startup eVTOL company Archer last month released a map of its planned Manhattan vertiports to serve JFK, LGA, EWR, as well as Teterboro in New Jersey and Republic Airport on Long Island. The system would rely on three existing heliports in Manhattan. Aviation Daily (April 28) reported that Archer has contracted with Skyports Infrastructure and Groupe ADP to electrify one of the Manhattan sites; the other two are operated, respectively, by Atlantic Aviation and Air Pegasus. At the destination airports, Archer is working with Signature Aviation at Newark, Modern Aviation at Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Republic, and with Atlantic and Signature at Teterboro and Westchester.

London Gatwick Agrees to Surface Transportation Changes
To mitigate the noise impacts of the conversion of its parallel taxiway to a second runway, Gatwick Airport has agreed to stricter limits on aircraft noise, sound insulation for nearby residences, and a goal of 54% of passengers arriving by public transit. The overall runway project is estimated to cost £2.2 billion.

MacArthur Airport Plans Terminal P3
Infralogic (April 8) reported that the Town of Islip (Long Island) has issued a request for qualifications (RFQ) for a new terminal at its MacArthur Airport. Statements of qualifications are due Aug. 14. Two terminal options are being offered: a new North Terminal with an air-conditioned connection to the nearby Long Island Railroad station; or a modernization and expansion of the existing terminal. The airport (ISP) served 1.3 million passengers last year and hosts Breeze, Frontier, JetBlue and Southwest airlines, with Avelo also planning to start service this month.

New Vertiport Design Deals with eVTOL Downwash
Field tests and modeling have demonstrated high-velocity downwash of up to 35 mph, posing a hazard to people and objects on the ground. Australian vertiport designer Skyportz has received a provisional patent for a design that would mitigate these effects, as reported by Aviation Week. FAA Engineering Brief 105A requires downwash caution areas (DCAs) to be established anywhere that wind velocities could exceed 34.5 mph.

MUAC Streamlines North European Airspace
The Maastricht Upper Area Control Center, operated by Eurocontrol, has completed a streamlining of the upper-altitude airspace of the Netherlands and northwest Germany. It allows more direct routes, continuous climb and descent, and a reshaped military training area. Together the changes will save time and fuel for aircraft using this busy airspace.

San Jose, CA Airport Connector P3 Moving Forward
Public Works Financing reported (March 2025 issue) that the city council in March approved the next stage of its proposed public-private partnership (P3) with Glydways for a 3.5-mile automated people mover between the San Jose airport (SJC) and the city’s light rail station downtown. Phase 2 of the P3’s predevelopment process includes preliminary design, environmental permitting, and project finance alternatives.

Ultra-Short Takeoff Developer Raises $115 Million
Electra.aero announced on April 21 that it had secured $115 million in Series B funding, enabling it to proceed with the pre-production and certification phase for its EL9 aircraft. As noted in previous issues, the EL9’s “blown wing” design will enable takeoffs and landings using only 150 feet of runway. The EL9 is a hybrid-electric aircraft with nine seats. The company has received more than 2,200 pre-orders for the EL9. It also has an Air Force contract looking into military applications.

Philippines Considers 20 Airport P3s
Infralogic reported (April 7) that the country’s transportation undersecretary announced that the government plans to increase the number of airports to be considered for long-term public-private partnerships, to as many as 20. Offers have already been received for the airports in Davao, Iloilo, Kalibo, and Puerto Princesa.

Correction Regarding FAA and ADS-B/In
A retired FAA official pointed to inaccuracies in last month’s article on the case for reviving ADS-B/In. First, he noted that the former FAA ADS-B mandate came about via a federal regulation, not a statute. Second, he pointed out that FAA work on ADS-B/In had continued until very recently, when it was abandoned by the most recent Administrators. That is unfortunate.

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Quotable Quotes

“[FAA] is responsible for the operation and oversight of the nation’s air traffic system, and it is critical that those responsibilities be separated clearly. Near-term policy change should be implemented to ensure that the ATO is subject to the same types of certification and surveillance processes as commercial air operators and other industry service providers. A long-term solution is to separate the FAA’s air traffic and safety oversight organizations, as has been done in other countries.”
—John Illson, “The Case for Enhanced Aviation Oversight,” Aviation Week, April 21-May 4, 2025

“We believe that FAA regulatory authorities should be free to focus on air safety while an independent air traffic service works on innovation and efficiency while meeting the standards set by regulators. An additional wrinkle in this structure is being demonstrated in Europe where ATC is run by independent air navigation services providers while the supporting technology and data services are run by a separate entity called an ATM Data Service Provider.”
—Gene Hayman and Charlie Keegan, “The Now or Never ATC System,” Aviation Daily, April 18, 2025

“Unacceptable. Our helicopter restrictions around DCA are crystal clear. In addition to investigations from NTSB and FAA News, I’ll be talking to the Dept. of Defense to ask why the hell our rules were disregarded. No more helicopter rides for VIPs or unnecessary training in a congested DCA airspace full of civilians. Take a taxi or Uber—besides, most VIPs have black car service.”
—Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, “Duffy Blasts Defense Department After Incident in D.C. Airspace,” PoliticoPro, May 3, 2025

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The post Aviation Policy News: Transportation Secretary Duffy’s plan will not produce a ‘new air traffic control system’ appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Remote air traffic control towers, sometimes referred to as virtual towers or digital towers, are being deployed in increasing numbers around the world. Rather than building a tall concrete structure with a control cab on top to house the controllers for visual views of aircraft movements, a steel tower (or several towers) is mounted with an array of video cameras and communications equipment. Those cameras and sensors feed information securely to controllers in a ground-level building housing the control room, often in a location remote from the airfield. Instead of the traditional out-the-window view, controllers have panoramic video displays of the airfield and its environs, including identifying individual aircraft with tags displayed on-screen. This allows them to continuously monitor traffic without turning their head or standing, which is critical for safe and efficient air traffic management.

Remote towers provide the ability to serve low-activity airports from locations where controllers live or desire to live, rather than requiring staff relocations. Management of multiple remote towers can be conducted from a single facility known as a remote tower center.

Regardless of how these technologies are deployed, traffic procedures are unchanged from those used in traditional tower operations. While controllers working in a remote tower center can be certified to handle traffic at multiple airports, they only control traffic at one airport at a time. This allows for control of a particular airport to be easily transferred to a second controller as the need arises. As a result, remote tower technology has the potential to maximize utilization of the limited national pool of certified controllers.

The United States is not alone in facing difficulties in attracting and retaining staff to operate control towers, especially those located far from population centers. But many air navigation service providers have begun adopting remote towers, and they have found that the digital working environments supporting multiple airports are attractive to younger prospective recruits. And by increasing controller situational awareness, this technology also reduces workload and stress, helping to retain these highly trained and specialized employees.

Significant cost savings can also be realized. Construction costs for remote towers are a fraction of those for conventional brick-and-mortar towers. When several low-activity airports are controlled from a single remote tower center, air navigation service providers can realize significant staff and operating cost savings. Importantly, this does not reduce the demand for controllers nationwide, but it does mean that existing and new controllers can be employed more productively.

New airspace entrants, such as electric vertical takeoff-and-landing (eVTOL) aircraft operating advanced air mobility (AAM) services, already plan to make use of remote/digital tower technology for vertiport infrastructure. The AAM service model is expected to leverage smaller airports, so implementing remote towers at those airports can support development of technology and procedures for more robust utilization of this proven technology.

The challenge in the United States is that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in recent years has been unenthusiastic and inconsistent about remote/digital tower technology. Congress has attempted to spur the agency to act, although progress to date has been minimal.

This brief makes the case for embracing remote/digital towers in the United States.

Part 2 discusses FAA’s original research into remote tower technology.

Part 3 surveys the global success of remote/digital towers.

Part 4 discusses remote tower development in the United States.

And Part 5, shown below, concludes with recommendations for policymakers.

Conclusion and recommendations

Remote tower technology has been proven and can provide air traffic control services to several small airports from a single facility. A controller would monitor and direct traffic at only one airport at a time, but would be certified for several aerodromes. This would make more productive use of available controllers, allow redundant staffing during low-traffic periods, and allow for consolidated facilities to be located in areas desirable to current controllers and new hires. Compared to new or replacement conventional air traffic control towers, there are significant capital and operating cost advantages.

A secondary but important benefit is that the successful implementation of remote tower centers would be an important step in providing additional digital technology and services for air traffic facilities throughout the National Airspace System, NAS. Digitalization is key to continuing improvements in system efficiency and communication with NAS users.

Internationally, air navigation service providers are developing additional uses for this technology, including at very large airports.

FAA is sensitive to ongoing criticism about the technological advances and deployments made by other air navigation service providers and often emphasizes the higher complexity of the U.S. NAS. While it is true that the United States has some of the most congested and complex activity near major metropolitan areas, dozens of small U.S. airports have relatively simple, low-volume operations that can benefit from this technology.

Many advancements that the FAA needs to make are complex and must be done carefully and step by step. Deploying remote/digital tower technology, initially at small U.S. airports, is a logical starting place. The technology is proven, and successful procedures have been published and deployed for nearly a decade.

As with the prior FAA tests using virtual tower equipment, once anyone (especially controllers, but even laypeople) sees an installation, they realize that this technology can provide significant support to air traffic controllers and to the National Airspace System writ large.

FAA senior management should have a technology plan for remote/digital towers and remote tower centers that envisions the logical next steps in a rollout in the NAS. To facilitate a holistic view of the possibilities, FAA staff should conduct site visits to remote tower centers in Norway and Sweden. FAA staff should also review the simulations of the planned digital tower deployments at Singapore and Al Maktoum airports.

To advance near-term deployment in the United States, the FAA should consider:

• Developing a new remote tower center to manage multiple small airports;
• Testing and certification of multiple technology vendors;
• Conducting field pilots, including system design approval, at sponsor airports as contemplated in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024; and
• Reviewing European Union standards for (partial) applicability in the United States.

FAA is on a path to support the development of remote towers, and these efforts should be finalized and standards issued as soon as practicable. Congress should continue its encouragement and oversight to ensure FAA remains on this path to success. Ongoing attention on air traffic control modernization from the Office of the Secretary at the U.S. Department of Transportation should be sustained, with a particular focus on the near-term benefits that could be realized from proven remote tower technology.

Read the full report here:

The post Advancing remote air traffic control tower deployment in the United States appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• Separating ATC operations from FAA safety regulator
• Reviving the case for ADS-B/In
• A flawed approach to reforming airport security
• How could London Heathrow lose all electric power?
• Airports see new hope for PFC increase
• Hybrid-electrics to meet military needs
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Time to Separate Air Traffic Control Operations from the FAA Safety Regulator

One lesson stands out from the horrific late-January collision at Reagan National Airport (DCA): the safety regulator (Federal Aviation Administration) fell down on the job of properly looking after aviation safety at this congested airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chair Jennifer Homendy was astounded that no action had been taken despite a mountain of pilot reports documenting near-misses and an obvious safety hazard where the airliner approach path to Runway 15/33 crossed over Helicopter Route 4.

New Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, in a March 11 congressional briefing session, acknowledged the lapse: “Why this information wasn’t studied and known before January 29 is an important question.”

As Aviation Week reported (March 24-April 6), Duffy asked, “When this data comes in, how did the FAA not know? How do they not study the data to say, ‘Hey, this is a hot spot. We’re having near-misses, and if we don’t change our way, we’re going to lose lives.’ But that wasn’t done.”

Duffy was not the only one upset by this regulatory failure. In testimony before the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, former air traffic controllers’ union president Paul Rinaldi told lawmakers, “It’s been a known conflict area for years. FAA should look at these known conflict areas and deconflict them so we don’t have to worry about them.”

And at a hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee’s Aviation Subcommittee, Acting FAA Administrator Chris Rocheleau said, “The reports that came in previously were certainly analyzed, but something was missed.”

That did not satisfy subcommittee members. “You had an alarm going off once a month [referring to TCAS alerts]. You had the data. While I get that AI is a very new and interesting technology, it’s no substitute for FAA having an oversight over this level of traffic,” said Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA).

How the Federal Aviation Administration handled the pilot reports data will be “one of NTSB’s primary focus areas as it continues its investigation of the collision,” Homendy said. FAA’s Safety Management System, SMS, lays out protocols for investigating incidents and evaluating risks. I’m sure NTSB will be looking into those protocols.

Former FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker hit the nail on the head in his Aviation Daily interview on Feb. 28: “[There is] an inherent conflict in FAA being both the regulator and the operator. You can’t be the conductor and [also] play the tuba section. Sometimes, as a regulator, you really have to bring the hammer down, and it’s a lot to ask to bring the hammer down on yourself.”

That is why numerous aviation experts have long called for the separation of aviation safety regulation from air traffic control operations. Self-regulation poses an inherent conflict of interest, as repeatedly emphasized by the highly respected aviation safety expert Clinton V. Oster in books and reports.

Former FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond co-authored an article with me calling for the separation of air traffic control and safety regulation in the Journal of Air Traffic Control in 2010. Other former FAA administrators also endorsed the idea, including Randy Babbitt, Allan McArtor, and David Hinson, along with a number of associate administrators. Three previous chief operating officers of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization—Russ Chew, Hank Krakowski, and David Grizzle—have also endorsed the idea.

This is hardly a new or radical concept. In 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) called for the organizational separation of air traffic control and aviation safety regulation. Today, the only developed countries that have not done this are Japan and the United States.

In 2014, MITRE released a report called “CAA International Structures,” researching what happened in leading nations that separated ATC provision from government air safety regulation. It focused mostly on Australia, Canada, Germany, France, New Zealand, and the U.K. Among the study’s conclusions were the following:

“Despite the many approaches to organizing the CAA and the ANSP, in each case the safety record of the ANSP was equal to or better than the record prior to the separation. . . . The CAAs we interviewed were unanimous in stating that the separation of the CAA from air traffic service provision was worth it. Among the benefits they expressed were an increased focus on safety by the Regulator and the ANSP, improved efficiency of the ANSP, reduction in total cost to users, and improved participation by aviation stakeholders.”

This idea is sometimes confused with “ATC privatization,” though there is no necessary link between the two. Congress could simply require the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) to be separated from the safety regulator, FAA. The ATO would become another modal agency within the Department of Transportation. Since the ATO accounts for the large majority of the current FAA workforce, the non-ATO staff could be relocated to the Department of Transportation headquarters building in Southeast D.C., and the ATO’s D.C. staff could remain in one of the two FAA office buildings in the District, likely allowing the other one to be sold. And if Congress eventually decides to convert the ATO into an air traffic control utility, it might make sense to relocate it out of the District of Columbia, perhaps adjacent to the ATC Command Center in Warrenton, VA.

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Reviving the Case for ADS-B/In

As part of post-DCA collision discussions about aviation safety, I was interested to learn that the NTSB had argued in favor of FAA implementing both ADS-B/Out and ADS-B/In at the same time. For those not up-to-speed on this subject, pursuant to a law passed by Congress, all users of controlled U.S. airspace were required to install in their aircraft by Jan. 1, 2020, a new transponder sending out its position, speed, and altitude once per second—much more frequent than radar.

The original NextGen plan for ADS-B had also called for aircraft to install cockpit receivers that would display ADS-B signals received from nearby aircraft. The former was designated ADS-B/Out and the latter became known as ADS-B/In. An advisory body called an ADS-B aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) in 2011 urged FAA not to mandate ADS-B/In claiming that there was no business case for it. FAA subsequently dropped ADS-B/In from its NextGen implementation plan.

An aviation colleague recently alerted me to a letter sent by NTSB to U.S. DOT in Feb. 2008, arguing against the ARC position, explaining important safety benefits of ADS-B/In. NTSB’s primary focus was safety problems at airports, such as runway incursions and other accidents. NTSB’s Runway Incursion Forum in 2007 had focused on that subject, and one of its main conclusions was the need for better real-time information transfer to the cockpit, especially pilot awareness of surrounding traffic. Needless to say, in 2025, this problem is still very much with us.

In a recent email exchange with several former DOT and FAA officials, I learned that at the time FAA decided not to proceed with ADS-B/In, the reason did not rest on any expected increase in FAA costs. It was apparently a concern about the cost to aircraft operators of cockpit equipage for ADS-B/In. Here again, we see an apparent conflict between an ATC improvement and the safety regulator unwilling to value the airport/incursion safety benefits. Incidentally, NTSB has made it clear post-DCA that it still favors implementation of ADS-B/In, for the same reasons as in 2008.

Despite the lack of an FAA mandate, several airlines have implemented ADS-B/In for portions of their fleet, including the former U.S. Airways and, more recently, American. The latter has been evaluating such planned NextGen procedures as in-trail separation and cockpit-display-assisted separation on approaches to busy airports such as DFW. (“What Ever Happened to ADS-B/In?” Aviation Policy News, July 2024) Let’s hope improved flight operations, added to significant reductions in runway incursions, will bring ADS-B/In back onto FAA’s agenda.

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A Flawed Approach to Reforming Airport Screening
By Marc Scribner

Last month, Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) introduced the Abolish TSA Act of 2025 (S. 1180). The bill would eliminate the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), privatize screening operations, and transfer screening regulatory oversight to a new office that would be housed within FAA. Sens. Lee and Tuberville deserve praise for highlighting the problems with TSA’s bloated, bureaucratic monopoly on airport security screening and addressing the fundamental conflict of interest of having screening provided by the same agency tasked with regulating it. In last month’s issue of this newsletter, I discussed two promising reform options. Unfortunately, the Abolish TSA Act misses the mark and would perpetuate a major flaw of the TSA status quo.

The Abolish TSA Act would terminate the agency three years after the date of enactment. During that period, the secretaries of homeland security and transportation would develop a reorganization plan that would transfer TSA’s regulatory functions to a new Office of Aviation Security Oversight within FAA. This office would oversee the private companies that perform security screening at airports, and the office would contract with those companies under the existing Screening Partnership Program. In short, TSA would cease to exist, and screening services would be privatized.

Many critics of the TSA status quo cheered the introduction of the Lee-Tuberville bill. However, the bill fails to amend the Screening Partnership Program—the statutory conduit through which it would privatize airport screening—and would thus perpetuate the major flaws with that program.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 was enacted just two months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Section 110(b) replaced the previous requirement that airport screening be conducted “by an employee or agent of an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier” with a new requirement that screening “shall be carried out by a Federal Government employee” (49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)).

The major exception to TSA’s general security screening monopoly is the Screening Partnership Program, which allows airports to apply to seek the services of private screening companies (49 U.S.C. § 44920). Just 21 airports are currently enrolled in the Screening Partnership Program, mostly small airports but also including Kansas City International, Orlando Sanford, and San Francisco International.

Growth in the number of airports opting for private screening has stalled. Many observers point to a complicated and time-consuming process in which the TSA holds all the cards. A normal government contracting process typically involves a government agency issuing a request for proposals from qualified firms and then initiating a competitive bidding process. In the case of airport security, this might involve a sponsor airport beginning procurement from a list of security companies certified by the regulator and then selecting the firm that best fits their particular needs.

This is not how the Screening Partnership Program is designed. Instead, under current law, an airport seeking to opt in to private screening must submit a detailed request to the TSA. The TSA, if it decides to grant the airport entry into the Screening Partnership Program, will then decide which security company it thinks best fits the needs of the airport applicant. The security company is then assigned to the airport—take it or leave it—with the contract being entered between the TSA and private screening company, rather than the company and the airport.

Yet the Abolish TSA Act does not alter the Screening Partnership Program. As a result, top-down federalized screening management—and all of its flaws—will continue to exist under FAA’s new Office of Aviation Security Oversight. This is surely not the intent of Sens. Lee and Tuberville, so I will suggest some “friendly amendments” to their bill to increase the likelihood that their good intentions deliver their desired outcomes.

First, the Screening Partnership Program’s authorizing statute should be amended to allow airports to contract directly with private screening companies, which is a common practice at many European airports. The screening companies should be certified by the proposed FAA Office of Aviation Security Oversight to be eligible for selection by airports, but airports should be able to choose the screening companies that best fit their needs and terminate contracts with those that fail to provide adequate service.

The principal barrier to direct airport contracting with screening companies is payment responsibility. Under the Screening Partnership Program, rates are determined by TSA, which then pays the providers with which it contracts and assigns to willing airports. Requiring airports to provide certain security services without compensation would surely be opposed by the airport industry. Indeed, the airlines that had previously been responsible for airport passenger screening prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks lobbied for the creation of TSA to avoid such an unfunded mandate.

Second, to address these legitimate concerns, Congress should reform the existing 9/11 Security Fee assessed on airline tickets to actually serve its stated purpose. Currently, airlines are required to impose fees of $5.60 per one-way trip and a maximum of $11.20 for round trips on all tickets. Airlines then remit the fee revenue to TSA. However, since the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Congress has diverted one-third of 9/11 Security Fee revenue for deficit-reduction purposes.

To fund airports’ private screening under the reformed Screening Partnership Program, Congress should convert the 9/11 Security Fee to a local airport user fee akin to the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). Congress authorizes airports to impose PFCs of up to $4.50 per flight segment, with a maximum of two PFCs per one-way trip ($9) and four PFCs per round trip ($18). Airlines collect the fees on passenger tickets and remit the revenue directly to the enplaning airports. FAA regulates the use of airport PFC revenue by project eligibility criteria. Despite these restrictions, PFC revenue now accounts for a large share of commercial service airport capital investment, particularly on terminal projects.

Revenue from a PFC-style 9/11 Security Fee should be sufficient to cover screening operations at most airports, although the Abolish TSA Act’s reorganization provisions should include a requirement that FAA conduct a detailed financial analysis. Like the PFC, FAA should regulate the use of these funds to ensure they are spent on security-related projects and operations. For low-volume airports that might not be able to raise sufficient revenue, FAA Office of Aviation Security Oversight administrative costs, and other activities lawmakers deem appropriate, Congress could establish a separate account to be funded by annual appropriations, just as they do today under centralized TSA screening.

Adopting these two amendments to the Abolish TSA Act would do much to address well-deserved criticism of TSA’s screening regime. It would also better align the bill with the intentions of Sens. Lee and Tuberville. But it remains to be seen if Congress is willing to give up control over airport screening and the funds it raids each year from the 9/11 Security Fee account.

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How Could Heathrow Have Lost All Electric Power?

As we all know, on March 21 London Heathrow Airport (LHR) shut down for 18 hours after a fire at an off-airport electric substation led to it ceasing to provide electric power to the airport. Some 200,000 passengers had flights cancelled or delayed for several days. No comprehensive report is yet available explaining why there was either no or insufficient backup electric capability to (perhaps) keep LHR open at reduced rather than zero flights.

Very early in my career, I worked for a start-up company that was designing computer-assisted public safety dispatch centers. This was when the 9-1-1 emergency telephone number was introduced in the United States. With a single number for people to call if they were reporting a medical emergency, a fire, or a crime in progress, the new dispatch center would answer all such calls and dispatch the appropriate first responders. Given their life-safety responsibilities, these dispatch centers needed super-reliable electricity. Hence, I learned about uninterruptible power systems (UPSs).

It seems obvious that in 2025, all major airports should have the equivalent of UPSs. It’s likely far from cost-effective for a major airport like LHR to own and operate an entire electric power system, but it needs to be prepared in-depth for the failure of one or more of its electricity sources. These could include some self-generation capacity, contingent arrangements with off-airport providers, etc.

The U.K. government has enlisted its electric utility regulator (Ofgem) to assist the National Energy System Operator (NESO) to assess what happened and outline lessons learned. In parallel, LHR has asked an independent member of the airport’s board, Ruth Kelly (a former transport minister) to review Heathrow’s crisis management plans, its actions during the shutdown, and suggestions for “improvements that could be made to [improve] resilience.”

This catastrophe should not have happened. I expect major changes will be needed to improve LHR’s resilience.

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Airports See New Hope for PFC Increase  

Like many supporters of federalism, I have long favored a local aviation self-help measure that Congress legalized in 1990: the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). Falsely described by airlines as a “federal tax,” it is not federal nor is it a tax that gets sent to the federal Treasury, like the proceeds from passenger ticket taxes and aviation fuel taxes. It is a local user tax charged by and paid to an individual airport and used by that airport to finance improvements such as expanded terminals.

The news that caught my eye was reported in the April 11 Eno Transportation Weekly by Jeff Davis, one of the best transportation reporters in the business. He reported on an April 8 hearing of the House Aviation Subcommittee, one of whose topics was future airport funding. Currently, funding for airport capital improvements comes from five sources:

The last two began in 2022 and will be gone by 2027—unless Congress decides to make the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) funding levels (all of which is borrowed money, increasing the national debt) the baseline going forward starting in 2027. Keeping IIJA funding levels as the surface transportation baseline seems to have wide support among surface transportation organizations, but it’s not clear if airports and their organizations have the same expectations.

Davis reported that “Republican leaders seem dead-set against extending the various general fund ‘advance appropriations’ from the IIJA, which includes all of the IIJA’s airport development funds. But the timing presents a custom-made opportunity for the airport lobby to push for a PFC increase . . . to pay for the money being lost by the expiration of the IIJA advances—and doing so in a way that does not affect federal deficits or federal debt.”

Davis reports enthusiasm from Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), who, some years ago, co-sponsored then-Rep. Peter DeFazio’s (D-OR) bill to remove the federal cap on airport PFCs; that static $4.50 cap has cut the purchasing power of PFCs in half over the past two decades.

The end of IIJA grants in 2027 provides U.S. airports with their best shot ever at a significant PFC increase—or perhaps even the removal of this cap on a local self-help user tax. Massie’s previous uncapping bill would have made airports that increased their PFC above $4.50 ineligible for future FAA AIP grants. That’s a trade-off I think many large airports would be happy with.

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Military Needs Foster Hybrid eVTOLs

Under its AFWerx program, the U.S. Air Force has been funding several leading U.S. electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) companies to test their products for delivering cargo to troops in the field. Its Agility Prime program seems to have concluded that battery-electric eVTOLs have neither the range nor the payload to be viable for such cargo deliveries. Hence, its contractors—Archer, Beta, and Joby— are now working on hybrid eVTOLs.

Aviation Week’s Garrett Reim provided an update on these developments in the magazine’s Dec. 23, 2024-Jan. 12, 2025 issue. For example, Beta has two hybrid eVTOL aircraft under development for Agility Prime. One that has flown is an Alia A250 eVTOL with a range extension kit installed. The kit consists of a diesel-fueled generator that would allow the A250 to ferry itself, operating as a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) craft with up to a 3,000-mile range. Meanwhile, Archer has entered a partnership with Anduril Industries to develop next-generation aircraft, including a hybrid eVTOL. And Joby is also developing a hybrid eVTOL, with a hydrogen fuel cell as its range extender. Last July, Joby flew one of its S4 eVTOLs with such a fuel cell 561 miles.

Another approach that is catching on is short-takeoff electric hybrids (STOLs) and electric aircraft with conventional takeoff and landing (CTOLs). Electra Aero’s EL2 is a hybrid with a “blown” wing (greatly enhanced airflow) that takes off in just 150 feet of runway. The company has designed a successor: the 9-passenger EL9, aimed at defense missions.

There is a large array of companies aiming to produce and test mostly hybrid regional aircraft (for cargo and/or passengers). Aviation Week published a table last autumn listing 15 such projects, half of them battery only and the others hybrids. By not including vertical takeoff and landing, the battery CTOLs are projected to have ranges between 400 and 800 miles, thanks to the huge energy savings from avoiding vertical flight. Projected ranges for the hybrid versions are from 800 to 1,670 miles (for the Aura Aero EVA). The latter company, based in Toulouse (France), plans to use two turbogenerators to charge batteries to power eight wing-mounted engines for this 19-passenger CTOL.

These changes highlight the severe limitations in payload and range of “traditional” eVTOLs. What these newer companies (nearly all startups) are seeking to do is to retain the aura of electric power with the addition of wings and range extenders based on either hydrogen or fossil fuel. I think these may be a good fit for some military operations and might find market niches in certain low-passenger regional operations—but that remains to be seen.

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News Notes

Safety Improvements at DCA
The FAA and the Defense Department have revised several policies in the wake of the late-January airliner/helicopter collision. FAA announced that aircraft in the vicinity of this airport must operate with ADS-B turned on, and Army General Matthew Braman assured a Senate committee that the military will adhere to this FAA directive. FAA will permanently close Helicopter Route 4, per the NTSB’s recommendation. It will also prohibit the simultaneous use of intersecting Runways 15/33 and 4/22 (the main runway).

Italy’s ENAV Advances Use of Remote Tower Technology
The Italian air navigation service provider (ANSP) announced in early April that it will transform its control centers in Brindsi and Padua into hubs for the remote management of control tower functions at 16 low-traffic airports. ENAV also said it plans to have 26 remote towers by 2033.

Ferrovial Bidding for Perth Airport
Infralogic reported (April 7) that infrastructure developer Ferrovial has made an offer for 100% of the shares of Perth Airport, Australia’s 4th-largest. The current owners of concession company Perth Airport Pty Ltd include Future Fund, Utilities Trust of Australia, Australian Super, and Macquarie’s The Infrastructure Fund. The airport company has a 99-year P3 lease, awarded in 1997. Ferrovial aims to renew its airports portfolio after selling its stakes in London Heathrow and the AGS airports in the U.K.

Airline CEO Nominated for FAA Administrator
Bryan Bedford, the CEO of Republic Airways, has been nominated by President Trump to head the Federal Aviation Administration. Bedford has three decades of aviation leadership. He is also a pilot with sensible views about airline pilot training. His position on air traffic control reform is not known, but one of his current board members is David Grizzle, a supporter of reform and a former COO of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO).

U.K. Airports Seek Expanded Capacity
With the relatively new Labor government favoring the long-planned third runway at London Heathrow and conversion of the taxiway at London Gatwick into a second runway, other airports have announced plans to expand their capacity. London Stansted hopes to increase its annual passenger capacity by 70% by 2040, Aviation Daily reported, and London City Airport is seeking approval to be served by Airbus A320neo capable of 194 passengers. Finally, London Luton recently received permission to nearly double its annual passenger capacity, from 18 million to 32 million, per Aviation Daily. The U.K. is no longer bound by European Union climate mandates.

Controller Training Initiative (CTI) Gets a Fifth School
Vaughn College on Long Island has signed an agreement with FAA to enhance its curriculum to cover all the subject matter taught at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. Vaughn CTI graduates who pass the Air Traffic Skills Assessment (ATSA) will be able to bypass the Academy and be assigned to an ATC facility for on-the-job training. This change is expected to increase the number of controller trainees entering the FAA workforce each year.

Private Investment Continues to Expand India’s Airport Capacity
First quarter 2025 brought additional public-private partnership (P3) news in India’s airports sector. In February, the government announced that a privatization process will proceed for 13 more airports, as air travel continues to boom in that country. On March 7, Infralogic reported that India-based GMR Airports has acquired Fraport’s 10% stake in Delhi International Airport, increasing GMR’s share to 74%. And on March 18, the same newsletter reported that Mumbai International Airport, owned by Adani Airport Holdings, will invest $1.16 billion in terminal and other capacity expansions over the next five years.

Skyports and Blade Air Mobility Team Up in New York
Aiming to pave the way for eventual eVTOL service from lower Manhattan to JFK airport, the vertiport company and an experienced passenger helicopter service in March announced a joint venture, aiming to launch this month, from the existing heliport near Wall Street. The program will expand Blade’s existing by-the-seat helicopter service to and from JFK. The plan is to amass passenger data and gradually convert the heliport into an eVTOL vertiport. The service will initially operate between 3 and 7 PM, with per-seat flights starting at $195.

ICAO Plans New Noise Rules for Supersonic Airliners
The 13th annual meeting of ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection reached agreement that current Chapter 14 noise levels on take-off and landing will be applied to supersonic passenger-carrying aircraft. The proposal was supported by Boom Supersonic, which has long said that its planned Mach 1.7 Overture supersonic transport is being designed with those limits in mind.

Will Newark’s New Terminal Be America’s Next Major Terminal P3?
Infralogic reported (April 1) that teams are beginning to form to bid for redevelopment of Newark’s Terminal B. Companies mentioned in the article include Ferrovial, Meridiam Infrastructure, and Vantage Airport Group. All three of these firms are or have been involved with other Port Authority P3 terminal projects at LaGuardia (LGA) and Kennedy (JFK). Last October, the agency’s board approved planning funds of $35 million for the project and will look into financing options, including airline financing, P3s, or other alternatives.
 
Jet Zero’s BWB Would Save on Maintenance, as Well as Fuel
JetZero, the leading developer of blended wing body (BWB) airliners and military transports, told attendees at an Aviation Week MRO Americas conference in Atlanta earlier this month that, in addition to its projected 30% fuel savings from reduced aerodynamic drag, expected maintenance will occur 30% less often, providing additional operating-cost savings. The key innovation is said to be fiber optic sensors throughout the aircraft, monitoring numerous parameters. JetZero is developing a demonstrator in conjunction with Northrop Grumman’s Scaled Composites division, under a $235 million Air Force contract. The first flight is expected in 2027.

U.K. Planning Airspace Reform
The Labor government, as part of its plans to increase U.K. economic productivity, is working with the U.K. ANSP (NATS) to create a U.K. Airspace Design Service that would revamp the country’s airspace and air traffic management to permit more more-direct flights, less holding near airports, and other streamlining to save both time and fuel/emissions. Both Airlines U.K. and Airports U.K. have endorsed this effort.

Blue Origin’s New Glenn Wins Approval for National Security Launches
On April 4, Blue Origin announced that it had been qualified to launch national security payloads with its New Glenn rocket. New Glenn has qualified as a National Security Space Launch (NSSL) heavy lift provider for the Department of Defense and the National Reconnaissance Office, the company announced.

Ecuador Further Liberalizes Airline Service
The government of Ecuador, which signed an open-skies agreement with the United States in 2022, has announced that it will recognize air operator certificates (AOCs) from other countries in the Andean region that meet ICAO standards. At present, Colombia is Ecuador’s largest international market, according to OAG.

Virgin Atlantic Picks Joby to Replace Vertical Aerospace
With British startup Vertical Aerospace short of funding, Virgin Atlantic (which at one point planned to order 150 of it eVTOLs), has shifted its plans to Joby, one of the two leading American eVTOL developers. Industry experts rank Archer and Joby as the most likely to achieve FAA certification within the next two years.

Avelo Adds Fourth Overseas Destination
Low-cost carrier Avelo has announced that Nassau, Bahamas, will be its fourth international destination, with initial flights planned from Raleigh-Durham, NC. Its existing overseas points are Montego Bay (Jamaica), Punta Cana (Dominican Republic), and Cancun (Mexico). Avelo launched its first flights in 2021 and has grown rapidly.

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Quotable Quotes

“Putting aside the serious issues with the helicopter routes sharing airspace with landing and departing passenger aircraft [at DCA], closing runway 15/33 should also be considered. Intersecting runways have long been known to create risk, on the ground and in the air. That’s why the published standards don’t allow them! DCA has had recent near misses that involved two commercial aircraft on intersecting runways. That runway would never be approved for construction today. Think how many billions Chicago spent to eliminate their intersecting runways. Denver, Atlanta, DFW—all modern airfields do not have intersecting runways. Not long ago FAA instituted the converging operations rule for runways that don’t cross on the ground but which are oriented so that trajectories cross in flight. They increased minimum separation for those conditions. The DCA controller reportedly moved AA flight 5342 to runway 33 to allow time for another aircraft to take off using runway 1. Operating things that tightly causes complexity for the controller and pilot (increased communications and monitoring). The AA pilot had to make a jog to the east, then back to the northwest, within the narrow DCA approach corridor—just before lining up for final approach. Would closing 15/33 impact capacity? Quite possibly. But if safety is really our highest priority, shouldn’t that be considered?”  
—Senior aviation executive and FAA consultant, email to Robert Poole, Feb. 24, 2025
(name withheld by request)

“Indian airports are some of the most beautiful in the world. They reveal what India is capable of—and where it falls short. . . . Bangalore’s Terminal 2, which opened in 2023, was designed as a ‘terminal in a garden.’ . . . The first major new terminals to open in India’s modern airport-building boom aspired to be like those Chinese ones—standard-issue glass and steel. Mumbai’s Terminal 2, completed in 2014, marked a turning point. Bangalore’s second terminal followed suit. Goa’s second airport, opened in 2023, is another example. . . . A second airport for Mumbai, scheduled to start operations in May, uses as its motif the lotus, India’s national flower. . . . India’s airports exemplify the power of privatization. Until the turn of the century, the state operated every airport in India, and most were awful. Massive amounts of investment poured in after each privatization. But the job is incomplete. State-run airports and other public buildings—new railway and metro stations, especially—are an eyesore.”
—”Great Expectations: What India’s Beautiful Airports Reveal About the Country,” The Economist, March 15, 2025.

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The post Aviation Policy News: Separating air traffic control operations from FAA safety regulator appeared first on Reason Foundation.

• NTSB collision assessment faults FAA
• How not to fix a broken air traffic control system
• TSA ends union representation for airport screeners
• Is Europe’s Net Zero 2050 down the drain?
• Europe’s eVTOL startups are fading away
• Atlanta’s last chance for a second airport
• Corrections to controller training article
• News notes
• Quotable quotes

NTSB Collision Assessment Faults FAA

In its preliminary assessment of the Jan. 29 collision at Reagan National Airport (DCA), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chair Jennifer Homendy recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) take steps to prevent helicopter traffic from crossing arrival and departure paths at DCA (and, by implication, other airports). A ban would, at the very least, affect helicopter route 4, which the Black Hawk helicopter was using when it collided with the American Airlines regional jet on final approach to runway 15/33. While not calling for deleting route 4, Homendy argued that helicopters should not be permitted to fly that route when runway 33 is in use.

The preliminary report also delved deeper into what the FAA should have known about the hazards of such collisions. As Aviation Daily (March 12) summarized:

“Investigators also found that commercial aircraft and helicopters came within one nautical mile laterally and 400 ft vertically some 15,200 times on 974,000 operations from October 2021 to December 2024. On 85 occasions, the separations were less than 1,500 ft laterally and 200 ft vertically. There’s a serious safety issue here …Now we need to see [a] more permanent solution.”

Politico reported that the NTSB also found that airliner collision avoidance systems had triggered at least once a month to warn of an imminent threat of a helicopter collision at Reagan National. In addition, at the location where the approach to runway 33 crossed helicopter route 4, the difference in altitudes could be as little as 75 feet. “Seventy-five feet is very close—far too close,” Homendy said, adding that she is angry that it took a major fatal air crash to expose this problem.

As I wrote in last month’s newsletter issue, this horrible collision reflects a serious FAA regulatory failure. All the data on previous pilot reports and the new NTSB findings noted above were in FAA databases—but nobody noticed them or took any action to change this disaster waiting to happen. Moreover, in its role as aviation safety regulator, FAA management should have focused on the communications limitations at the DCA tower that evening, under which neither the airliner crew nor the helicopter crew could hear the controller’s communications with the other crew, meaning both crews lacked sufficient situational awareness. The reduced controller staffing at that hour of the day likely contributed to this reduced situational awareness. This, too, is a regulatory failure (illustrating the problem of combining safety regulation and air traffic control operations in the same organization).

A week before the NTSB’s preliminary report, aviation stakeholders testifying before the House Aviation Subcommittee proposed a stronger policy change than what Homendy suggested. Airlines for America President Nick Calio recommended that the helicopter routes around Reagan National Airport be closed and that other large airports be studied for possible changes to reduce the probability of helicopter/airliner collisions. His proposal was seconded by Paul Rinaldi, former president of air traffic controllers’ union NATCA. This makes very good sense.

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How Not to Fix the US Air Traffic Control System

A large coalition of aviation organizations last month released a manifesto arguing for a five-point emergency program, four years ahead of the next FAA reauthorization bill. The agenda has five main points:

• Provide robust immediate funding for both new air traffic control (ATC) technology and increased controller training and staffing.
• Direct FAA to divest various legacy systems and use only newer systems in the ATC system.
• Realign and modernize aging ATC facilities.
• Implement new financial mechanisms to spend more from the Aviation Trust Fund, including through multi-year budgeting.
• Exempt FAA from government shutdowns to ensure ongoing funding and employment of air traffic control personnel.

Let’s look at these one at a time.

First, for Congress to come up with the “tens of billions” proposed by Department of Transportation (DOT) Secretary Sean Duffy on March 11 would require borrowing that sum, increasing the FY 2025 budget deficit and the national debt by that same amount. The honest way to increase FAA’s budget would be to increase the user taxes so that airlines and business jets would be paying for the improved services they hope would follow this big funding increase. All over the world air traffic control is funded directly by International Civil Aviation Organization-compliant weight/distance ATC fees. It’s the users-pay/users-benefit principle.

Furthermore, the increased funding would still be allocated and spent by an unreformed FAA, which decades of assessments by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOT Inspector General have shown is unable to procure and implement advanced technology, so much of the new funding would not be well-spent. The agency’s acquisition system is an ongoing failure, and giving it new billions to spend—without major reform—would be unwise. Moreover, as Sean Broderick pointed out in Aviation Daily, upgrading air traffic control systems would not accomplish very much if aircraft were not equipped to interface with it. Getting whole fleets upgraded can take several decades.

Divestment of legacy systems has been proposed many times, and a step in that direction would be to implement a policy of best-equipped/best-served. Congress, under pressure from both the producers of ancient technology and various aviation user groups, has never supported such a change. It would be a small step in the right direction, but I’ll believe it when I see it.

Modernization of aging air traffic control facilities is long overdue, but the barriers to doing this under the current funding and governance structure are formidable. First, as former National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) President Paul Rinaldi explained to the House Aviation Subcommittee on March 4, FAA towers now average 40 years old, TRACONs 27 years, and high-altitude Centers 62 years. There are very sound reasons for not replacing all 20 Centers.

Today’s technology enables controlling traffic anywhere in the USA from anywhere in the United States. Replacing 20 Centers with perhaps three or four new ones would provide redundancy, economies of scale, and all-new technology. But if this is left up to Congress, it will never happen. (‘You aren’t going to take away the ARTCC in MY state,’ we will hear repeatedly.) This would only be possible if Congress someday removes the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) from the federal budget and enables it to charge ICAO-compliant user fees and issue revenue bonds based on that revenue stream. Numerous countries have done this, and the larger ones have consolidated ATC facilities.

Financial tinkering with the Aviation Trust Fund might make a small difference, as might multi-year budgeting, but the ATO would still not be able to finance the procurement of new technology systems, as Nav Canada, NATS, DFS, and Airservices Australia all do. Those self-supporting air navigation service providers (ANSPs) can buy new technology in bulk and roll it out to all the relevant facilities over one or two years, not 10 to 15 years. That would make for a more consistent system, updated nationwide, which we never see with current FAA procurement “waterfalls.”

Finally, I have no problem with exempting FAA (or at least the ATO) from government shutdowns. That problem is unknown in our peer countries, where legislatures or parliaments don’t micromanage ANSP budgets.

In his Aviation Subcommittee testimony, NATCA’s Rinaldi reminded members of the air traffic control reform provision in the House FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. It provided “a viable framework for separating the Air Traffic Organization from federal appropriations, ensuring stable, predictable funding” via air traffic control fees and revenue bonding. The new ATO would have been a nonprofit corporation governed by a board nominated by a wide group of aviation stakeholders. It was modeled explicitly on the highly successful Nav Canada. That structure in this country would address all the concerns expressed by the broad coalition.

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TSA Ends Union Representation for Screeners
By Marc Scribner

On March 7, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced it would no longer recognize the collective bargaining agreement between DHS and the American Federal of Government Employees (AFGE) covering Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners. Unions filed suit challenging these DHS actions on March 13. Setting aside the legal underpinnings of this decision and the ongoing litigation, this fight does raise interesting policy questions that Congress and the Trump administration should seek to address through more substantive legislative reform.

The March 7 public announcement followed a Feb. 27 memo from Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem in which she rescinded a 2022 TSA determination expanding collective bargaining rights to TSA screeners. Secretary Noem’s new determination serves as the basis for invalidating the seven-year collective bargaining agreement between DHS and AFGE that took effect in May 2024. As a result, DHS no longer recognizes AFGE as the exclusive, national representative of TSA screeners and has halted the collection of union dues through the DHS payroll system.

Secretary Noem suggests that she is simply returning to the original labor-management relations status quo when the TSA was created. Her memo cites a 2003 determination by TSA Administrator James Loy finding that TSA screeners are not entitled to collective bargaining rights owing to their “critical national security responsibilities.” Loy’s determination was challenged by AFGE at the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) and the FLRA upheld the 2003 determination. The FLRA reconsidered the issue in 2010 and once again sustained the initial 2003 determination on TSA collective bargaining. However, the FLRA held that an election for employee representation could be held for purposes other than bargaining.

In 2011, TSA Administrator John Pistole issued a new determination granting limited collective bargaining rights to TSA screeners. This limited representation and bargaining framework continued until 2022 when TSA Administrator David Pekoske expanded TSA employee bargaining rights to match those held by most other federal employees. Pekoske’s determination directly enabled the 2024 collective bargaining agreement between DHS and AFGE.

To be sure, the Biden administration greatly expanded bargaining rights for TSA screeners beyond what had ever before been contemplated by past administrations or the FLRA. The ratification of the 2024 collective bargaining agreement between DHS and AFGE also confirmed the fears of many early critics of the TSA, who warned of the potential to convert the agency’s nationalized airport screening monopoly into just another government jobs program.

However, while Secretary Noem is correct that the TSA’s initial determination forbade collective bargaining out of stated national security interests, attempting to restore that policy is likely more complicated. The big difference between 2025 and 2003 is that TSA’s screeners have been working under a collective bargaining agreement ratified by the federal government. The mere existence of this contract is a vast change in the labor-management relations landscape when the FLRA last considered the collective bargaining rights of TSA’s employees in 2010.

The Department of Homeland Security’s recent actions were quickly challenged in federal court. While the litigation plays out, Congress and the Trump administration should take the time to reflect more deeply on the policy tensions that led to this dispute. Specifically, they should reconsider the structure of TSA and its role in security screening.

Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 just two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Section 110(b) replaced the previous requirement that airport screening be conducted “by an employee or agent of an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier” and with a new requirement that screening “shall be carried out by a Federal Government employee” (49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)).

The TSA’s general security screening monopoly has few exceptions, the most significant being the sparsely used Screening Partnership Program that allows airports to apply to seek the services of private screening companies (49 U.S.C. § 44920). Just 20 airports are currently enrolled in the Screening Partnership Program, mostly small airports but also including Kansas City International, Orlando Sanford, and San Francisco International.

Growth in the number of airports opting for private screening has stalled. Many observers point to a complicated and time-consuming process, in which the TSA holds all the cards. A normal government contracting process typically involves a government agency issuing a request for proposals from qualified firms and then initiating a competitive bidding process. In the case of airport security, this might involve a sponsor airport beginning procurement from a list of security companies certified by the regulator and then selecting the firm that best fits their particular needs.

This is not how the Screening Partnership Program is designed. Instead, under current law, an airport seeking to opt-in to private screening must submit a detailed request to the TSA. The TSA, if it decides to grant the airport entry into the Screening Partnership Program, will then decide which security company it thinks best fits the needs of the airport applicant. The security company is then assigned to the airport—take it or leave it—with the contract being entered between the TSA and private screening company, rather than the company and the airport.

A reform proposal that Congress should consider is separating the provision of airport security from its regulation. The TSA’s dual mandate represents a fundamental conflict of interest. The risks of regulatory capture are further heightened when the national screening monopoly’s employees are represented by a single national labor contract. At the very least, Congress should modify the Screening Partnership Program to allow airports to select and directly contract with private security firms that have been certified by the TSA. Either of these reforms would lower the temperature of airport screening labor relations and attenuate the associated risks.

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Is Europe’s Net Zero 2050 Down the Drain?

Several recent developments have led to questions being raised about the viability of previous consensus plans for European aviation to achieve “net zero” climate impact by 2050.

The first of these was an upward revision of the estimated cost of achieving that goal by a coalition of European airlines, airports, ANSPs, and others. On Feb. 4, this coalition released its updated Destination 2050 roadmap, with a $516 billion upward revision of the cost to $2.6 trillion. The majority of the increase was due to a much higher cost estimate for the projected volume of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF). Another factor was a much smaller role for hydrogen-based propulsion (which had been modeled as achieving 20% of the overall reduction but has been revised downward to only 2%).

The second blow came a week later when Airbus announced a five- to ten-year postponement of a hydrogen-based airliner prototype. Airbus had previously hinted that its ZEROe initiative, begun in 2020 with a goal of bringing to market a zero-emission airliner by 2035, was looking to be infeasible. It has cut that program’s budget by 25% and terminated some of its sub-projects, according to aviation trade union Force Ourviere, per Aviation Daily (Feb. 12).

Taking these developments into account, on March 3 International Air Transport Association (IATA) Director General Willie Walsh announced that the European airline industry will have to re-evaluate the Net Zero target. “We are going to have to revisit [Net Zero 2050]; we are not making as strong a progress on SAF as we thought,” he told the International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading conference in Phoenix, AZ. He also let fly at European Union officials: “The EU is mad in its pursuit of environmental goals because it is completely disconnected from the economic impact.” He also predicted that there will be no major technology changes between now and 2050, and said that Airbus’s hydrogen-powered narrowbody airliner “was never going to happen.”

In the lead article in Aviation Daily for March 7, Guy Norris suggested that the lack of availability of SAF “is at the heart of IATA’s assertion that getting to net zero within the allotted time is impossible.” Lending credibility to that point was an announcement by two SAF producers—Arcadia eFuel and LanzaJet—that the EU itself is contributing to this problem. The EU requires eSAF plants to be located in countries where electricity on the grid is more than 90% provided by renewable energy or that the eSAF company must add enough renewable energy to the grid to support their project. (Aviation Daily, Feb. 27).

In another disturbing note for airlines, the revised Destination 2050 road map assumes that because SAF will be several times as expensive as jet fuel, the price of tickets will be increased enough that reduced air travel will contribute to 19% of the overall emission reductions.

And if that is not enough damage to air travel, consider what green groups will be lobbying for. In a guest editorial in Aviation Week (Feb. 24-March 9), William Todts, Executive Director of Transport & Environment, argues that governments should exempt zero-emission aircraft from landing fees, giving them free slots, and ultimately requiring that these be the only airliners allowed to fly to island destinations. Mr. Todts ignores the fact that most airports in Europe are tax-paying businesses and that landing fees and other airport revenue sources are critically important to keeping airports solvent. ACI-Europe should strongly oppose such proposals.

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European eVTOL Startups Are Fading Away

In recent years, non-China investors have poured $13 billion into start-up electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) companies, with not very much to show for it. But of that $13 billion, $10 billion was raised by three U.S. startups—Archer, Beta, and Joby. So the remaining $3 billion was split among some 57 companies, according to SMG Consulting, which closely tracks this sector. The U.S. Big Three have flying prototypes or near-production models and are in the early stages of working with FAA on type certification. But the best-known players in Europe are dwindling.

Both Lilium and Volocopter filed for bankruptcy near year-end, and an attempted rescue of Lilium failed in February. Volocopter landed a new investor in March, after having laid off all its employees. Mighty Airbus put its City Airbus project on indefinite hold last month, deeming today’s battery technology inadequate to meet its requirement for range and endurance. The U.K.’s Vertical Aerospace managed to raise $50 million near year-end from a new investor, but whether it can raise enough additional funding to get certified remains an open question.

One mistake made by many startups was not coming up with a realistic operating model, with the right amount of passenger capacity and range to support a large enough market niche. Another appears to be an unrealistic estimation of both the large cost and long time needed to gain FAA or European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certification. Batteries are very heavy compared with aviation fuel. And vertical take-off is very energy-intensive, as I learned in my first job after MIT, at Sikorsky Aircraft. The eVTOL idea has always struck me as dicey both technologically and economically. What can this much heavier air vehicle do better than helicopters? We’re still waiting for a good answer.

So we are now waiting to see how many millions of dollars and how many years it will take for Archer, Beta, and Joby to not only achieve FAA certification but also to find viable market niches for more than a handful of aircraft. SMG Consulting estimates that Archer and Joby will enter Type Inspection Authority for-credit flight testing within a year and achieve type certification in the first quarter of 2027, and actually launch service in the second quarter of 2028 (but under a best-case scenario, by the second quarter of 2027). That may sound overly cautious, but certification experts whose discussions I’ve read worry that even these best-funded startups have been unrealistic about the time and cost of certification.

Consequently, as Ben Goldstein reported in Aviation Daily (March 12), both Archer and Joby are planning to jump-start things in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Prior to receiving FAA certification, Archer plans to begin test flights in Abu Dabi later this year. Technically, these will be non-commercial market survey flights using its Midnight eVTOL. Goldstein notes that “It is not yet clear whether the Gulf Civil Aviation Authority will require its own certification or if there is a pathway to [commercial] operations on some other basis.”

Joby has the same basic idea, focusing on Dubai, using its S4 air taxi, starting in the middle of this year. While Joby still hopes to begin commercial service there in late 2025 or early 2026, “the company said in its Q4 earnings call . . . that the initial flights will be market test flights.”

Goldstein comments that “Neither Archer nor Joby has rolled out a conforming aircraft yet.”  And he adds, “Investors and industry watchers have awakened to the reality that [eVTOL] service is still likely years away.” Accordingly, I think investing in networks of vertiports is quite premature.

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Atlanta’s Last Chance for a Second Airport
By Baruch Feigenbaum

Last month, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution wrote that the city of Atlanta is considering selling two 10,000-acre second-airport sites in exurban Dawson and Paulding counties. The city bought the sites in the 1970s with plans to reserve them as potential sites for a secondary airport and has been managing them as public recreation sites. For the last year the city has been mulling an offer from the State Department of Natural Resources to put the tracts into permanent conservation.

To the city’s credit, it is carefully weighing any potential sale. Mayor Andre Dickens told the newspaper that it is a “complicated matter. It’s one of 100 years or more consequence.” “We made a wise decision to purchase them 50 years ago,” he said. “So I have to make a wise, critical decision on determining what’s the next step. I’m not ready to make that decision just yet. We are still analyzing.”

With 6 million people, metro Atlanta is the sixth largest U.S. metro area. Other than Atlanta, each of the 13 largest metro areas has at least two commercial service airports. Comprehending why the city has only one airport, requires an understanding of its relationship with Delta Air Lines.

Delta began as a crop-dusting operation in Macon in 1925 before quickly moving to Monroe, Louisiana. By 1941, Delta had started passenger and mail flights. It was looking to relocate its headquarters to a more central location. While the early favorite was Birmingham, Atlanta mayor William Hartsfield’s lobbying for the headquarters, Alabama’s aviation tax, and the city of Birmingham’s overtly racist policies caused Delta to choose Georgia instead.

As Atlanta grew, Delta grew. As early as 1957, the Atlanta airport claimed to be the busiest airport between noon and 2 pm each day. In addition to Delta, Eastern Airlines also operated a hub in Atlanta. In the 1950’s, Eastern’s Atlanta hub was the company’s busiest in the eastern region.

Almost from the day it moved to Atlanta, Delta relied more on hubs than Eastern. Even though it was the smaller carrier, Delta had the bigger Atlanta operation, generating local support. When Eastern ceased operations in 1991, the Delta hub became even more important. In 1998, Atlanta overtook Chicago O’Hare as the busiest airport in passenger volume. For most years since 2004, including the last several, it has also been the busiest airport by number of flights. After Eastern’s demise, AirTran and later Southwest operated smaller hubs at the airport. But they never rivaled Delta’s share of passengers. Today, the airline has an approximately 80% market share, operating approximately 1,000 flights per day.

In addition to its corporate headquarters, and its workforce supporting flights at the airport, Delta has TechOps, the world’s largest airline maintenance operation. As the largest private employer in the state of Georgia, Delta employees are located throughout the Atlanta community, particularly in the southwestern suburbs. When I worked on Capitol Hill, my boss represented the 3rd district of Georgia, which has more airline employees than any other congressional district.

Delta has meant more to the growth of Atlanta than any airline has meant to any other region. The only similar examples, albeit on a smaller scale, would be American Airlines hubs in Charlotte and Dallas.

Delta has also helped its favorability by running an outstanding operation. The airline is routinely ranked number one by passengers, placing at or near the top in on-time operations, fewest cancelled flights, best customer/employee interactions, and best tech. It is also the most profitable U.S. airline.

Delta has used its strength and goodwill to block a second Atlanta airport. When Propeller Investments tried to bring commercial service (likely Allegiant Airlines) to the Paulding County airport, near the tract of land the city owns for a second airport, Delta actively opposed the project.

But regardless of the number of airports, Atlanta needs to be able to accommodate aviation growth. Passenger numbers at Hartsfield-Jackson continue to increase. The airport handled more than 108 million passengers in 2024, its second-largest number ever. Yet gate space remains constrained. The airport has the 2nd highest turns (gate usage) per gate of any hub airport in the country.

Under the city of Atlanta’s current airport master plan, the city was supposed to build Concourse G between 2018 and 2024. Yet, the airport has pushed back construction. An alternate plan to extend Concourse F is on ice. The airport is in the process of modernizing and widening Concourse D, but that project will shrink the number of gates as the terminal is modernized to handle mainline, not regional, aircraft.

The airport will get a minor reprieve as Southwest Airlines, which due to poor financial performance, is moving its focus city headquarters from Atlanta to Nashville. However, the airline will still have a large presence in Atlanta. Southwest is only reducing its number of gates by seven, keeping its crew base, and continuing to operate more than 100 flights a day.

Over the last few years, the aviation market has grown rapidly. Atlanta is no different. Avelo has entered the market with flights to New Haven. Eithad is starting service to Abu Dhabi. Frontier is adding service to Islip, NY. Skyteam partner SAS is flying to Copenhagen, WestJet to Edmonton, and AeroMexico Connect to Manzanillo. Delta is adding service to Fresno, Marrakesh, Morocco; Naples, Italy; and Tulum, Mexico. And that is far from an exhaustive list.

Ideally, Atlanta would build a second airport. Second and third airports are common in large U.S. regions. And it’s not just megacities such as New York and Los Angeles, which each have five airports. It’s peer metro areas like Dallas/Fort Worth (two airports), Washington D.C. (three airports), Boston (three airports), and Miami (three airports). It’s also smaller competitors such as Charlotte and Orlando, which each have two airports. The Atlanta metropolitan statistical area (population 6.3 million) is the only metropolitan statistical area with more than 4.5 million people that does not have a second airport. And while Delta has opposed a secondary airport in Atlanta, it serves both primary and secondary airports in Dallas, Washington D.C, Boston, and Miami.

And these second airports have not hurt the viability of the primary airports. Each of those primary airports is ranked in the top 16 airports by passengers, and each of the secondary airports (with the exception of Charlotte’s secondary airport in Concord which is relatively new) is ranked in the top 100 by passenger count. All of these airports are thriving. All the primary airports increased their passenger count between 2023 and 2024.

For airlines, the cost to use these secondary airports is typically lower than using the primary airport. The cost per enplanement at Dallas Love Field is $2.50 less than DFW. Newark is $3.00 cheaper than JFK. And Fort Lauderdale is $11.00 cheaper than Miami. Competition puts pressure on all airports to decrease costs and improve service.

But given the challenges of building a second airport paired with the city’s partnership with Delta, the city of Atlanta could take another step. Retain at least one of the two secondary airport sites but enter into an agreement to keep a second airport on ice as long as Delta agrees to expand Hartsfield-Jackson airport when passenger numbers and gate usage justify it. The agreement would need specific thresholds, to make sure that when passenger counts or gate usage hit certain limits, expansion could begin. The city of Atlanta needs to make sure it finds an agreement that works for Delta and for city residents.

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Corrections to Controller Training Article

Shortly after last month’s newsletter went out to subscribers, I received a lengthy, polite email from a PhD psychologist with 30 years of applied research on air traffic controller training (and numerous publications in this field). I recognized his name as an expert in the field, but I was asked not to identify him in this follow-up article.

I begin by acknowledging several errors in the article. First, I stated that prior to 2014, the majority of controller trainees had been graduates of the Collegiate Training Initiative (CTI) program. I did not have specific figures in my files, and what I wrote was based on how CTI proponents had argued at the time the recruiting and hiring process was changed. It turns out that for 2009-2014 only 42% were CTI grads, 24% were former controllers, and 34% were from the general public (unpublished numbers). I made another error by stating that the AT-SAT test occurred after Academy training. In fact, it was and is a precondition of being accepted for training there.

My correspondent objected to how I described the decision to recruit more applicants “off-the-street” and provided a long history of attempts to identify barriers to applying for controller jobs. I recall from that time that there were one or two “barrier analysis reports” which found that the critical barrier to having more minorities being hired was differences by race in passing the AT-SAT. EEOC policy in 2012-14 required FAA and other federal agencies to attempt to reduce or eliminate any identified barriers. That policy led to an effort to revise the controller applicant testing process. The result was a two-hurdle process, with a non-cognitive test followed by the cognitive test (AT-SAT). How the former (the Biographical Questionnaire) was developed by an FAA consultant was not known to my correspondent. I don’t think this obviates the concerns expressed by CTI graduates who “failed” the BQ (or FAA never releasing the questions or how they were scored), but I can see that the professionals involved in much of this process had honorable intentions.

I appreciate my correspondent’s effort to set the record straight on this subject. And I’m very pleased to see the positive steps FAA took under Administrator Mike Whitaker to enable CTI schools to upgrade their curricula to enable their graduates to bypass the Academy and go directly to on-the-job training at a tower, TRACON, or Center. 

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News Notes

Thailand Opts for Digital Towers
AeroThai, the ANSP of Thailand, is in its first year of implementing digital towers at its airports. The first-year plan is to equip five international airports and one other high-traffic airport. Besides increasing controller situational awareness, the plan will enable runway expansions without having to build a new tower. A second phase of the plan will provide remote tower services at lower-traffic airports, without having to station AeroThai controllers at them. This may be the first digital towers implementation to begin with high-traffic international airports and then move on to remote service for smaller airports.

JetZero Gets New Support for Its Blended Wing Body (BWB) Airliner
Delta Airlines has formalized a partnership with BWB developer JetZero. The airline will provide operational support as JetZero develops its full-scale demonstrator, aiming for first flight in 2027. Among other things, Delta will assist in designing the BWB airliner’s interior, promising “dedicated overhead bin space for each passenger.” JetZero also announced earlier this month an agreement with RTX for the demonstrator’s engines, APU, and nacelles.

British Government Supports Second Runway at Gatwick
The U.K. Secretary of State for Transport announced on Feb. 27 that she plans conditional approval for London Gatwick Airport (LGW) to convert its main taxiway into a parallel main runway. LGW is currently tied with the Mumbai (India) airport as the world’s busiest single-runway airport. The plan would move the centerline of the taxiway 39.4 feet to provide the proper spacing from the existing runway. The estimated cost of the project is £2.2 billion.

Italy’s ANSP Adding Telecom Services
Enav, the partly investor-owned air navigation service provider in Italy, is in advanced talks to invest in telecoms service provider Sitti, reports Infralogic (March 10). Enav is reported to be negotiating a majority stake in the company, which provides it with a voice communication system (VCS) used for pilot-controller communications. Enav’s advisor on the deal, Intesa Sanpaolo, estimates Sitti’s enterprise value of €40 million. Enav is majority-owned by the Italian government but with private shareholders as well.

Paine Field Gets a Second Airline
The Seattle metro area’s second airport, which has been used exclusively by Alaska Airlines in recent years, has landed a second carrier. Frontier Airlines and Paine Field developer/operator Propeller Airports announced the news on March 4. Frontier’s initial routes will serve Denver (DEN), Las Vegas (LAS), and Phoenix (PHX). Paine Field is a former military base and is also the site of a major Boeing airliner assembly plant.

Argentina Further Liberalizes Airspace
Aviation Daily (Feb. 24) reported that Argentina has signed additional open skies agreements, adding the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Turkey. Chilean ultra low-cost carrier (ULCC) JetSmart is one of the airlines taking advantage of the change, basing additional aircraft in Argentina, with the total now up to 15, including A321neos. JetSmart operates both domestic and international routes in Argentina and now provides nearly 18% of domestic air service in that country.

Global Firms Compete to Develop Saudi Airport
ABDRN, Aeroporti di Roma, and Manchester Airports Group are among numerous companies hoping to be selected for a long-term public-private partnership (P3) to develop the new Taif International Airport in Saudi Arabia, Infralogic reports (Feb. 13). Up to 90 companies have submitted expressions of interest in the planned airport east of Mecca, scheduled to be in operation by 2030 with an initial capacity of 2.5 million annual passengers. The agencies in charge of the process are aviation authority Matarat Holding and the National Center for Privatization and PPP.

NASA Acquires GPS Signals on the Moon
On March 2, the Firefly Aerospace “Blue Ghost” lunar lander touched down on the Moon’s surface. The next day it received GPS signals from the satellite constellation in orbit around the Earth. The receiver was LuGRE, part of the Blue Ghost’s payload, developed by the Italian Space Agency. The signals were first received when Blue Ghost was in lunar orbit, 243,000 miles from Earth. This demonstration means that GPS and other systems are capable of being used for navigation on or near the Moon.

AENA Plans Billion-Dollar Investment in Canary Islands
Spanish airports company AENA has announced plans to invest $1.04 billion to expand and upgrade airports in the Canary Islands, including the two airports on Tenerife, as Aviation Daily reported (Feb. 10). Other airports getting upgrades include Gran Canaria (the largest) and Lanzarote.

Royal Schiphol Group Ups Investment in Brisbane Airport
The company that runs Amsterdam Schiphol Airport has increased its shareholding in Brisbane Airport Corporation Holdings (BACH) above 20%, entitling it to a second board seat. Brisbane Airport (BNE) is underway on a $3 billion expansion, preparing for the 2032 Olympic Games. BACH won a 50-year lease on BNE in 1997, with the option to renew it for another 49 years.

Zurich University Proposes GPS Augmentation
As recounted by Dana Goward in a guest editorial in Aviation Week (Feb. 10-23, 2025), researchers at the Zurich University of Applied Science have proposed a three-part enhancement of GPS to guard against interference and interruption of GPS signals. The idea is to combine GPS data with data from three independent sources: eDME, eLoran, and LDACS-NAV. These systems use different frequencies and have different failure modes, providing “ample redundancy” according to the researchers.

Boost in Pay for New FAA Controllers
U.S. DOT Secretary Sean Duffy has announced that new graduates from the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City will get a nearly 30% increase in starting pay for their on-the-job training. Per a Washington Post article by Ian Duncan (Feb. 27), the training wage will increase from $17.61/hour to $22.61/hour. The article noted that an outside study in 2023 found that about 30% of Academy students failed to graduate.

Boom Supersonic Begins Detailed Design of Overture Airliner
Following the last test of its XB-1 prototype, Boom announced that it has finalized the configuration of its planned Overture supersonic passenger plane. That plane is intended to fly at Mach 1.7 over water, and—the company hopes—Mach 1.3 over land, if its projected “boomless cruise” concept works out, and if current FAA regulations on supersonic flight over U.S. territory can be amended.

GAP Plans $1.3 Billion Investment in Jalisco Airports
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico last month announced plans to invest $1.3 billion to modernize and expand its two airports in Jalisco state. The largest share will be spent to modernize and expand Guadalajara International Airport, including the addition of a second terminal. It will also invest in improvements to Puerto Vallarta International Airport.

Infrastructure Fund Buys Goldman’s Stake in AFCO
Infralogic (Feb. 19) reported that infrastructure investment fund Ardian has agreed to acquire Goldman Sachs’ stake in Airport Facilities Company (AFCO). The company manages 29 properties at 15 airports in the United States and the U.K. Many of these are cargo facilities and hangars at airports, including Austin (AUS), Baltimore (BWI), Hartford (BDL), and Dallas (DFW).
 
Sydney Airport Metro Being Delayed
Sydney Metro faces a delay in the completion of its new line from St. Marys to Bradfield, serving the under-construction Western Sydney Airport, according to the Sydney Morning Herald. Instead of being ready to roll near the end of 2026, the 23 km line is now likely to open in mid-2027. The $7 billion project has experienced construction problems and labor union problems, as well as pandemic-related supply chain disruptions.

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Quotable Quotes

“Air traffic controllers are working on antiquated equipment in facilities that are falling apart. While the FAA has spent billions of dollars to try and bring its air traffic system into the 21st century, most of the technology is decades behind by the time it is deployed, requiring tech refreshes almost right away and diverting sustainment funds away from actual modernization. For instance, controllers still use paper strips and floppy disks. . . . At a time when your cell phone has massive computing power and can communicate with satellites, the FAA is still using paper strips and floppy disks to run our nation’s air traffic control. The United States has the greatest aviation network in the world. Its airspace is the most open for public use; it has the most commercial flights . . . . And yet it cannot be disputed that the U.S. air traffic system lags behind those of many other nations, like Canada, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom. The U.S. air traffic control is less efficient, less advanced, less agile, and some argue, less safe. . . . The question of whether FAA has the money it needs to modernize the system misses the point. The more appropriate question is, “Is the FAA even capable of modernizing the air traffic system or does Congress need to re-examine wholesale how the FAA is structured?”
—Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), speech at Aero Club of Washington, Feb. 20, 2025

“That mission tries to capture two distinct functions of FAA: regulating safety and operating the air traffic system. The Administrator ought to be focused on the safety of the flying public, and I’m pretty sure that if you took a poll of Americans, you would find they would overwhelmingly tell you that they care more about keeping flying safe than they do about the efficiency of the air traffic system. . . . [There is] an inherent conflict in FAA being both the regulator and the operator. You can’t be the conductor and [also] play the tuba section. Sometimes as a regulator you really have to bring the hammer down, and it’s a lot to ask to bring the hammer down on yourself.”
—Michael Whitaker, in Christine Boynton, “Prioritize Safety Over Efficiency, Former FAA Administrator Urges,” Aviation Daily, Feb. 28, 2025

“Congress questions FAA about issues they (Congress) could easily fix by following ICAO guidance and the examples of other States—separate the service provider from the regulator and make it (the ANSP) a commercial enterprise. Had that occurred years ago, the current purges from DOGE would not be occurring for two reasons—the enterprise would already be efficient and it would not be within the government sphere.”
—Mike Gahan, email to Robert Poole, March 5, 2025 (used with author’s permission)

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